Domain 4PrivEsc & Password AttacksCORE

Windows User and Group Enumeration

Comprehensive guide to enumerating Windows users, groups, SIDs, and privileges as the first step in privilege escalation.

Domain: Domain 4: Privilege Escalation & Password Attacks•Updated: 2026-09-01
#enumeration#windows#users#groups#sids

Windows User and Group Enumeration

Why This Is the Critical First Step

Before attempting any privilege escalation technique, you must understand the security context you are operating in. User and group enumeration answers the fundamental questions:

  • Who am I? — What account do I currently have?
  • What can I do? — What privileges and group memberships does this account carry?
  • Who else is here? — What other users and groups exist on this system?
  • Who has power? — Which accounts are administrators or members of privileged groups?

Skipping this step is the #1 reason candidates waste time on the OSCP exam. You might spend 20 minutes trying a kernel exploit when whoami /all would have revealed you already have SeImpersonatePrivilege and could use JuicyPotato in 2 minutes.

Exam Tip: Always run whoami /all immediately after gaining initial access. Screenshot or save the output. It is your single most important piece of intelligence.


Core Enumeration Commands

whoami — Know Yourself

The whoami command family is your primary reconnaissance tool. Each variant reveals different layers of your security context.

whoami — Basic Identity

whoami

Output:

WORKGROUP\student

This tells you the domain/workgroup and username. Simple, but essential.

whoami /groups — Token Group Memberships

whoami /groups

Output:

GROUP INFORMATION
-----------------

Group name                                 SID             Attributes
=========================================  =============== ==================================================
Everyone                                   S-1-1-0         Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Users                              S-1-5-32-545    Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Performance Log Users              S-1-5-32-559    Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Remote Desktop Users               S-1-5-32-555    Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
CONSOLE LOGON                              S-1-2-1         Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users           S-1-5-11        Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\This Organization            S-1-5-113-48815... Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\Local account                 S-1-5-113       Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\Local account and member of...S-1-5-114       Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\NTLM Authentication           S-1-5-64-10     Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
Mandatory Label\Medium Mandatory Level     S-1-16-8192     Mandatory Label

Key things to look for:

  • BUILTIN\Administrators (S-1-5-32-544) — If present, you already have admin-level access
  • BUILTIN\Backup Operators (S-1-5-32-551) — Can backup/restore all files, potential privesc vector
  • Mandatory Label\Medium Mandatory Level — Your integrity level (see Privilege Levels topic)
  • CONSOLE LOGON vs REMOTE LOGON — Tells you how you authenticated

whoami /priv — Enabled Privileges

whoami /priv

Output:

PRIVILEGES INFORMATION
----------------------

Privilege Name                            Description                               State
========================================= ========================================= =======
SeShutdownPrivilege                       Shut down the system                    Disabled
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege                   Bypass traverse checking                Enabled
SeUndockPrivilege                       Remove computer from docking station      Disabled
SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege             Increase a process working set          Disabled
SeImpersonatePrivilege                    Impersonate a client after authentication Enabled
SeCreateGlobalPrivilege                   Create global objects                   Enabled

This is arguably the most important output for privesc. Each privilege maps directly to an attack vector:

Privilege State Attack Enabled
SeImpersonatePrivilege Enabled JuicyPotato, RoguePotato, PrintSpoofer, Named Pipe impersonation
SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege Enabled RottenPotato, primary token manipulation
SeDebugPrivilege Enabled Process injection, token theft, read any process memory
SeBackupPrivilege Enabled Read any file regardless of ACL (via backup APIs), SAM hive extraction
SeRestorePrivilege Enabled Write any file regardless of ACL, create/modify services
SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege Enabled Take ownership of any object, then grant yourself full control
SeLoadDriverPrivilege Enabled Load arbitrary kernel drivers (kernel privesc)
SeRelabelPrivilege Enabled Modify integrity labels on objects
SeCreateTokenPrivilege Enabled Create primary tokens — essentially SYSTEM-level power
SeTcbPrivilege Enabled Act as part of the OS — can act on behalf of any user
SeProfileSingleProcessPrivilege Enabled Profile any process — potential info leak
SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege Enabled Modify memory quotas — rarely exploitable directly

Exam Tip: If you see SeImpersonatePrivilege as Enabled, immediately think: JuicyPotato → RoguePotato → PrintSpoofer → JuicyPotatoNG. This is the most common privesc path on OSCP Windows boxes.

whoami /all — Everything at Once

whoami /all

This combines all information: user identity, group memberships, privileges, integrity level, logon type, and more. Always run this first.

Full example output:

user name
=======================
workgroup\student

user's groups
=======================
Group Name                                 Type             SID          Attributes
========================================== ================ ============ ==================================================
Everyone                                   Well-known group S-1-1-0      Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Users                              Alias            S-1-5-32-545 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Performance Log Users              Alias            S-1-5-32-559 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
CONSOLE LOGON                              Well-known group S-1-2-1      Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK                       Well-known group S-1-5-2      Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users           Well-known group S-1-5-11     Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\This Organization             Well-known group S-1-5-113    Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\NTLM Authentication           Well-known group S-1-5-64-10  Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
Mandatory Label\Medium Mandatory Level     Label            S-1-16-8192

user claim values
=======================
<none>

user's privileges
=======================
Privilege Name                Description                          State
============================= ==================================== ========
SeShutdownPrivilege           Shut down the system               Disabled
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege       Bypass traverse checking            Enabled
SeUndockPrivilege             Remove computer from docking station Disabled
SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege Increase a process working set     Disabled

net user — Enumerate All Users

List All Users

net user

Output:

User accounts for \\TARGET

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
admin            DefaultAccount   DefaultFirstUser guest              student
WDAGUtilityAccount

The command completed successfully.

Detailed User Information

net user <username>

Output:

User name                    student
Full Name                    Student Account
Comment                      Test user account
User's comment
Country/region code          000 (System Default)
Account active               Yes
Account expires              Never

Password last set            8/15/2025 3:42:18 PM
Password expires             Never
Password changeable          8/15/2025 3:42:18 PM
Password required            Yes
User may change password     Yes

Workstations allowed         All
Logon script
User profile
Home directory
Last logon                   8/20/2025 10:15:33 AM

Logon hours allowed          All

Local Group Memberships      *Users
Global Group memberships     *None
The command completed successfully.

Key fields to note:

  • Account active — Is the account enabled?
  • Password expires — Does the password have an expiration?
  • Last logon — When was this account last used? Active accounts are better targets.
  • Local Group Memberships — What groups is this user in? This is gold.
  • Password required — Can this account log in without a password?

Enumerate All Users in a Loop

for /f "tokens=1-3" %a in ('net user ^| findstr /b /c:"---" /v ^| more') do @net user %a 2>nul | findstr /c:"Full Name" /c:"Comment" /c:"Password expires" /c:"Local Group Memberships"

Or in PowerShell:

Get-LocalUser | ForEach-Object {
    Write-Host "=== $($_.Name) ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
    $_ | Select-Object Name, Enabled, LastLogon, PasswordLastSet
}

net localgroup — Enumerate Groups

List All Local Groups

net localgroup

Output:

Local groups of \\TARGET

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Administrators
Backup Operators
Cryptographic Operators
Database Operators
Device Owners
Distributed COM Users
Event Log Readers
Guests
Hyper-V Administrators
IIS_IUSRS
Network Configuration Operators
Performance Log Users
Performance Monitor Users
Power Users
Print Operators
Remote Desktop Users
Remote Management Users
Replicator
Server Operators
Storage Replica Managers
Users
Windows Management Infrastructure
WinRMRemoteWMIUsers__

The command completed successfully.

View Members of a Specific Group

net localgroup <groupname>

Most important — check Administrators:

net localgroup Administrators

Output:

Alias name     Administrators
Comment        Administrators have complete and unrestricted access to the computer/domain

Members

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
admin
DefaultFirstUser
student
The command completed successfully.

If your user appears here, you may already have admin-level access. Check further with whoami /priv.

Other critical groups to check:

net localgroup "Backup Operators"
net localgroup "Remote Desktop Users"
net localgroup "Server Operators"
net localgroup "Account Operators"
net localgroup "Print Operators"

net accounts — Password Policy

net accounts

Output:

Computer property:
        Minimum password length: 0
        Length of password history maintained: 0
        Force logoff when logon hours expire: No
        Lockout threshold: 0
        Lockout duration (minutes): 30
        Lockout observation window (minutes): 30
        Maximum password age (days): 0
        Minimum password age (days): 0
        Machine password age (days): 30

User property:
        Domain is currently synced for password directory policies: No
The command completed successfully.

Why this matters:

  • Minimum password length: 0 — No password complexity. Brute force is trivial.
  • Lockout threshold: 0 — No account lockout. Unlimited password guessing.
  • Maximum password age: 0 — Passwords never expire.
  • Length of password history: 0 — Users can reuse old passwords.

These settings make password-based attacks (brute force, dictionary attacks) much more viable.


PowerShell Equivalents

PowerShell provides richer, more structured enumeration. These commands work on Windows 8 / Server 2012 and later.

Get-LocalUser

Get-LocalUser

Output:

Name              Enabled LastLogon              PasswordLastSet     PasswordExpires
----              ------- ---------              ---------------     ---------------
admin             True    8/20/2025 10:15:33 AM  8/15/2025 3:42:18 PM 8/15/2026 3:42:18 PM
DefaultAccount    False   1/1/0001 12:00:00 AM   1/1/0001 12:00:00 AM 1/1/0001 12:00:00 AM
student           True    8/20/2025 9:30:00 AM   8/15/2025 3:42:18 PM 8/15/2026 3:42:18 PM
DefaultFirstUser  True    8/18/2025 2:00:00 PM   8/15/2025 3:42:18 PM 8/15/2026 3:42:18 PM

Detailed view:

Get-LocalUser | Select-Object Name, Enabled, LastLogon, PasswordLastSet, Description | Format-Table -AutoSize

Get-LocalGroup

Get-LocalGroup

Output:

Name                 Description
----                 -----------
Administrators       Members...
Users                Members...
Guests               Members...

Get-LocalGroupMember

Get-LocalGroupMember -Group "Administrators"

Output:

ObjectClass Name             PrincipalSource
----------- ----             ---------------
User        admin            Local
User        DefaultFirstUser Local
User        student          Local

Enumerate all groups and their members:

Get-LocalGroup | ForEach-Object {
    $group = $_.Name
    $members = Get-LocalGroupMember -Group $group -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
    if ($members) {
        Write-Host "=== $group ===" -ForegroundColor Yellow
        $members | ForEach-Object { Write-Host "  - $($_.Name) ($($_.PrincipalSource))" }
    }
}

Get Current User SID via PowerShell

[System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]::GetCurrent().User.Value

Output:

S-1-5-21-3298345672-1834567890-2603456789-1001

SIDs — Security Identifiers

SID Structure

Every Windows security principal (user, group, computer) has a unique Security Identifier (SID). Understanding SID structure is essential for privesc.

Format: S-Revision-Authority-SubAuthority1-SubAuthority2-...-RID

Example: S-1-5-21-3298345672-1834567890-2603456789-1001

Component Value Meaning
S — Indicates this is a SID
1 Revision SID revision level (always 1)
5 Authority NT Authority (Microsoft)
21-3298345672-1834567890-2603456789 Sub-Authorities Unique domain/machine identifier (random per installation)
1001 RID Relative Identifier — unique within the domain

Well-Known SIDs Reference Table

These SIDs are consistent across all Windows installations:

SID Name Description Privesc Relevance
S-1-0 Null Authority No security context —
S-1-0-0 Null No principal —
S-1-1 World Authority Everyone —
S-1-1-0 Everyone All users ACL check target
S-1-2-1 Console Logon User logged on at console Logon type indicator
S-1-2-2 Package UWP package —
S-1-3 Creator Authority Object creators —
S-1-5 NT Authority Windows NT —
S-1-5-1 Dialup Dial-up users —
S-1-5-2 Network Network logon users Logon type indicator
S-1-5-3 Batch Batch logon users —
S-1-5-4 Interactive Interactive logon —
S-1-5-6 Service Service logon —
S-1-5-7 Anonymous Anonymous logon —
S-1-5-8 Proxy Proxy logon —
S-1-5-9 Enterprise Domain Controllers DCs in forest Domain privesc
S-1-5-10 Principal Self The principal itself —
S-1-5-11 Authenticated Users All authenticated users ACL check target
S-1-5-12 Restricted Code Restricted code —
S-1-5-18 LOCAL SYSTEM NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM Highest privilege — privesc target
S-1-5-19 LOCAL SERVICE NT AUTHORITY\LOCAL SERVICE Service account
S-1-5-20 NETWORK SERVICE NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK SERVICE Service account
S-1-5-32-544 Administrators BUILTIN\Administrators Admin group — check membership
S-1-5-32-545 Users BUILTIN\Users Standard users
S-1-5-32-546 Global Users Domain global users —
S-1-5-32-547 Guests BUILTIN\Guests Minimal access
S-1-5-32-548 Computer Management Operators — —
S-1-5-32-549 Terminal Server Users RDP users —
S-1-5-32-550 Account Operators BUILTIN\Account Operators Can create/modify user accounts
S-1-5-32-551 Backup Operators BUILTIN\Backup Operators Can bypass file ACLs via backup
S-1-5-32-552 Replicators BUILTIN\Replicators File replication — rare privesc
S-1-5-32-554 Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access — Read access to user objects
S-1-5-32-555 Remote Desktop Users BUILTIN\Remote Desktop Users RDP access
S-1-5-32-556 Network Configuration Operators — Network config access
S-1-5-32-557 Incoming Forest Trust Builders — Domain trust manipulation
S-1-5-32-558 Performance Monitor Users — Performance data access
S-1-5-32-559 Performance Log Users BUILTIN\Performance Log Users Perfmon data access
S-1-5-32-560 Windows Management Infrastructure WMI Users WMI remote management
S-1-5-32-561 Encryption Domain Users — EFS encryption
S-1-5-32-562 Remote Management Users — WinRM access
S-1-5-32-568 Storage Replica Administrators — Storage management
S-1-5-32-574 Cloud Domain Controllers — Azure AD hybrid
S-1-5-80-0 All Services Virtual accounts for services —
S-1-16-0 Untrusted Mandatory Level IL = Untrusted Low-IL process
S-1-16-4096 Low Mandatory Level IL = Low Protected mode browsers
S-1-16-8192 Medium Mandatory Level IL = Medium Standard user process
S-1-16-8448 Medium-Plus Mandatory Level IL = Medium+ —
S-1-16-12288 High Mandatory Level IL = High Elevated process
S-1-16-16384 High-Plus Mandatory Level IL = High+ —
S-1-16-20480 System Mandatory Level IL = System SYSTEM processes
S-1-16-28672 Protected Process Mandatory Level IL = Protected Antivirus, secure processes
S-1-16-32768 Secure Process Mandatory Level IL = Secure Highest integrity

RID Patterns to Know

RID Account Description
500 First admin account The built-in Administrator (renamed on modern Windows)
501 Guest Built-in Guest account
503 DefaultFirstUser Default user on Windows 10+ OOBE
504 DefaultAccount Default account on Windows 10+
1000+ Regular users User-created accounts start at 1000

Exam Tip: RID 500 is the built-in Administrator. Even if renamed, net user administrator or checking RID 500 can reveal the actual admin account name.


Important Groups — Deep Dive

Administrators (S-1-5-32-544)

  • Privileges: Full system control, install software, modify any file, manage services, access all objects
  • Default members: Built-in Administrator account
  • Abuse: If you are a member, you can escalate to SYSTEM via psexec -s cmd.exe, modify any service, or use any privesc technique that requires admin rights
  • Check: net localgroup Administrators

Users (S-1-5-32-545)

  • Privileges: Standard user rights, run applications, own personal files
  • Default members: All regular user accounts
  • Abuse: Limited — this is your starting point. You need to find misconfigurations to escalate.

Backup Operators (S-1-5-32-551)

  • Privileges: Can back up and restore all files on the system regardless of ACLs
  • Abuse vectors:
    1. SAM Hive Extraction: Use backup APIs to copy C:\Windows\System32\config\SAM and SYSTEM, then extract password hashes with secretsdump.py or samdump2
    2. NTDS.dit Extraction: On domain controllers, extract the entire Active Directory database
    3. Shadow Copy Abuse: Create volume shadow copies and copy protected files
  • Key commands:
    # Create shadow copy
    vssadmin create shadow /for=C:
    
    # List shadow copies
    vssadmin list shadows
    
    # Access shadow copy
    copy \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1\Windows\System32\config\SAM .

Remote Desktop Users (S-1-5-32-555)

  • Privileges: Can log in via Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP)
  • Abuse vectors:
    1. If you have credentials for a user in this group, you can RDP in for a richer shell
    2. Combined with credential dumping, this enables persistent remote access
    3. RDP sessions run at High Integrity Level, opening more attack surfaces

Performance Log Users (S-1-5-32-559)

  • Privileges: Can assign performance log and alert objects to directories and files
  • Abuse vectors:
    1. Can create performance monitor data collector sets that write to arbitrary locations
    2. Can potentially read files through performance counter logging
    3. Lower priority target but worth noting

Distributed COM Users (S-1-5-32-557)

  • Privileges: Can access DCOM objects
  • Abuse vectors:
    1. DCOM objects often run with higher privileges
    2. JuicyPotato and similar tools exploit DCOM impersonation
    3. Being in this group alone doesn’t grant much, but combined with SeImpersonatePrivilege it enables COM-based attacks

IIS_IUSRS (S-1-5-32-578)

  • Privileges: IIS application pool identity
  • Abuse vectors:
    1. If you compromise a web application running under this identity
    2. Check for writable web directories, configuration files
    3. Look for application-specific vulnerabilities

WinRMRemoteWMIUsers__ (S-1-5-32-580)

  • Privileges: Can connect via WinRM (Windows Remote Management) and WMI
  • Abuse vectors:
    1. Remote PowerShell sessions: Enter-PSSession -ComputerName TARGET -Credential USER
    2. WMI execution: wmic /node:TARGET process call create "cmd.exe"
    3. File transfer over WinRM

Account Operators (S-1-5-32-550)

  • Privileges: Can create, modify, and delete user and group accounts (but not in privileged groups)
  • Abuse vectors:
    1. Create a new user account and add it to the Administrators group (if permissions allow)
    2. Modify existing user passwords
    3. Create accounts with specific SIDs for SID history attacks (domain environments)

Server Operators (S-1-5-32-549)

  • Privileges: Can manage servers, including changing system time, shutting down, and managing shares
  • Abuse vectors:
    1. Can modify NTLM authentication timestamps — potential Kerberos attacks
    2. Can create and manage shared folders
    3. Can restart services on Windows Server
  • Privileges: Manage printers and print jobs
  • Abuse vectors:
    1. PrintNightmare (CVE-2021-34527): Print Operators can load arbitrary DLLs as SYSTEM
    2. Can modify printer driver paths to execute code as SYSTEM
    3. High-value target on modern Windows systems

Replicators (S-1-5-32-552)

  • Privileges: Support file replication in domain environments
  • Abuse vectors:
    1. Rarely exploitable directly
    2. In domain environments, may have access to SYSVOL replication
    3. Low priority but worth noting in domain scenarios

Token Types

Understanding token types is critical for token-based privilege escalation attacks.

Primary Token

  • Definition: The main security token associated with a process
  • Characteristics: Represents the process owner’s identity and privileges
  • Usage: Every process has exactly one primary token
  • Privesc relevance: Stealing a primary token from a SYSTEM process gives you SYSTEM privileges

Impersonation Token

  • Definition: Created when a server process acts on behalf of a client
  • Characteristics: Limited by impersonation level (see below)
  • Usage: IIS, RPC servers, named pipe servers create these
  • Privesc relevance: JuicyPotato, RoguePotato, and PrintSpoofer all exploit impersonation tokens to escalate to SYSTEM
  • Definition: A token that links to another token
  • Characteristics: Rarely seen directly
  • Usage: Internal Windows mechanism
  • Privesc relevance: Low — mainly of theoretical interest

New Primary Token (from Impersonation)

  • Definition: A primary token created by duplicating an impersonation token
  • Characteristics: Full privileges of the impersonated identity
  • Usage: DuplicateTokenEx API call
  • Privesc relevance: This is the mechanism used by Potato-family exploits — convert an impersonation token into a primary SYSTEM token

Impersonation Levels

Level Constant Description Privesc Impact
SecurityAnonymous 0 Server cannot obtain any info about client No impact
SecurityIdentification 1 Server can query client identity but cannot impersonate Limited
SecurityImpersonation 2 Server can impersonate client in local system Key level for Potato exploits
SecurityDelegation 3 Server can impersonate client on remote systems Highest impact — remote privesc possible

Privilege Attributes from whoami /priv

Each privilege shown by whoami /priv has a state attribute:

State Meaning Privesc Relevance
Enabled The privilege is active and can be used immediately Directly exploitable
Enabled By Default The privilege exists but must be explicitly enabled Can be enabled via AdjustTokenPrivileges API
Disabled The privilege exists but cannot be enabled by this process Not directly exploitable without admin rights

Key Insight: A privilege that is “Enabled By Default” can often be activated by the process itself using the AdjustTokenPrivileges Windows API. Tools like Incognito can enumerate and activate these privileges.


Key Privileges and Their Attacks

SeImpersonatePrivilege

  • Description: Impersonate a client after authentication
  • Default holders: Everyone (non-admin users), IIS, services
  • Attacks:
    • JuicyPotato: Uses COM object impersonation to get SYSTEM token (Windows 7–10 1809)
    • RoguePotato: Uses HTTP.SYS + Named Pipe, works on all Windows versions
    • PrintSpoofer: Uses named pipe impersonation via spooler service (Windows 7–11)
    • JuicyPotatoNG: Updated version with more CLSIDs and better compatibility
    • Named Pipe Impersonation: Manual technique using Python or C

SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege

  • Description: Replace a process level token
  • Default holders: Rarely given to non-admins
  • Attacks:
    • RottenPotato: Original token manipulation exploit (requires MS16-034 unpatched)
    • Primary token theft and duplication

SeDebugPrivilege

  • Description: Debug programs and access any process memory
  • Default holders: Administrators
  • Attacks:
    • Read memory of lsass.exe to extract credentials (mimikatz)
    • Inject code into high-privilege processes
    • Token theft from SYSTEM processes

SeBackupPrivilege

  • Description: Bypass file ACLs for backup operations
  • Default holders: Backup Operators group
  • Attacks:
    • Copy SAM and SYSTEM hives for hash extraction
    • Read any file on the system (including NTDS.dit on DCs)
    • Use ntfsutil or backup APIs to bypass ACLs

SeRestorePrivilege

  • Description: Bypass file ACLs for restore operations
  • Default holders: Backup Operators, Administrators
  • Attacks:
    • Write to any file on the system
    • Replace system binaries
    • Modify service configurations

SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege

  • Description: Take ownership of any object
  • Default holders: Administrators
  • Attacks:
    • Take ownership of protected files, then grant yourself full control
    • Modify ACLs on critical system objects

SeLoadDriverPrivilege

  • Description: Load and unload kernel drivers
  • Default holders: Administrators
  • Attacks:
    • Load arbitrary kernel drivers for kernel-level privesc
    • Exploit vulnerable signed drivers

SeRelabelPrivilege

  • Description: Modify integrity labels on objects
  • Default holders: Administrators
  • Attacks:
    • Lower integrity level of protected objects
    • Modify Mandatory Integrity Control labels

Enumeration Flow Diagram

graph TD
    A[Initial Access: Low Priv Shell] --> B[Run: whoami /all]
    B --> C{Analyze Output}
    C --> D[Check Group Memberships]
    C --> E[Check Privileges]
    C --> F[Check Integrity Level]
    
    D --> D1{In Administrators?}
    D1 -->|Yes| G[Already Elevated - Use psexec -s]
    D1 -->|No| D2{In Backup Operators?}
    D2 -->|Yes| H[SAM Extraction via Shadow Copy]
    D2 -->|No| D3{In Other Privileged Group?}
    D3 -->|Yes| I[Research Group-Specific Attacks]
    D3 -->|No| J[Continue Enumeration]
    
    E --> E1{SeImpersonatePrivilege?}
    E1 -->|Enabled| K[JuicyPotato / RoguePotato / PrintSpoofer]
    E1 -->|No| E2{SeDebugPrivilege?}
    E2 -->|Enabled| L[Token Theft / Process Injection]
    E2 -->|No| E3{SeBackupPrivilege?}
    E3 -->|Enabled| H
    E3 -->|No| J
    
    F --> F1{Integrity Level}
    F1 -->|High| M[More Attack Options Available]
    F1 -->|Medium| N[Standard User Constraints]
    F1 -->|Low| O[Very Limited - Need IL Bypass First]
    
    J --> P[net user / net localgroup]
    P --> Q[net accounts - Password Policy]
    Q --> R[Map Complete Attack Surface]
    
    style A fill:#ff9999
    style G fill:#99ff99
    style K fill:#99ff99
    style H fill:#99ff99
    style L fill:#99ff99

“What to Look For” Checklist

Use this checklist after running whoami /all:

  • Am I in the Administrators group? → Use psexec -s cmd.exe or any admin privesc
  • Do I have SeImpersonatePrivilege (Enabled)? → JuicyPotato / RoguePotato / PrintSpoofer
  • Do I have SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege? → RottenPotato / token manipulation
  • Do I have SeDebugPrivilege? → Mimikatz / process injection / token theft
  • Am I in Backup Operators? → SAM extraction via shadow copies
  • Am I in Server Operators? → Service restart, share manipulation
  • Am I in Account Operators? → Create admin user
  • Am I in Print Operators? → PrintNightmare (CVE-2021-34527)
  • What is my Integrity Level? → Determines what objects I can access
  • What is my logon type? → Console vs Remote affects available attacks
  • Are there other admin accounts? → Target for credential attacks
  • What is the password policy? → Weak policy = brute force viable

Common Mistakes

Mistake 1: Running whoami Instead of whoami /all

whoami only shows your username. whoami /all shows groups, privileges, integrity level, and logon type. The difference is the difference between finding a privesc vector in 30 seconds and spending 30 minutes enumerating.

Mistake 2: Ignoring “Enabled By Default” Privileges

A privilege listed as “Enabled By Default” can often be activated programmatically. Don’t dismiss these — tools like Incognito can enumerate and activate them.

Mistake 3: Not Checking All Admin Accounts

Finding that admin is in the Administrators group is useful, but so is knowing that DefaultFirstUser is also an admin. Each admin account is a potential target for credential attacks.

Mistake 4: Forgetting About Service Accounts

NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM, NT AUTHORITY\LOCAL SERVICE, and NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK SERVICE are built-in accounts. Services running as SYSTEM are prime targets for exploitation.

Mistake 5: Not Saving Output

In the OSCP exam, you need evidence. Always redirect output to files:

whoami /all > C:\temp\whoami_all.txt 2>&1
net user > C:\temp\net_user.txt 2>&1
net localgroup Administrators > C:\temp\admins.txt 2>&1

Quick Reference Command Cheat Sheet

# Essential first commands
whoami /all
net user
net localgroup Administrators
net accounts

# PowerShell alternatives (Win 8+/Server 2012+)
Get-LocalUser
Get-LocalGroup
Get-LocalGroupMember -Group "Administrators"
[System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]::GetCurrent().User.Value

# Detailed user info
net user <username>
net localgroup <groupname>

# Check specific groups for privesc
net localgroup "Backup Operators"
net localgroup "Server Operators"
net localgroup "Account Operators"
net localgroup "Print Operators"