WinPEAS Usage
Introduction
What Is WinPEAS?
WinPEAS (Windows Privilege Escalation Awesome Script) is a comprehensive, all-in-one Windows enumeration tool designed to identify privilege escalation vectors. It is part of the PEASS-ng project, which also includes linPEAS for Linux systems. WinPEAS performs hundreds of automated checks across user context, OS configuration, network settings, installed software, services, registry, files, and more — producing a single consolidated report.
History and Authorship
| Attribute | Detail |
|---|---|
| Author | Carlos Polop (carlospolop) |
| Project | PEASS-ng (Privilege Escalation Awesome Scripts - New Generation) |
| Repository | carlospolop/PEASS-ng (GitHub) |
| License | GPL-3.0 |
| First Released | 2020 (as PEASS-ng, successor to original PEAS) |
| Languages | C# (compiled .exe), Java (.jar), PowerShell (.ps1) |
Relationship to linPEAS
WinPEAS and linPEAS are siblings in the PEASS-ng suite:
| Feature | linPEAS | WinPEAS |
|---|---|---|
| Target OS | Linux | Windows |
| Format | Shell script (.sh) |
C# binary (.exe), Java (.jar), PowerShell (.ps1) |
| Output Style | Colorized terminal | Colorized terminal + file output |
| Checks | Linux-specific (SUID, cron, capabilities) | Windows-specific (services, registry, tokens) |
| Philosophy | Same — comprehensive automated enumeration | Same — comprehensive automated enumeration |
Why WinPEAS Matters for OSCP
- Comprehensive: Covers more ground than any single manual enumeration approach
- No Dependencies: The
.exeversion requires nothing — no PowerShell, no .NET framework issues - Fast: Completes full enumeration in seconds to a few minutes
- Color-Coded Output:
[!]warnings stand out visually from[+]information - Silent Option:
-quietmode writes only to file — useful for stealth - Cloud Awareness: Checks for AWS, Azure, and GCP credentials (relevant for cloud-based OSCP labs)
Downloading and Running WinPEAS
Method 1: Pre-compiled .exe (Recommended for OSCP)
# Download from GitHub releases
# https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng/releases
# Via Invoke-WebRequest on target
Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng/releases/latest/download/winPEAS.exe" -OutFile winPEAS.exe
# Via certutil (no PowerShell download restrictions)
certutil -urlcache -split -f "https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng/releases/latest/download/winPEAS.exe" winPEAS.exe
# Run
.\winPEAS.exe
Method 2: Java .jar Version
# Download
Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng/releases/latest/download/winPEAS.jar" -OutFile winPEAS.jar
# Run (requires Java installed on target)
java -jar winPEAS.jar
Method 3: PowerShell Version
# Download
Invoke-WebRequest "https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng/raw/master/winPEAS/winPEASps1/winPEAS.ps1" -OutFile winPEAS.ps1
# Run
powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File .\winPEAS.ps1
Method 4: Compile from Source
# Clone the repository (requires Git and .NET SDK)
git clone https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng.git
cd PEASS-ng\winPEAS\winPEASexe
# Compile with dotnet CLI
dotnet build -c Release
# The compiled binary will be in:
# bin\Release\netX.X\winPEAS.exe
OSCP Tip: Always carry the pre-compiled
.exeversion. It has zero dependencies and works on any Windows system. Upload it via your preferred method (SMB, HTTP, certutil, etc.).
Command-Line Options
Full Option Reference
winPEAS.exe [options]
Options:
-outputfile <filename> Write output to file (default: winPEASResult.txt)
-quiet No console output, only file output
-enabled Only show enabled checks
-groupadmin <groupname> Additional group to check for admin privileges
-grouprestrictedadmin <groupname> Group with restricted admin rights
-help Show help message
Option Details
-outputfile
Writes all output to a specified file. Useful for reviewing results later or searching for specific findings.
# Default output file
.\winPEAS.exe -outputfile results.txt
# Custom location
.\winPEAS.exe -outputfile C:\temp\privesc_findings.txt
-quiet
Suppresses all console output. Everything is written only to the output file. Useful for:
- Stealth (less terminal noise)
- Running in the background
- Avoiding screen clutter on limited shells
# Quiet mode with file output
.\winPEAS.exe -quiet -outputfile C:\temp\results.txt
# Review results later
Get-Content C:\temp\results.txt
-enabled
Shows only the checks that are currently enabled/active. Useful for focusing on relevant findings.
.\winPEAS.exe -enabled
-groupadmin
Specifies an additional group that should be treated as having administrative privileges. Useful when the target organization uses custom admin groups.
# If your org uses "IT_Admins" as an admin group
.\winPEAS.exe -groupadmin "IT_Admins"
-grouprestrictedadmin
Specifies a group with restricted administrative rights. WinPEAS will note findings relevant to this group’s limitations.
.\winPEAS.exe -grouprestrictedadmin "HelpDesk"
Check Categories (Detailed)
1. User Information
What It Checks
- Current user name and SID
- Group memberships (local and domain)
- User privileges (
SeImpersonatePrivilege,SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege, etc.) - Password policy (complexity, history, length, expiration)
- Whether the current user is in the
Administratorsgroup
Realistic Output
[+] User
└─ Current user
├─ Name: WORKSTATION\john
├─ SID: S-1-5-21-3266464563-1234567890-1234567890-1001
└─ Groups:
├─ Users (S-1-5-32-545)
├─ Authenticated Users (S-1-5-11)
└─ This Organization (S-1-5-15)
[+] Privileges
├─ SeChangeNotifyPrivilege Bypass traverse checking
├─ SeImpersonatePrivilege Impersonate a client after authentication [!]
├─ SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege Increase a process working set
└─ SeShutdownPrivilege Shut down the system
[!] Interesting privilege: SeImpersonatePrivilege
→ Can use JuicyPotato, RoguePotato, or PrintSpoofer for SYSTEM escalation
Key Findings to Act On
| Finding | Action |
|---|---|
SeImpersonatePrivilege enabled |
Use RoguePotato, PrintSpoofer, or SweetPotato |
SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege |
Token manipulation possible |
User in Administrators group |
Already high privilege — may need UAC bypass |
User in Backup Operators |
Can backup/restore any file — dump SAM database |
| Weak password policy | Consider password spraying or brute force |
2. OS Information
What It Checks
- Windows version and build number
- Architecture (x86/x64)
- Language/locale settings
- Product type (Client vs Server)
- Registered owner and organization
Realistic Output
[+] OS
├─ Version: Microsoft Windows 10 Enterprise
├─ Build: 17763.4374 (Windows 10 Version 1909)
├─ Architecture: x64
├─ Language: en-US
└─ Product Type: Windows NT
[!] OS Version: Windows 10 1909 (Build 17763)
→ Check for missing patches and kernel exploits
Why This Matters
The OS version and build number are critical for:
- Kernel exploit matching: Each exploit targets specific OS versions
- Patch verification: Cross-reference with installed hotfixes
- Architecture: Determines 32-bit vs 64-bit exploit selection
3. Network Configuration
What It Checks
- IP configuration (all interfaces)
- Active connections (
netstat) - ARP table
- Routing table
- DNS configuration
- Firewall rules
- Listening ports and associated processes
- SMB shares
Realistic Output
[+] Network
└─ Interfaces
├─ Ethernet adapter Ethernet:
│ ├─ IPv4 Address: 10.10.10.50
│ ├─ Subnet Mask: 255.255.255.0
│ ├─ Default Gateway: 10.10.10.1
│ └─ DNS Servers: 10.10.10.1
└─ Loopback Pseudo-Interface 1:
└─ IPv4 Address: 127.0.0.1
[+] Listening Ports
├─ TCP 0.0.0.0:80 http.sys (PID 4)
├─ TCP 0.0.0.0:443 http.sys (PID 4)
├─ TCP 0.0.0.0:445 srvhost.exe (PID 924)
├─ TCP 0.0.0.0:3389 svchost.exe (PID 1232)
└─ TCP 0.0.0.0:5985 svchost.exe (PID 1868)
[!] Port 3389 (RDP) is open
→ Check for valid credentials to RDP in
Key Findings to Act On
| Finding | Action |
|---|---|
| Port 3389 (RDP) open | Try credential reuse for RDP access |
| Port 5985 (WinRM) open | Try WinRM with valid credentials |
| SMB shares visible | Check for accessible shares with sensitive data |
| Multiple network interfaces | Potential for pivoting |
4. Software Enumeration
What It Checks
- Installed programs (via Registry
Uninstallkeys) - Software versions
- Known vulnerable software
- Browser versions and plugins
- Development tools (Python, Node.js, etc.)
- Database software
Realistic Output
[+] Software
├─ Adobe Acrobat Reader DC - 2020.001.20095
├─ Apache HTTP Server 2.4.41 (English)
├─ Google Chrome 91.0.4472.124
├─ Microsoft Edge 91.0.864.67
├─ Microsoft Office Professional Plus 2016
├─ Python 3.8.2
└─ WinRAR 6.21
[!] Apache HTTP Server 2.4.41
→ Check for local privilege escalation vulnerabilities
→ Known CVEs may exist for this version
Why This Matters
- Vulnerable software: Older versions of common software may have known local privilege escalation vulnerabilities
- Development tools: Python, Node.js, etc. can be used to compile and run exploits
- Browsers: May contain saved credentials or cookies
5. Services
What It Checks
This is one of the most important sections. WinPEAS checks:
- All installed services and their status
- Service binary paths and permissions
- Service accounts (which account runs each service)
- Unquoted service paths
- Writable service binaries
- Writable service configuration (Registry)
- Services running as SYSTEM or LOCAL SERVICE
Realistic Output
[+] Services
└─ Writable Service Binaries
[!] VulnService
├─ Path: C:\Program Files\VulnApp\service.exe
├─ Account: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
├─ State: Running
└─ Permissions: BUILTIN\Users - Write, Modify
└─ Unquoted Service Paths
[!] Apache2.2
├─ Path: C:\Program Files\Apache Software Foundation\Procrun 2.0\bin\procrun.exe
├─ Account: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
└─ Abusable: C:\Program Files\Apache Software Foundation\Procrun.exe
└─ Services Running as SYSTEM
├─ BackupSvc → C:\Program Files\Backup\backup.exe
├─ Monitoring → C:\Tools\monitor.exe
└─ VulnService → C:\Program Files\VulnApp\service.exe
Priority Findings
| Finding | Priority | Action |
|---|---|---|
| Writable service binary (SYSTEM) | CRITICAL | Replace binary with reverse shell |
| Unquoted service path (SYSTEM) | CRITICAL | Create exe at space boundary |
| Writable service config | HIGH | Change binPath to malicious exe |
| Service running as SYSTEM | MEDIUM | Check if binary/path is exploitable |
6. Scheduled Tasks
What It Checks
- All scheduled tasks and their schedules
- Task accounts (which user each task runs as)
- Task action executables and their permissions
- Writable task action binaries
- Tasks running as SYSTEM or Administrator
Realistic Output
[+] Scheduled Tasks
└─ Tasks Running as SYSTEM
[!] DailyBackup
├─ Action: C:\Scripts\backup.bat
├─ Schedule: Daily at 02:00
├─ Account: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
└─ Writable: True (BUILTIN\Users - Modify)
[!] SystemUpdate
├─ Action: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
├─ Arguments: -File C:\Scripts\update.ps1
├─ Schedule: Weekly on Monday at 03:00
└─ Account: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
Attack Workflow
# 1. WinPEAS identifies writable task action
# 2. Check the file permissions manually
icacls "C:\Scripts\backup.bat"
# 3. Replace with reverse shell
echo "powershell -e JABwAGwAYQBjAGgA..." > "C:\Scripts\backup.bat"
# 4. Wait for the task to execute
# Or force execution:
schtasks /run /tn "DailyBackup"
7. Registry
What It Checks
- Autorun keys (
Run,RunOnce,RunServices) - Registry key permissions
- AlwaysInstallElevated setting
- AutoLogon credentials
- UAC settings
- Weak registry permissions on service keys
- NLA (Network Level Authentication) settings
Realistic Output
[+] Registry
└─ AlwaysInstallElevated
[!] HKLM: AlwaysInstallElevated = 1
[!] HKCU: AlwaysInstallElevated = 1
→ Both set! Any user can install MSI as SYSTEM
└─ AutoLogon
[-] No AutoLogon credentials found
└─ Autorun Keys
[+] HKLM\...\Run
├─ Skype: "C:\Program Files\Skype\Phone\Skype.exe"
└─ SecurityTool: "C:\Program Files\Security\tool.exe"
└─ UAC Settings
[+] EnableLUA = 1 (UAC enabled)
[+] ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin = 5 (Prompt for consent)
Key Findings
| Finding | Action |
|---|---|
AlwaysInstallElevated = 1 (both keys) |
Create malicious MSI → msiexec /q /i shell.msi |
| AutoLogon credentials found | Use password for lateral movement |
| Writable autorun key | Add reverse shell to autorun |
| UAC enabled | May need UAC bypass for full admin access |
8. Files
What It Checks
- Writable files in sensitive directories
- Credential files (
.vnc,.ssh,.kubeconfig) - Configuration files containing passwords
- Backup files (
.bak,.old,.orig) - History files (
.bash_history, PowerShell history) - Desktop and Documents folders
- IIS configuration files
- SSH keys
- AWS/Azure/GCP credential files
Realistic Output
[+] Interesting Files
└─ Credential Files
[!] C:\Users\john\AppData\Roaming\.ssh\id_rsa
→ Private SSH key found
[!] C:\Users\john\Desktop\credentials.txt
→ Plaintext credentials file
[!] C:\inetpub\wwwroot\web.config
→ May contain database connection strings
└─ Writable Files
[!] C:\Program Files\VulnApp\config.ini
→ Writable by current user
└─ Backup Files
[+] C:\backups\database.bak
[+] C:\temp\config.old
└─ History Files
[+] C:\Users\john\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\ConsoleHost_history.txt
Most Valuable File Findings
| File Type | Why It Matters |
|---|---|
.ssh/id_rsa |
SSH private key — use for lateral movement |
web.config / appsettings.json |
Database credentials, API keys |
.vnc/config |
VNC passwords |
ConsoleHost_history.txt |
PowerShell command history with credentials |
unattend.xml |
Plaintext admin passwords |
.kubeconfig |
Kubernetes cluster access |
AWS credentials (~/.aws/credentials) |
Cloud access |
9. Tokens
What It Checks
- Available impersonation tokens
- Primary tokens
- Token privileges
Realistic Output
[+] Tokens
└─ Available Tokens
[-] No usable impersonation tokens found
10. Hotfixes
What It Checks
- All installed Windows updates (hotfixes)
- Missing critical security patches
- Cross-references with known exploit requirements
Realistic Output
[+] Hotfixes
├─ KB4535996 Installed: 2020-06-09
├─ KB4561600 Installed: 2020-11-10
├─ KB4577071 Installed: 2020-12-08
└─ KB4580325 Installed: 2021-01-12
[!] Missing Hotfix: KB4570441
→ Related to CVE-2020-17087 (PrintNightmare precursor)
Why This Matters
Missing hotfixes directly indicate which kernel exploits may work. Cross-reference with:
- ExploitSuggester output
- SecWiki Windows kernel exploits collection
- FuzzySec tutorial videos
11. AntiVirus
What It Checks
- Installed antivirus products
- Real-time protection status
- Windows Defender status
- Excluded paths and processes
Realistic Output
[+] AntiVirus
├─ Windows Defender
│ ├─ Status: Running
│ ├─ Real-time protection: On
│ └─ Excluded paths:
│ └─ C:\Temp\
└─ Third-party AV: None detected
[!] Windows Defender is the only AV
→ May be bypassable with common techniques
→ Excluded path C:\Temp\ can be used for payload storage
12. Cloud Credentials
What It Checks
- AWS credentials (
~/.aws/credentials, IAM role metadata) - Azure credentials (
az cliconfig, service principal secrets) - GCP credentials (application default credentials, service account keys)
- Cloud metadata endpoints accessibility
Realistic Output
[+] Cloud
└─ AWS
[!] AWS Credentials found:
├─ Access Key ID: AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE
├─ Secret Access Key: wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY
└─ Region: us-east-1
└─ Azure
[-] No Azure credentials found
└─ GCP
[-] No GCP credentials found
13. Containers
What It Checks
- Docker installation and running containers
- Kubernetes configuration and access
- Container runtime permissions
Realistic Output
[+] Containers
└─ Docker
[-] Docker not installed
└─ Kubernetes
[-] Kubernetes not detected
Interpreting WinPEAS Output
Output Symbols
| Symbol | Meaning | Action |
|---|---|---|
[!] |
Warning / Potential vulnerability | Investigate immediately — these are your attack vectors |
[+] |
Information found | Review for context — may lead to findings |
[-] |
Nothing found | Skip — no actionable information |
Reading Strategy
- First pass: Scan for all
[!]markers — these are your priority findings - Second pass: Review
[+]sections for context and secondary vectors - Third pass: Cross-reference findings (e.g., a writable service binary + missing patch = two attack paths)
Priority Ranking of Findings
| Rank | Finding | Exploitation Difficulty |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | AlwaysInstallElevated enabled |
Trivial — one command |
| 2 | Writable service binary (SYSTEM) | Easy — replace and restart |
| 3 | Unquoted service path (SYSTEM) | Easy — create exe at boundary |
| 4 | Missing critical patch with known exploit | Medium — find and compile exploit |
| 5 | Writable PATH directory | Easy — place malicious exe |
| 6 | Plaintext credentials in files | Easy — use credentials directly |
| 7 | SeImpersonatePrivilege |
Easy — use RoguePotato/PrintSpoofer |
| 8 | Writable scheduled task (SYSTEM) | Easy — replace action |
| 9 | AutoLogon credentials | Easy — use password laterally |
| 10 | DLL hijack opportunity | Medium — understand DLL search order |
WinPEAS vs PowerUp: Detailed Comparison
Feature Comparison Table
| Feature | WinPEAS | PowerUp |
|---|---|---|
| Language | C# (compiled .exe) | PowerShell (.ps1) |
| Dependencies | None (for .exe) | PowerShell 3.0+ |
| Execution | Single binary execution | Module import required |
| Enumeration Scope | Broader (cloud, containers, AV, software) | Focused (services, PATH, DLL, registry) |
| Service Analysis | Good — identifies writable services and unquoted paths | Excellent — deep permission analysis with exploitation |
| Exploitation | Enumeration only — no built-in exploit functions | Built-in exploitation (Invoke-ServiceAbuse, etc.) |
| Cloud Checks | Yes (AWS, Azure, GCP) | No |
| Container Checks | Yes (Docker, Kubernetes) | No |
| AV Detection | Yes | No |
| Output Format | Colorized terminal + file | Console output + pipe to file |
| Stealth | Quieter (no PowerShell activity) | Noisy (PowerShell module loading) |
| File Size | ~2-5 MB | ~50 KB |
| Speed | Fast (compiled binary) | Slower (PowerShell interpretation) |
| Best For | Initial broad enumeration | Targeted exploitation |
When to Use Each
| Scenario | Recommended Tool |
|---|---|
| First touch on a Windows box | WinPEAS — broadest coverage |
| Service exploitation needed | PowerUp — built-in exploit functions |
| PowerShell is blocked | WinPEAS (.exe works without PowerShell) |
| Cloud environment | WinPEAS — checks for cloud credentials |
| Quick check during exam | WinPEAS — one command, comprehensive output |
| Deep service analysis | PowerUp — more granular service checks |
| Need to exploit a finding | PowerUp — Invoke-ServiceAbuse |
Recommended Workflow: Use Both
# Step 1: Run WinPEAS for broad enumeration
.\winPEAS.exe -outputfile winpeas_results.txt
# Step 2: Review WinPEAS output for findings
# If service-related finding:
# Step 3: Use PowerUp for targeted exploitation
Import-Module .\PowerUp.ps1
Invoke-AllChecks
# Step 4: Exploit using PowerUp functions
Invoke-ServiceAbuse -Name 'VulnService' -Path 'C:\temp\shell.exe'
Mermaid: WinPEAS Workflow
graph TD
A[Upload winPEAS.exe] --> B[Run: .\winPEAS.exe -outputfile results.txt]
B --> C[Scan for [!] warnings]
C -->|AlwaysInstallElevated| D[Create MSI payload]
C -->|Writable Service Binary| E[Replace with reverse shell]
C -->|Unquoted Service Path| F[Create exe at space boundary]
C -->|Writable PATH Dir| G[Place malicious exe]
C -->|Missing Patch| H[Find kernel exploit]
C -->|SeImpersonatePrivilege| I[Use RoguePotato/PrintSpoofer]
C -->|Plaintext Credentials| J[Use for lateral movement]
C -->|Writable Scheduled Task| K[Replace task action]
C -->|AutoLogon Creds| J
D --> L[SYSTEM Shell]
E --> L
F --> L
G --> L
H --> L
I --> L
K --> L
J --> M[Lateral Movement]
style A fill:#e1f5fe
style B fill:#fff3e0
style L fill:#c8e6c9
style M fill:#fce4ec
WinPEAS Quick Reference
╔══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╗
║ WINPEAS QUICK REFERENCE ║
╠══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╣
║ ║
║ DOWNLOAD: ║
║ GitHub Releases → winPEAS.exe ║
║ ║
║ RUN: ║
║ .\winPEAS.exe # Full output ║
║ .\winPEAS.exe -outputfile results.txt # Save to file ║
║ .\winPEAS.exe -quiet -outputfile results.txt # Silent mode ║
║ ║
║ OUTPUT SYMBOLS: ║
║ [!] = Warning/Potential vulnerability → ACT ON THESE FIRST ║
║ [+] = Information found → Review for context ║
║ [-] = Nothing found → Skip ║
║ ║
║ PRIORITY FINDINGS (scan [!] markers in this order): ║
║ 1. AlwaysInstallElevated → msiexec /q /i shell.msi ║
║ 2. Writable Service Binary (SYSTEM) → Replace + restart ║
║ 3. Unquoted Service Path → Create exe at space boundary ║
║ 4. Missing critical patch → Kernel exploit ║
║ 5. Writable PATH directory → PATH hijack ║
║ 6. SeImpersonatePrivilege → RoguePotato / PrintSpoofer ║
║ 7. Plaintext credentials → Lateral movement ║
║ 8. Writable Scheduled Task → Replace action ║
║ ║
║ CHECKS PERFORMED: ║
║ User / OS / Network / Software / Services / Scheduled Tasks ║
║ Registry / Files / Tokens / Hotfixes / AntiVirus / Cloud ║
║ Containers ║
║ ║
╚══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╝
OSCP Exam Tips
Critical Tips for Using WinPEAS on Exam
-
Always carry winPEAS.exe — It should be in your standard Windows privesc toolkit alongside PowerUp.ps1. Upload it immediately after gaining initial access.
-
Use
-outputfilealways — Even if you review console output, always save to a file. You may need to revisit findings later:.\winPEAS.exe -outputfile C:\temp\winpeas.txt -
Scan for
[!]first — After running WinPEAS, search the output for[!]markers. These are your actionable findings. Ignore[-]sections. -
WinPEAS + PowerUp combo — Run WinPEAS first for broad enumeration, then use PowerUp for exploitation. WinPEAS finds the vulnerability; PowerUp exploits it.
-
Check the Services section carefully — On OSCP boxes, service-related vulnerabilities are the most common privesc vector. Look for:
- Writable service binaries
- Unquoted service paths
- Services running as SYSTEM with weak permissions
-
AlwaysInstallElevated is gold — If WinPEAS finds this enabled (both HKLM and HKCU), it is the fastest path to SYSTEM. Create a malicious MSI and install it.
-
Check for plaintext credentials — WinPEAS searches for credential files, config files with passwords, and history files. These can provide passwords for lateral movement.
-
Use
-quietmode on noisy shells — If you have a limited reverse shell, use quiet mode to avoid flooding your terminal:.\winPEAS.exe -quiet -outputfile C:\temp\results.txt -
Cross-reference with manual checks — WinPEAS is comprehensive but not perfect. After reviewing its output, manually verify key findings:
# Verify a writable service icacls "C:\Program Files\VulnApp\service.exe" # Verify AlwaysInstallElevated reg query HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Installer /v AlwaysInstallElevated -
WinPEAS won’t exploit — it only enumerates — Remember that WinPEAS identifies vulnerabilities but does not exploit them. Use PowerUp or manual techniques for exploitation.
Troubleshooting
Common Issues
| Problem | Solution |
|---|---|
| winPEAS.exe won’t run | Antivirus may be blocking it — try from an excluded directory |
| Output is truncated | Use -outputfile to save to file |
| Very slow execution | System has many services/installed programs — wait it out |
| .jar version fails | Java not installed — use .exe instead |
| PowerShell version fails | Execution policy — use -ExecutionPolicy Bypass |
| Missing findings | Run PowerUp as well — different tools find different things |
Verifying WinPEAS Findings
# After WinPEAS finds a writable service, verify manually:
icacls "C:\Program Files\VulnApp\service.exe"
# After WinPEAS finds AlwaysInstallElevated, verify:
reg query HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Installer /v AlwaysInstallElevated
reg query HKCU\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Installer /v AlwaysInstallElevated
# After WinPEAS finds unquoted service path, verify:
sc qc VulnService