Domain 6Active Directory AttacksCORE

AD Objects

Detailed study of AD object types: users (UAC flags, attributes), groups (scopes, types, built-in high-value groups), computers (machine accounts, attack vectors), OUs (organization, GPO linkage), and GPOs (structure, attack vectors).

Domain: Domain 6: Active Directory Exploitation•Updated: 2026-09-01
#active-directory#users#groups#computers#ous#gpos#oscp

AD Objects

Active Directory stores everything as objects. Every user, group, computer, organizational unit, and GPO is an object with attributes and a distinguished name. Understanding these objects and their relationships is the foundation of AD exploitation.


1. Users

User objects represent human (or service) accounts that authenticate to the domain. They are the most frequently targeted objects in AD attacks.

Key User Attributes

Attribute Description Attack Relevance
sAMAccountName Pre-Windows 2000 logon name Primary identifier for authentication attacks
userPrincipalName UPN format logon name (user@domain) Kerberos TGT requests, may differ from sAMAccountName
displayName Human-readable display name Social engineering, information gathering
mail Email address Phishing targets, information gathering
description Free-text description field CRITICAL: Often contains passwords in OSCP labs
title Job title Identify high-value targets (admins, executives)
department Department name Map organizational structure
userAccountControl Bitmask of account flags Determines account capabilities and vulnerabilities
pwdLastSet Last password change (FILET time) Identify stale passwords; 0 = must change at next logon
lastLogon Last login (not replicated) Identify active accounts (check each DC)
lastLogonTimestamp Last login (replicated, ~14 day delay) Quick active account identification
servicePrincipalName Kerberos SPN(s) Kerberoasting targets
memberOf Groups the user belongs to Privilege escalation paths
primaryGroupID Primary group RID 513 = Domain Users, 512 = Domain Admins
badPasswordTime Last bad password attempt Detect brute force activity
lockoutTime Account lockout status 0 = not locked; non-zero = locked out

UserAccountControl (UAC) Flags

The userAccountControl attribute is a bitmask — each bit represents a different account property. This is one of the most important attributes for OSCP.

Flag Value Meaning Attack Relevance
NORMAL_ACCOUNT 512 Standard user account Baseline — most accounts have this
DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWORD 65536 Password never expires HIGH-VALUE TARGET — stale credentials, likely weak or reused
NOT_DELEGATED 1048576 Cannot be delegated Blocks delegation-based attacks against this account
USE_DES_KEY_ONLY 2097152 Forces DES encryption for Kerberos Weak encryption — easier to crack captured tickets
DONT_REQ_PREAUTH 4194304 Kerberos pre-authentication not required AS-REP Roasting — capture AS-REP and crack offline
TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION 524288 Unconstrained delegation enabled Delegation attack — capture TGTs of users who access this machine
TRUSTED_TO_AUTH_FOR_DELEGATION 1073741824 Protocol transition (S4U) enabled S4U2Self/S4U2Proxy — constrained delegation abuse
SENSITIVE_ACCOUNT 524288 Protected from delegation Defense indicator — this account cannot be delegated
PASSWORD_NOT_REQUIRED 32 Account can have empty password TRIVIAL TO EXPLOIT — empty password authentication
ACCOUNTDISABLE 2 Account is disabled Cannot authenticate, but ACL abuse still possible

Calculating UAC — Worked Example

Given: UAC = 593920

Step 1: 593920 - 524288 (TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION) = 69632
Step 2: 69632 - 65536 (DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWORD) = 4096
Step 3: 4096 - 4096 (DONT_REQ_PREAUTH) = 0

Wait — let me recalculate:
593920 - 524288 = 69632
69632 - 65536 = 4096
4096 is not a standard flag...

Let me try again:
593920 = 512 + 65536 + 524288 + 4096
4096 = SCRIPT flag (logon script)

Result: NORMAL_ACCOUNT (512) + DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWORD (65536) + TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION (524288) + SCRIPT (4096)

This account:
✓ Is a normal user account
✓ Has a password that never expires (HIGH VALUE)
✓ Has unconstrained delegation enabled (CRITICAL)
✓ Has a logon script configured

Quick UAC Calculation Reference

Common UAC Values:
512     = Normal account
544     = Normal account + Disabled
514     = Normal account + Homedir req
66048   = Normal account + Password never expires
524800  = Normal account + Unconstrained delegation
593920  = Normal + No expire + Unconstrained delegation
4194304 = Normal + No pre-auth (AS-REP Roasting)

2. Groups

Groups are the primary mechanism for access control in Active Directory. They follow the principle of least privilege through nested membership.

Group Scopes

Scope Can Contain Can Be Assigned Permissions On Replication
Universal Users, Global groups, other Universal groups Any resource in the entire forest Forest-wide (stored in Global Catalog)
Domain Local Any object type (users, global groups, universal groups, computers) Resources in the same domain only Domain-only
Global Users and other Global groups in the same domain Resources in the same domain only Domain-only

Group Types

Type Purpose Security Identifier
Security Group Used for access control (NTFS permissions, GPO security filtering) Has a SID — can be used in ACLs
Distribution Group Used for email distribution lists only No SID — cannot be used in ACLs

Best Practice: AGDLP / AGUDLP

AGDLP (Single Domain):
Accounts → Global groups → Domain Local groups → Permissions

AGUDLP (Multi-Domain Forest):
Accounts → Global → Universal → Domain Local → Permissions

Example:
1. Users "alice" and "bob" are added to Global group "Sales_Users"
2. "Sales_Users" is added to Universal group "Sales_Users_Global"
3. "Sales_Users_Global" is added to Domain Local group "Sales_FileServer_Admins"
4. "Sales_FileServer_Admins" is granted Write permission on the file share

High-Value Built-in Groups

These groups are your primary targets during OSCP AD exploitation:

Group SID Suffix Privilege Attack Relevance
Domain Admins S-1-5-32-544 Full control over the domain PRIMARY TARGET — DA = own the domain
Enterprise Admins S-1-5-32-519 Full control over the entire forest Forest-wide domination, cross-domain attacks
Schema Admins S-1-5-32-518 Can modify the AD schema Add malicious attributes, backdoor the directory
Account Operators S-1-5-32-548 Create/modify users and groups (except DA/EA) Create new admin accounts, modify existing users
Server Operators S-1-5-32-549 Manage domain controllers (start/stop services, manage shares) Service manipulation, share access
Print Operators S-1-5-32-550 Manage print spooler PrintNightmare — remote code execution on DC
Backup Operators S-1-5-32-551 Backup access to all files Can backup NTDS.dit, access sensitive files
DnsAdmins Custom (varies) DNS zone and server management DCOM privilege escalation — can reload DNS service with malicious DLL
Exchange Windows Permissions Custom (varies) Exchange management permissions Can modify Domain Admins group membership
RDS Management Servers Custom (varies) Remote Desktop Services management Can modify DA group in some configurations
VMware Admins Custom (varies) VMware vCenter management Can modify DA group in some configurations

Group Enumeration Commands

# All groups
Get-ADGroup -Filter * -Properties *

# Members of a specific group (recursive)
Get-ADGroupMember "Domain Admins" -Recursive

# Groups a user belongs to
Get-ADPrincipalGroupMembership "username"

# High-value group members
$groups = @("Domain Admins", "Enterprise Admins", "Administrators",
            "Account Operators", "Server Operators", "Backup Operators",
            "DnsAdmins", "Print Operators")
foreach ($g in $groups) {
    Write-Host "=== $g ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
    Get-ADGroupMember $g -Recursive | Select-Object Name, ObjectClass
}

# Groups with SID History (potential privilege escalation)
Get-ADGroup -Filter * -Properties sidHistory |
  Where-Object { $_.sidHistory -ne $null }

3. Computers

Every domain-joined machine creates a computer object in Active Directory. Computer objects are often overlooked but are critical attack targets.

Computer Object Basics

Property Detail
Account Name Machine name with $ suffix (e.g., WORKSTATION01$)
Password Machine account password, auto-rotated every 30 days
Default Group Member of Domain Computers group
Default Rights Can authenticate, read AD objects, create up to 10 computer accounts (default ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota)
Primary Group Domain Computers (RID 515)

Computer Object Attack Relevance

Attack Requirement Description
Resource-Based Constrained Delegation (RBCD) Write access to computer object (GenericAll/GenericWrite) Add your own machine to msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity, then delegate to the target as any user
GPO Abuse Computer is in an OU with a vulnerable GPO If you control the computer and a GPO with weak ACLs applies to its OU, you can abuse the GPO
MS-ESENT / PrinterBug Write DACL on computer object Use the computer object’s DACL write access to escalate to Domain Admin
Shadow Credentials Write msDS-KeyCredentialLink Add authentication material to the computer account, then authenticate as the computer using Kerberos Kerberos Armored Authentication (KERB)
RBCD via SPN Control over the computer’s SPN Manipulate SPN for Kerberoasting or delegation attacks
Local Admin Access Computer object controlled by attacker If you have local admin on the machine, you can dump credentials, install persistence, and pivot

Computer Enumeration Commands

# All computers
Get-ADComputer -Filter * -Properties *

# Computers with specific attributes
Get-ADComputer -Filter * -Properties operatingSystem, lastLogonTimestamp, \
  servicePrincipalName, msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity

# Domain Controllers (primaryGroupID = 516 = Domain Controllers group)
Get-ADComputer -Filter {operatingSystem -like "*Server*"} |
  Where-Object { $_.primaryGroupID -eq 516 }

# Computers with unconstrained delegation
Get-ADComputer -Filter {userAccountControl -band 524288} -Properties userAccountControl

# RODCs
Get-ADComputer -Filter {isReadOnly -eq $true}

# Check machine account quota (how many computers can a user create?)
Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy
Get-ADObject -Identity (Get-ADDomain).DistinguishedName -Properties ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota

4. OUs (Organizational Units)

Organizational Units are containers for organizing objects within a domain. They are NOT security boundaries but are critical for GPO application and delegation.

OU Characteristics

Property Detail
Purpose Organize objects hierarchically within a domain
GPO Linkage GPOs are linked to OUs (not to groups)
Delegation Administrative delegation can be granted at the OU level
Security Boundary NO — OUs are NOT security boundaries
Nesting OUs can be nested within other OUs

Example OU Structure

DC=corp,DC=local
├── OU=Users
│   ├── OU=Sales
│   │   ├── User: john.sales
│   │   └── User: jane.sales
│   └── OU=Engineering
│       ├── User: dev1
│       └── User: dev2
├── OU=Servers
│   ├── OU=DCs
│   │   └── Computer: DC01$
│   └── OU=FileServers
│       └── Computer: FILE01$
└── OU=Workstations
    ├── Computer: WS01$
    └── Computer: WS02$

OU Attack Relevance

Aspect Detail
GPO Targeting GPOs linked to an OU affect ALL objects in that OU and its child OUs. If you control an object in an OU with a vulnerable GPO, you can exploit that GPO.
Delegation Admins often delegate OU-level permissions to helpdesk or team leads. These delegated permissions can be abused.
ACL Inheritance ACLs set on an OU inherit to child objects. A weak ACL on an OU can affect all contained objects.
Admin SD Protection Protected groups have their ACLs reset every 60 minutes. Moving them to different OUs does not remove protection.

5. GPOs (Group Policy Objects)

Group Policy Objects are the centralized configuration mechanism for Active Directory. They are one of the most commonly exploited vectors in OSCP labs.

GPO Basics

Property Detail
Applied To OUs, domains, or sites (NOT groups)
Contents Group Policy Preferences (GPP) and security settings
Storage AD database (metadata) + SYSVOL (actual policy files)
Processing Order SDOU — Site → Domain → OU (last one wins)
Refresh Interval Every 90 minutes + random offset (30 min for computers)

GPO Attack Vectors

Attack Vector Description Required Access
GPP Passwords (cpassword) GPP stores passwords as AES-256 encrypted cpassword in XML files. The decryption key is public and hardcoded. Read access to SYSVOL (all domain users)
Restricted Groups GPO can force users into privileged groups (e.g., local Administrators). If you can modify the GPO, you can add yourself. Write access to the GPO
Preferences Drive Maps Mapped drives configured via GPP may contain credentials in XML. Read access to SYSVOL
Scheduled Tasks GPO can create scheduled tasks that run as SYSTEM or high-privilege users. Modify the task to run your payload. Write access to the GPO
Service Configuration GPO can configure services with specific credentials. These credentials may be extractable. Write access to the GPO
Logon Scripts Scripts deployed via GPO may contain hardcoded credentials or API keys. Read access to SYSVOL
GPO ACL Abuse If you have Write access to a GPO, you can modify it to escalate privileges. WriteDACL, GenericAll, or GenericWrite on the GPO

GPO Storage Structure

\\DOMAIN\SYSVOL\DOMAIN\
├── Policies\
│   └── {GPO-GUID}\
│       ├── Machine\
│       │   ├── Preferences\
│       │   │   ├── Groups\
│       │   │   │   └── Groups.xml          ← cpassword, restricted groups
│       │   │   ├── ScheduledTasks\
│       │   │   │   └── ScheduledTasks.xml  ← scheduled task credentials
│       │   │   ├── Drives\
│       │   │   │   └── Drives.xml          ← drive map credentials
│       │   │   └── Services\
│       │   │       └── Services.xml        ← service credentials
│       │   └── Registry.pol                ← compiled policy settings
│       └── User\
│           └── Preferences\
│               └── (same structure as Machine)
└── Scripts\
    └── logon.bat                           ← logon scripts

OSCP Exam Checklist: AD Objects

Must-Know Facts

  • description field often contains passwords in OSCP labs — always check it
  • UAC 512 = Normal, 65536 = No expire, 524288 = Unconstrained delegation, 4194304 = No pre-auth
  • Domain Admins SID suffix = 544, Enterprise Admins = 519
  • Every domain user can create up to 10 computer accounts by default
  • Computer objects have auto-rotated passwords (30 days)
  • GPOs are linked to OUs, not groups
  • GPO processing order: Site → Domain → OU (last wins)
  • GPP cpassword uses a public AES-256 key — always decrypt
  • DnsAdmins can escalate to DA via DCOM
  • Print Operators can exploit PrintNightmare for DC RCE
  • Backup Operators can backup NTDS.dit

Must-Check Attributes (Every User Object)

Get-ADUser -Filter * -Properties \
  sAMAccountName, description, servicePrincipalName, \
  userAccountControl, pwdLastSet, lastLogonTimestamp, \
  passwordNeverExpires, doesNotRequirePreAuth, \
  trustedForDelegation, primaryGroupID