Trust Relationships
Trust relationships define how Active Directory domains and forests authenticate users across security boundaries. In OSCP labs, trusts are often the key to moving from one domain to another and achieving full forest compromise.
1. Trust Types Overview
Trust Direction
| Direction |
Description |
Example |
| One-Way |
Domain A trusts Domain B. Users from B can access resources in A, but not vice versa. |
A ← B (B’s users can access A) |
| Two-Way |
Domain A trusts Domain B AND Domain B trusts Domain A. Bidirectional access. |
A ↔ B (both directions) |
Trust Transitivity
| Type |
Description |
Example |
| Transitive |
If A trusts B and B trusts C, then A automatically trusts C. |
A → B → C means A → C |
| Non-Transitive |
Trusts do NOT extend beyond the two domains involved. |
A → B does NOT mean A → C even if B → C |
Trust Types
| Trust Type |
Auto-Created? |
Transitive? |
Direction |
Scope |
| Intra-Forest |
Yes |
Yes |
Two-way |
Within same forest |
| Inter-Forest |
No (manual) |
Configurable |
Configurable |
Between different forests |
| External |
No (manual) |
No |
Configurable |
Between domains in different forests |
| Child-to-Parent |
Yes |
Yes |
Two-way |
Within same tree |
| Parent-to-Child |
Yes |
Yes |
Two-way |
Within same tree |
| Cross-Link |
Yes |
Yes |
Two-way |
Between child domains of same parent |
2. Intra-Forest Trusts
Intra-forest trusts are automatic and exist between all domains within the same forest. They are the foundation of forest-wide authentication.
How They Work
Forest: contoso.com
│
├── contoso.com (Root)
│ ├── ←→ uk.contoso.com (Child-to-Parent / Parent-to-Child)
│ └── ←→ us.contoso.com (Child-to-Parent / Parent-to-Child)
│
└── uk.contoso.com ←→ us.contoso.com (Cross-Link)
Result: ALL domains trust ALL other domains (transitive).
A user from uk.contoso.com can access resources in us.contoso.com.
Key Properties
| Property |
Value |
| Created |
Automatically when domains are added to the forest |
| Direction |
Always two-way |
| Transitive |
Always transitive |
| Authentication |
Kerberos-based |
| SID Filtering |
NOT applied (full SID history preserved) |
| Trust Account |
Uses KRBTGT (same as within-domain auth) |
Attack Relevance
| Aspect |
Detail |
| Automatic Access |
If you compromise one domain in a forest, you have a path to all other domains through automatic trusts. |
| Enterprise Admins |
Enterprise Admins in the root domain have control over ALL domains in the forest. |
| Domain Admins |
Domain Admins in a child domain CANNOT automatically access the parent domain. But they can be a stepping stone to Enterprise Admins. |
| No SID Filtering |
Within a forest, SID history is preserved. This means group memberships from one domain are recognized in another. |
3. Inter-Forest Trusts
Inter-forest trusts are manual trusts between two different forests. They are the most attack-relevant trust type in OSCP because they connect separate security boundaries.
How They Work
Forest A: contoso.com Forest B: partner.com
│ │
├── Enterprise Admins ├── Enterprise Admins
│ │ │
│ └──── Inter-Forest Trust ─────────────┘
│ (Two-way, Transitive)
│
Authentication:
├── Uses forest-wide trust accounts (Trust_XXXXX$)
├── Trust accounts are created in BOTH forests
├── Trust account passwords are synchronized
└── Kerberos cross-realm TGTs are issued
Key Properties
| Property |
Value |
| Created |
Manually by Enterprise Admins from BOTH forests |
| Direction |
Configurable (one-way or two-way) |
| Transitive |
Configurable (transitive or non-transitive) |
| Authentication |
Kerberos-based (cross-realm TGTs) |
| Trust Accounts |
Trust_XXXXX$ accounts in both forests |
| SID Filtering |
APPLIED — SID history is filtered for security |
SID Filtering
SID filtering is a security mechanism that prevents privilege escalation across forest trusts.
How SID Filtering Works:
════════════════════════
When a user from Forest A accesses Forest B:
1. The user's token includes their SID and SID History
2. SID filtering REMOVES certain SIDs from the token:
└── SIDs from Forest A's domains are removed
└── Only SIDs from Forest B are preserved
3. This prevents a Domain Admin from Forest A from
automatically becoming a Domain Admin in Forest B
SID Filtering Blocks:
├── Domain Admins SID (S-1-5-32-544)
├── Enterprise Admins SID (S-1-5-32-519)
├── Any SID from the source forest's domains
└── Preserves: user's primary SID, global group SIDs
SID History Bypass
SID History can be used to bypass SID filtering under certain conditions:
SID History Attack:
═══════════════════
1. Compromise a trust account (Trust_XXXXX$)
2. The trust account is NOT subject to SID filtering
3. Add privileged SIDs to the trust account's SID History
4. Authenticate as the trust account
5. The privileged SIDs are recognized in the target forest
Alternatively:
1. Find a user/group that is NOT filtered
2. Add SID History to include Domain Admins from target forest
3. Authenticate and gain elevated access
Inter-Forest Trust Attack Relevance
| Attack |
Description |
Prerequisites |
| Trust Ticket Attack |
Forge a cross-forest TGT using the trust account’s password hash. This allows authentication in the target forest. |
Trust account hash (Trust_XXXXX$) |
| Resource SID Delegation |
Abuse SID filtering bypass via SID History injection on trust accounts. |
Write access to trust account or user with SID History control |
| Shadow Credentials |
Add key credential links to trust accounts to authenticate as them. |
Write access to trust account (msDS-KeyCredentialLink) |
| CG2G (Cross-Golden-to-Golden) |
Compromise KRBTGT in one forest, use inter-forest trust to attack the other forest. |
KRBTGT hash from source forest + inter-forest trust |
4. External Trusts
External trusts are manual, non-transitive trusts between two domains in different forests.
Key Properties
| Property |
Value |
| Created |
Manually by Domain Admins from both domains |
| Direction |
Configurable (one-way or two-way) |
| Transitive |
Always non-transitive |
| Authentication |
Kerberos-based |
| SID Filtering |
APPLIED |
| Scope |
Limited to the two specific domains |
When to Use External vs Inter-Forest
| Scenario |
Trust Type |
| Need access between specific domains only |
External Trust |
| Need access between entire forests |
Inter-Forest Trust |
| Merged companies with separate forests |
Inter-Forest Trust |
| Partner organization with limited access |
External Trust |
Attack Relevance
| Aspect |
Detail |
| Limited Scope |
External trusts are non-transitive, so they don’t extend to other domains. This limits the attack surface. |
| SID Filtering |
SID filtering is applied, similar to inter-forest trusts. |
| Less Common in OSCP |
External trusts appear less frequently than inter-forest trusts in OSCP labs. |
5. Trust Attack Summary
Trust Attack Comparison
| Trust Type |
Auto-Created |
Transitive |
SID Filtering |
Attack Surface |
OSCP Frequency |
| Intra-Forest |
Yes |
Yes |
No |
High (automatic, widespread) |
Very Common |
| Inter-Forest |
No |
Configurable |
Yes |
Critical (cross-forest pivoting) |
Common |
| External |
No |
No |
Yes |
Medium (limited scope) |
Less Common |
| Child-to-Parent |
Yes |
Yes |
No |
High (automatic hierarchy) |
Very Common |
Trust Ticket Attack (Detailed)
Attack Flow:
═══════════
1. Obtain the trust account password hash
→ The trust account is Trust_XXXXX$ (5 random hex chars)
→ Use DCSync to extract: secretsdump.py -just-dc-user "Trust_XXXXX$" DOMAIN/admin@DC_IP
2. Forge a cross-forest TGT
→ Use the trust account hash to create a TGT for the target forest
→ Mimikatz: kerberos::golden /user:admin /sid:SOURCE_SID /rc4:TRUST_HASH \
/sids:TARGET_SID /domain:SOURCE /service:krbtgt \
/target:TARGET_FOREST
3. Use the forged TGT to access the target forest
→ The target forest's KDC accepts the cross-realm TGT
→ You can request service tickets in the target forest
CG2G Attack (Cross-Golden-to-Golden)
Attack Flow:
═══════════
1. Compromise KRBTGT in Forest A
→ DCSync: secretsdump.py -just-dc-user krbtgt FORESTA/admin@DC_A
2. Create a Golden Ticket for Forest A
→ Forge TGT as any user in Forest A
3. Use the Golden Ticket to access the trust relationship
→ Request a cross-realm TGT for Forest B
→ The KDC in Forest B issues a cross-realm TGT
4. Use the cross-realm TGT in Forest B
→ Request service tickets in Forest B
→ Access resources in Forest B
5. (Optional) Extract KRBTGT from Forest B
→ If you can authenticate to DC in Forest B
→ Now you own both forests
6. Trust Enumeration
# PowerShell - All trusts
Get-ADTrust -Filter *
# PowerShell - Trust details
Get-ADTrust -Filter * -Properties *
# PowerShell - Specific trust attributes
Get-ADTrust -Filter * -Properties TrustDirection, TrustType, TrustAttributes
# netdom
netdom trust DOMAIN /domainlist
# klist
klist domains
# systeminfo
systeminfo | Select-String "Domain"
# Using ldapsearch
ldapsearch -x -H ldap://DC_IP -D "user@domain.com" -w password \
-b "CN=Configuration,DC=domain,DC=com" "(objectClass=trustedDomain)"
# Using BloodHound
# Trust relationships are collected by the Trusts collector
# Query: Match (n:Domain)-[:TrustedBy]->(m:Domain) Return n.name, m.name
Trust Direction Values
| Value |
Meaning |
| 1 |
Inbound (other domain trusts us) |
| 2 |
Outbound (we trust other domain) |
| 3 |
Bidirectional (two-way trust) |
Trust Type Values
| Value |
Meaning |
| 2 |
Windows NT 4.0 trust |
| 3 |
Tree-root trust (intra-forest) |
| 4 |
Parent-child trust (intra-forest) |
| 5 |
External trust |
| 6 |
Forest trust (inter-forest) |
OSCP Exam Checklist: Trust Relationships
Must-Know Concepts
Must-Remember Commands
# Enumerate trusts
Get-ADTrust -Filter * -Properties *
netdom trust DOMAIN /domainlist
klist domains
# DCSync trust account
secretsdump.py -just-dc-user "Trust_XXXXX$" DOMAIN/admin@DC_IP
# Forge cross-forest TGT (Mimikatz)
kerberos::golden /user:admin /sid:SOURCE_SID /rc4:TRUST_HASH \
/sids:TARGET_SID /domain:SOURCE /service:krbtgt /target:TARGET_FOREST