Enumeration from Inside AD
Once you have domain credentials (even low-privilege) and are domain-joined (or can authenticate), you gain access to a wealth of information. Every domain user has read access to most AD objects by default, making internal enumeration extremely powerful.
1. Scenario Overview
Your Position:
═════════════
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Inside the Domain │
│ │
│ ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ │
│ │ Compromised │ │ Your Tools │ │
│ │ Workstation │───>│ PowerShell │ │
│ │ (domain- │ │ Impacket │ │
│ │ joined) │ │ BloodHound │ │
│ │ │ │ PowerView │ │
│ └──────────────┘ └──────────────┘ │
│ │
│ Credentials: DOMAIN\lowpriv_user:password │
│ Access: LDAP, SMB, RPC, Kerberos │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────┘
What You Have:
├── Domain credentials (even low-privilege)
├── Domain-joined machine OR ability to authenticate
├── Access to LDAP, SMB, RPC, Kerberos interfaces
└── Read access to most AD objects (default)
What You Can Enumerate:
├── All users and their attributes
├── All groups and memberships
├── All computers and their properties
├── All GPOs and their configurations
├── All shares and their permissions
├── All trust relationships
├── All OUs and their delegation
├── All ACLs and ACEs
└── Password policy
2. User Enumeration
User enumeration is your first priority inside AD. You need to identify high-value targets, Kerberoasting candidates, AS-REP Roasting targets, and accounts with misconfigured properties.
PowerShell Commands
# Get ALL users with ALL attributes
Get-ADUser -Filter * -Properties *
# Get specific attack-relevant attributes
Get-ADUser -Filter * -Properties \
sAMAccountName, description, servicePrincipalName, \
pwdLastSet, lastLogonTimestamp, userAccountControl, \
passwordNeverExpires, doesNotRequirePreAuth, \
trustedForDelegation, primaryGroupID, displayName, mail
# Users with SPNs (Kerberoasting targets)
Get-ADUser -Filter {servicePrincipalName -ne "$null"} \
-Properties servicePrincipalName, sAMAccountName, description
# Users without pre-auth (AS-REP Roasting targets)
Get-ADUser -Filter {doesNotRequirePreAuth -eq $true} \
-Properties sAMAccountName, description, displayName
# Users with password never expires
Get-ADUser -Filter {passwordNeverExpires -eq $true} \
-Properties sAMAccountName, description, pwdLastSet
# Users with empty passwords
Get-ADUser -Filter {passwordNotRequired -eq $true} \
-Properties sAMAccountName, description
# Users with unconstrained delegation
Get-ADUser -Filter {trustedForDelegation -eq $true} \
-Properties sAMAccountName, userAccountControl
# Users who haven't logged in for 90+ days (stale accounts)
$threshold = (Get-Date).AddDays(-90)
Get-ADUser -Filter * -Properties lastLogonTimestamp |
Where-Object {
$_.lastLogonTimestamp -eq $null -or
([DateTime]::FromFileTime($_.lastLogonTimestamp) -lt $threshold)
} | Select-Object sAMAccountName, lastLogonTimestamp
# Users with "password" in description
Get-ADUser -Filter * -Properties description |
Where-Object { $_.description -match "password|pass|pwd|cred" }
# Convert pwdLastSet to readable date
Get-ADUser -Filter * -Properties pwdLastSet |
Select-Object sAMAccountName,
@{N='PwdLastSet';E={[DateTime]::FromFileTime($_.pwdLastSet)}}
Impacket Commands
# Get all users
getusers.py -dc-ip DC_IP DOMAIN/user:password@DC_IP
# LDAP search with credentials
ldapsearch -H ldap://DC_IP -D "DOMAIN\\user" -w password \
-b "DC=domain,DC=com" "(objectClass=user)" \
sAMAccountName description servicePrincipalName
# Kerberoasting (request TGS tickets)
getUserSPNs.py -request -dc-ip DC_IP DOMAIN/user:password@DC_IP
# AS-REP Roasting
getusers.py -dc-ip DC_IP DOMAIN/ -usersfile asrep_targets.txt
Key Attributes to Check
| Attribute | Why Check It | Attack if Found |
|---|---|---|
description |
Often contains passwords | Direct credential access |
servicePrincipalName |
Kerberoasting target | Request TGS, crack offline |
doesNotRequirePreAuth |
AS-REP Roasting target | Request AS-REP, crack offline |
passwordNeverExpires |
Stale credentials likely | Target for brute force / spraying |
trustedForDelegation |
Unconstrained delegation | Capture TGTs from memory |
pwdLastSet |
Stale password detection | Old passwords likely reused |
userAccountControl |
Account flags | Identify delegation, pre-auth settings |
3. Group Enumeration
Group membership is the primary path to privilege escalation in AD.
PowerShell Commands
# Get ALL groups
Get-ADGroup -Filter * -Properties *
# Get members of a specific group (recursive)
Get-ADGroupMember "Domain Admins" -Recursive
# Get groups a specific user belongs to
Get-ADPrincipalGroupMembership "username"
# Get all high-value group members
$groups = @("Domain Admins", "Enterprise Admins", "Administrators",
"Account Operators", "Server Operators", "Backup Operators",
"Print Operators", "DnsAdmins", "Exchange Windows Permissions",
"RDS Management Servers", "VMware Admins")
foreach ($g in $groups) {
Write-Host "=== $g ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
try {
Get-ADGroupMember $g -Recursive |
Select-Object Name, ObjectClass, DistinguishedName
} catch {
Write-Host " Group not found or no access" -ForegroundColor Yellow
}
}
# Groups with SID History (potential privilege escalation)
Get-ADGroup -Filter * -Properties sidHistory |
Where-Object { $_.sidHistory -ne $null } |
Select-Object Name, sidHistory
# Find nested group memberships
Get-ADGroup -Filter * -Properties member |
Where-Object { $_.member -ne $null } |
ForEach-Object {
Write-Host "$($_.Name) has $($_.member.Count) members"
}
High-Value Groups to Check
| Group | Why It Matters |
|---|---|
| Domain Admins | Full domain control — primary target |
| Enterprise Admins | Full forest control — cross-domain target |
| Administrators | Local admin on all machines (via nesting) |
| Account Operators | Can create/modify users (not DA/EA) |
| Server Operators | Can manage DC services and shares |
| Backup Operators | Can backup NTDS.dit |
| DnsAdmins | DCOM privilege escalation to DA |
| Print Operators | PrintNightmare RCE on DC |
| Schema Admins | Can modify AD schema |
| Exchange Windows Permissions | Can modify DA group |
4. Computer Enumeration
Computer objects reveal infrastructure details and delegation targets.
PowerShell Commands
# Get ALL computers
Get-ADComputer -Filter * -Properties *
# Get computers with attack-relevant attributes
Get-ADComputer -Filter * -Properties \
operatingSystem, lastLogonTimestamp, servicePrincipalName, \
userAccountControl, msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity, \
dnsHostName, whenCreated
# Domain Controllers (primaryGroupID = 516)
Get-ADComputer -Filter * |
Where-Object { $_.primaryGroupID -eq 516 }
# Computers with unconstrained delegation
Get-ADComputer -Filter {userAccountControl -band 524288} \
-Properties userAccountControl, dnsHostName
# RODCs (Read-Only Domain Controllers)
Get-ADComputer -Filter {isReadOnly -eq $true}
# Computers with RBCD configured
Get-ADComputer -Filter * -Properties msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity |
Where-Object { $_."msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity" -ne $null }
# Servers (by OS)
Get-ADComputer -Filter {operatingSystem -like "*Server*"} \
-Properties operatingSystem, dnsHostName
# Workstations
Get-ADComputer -Filter {operatingSystem -like "*Workstation*"} \
-Properties operatingSystem, dnsHostName
# Computers that haven't logged in for 90+ days
$threshold = (Get-Date).AddDays(-90)
Get-ADComputer -Filter * -Properties lastLogonTimestamp |
Where-Object {
$_.lastLogonTimestamp -eq $null -or
([DateTime]::FromFileTime($_.lastLogonTimestamp) -lt $threshold)
} | Select-Object Name, lastLogonTimestamp
# Live computers (ping test)
Get-ADComputer -Filter * |
Where-Object { Test-Connection $_.Name -Count 1 -Quiet } |
Select-Object Name
5. GPO Enumeration
GPOs are one of the most common privilege escalation vectors in OSCP labs.
PowerShell Commands
# Get ALL GPOs
Get-GPO -All
# Get GPO report (XML format — most detailed)
Get-GPOReport -Name "GPO_Name" -ReportType XML
# Get GPO report (HTML format — more readable)
Get-GPOReport -Name "GPO_Name" -ReportType HTML
# Get GPOs linked to a specific OU
Get-GPO -All | Where-Object { $_.LinksTo -like "*OU_PATH*" }
# Find GPOs with preferences (potential cpassword credentials)
Get-GPO -All | ForEach-Object {
$path = "\\$env:USERDNSDOMAIN\SYSVOL\$env:USERDNSDOMAIN\Policies\{\$($_.Id)}"
if (Test-Path $path) {
$results = Get-ChildItem $path -Recurse -Filter "*.xml" |
Select-String "cpassword" -List
if ($results) {
Write-Host "[$($_.DisplayName)] Found cpassword in:" -ForegroundColor Red
$results | ForEach-Object { Write-Host " $($_.Path)" }
}
}
}
# Check who can modify each GPO
Get-GPO -All | ForEach-Object {
$acl = Get-Acl "GPO:\$($_.DisplayName)"
$weak = $acl.Access | Where-Object {
($_.AccessRights -match "Write|GenericAll|GenericWrite|AllExtendedRights") -and
($_.IdentityReference -match "Authenticated Users|Domain Users|Users")
}
if ($weak) {
Write-Host "[$($_.DisplayName)] WEAK ACL:" -ForegroundColor Red
$weak | Format-Table IdentityReference, AccessRights
}
}
# Get GPO permissions
Get-GPO -All | ForEach-Object {
Write-Host "=== $($_.DisplayName) ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Get-GPPermission -Name $_.DisplayName -All
}
6. Share Enumeration
PowerShell Commands
# Enumerate shares on a specific computer
Get-SmbShare -ComputerName TARGET
# Using net commands
net share \\TARGET
# Access a share
net use \\TARGET\SHARE /user:DOMAIN\user password
# List files in a share
dir \\TARGET\SHARE
CrackMapExec / NetExec
# Share enumeration
crackmapexec smb DC_IP -u user -p password --shares
# Share access with file listing
crackmapexec smb DC_IP -u user -p password --shares --share-read
# Check writable shares
crackmapexec smb DC_IP -u user -p password --shares --share-write
7. Trust Enumeration
# All trusts
Get-ADTrust -Filter *
# Trust details
Get-ADTrust -Filter * -Properties TrustDirection, TrustType, TrustAttributes, \
SourceName, TargetName, TrustPartner
# Using net commands
netdom trust DOMAIN /domainlist
# Using systeminfo
systeminfo | Select-String "Domain", "Logon Server", "Forest"
# Using klist
klist domains
8. OU Enumeration
# All OUs
Get-ADOrganizationalUnit -Filter * -Properties *
# OU with GPO links
Get-ADOrganizationalUnit -Filter * -Properties name, linkedGroupPolicyObjects
# OU ACLs (who can modify?)
Get-ADOrganizationalUnit -Filter * | ForEach-Object {
$acl = Get-Acl "AD:\$($_.DistinguishedName)"
$weak = $acl.Access | Where-Object {
$_.AccessRights -match "Write|GenericAll|GenericWrite|AllExtendedRights"
}
if ($weak) {
Write-Host "[$($_.Name)] Has writable ACLs:" -ForegroundColor Yellow
$weak | Format-Table IdentityReference, AccessRights
}
}
9. Password Policy Enumeration
# Domain password policy
Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy
# Fine-Grained Password Policies
Get-ADFineGrainedPasswordPolicy
# Password policy applied to a specific user
Get-ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy -Identity "username"
# Using rpcclient
rpcclient -U "user%pass" DC_IP
rpcclient> getdompwinfo
10. Inside Enumeration Checklist
| Target | Tool/Command | Key Information | Priority |
|---|---|---|---|
| Users | Get-ADUser, ldapsearch |
SPNs, no-preauth, descriptions, UAC flags | P0 |
| Groups | Get-ADGroupMember |
DA/EA membership, nested groups, high-value groups | P0 |
| Computers | Get-ADComputer |
Delegation, OS, last logon, RBCD | P0 |
| GPOs | Get-GPOReport |
Preferences, ACLs, scripts, cpassword | P0 |
| Shares | crackmapexec --shares |
Readable/writable shares, SYSVOL access | P1 |
| Trusts | Get-ADTrust |
Trust direction, type, transitivity | P1 |
| OUs | Get-ADOrganizationalUnit |
Delegation, GPO links, ACLs | P1 |
| ACLs | Get-Acl, dsacls |
ACE permissions, abuse potential | P0 |
| Password Policy | Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy |
Min length, complexity, lockout | P1 |
OSCP Exam Checklist: Inside Enumeration
Must-Know Commands
-
Get-ADUser -Filter {servicePrincipalName -ne "$null"}→ Kerberoasting targets -
Get-ADUser -Filter {doesNotRequirePreAuth -eq $true}→ AS-REP Roasting targets -
Get-ADUser -Filter {passwordNeverExpires -eq $true}→ Stale credential targets -
Get-ADGroupMember "Domain Admins" -Recursive→ DA membership -
Get-ADComputer -Filter {userAccountControl -band 524288}→ Unconstrained delegation -
Get-GPO -All+ check for cpassword → GPP password extraction -
Get-ADTrust -Filter *→ Trust relationships - Check
descriptionfield on ALL users → Often contains passwords
Enumeration Order (OSCP Strategy)
- Users — Find Kerberoasting/AS-REP targets, check descriptions
- Groups — Identify DA/EA membership, high-value groups
- Computers — Find delegation targets, RBCD candidates
- GPOs — Find cpassword, weak ACLs, scripts with credentials
- ACLs — Find abusable permissions (GenericAll, WriteDACL, etc.)
- Trusts — Identify cross-domain attack paths
- Shares — Find readable/writable shares, sensitive files